IMMUNITY FROM PENALTIES AND REDUCTION OF PENALTIES IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS REGULATIONS

PENALTIES IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS

SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION 379.10

IMMUNITY FROM PENALTIES AND REDUCTION OF

PENALTIES IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS

REGULATIONS

18th June, 2021

LEGAL NOTICE 264 of 2021.

The title of these regulations is the Immunity from

Penalties and Reduction of Penalties in Cartel Investigations

Regulations.

(1)

For the purposes of these regulations, unless the

context otherwise requires

" "the Act" means the Competition Act

"applicant" means an undertaking within the meaning of

article 2 of the Act which is party to an alleged secret cartel,

including participants in a cartel, whether or not active on the

same market, which contributes to the implementation of a

cartel in a subsidiary, accessory or passive role, and which,

independently of the other undertakings involved in the cartel,

applies for immunity from penalties and, or a reduction of

penalties in exchange for the voluntary provision of

presentations regarding its knowledge of and role in the alleged

secret cartel by submitting a leniency application to the

Director General

Provided that the term "applicant" shall also

include an association of undertakings which performs an

economic activity on its own behalf where it participates in an

alleged secret cartel on its own behalf and not on behalf of its

members;

"cartel" means an agreement or concerted practice

between two or more competitors aimed at coordinating their

competitive behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant

parameters of competition, through practices such as, but not

limited to, the fixing or coordination of purchase or selling

prices or other trading conditions, including in relation to

intellectual property rights, the allocation of production or sales

quotas, the sharing of markets and customers, including bid-

rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-competitive

actions against other competitors;

"Directive" means Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018

to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to

be more effective enforcers, and to ensure the proper

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functioning of the internal market;

"inspection" means an inspection under article 12(7) of

the Act;

"leniency" means immunity from penalties or a reduction

in the amount of the penalty which would otherwise have been

requested by the Director General to be imposed on an

undertaking on account of its participation in a secret cartel, in

order to reward it for its cooperation with the Office within the

framework of these regulations;

"leniency application" means an application for leniency

which is submitted to the Director General and consists of a

leniency statement made by the applicant and any pre-existing

information submitted with or attached to it;

"leniency statement" means an oral or written

presentation voluntarily provided by, or on behalf of an

undertaking to the Director General, or a record thereof,

describing the knowledge of that undertaking of an alleged

secret cartel and describing its role therein, which presentation

was drawn up specifically for submission to the Office under

these regulations, with a view to obtaining immunity from or a

reduction of penalties, not including evidence that exists

irrespective of the investigation by the Office, whether or

otherwise such information is found in the file of the Office,

namely pre-existing information;

"penalties" means any penalty that may be imposed by

the Court in terms of article 21(1) of the Act;

"secret cartel" means a cartel the existence of which is

partially or wholly concealed, in particular whereby elements of

the cartel that make the full extent of the conduct more difficult

to detect are not known to the public or the customers or

suppliers"."

(2)

Other terms used in these regulations shall have the same

meaning as assigned to them in the Act.

(1)

These regulations transpose the provisions of

Chapter VI of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of

the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition

authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to

ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.

(2)

These regulations provide for a leniency programme in

relation to the application of article 5 of the Act and, or of Article 101

of the TFEU, on the basis of which a participant in an alleged secret

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cartel, independently of the other undertakings involved in the cartel,

cooperates with an investigation of the Office by voluntarily providing

presentations regarding that participant’s knowledge of and role in the

alleged cartel, in return for which the participant receives immunity

from, or a reduction of, penalties which would otherwise have been

requested by the Director General to be imposed by the Court in terms

of article 21(1) of the Act on account of its involvement in the cartel.

(3)

These regulations shall only apply to secret cartels, and

any reference to a "cartel" in these regulations shall be construed

accordingly.

(1)

Any undertaking which fulfils the conditions laid

down in regulation 5(1) shall be eligible for immunity from penalties,

with the exception of undertakings that have taken steps to coerce

other undertakings to join a secret cartel or to remain in it.

(2)

Notwithstanding the preceding sub-regulation, an

undertaking that took steps to coerce other undertakings to join a

secret cartel or to remain in it shall not be excluded from benefiting

from a reduction of penalties.

(1)

The Director General shall grant immunity from

penalties by refraining from requesting the Court to impose a penalty

on an applicant for leniency in terms of article 12A of the Act which

discloses its participation in a secret cartel to the Office where the

following conditions are met

(a)

the applicant is the first to submit evidence which

(i)

at the time the Office receives the leniency

application, enables the Director General to file a request

for a warrant in terms of article 12(7) of the Act to carry

out a targeted inspection in connection with the alleged

secret cartel, provided that the Director General did not

yet have in his possession sufficient evidence to file a

request for such a warrant, or had not already carried out

such an inspection; or

(ii)

in the view of the Director General, is

sufficient for him to find an infringement of article 5 of

the Act and, or of Article 101 of the TFEU in connection

with the alleged secret cartel, provided that the Director

General did not yet have in his possession sufficient

evidence to find such an infringement and that no

undertaking previously qualified for immunity from

penalties under the preceding sub-paragraph in relation

to that secret cartel; and

(b)

the applicant fulfils the conditions laid down in

regulation 10.

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(2)

An applicant who submits evidence to benefit from

immunity from penalties in terms of the preceding sub-regulation shall

provide the Director General with such evidence to the extent that this,

in the view of the Director General, would not jeopardize the

inspections.

(3)

The decision of the Director General to grant immunity

from penalties to an applicant for leniency who satisfies the conditions

laid down in sub-regulation (1) shall be made exclusively on the basis

of the type and quality of the evidence and information submitted by

the applicant, irrespective of whether an inspection was actually

conducted or successful.

(1)

Subject to the provisions of regulation 14, where

more than one applicant submits a leniency application, the Director

General shall assess the applications in the order in which they have

been submitted

Provided that information submitted in hypothetical terms

pursuant to regulation 16 shall not be eligible for any order of

classification in terms of this sub-regulation

Provided further that only the first applicant who fulfils

the conditions laid down in regulation 5(1) may benefit from immunity

from penalties.

(2)

Where a leniency application meets the conditions for

immunity from penalties, any applications of other applicants shall be

assessed in the order in which they have been submitted for a possible

reduction of penalties in accordance with the provisions of regulation

8, unless the applicant has specified that his application is to be

considered exclusively for immunity from penalties.

(3)

Where the Director General rejects an application for

immunity from penalties, the applicant concerned may request that the

Office considers its application as an application for a reduction of

penalties.

(1)

Where the Director General receives a leniency

application, he shall promptly assess the evidence submitted in support

of the application in order to ascertain whether the applicant satisfies

the conditions laid down in sub-paragraphs (i) or (ii) of paragraph (a) of

regulation 5(1).

(2) If an applicant is the first to satisfy the conditions referred

to in the preceding sub-regulation, the Director General shall grant the

applicant conditional immunity from penalties and shall refrain from

considering any other applications for immunity from penalties before

he would have taken a final decision on that application. The Director

General shall verbally inform the applicant, as soon as reasonably

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possible, of whether he has been granted conditional immunity from

penalties, unless the applicant has requested that he shall be informed

in writing.

(3) Subject to the first proviso of sub-regulation (2) of

regulation 11, the granting of conditional immunity pursuant to the

preceding sub-regulation shall provide assurance to the applicant that

the Director General shall grant the applicant immunity from penalties

if, at the end of the investigation, the Director General concludes that

the applicant has also satisfied the conditions set out in regulation 10.

(1)

Applicants who do not qualify for immunity from

penalties pursuant to regulation 5(1), may nonetheless benefit from a

reduction of penalties, subject to the provisions of this regulation.

(2)

In order to qualify for a reduction of penalties, an

applicant for leniency shall

(a)

disclose his participation in an alleged secret

cartel;

(b) submit evidence of the alleged secret cartel which,

in the view of the Director General, represents significant added

value for the purpose of proving an infringement of article 5 of

the Act and, or of Article 101 of the TFEU to the evidence

already in the possession of the Office at the time of the

leniency application; and

(c)

fulfil the conditions laid down in regulation 10.

(3)

For the purposes of paragraph (b) of the preceding sub-

regulation, the Director General shall consider that

(a)

written evidence originating from the period of

time to which the facts pertain shall have a greater value than

evidence subsequently established;

(b)

incriminating compelling evidence which is

directly relevant to the facts in question, such as written

statements, email correspondence between the cartel members

and other written documents relevant for the establishment of

the facts and circumstances of the case and duration of a cartel,

shall have a greater value than evidence which is indirectly

relevant; and

(c)

compelling evidence shall have a greater value

than evidence such as statements of cartel members which if

contested require corroboration.

(1)

Where the Director General concludes that a

leniency applicant qualifies for a reduction of penalties pursuant to

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regulation 8, he shall in proceedings instituted pursuant to article 12A

of the Act request the Court to impose a penalty of a specific amount on

the applicant, calculated in accordance with article 21(1) of the Act,

which shall be reduced in accordance with the following levels of

reduction

(a)

for the first undertaking to provide significant

added value, a reduction of thirty to fifty per centum (30-50%);

(b)

for the second undertaking to provide significant

added value, a reduction of twenty to thirty per centum (20-

30%);

(c)

for subsequent undertakings that provide

significant added value, a reduction of up to twenty per centum

(20%)

Provided that in specific cases in which the added

value of the information or evidence submitted by an applicant

is extraordinarily high, the Director General may, in his

discretion, request the Court to impose a penalty which is

reduced by a higher percentage than the scales specified in this

sub-regulation.

(2) In order to determine the applicable level of reduction

within each range referred to in the preceding sub-regulation, the

Director General shall take into account the time at which the evidence

referred to in paragraph (b) of regulation 8(2) was submitted and the

extent to which that evidence represents significant added value when

compared to the evidence which is already in the possession of the

Office at the time of the leniency application.

(3) Where an applicant submits compelling evidence as

referred to in regulation 8(3), which the Director General uses to prove

additional facts which lead to an increase in the requested amount of

the penalties to be imposed as compared to the amount of the penalties

that would otherwise have been requested to be imposed on the

participants in an alleged secret cartel, the Director General shall not

take such additional facts into account when establishing the amount of

the penalty to be requested to be imposed by the Court on the applicant

who provided such evidence.

(1)

Without prejudice to regulations 5(1) and 8(2), in

order to qualify for leniency pursuant to these regulations, an applicant

shall

(a)

end its involvement in the alleged secret cartel, at

the latest immediately following its application, save to the

extent that its continued involvement would, in the view of the

Director General, be reasonably necessary to preserve the

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integrity of the investigations;

(b)

co-operate genuinely, fully, on a continuous basis

and expeditiously with the Office from the time of its

application until the Court has concluded its proceedings by

issuing a judgement against all parties who are subject to

proceedings instituted pursuant to the relevant provisions of the

Act by delivering judgement, or until the Office or the Court

have otherwise terminated their investigation or proceedings

respectively; and

(c)

prior to making the leniency application to the

Office the applicant shall not have

(i)

destroyed, falsified or concealed any

evidence of the alleged secret cartel; or

(ii)

disclosed its intention to submit a leniency

application to the Office, or any of the contents of the

envisaged application, to any third party other than

competition authorities or competition authorities of a

third country.

(2)

The co-operation referred to in paragraph (b) of the

preceding sub-regulation shall include

(a)

providing the Office promptly with all relevant

information and evidence relating to the alleged secret cartel

that comes into the applicant’s possession or is accessible to it

and any other relevant information and evidence which may

come into the applicant’s possession or under its control at a

later date, in particular

(i)

the name and address of the applicant,

(ii)

the names of all other undertakings that

participate or participated in the alleged secret cartel,

(iii) a detailed description of the alleged secret

cartel, including the affected products, the affected

territories, the duration and the nature of the alleged

secret cartel conduct, and

(iv) information on any past or possible future

leniency applications made to any other competition

authorities or competition authorities of third countries in

relation to the alleged secret cartel;

(b)

remains at the disposal of the Office to reply to

any requests for information that may contribute to the

establishment of facts;

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(c)

ensures that directors, managers and other

members of staff are available for interviews with the Director

General and making reasonable efforts to ensure that former

directors, managers and other former members of staff are

available for interviews with the Director General;

(d)

does not destroy, falsify, or conceal relevant

information or evidence;

(e)

does not disclose to any third party, other than a

competition authority or competition authority of a third

country, the fact or any of the contents of its leniency

application before a sworn application has been filed under the

Act and it has been served on the undertakings and, or

association of undertakings under investigation by the Office,

unless otherwise agreed with the Director General.

(1)

Subject to the first provisos of sub-regulations (2)

or (3), as the case may be, the Director General shall take a final

decision regarding the leniency application at the end of the

investigation and shall verbally inform the applicant thereof as soon as

reasonably possible, but by no later than the date when a sworn

application is filed in respect of the infringement in question pursuant

to article 12A of the Act, unless the applicant has requested to be

informed of the decision in writing.

(2) Where the Director General concludes that the applicant

meets the conditions laid down in regulation 5(1), he shall grant the

applicant immunity from penalties

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any

other law, if during the proceedings before the Court the applicant fails

to continue to cooperate with the Office in terms of regulation 10(1)(b),

the Director General may file an application requesting the Court to

impose a penalty on the applicant pursuant to article 21(1) of the Act

and may indicate a specific amount of the penalty for this purpose

Provided further that the period of prescription laid down

in article 26A of the Act for the filing of such an application shall

commence to run on the day when the Director General considers that

the applicant has failed to co-operate with the Office.

(3)

Where the Director General concludes that the applicant

meets the conditions laid down in regulation 8(2), he shall, request the

Court to impose a reduced penalty on that applicant within a specified

scale as provided in regulation 9, in proceedings instituted pursuant to

article 12A of the Act

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any

other law, if during the proceedings before the Court the applicant fails

PENALTIES IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS

to continue to cooperate with the Office in terms of regulation

10(1)(b), the Director General may file an application requesting the

Court to impose a higher penalty pursuant to article 21(1) of the Act

and he may indicate a specific amount of the penalty for this purpose

Provided further that the period of prescription laid down

in article 26A of the Act for the filing of such application shall

commence to run on the day when the Director General considers that

the applicant has failed to co-operate with the Office.

(1)

An applicant shall submit a leniency statement in

relation to a full or summary application for leniency either in writing

delivered to the address of the Office by hand, or by registered mail in

a sealed envelope or by email

Provided that an applicant may also submit a leniency

statement in oral form by making a personal statement to the Director

General, which shall be recorded in any form deemed appropriate by

the said Director General, or by any other means as may be indicated

by the Office that permit applicants not to take possession, custody or

control of such submitted statements

Provided further that an oral statement shall only be

accepted by the Director General following a prior appointment with

the applicant set by telephone or by email

Provided further that a hypothetical application

submitted in terms of regulation 16 may not be submitted to the Office

by making an oral statement.

(2)

Pre-existing information and documents relating to an

application for leniency shall be submitted in writing to the address of

the Office by hand, by registered mail in a sealed envelope, or by

email, or by any other means as may be indicated by the Office, either

together with the leniency statement, or as soon as reasonably

possible, after the submission of the leniency statement

Provided that where a leniency statement is made orally

the applicant shall, as soon as reasonably possible thereafter, provide

the Office with copies of all pre-existing information and documents

relating to the cartel.

(3) If so requested by the applicant, the Office shall

acknowledge the receipt of the full or summary application in writing,

and shall indicate the date and time of receipt.

(4)

A leniency statement shall be submitted in the Maltese or

English language or in any other official language of the European

Union as may be agreed between the Director General and the

applicant on a case-by-case basis.

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(1)

A leniency application may only be withdrawn by

the applicant

(a)

prior to a decision by the Director General to grant

conditional immunity from penalties pursuant to regulation 7 or;

(b)

within eight (8) days following notification of the

Director General’s final decision not to grant immunity from

penalties to the applicant pursuant to regulation 11(1).

(2)

Where an application is withdrawn pursuant to the

preceding sub-regulation, the application as well as any evidence

submitted by the applicant, together with any copies thereof, shall be

returned promptly to the applicant

Provided that the withdrawal shall not prejudice the

investigative powers of the Office under the Act in relation to the secret

cartel in question.

(1)

An undertaking wishing to apply for leniency may

where it so requests, at the discretion of the Director General, be

initially granted a place in the queue for leniency, for a period to be

specified on a case-by-case basis by the Director General permitting

the applicant to gather the necessary information and evidence that

meets the requirements of paragraph (a) of regulation 5(1) or of

paragraph (b) of regulation 8(2), as the case may be.

(2)

An undertaking submitting a request for a marker

pursuant to the preceding sub-regulation shall provide such

information, as may be required by the Director General, including

where available

(a)

the name and address of the applicant;

(b)

the basis for the concern which led to the request;

(c)

the names of all other undertakings that participate

or participated in the alleged secret cartel;

(d)

the affected products and territories;

(e)

the duration and the nature of the alleged secret

cartel conduct;

(f)

information on any past or possible future leniency

applications made to any other competition authorities or

competition authorities of third countries in relation to the

alleged secret cartel.

(3)

Any information and evidence provided by the applicant

within the period specified pursuant to sub-regulation (1), shall be

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deemed to have been submitted at the time of the initial request.

(4)

A request pursuant to sub-regulation (1) shall be

submitted in the Maltese or English language or in any other official

language of the European Union, as may be agreed between the

Director General and the applicant on a case-by-case basis.

(1)

Where an applicant has already submitted a

leniency application to the European Commission which covers more

than three Member States as affected territories, either by applying for

a marker or by submitting a full application in relation to the same

alleged secret cartel, such applicant may submit a summary

application for leniency to the Director General.

(2)

A summary application pursuant to the preceding sub-

regulation shall consist of a short description of each of the following

(a)

the name and address of the applicant;

(b)

the names of other parties to the alleged secret

cartel;

(c)

the affected products and territories;

(d)

the duration and the nature of the alleged secret

cartel conduct;

(e)

the Member State where the evidence of the

alleged secret cartel is likely to be located; and

(f)

information on any past or possible future

leniency applications made to any other competition authorities

or competition authorities of third countries in relation to the

alleged secret cartel.

(3)

Where the European Commission receives a full

application and the Director General receives a summary application

in relation to the same alleged cartel, the European Commission shall

be the main interlocutor of the applicant until the European

Commission informs the Office that it intends to pursue the case in

whole or in part. During this period, the Director General may request

the European Commission to inform him about the state of play of its

investigations

Provided that in such cases, the Director General may

request the applicant to provide specific clarifications only regarding

the items referred to in sub-regulation (2), before the said Director

General requires the submission of a full application pursuant to sub-

regulation (5).

(4)

When the Director General receives a summary

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application, he shall verify whether he has already received a full or a

summary application for leniency from another applicant in relation to

the same alleged secret cartel at the time of receipt of such application.

If the Director General did not receive such an application from another

applicant and he considers the summary application to fulfil the

requirements referred to in sub-regulation (2), he shall inform the

applicant accordingly.

(5)

Without prejudice to the right of the applicant to

voluntarily submit a full application to the Director General at an

earlier stage, where the European Commission informs the Office that

it does not intend to pursue the case in whole or in part, the Director

General shall promptly inform the applicant that a full application for

leniency may be submitted, specifying a reasonable time-period within

which the applicant is to submit such full application together with the

corresponding evidence and information

Provided that the Director General may, in exceptional

cases where strictly necessary for case delineation or case allocation,

request the applicant to submit a full application before the said

European Commission has informed the Office that it does not intend

to pursue the case in whole or in part.

(6)

Where an applicant submits a full application in

accordance with the preceding sub-regulation within the time-period

specified by the Director General, the full application shall be deemed

to have been submitted at the time of the summary application,

provided that the said summary application covers the same affected

product and territory, as well as the same duration of the alleged secret

cartel, as the leniency application filed with the European Commission,

which may have been updated.

(1)

A prospective applicant intending to apply for

immunity from penalties may initially present any information to the

Director General concerning an alleged secret cartel in hypothetical

terms, in which case the said prospective applicant shall present a

detailed descriptive list of the evidence which is proposed to be

disclosed at a later date to be agreed with the Director General.

(2)

The list referred to in the preceding sub-regulation shall

accurately reflect the nature and content of the evidence to be disclosed

and shall clearly identify the product or service concerned by the

alleged cartel, the geographic scope and the estimated duration of the

alleged cartel whilst safeguarding the hypothetical nature of the

information. Copies of documents, from which sensitive parts have

been redacted, may be used to illustrate the nature and content of the

evidence

Provided that the identity of the prospective applicant and

of other undertakings involved in the alleged cartel need not be

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disclosed until the evidence described in a hypothetical application is

submitted

Provided further that where the prospective applicant

intends to remain anonymous until the disclosure of the evidence, a

contact person who shall communicate with the Director General until

such date shall be designated by the applicant.

(3) Upon receipt of hypothetical information as referred to in

sub-regulation (1), the Director General shall assess whether the nature

and content of the evidence described in the detailed list is liable to

meet the conditions set out in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) of paragraph (a)

of regulation 5(1), and shall inform the prospective applicant or his

contact person accordingly

Provided that such preliminary analysis shall not

prejudice the Director General’s eventual decision on the leniency

application which will be taken following the submission of all

evidence by the applicant.

(4)

Following the disclosure of the evidence by the

applicant, where the Director General determines that such evidence

corresponds to the description provided in the list referred to in sub-

regulation (1), and that it meets the conditions set out in sub-paragraph

(i) or (ii) of paragraph (a) of regulation 5(1), he shall grant the

applicant conditional immunity from penalties pursuant to regulation

7.

(1)

Current and former directors, managers and other

members of staff of an applicant for immunity from penalties to the

Office or any other competition authority, shall not incur any sanctions

imposed in criminal proceedings in relation to their involvement in the

secret cartel covered by the application for immunity from penalties,

for violations of any Maltese law that might pursue predominantly the

same objectives to those pursued by Article 101 of the TFEU if they

meet the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the

Directive and actively cooperate with the Office and, or with the

Police, as the case may be

Provided that if the condition of cooperation is not

fulfilled, the Office and, or the Police, as the case may be, may

proceed with the investigation against such individuals.

(2) In order to ensure the full effectiveness of the protection

from sanctions referred to in the preceding sub-regulation to function

in situations where more than one jurisdiction is involved, the Office

shall actively cooperate by ensuring the necessary contacts as required

by paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the Directive.

(3) This regulation is without prejudice to the rights of

victims who have suffered harm caused by an infringement of

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competition law to claim full compensation for that damage in

accordance with Directive 2014/104/EU.

(1)

Access to leniency statements submitted pursuant

to these Regulations shall only be granted to the parties subject to the

relevant investigation by the Office, or are subject to proceedings

which have been instituted before the Court under the relevant

provisions of the Act, or who are party to any proceedings before the

Court of Appeal instituted in terms of article 13B of the Act, and

exclusively for the purposes of exercising their rights of defence.

(2)

A party who has obtained access to the file concerning

investigations by the Office and, or concerning proceedings before the

Court or the Court of Appeal may only use information taken from

leniency statements, where necessary to exercise his rights of defence

in any proceedings before the courts of Malta, in cases that are directly

related to the case in respect of which access has been granted, and

only where such proceedings concern

(a)

the allocation between cartel participants of a

penalty imposed jointly and severally on them by the Court; or

(b)

an appeal before the Court of Appeal instituted in

terms of article 13B of the Act from a judgement of the Court

finding an infringement of articles 5 and, or 9 of the Act or of

Articles 101 and, or 102 of the TFEU.

(3) Leniency statements submitted pursuant to these

Regulations shall only be exchanged by the Office with other national

competition authorities, pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No

1/2003, either

(a)

with the consent of the applicant for leniency; or

(b)

where the national competition authority receiving

the leniency statement has also received a leniency application

relating to the same infringement from the same applicant as

that before the Office, provided that, at the time that the leniency

statement is transmitted by the Office, it is not open to the

applicant to withdraw the information which has been submitted

by the applicant to the national competition authority receiving

the leniency statement.

(4)

The form in which leniency statements are submitted

pursuant to regulation 12 shall neither affect the application of the

preceding sub-regulations and nor that of article 12D of the Act.

(5) Any party who has obtained access to a leniency

statement pursuant to sub-regulation (1) or (2), and their legal counsel

shall bind themselves not to make any copies thereof by mechanical or

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electronic means of a leniency statement.

In the event of conflict or incompatibility between the

English language

version shall

Maltese and English language versions of these regulations, the

prevail.

English language version shall prevail.