MT
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL) REGULATIONS
Table of Provisions (13)
Statutory Text (13 Articles)
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION 365.20
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (EURATOM SAFEGUARDS
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL) REGULATIONS
1st July, 2007
LEGAL NOTICE 182 of 2007, as amended by Legal Notice 25 of 2007.
The title of these regulations is the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Euratom Safeguards and
Additional Protocol) Regulations.
(Regulation 11)
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the
Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany,
t he H e l l e n i c R e p u b l i c , I r e l a n d , t h e I ta l i a n R e pu b l i c , t h e G r a n d Du c h y o f
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the
Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atom ic Energy
Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of
Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons.
(notified under document number COM(1998) 314)
(1999/188/Euratom)
PREAMBLE
Whereas the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the
Kingdom of Sweden (hereinafter referred to as 'the States`) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as 'the Community`) are parties
to an Agreement between the States, the Community and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the 'the Agency`) in implementation of
Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Safeguards Agreement`), which entered into force on
21 February 1997;
Aware of the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear
non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of
the Agency's safeguards system;
Recalling that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of
safeguards the need to avoid hampering the economic and technological
development in the Community or international cooperation in the field of peaceful
nuclear activities, to respect health, safety, physical protection and other security
provisions in force and the rights of individuals, and to take every precaution to
protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential
information coming to its knowledge;
Whereas the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall
be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards;
Now therefore the Community, the States and the Agency have agreed as follows
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT
Article 1
The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the
extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol.
In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of
this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
Article 2
(a) Malta shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the
information identified in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv), (ix) and (x). The Community
shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in
sub-paragraphs (v), (vi) and (vii). Malta and the Community shall provide the
Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs
(iii) and (viii).
(i)
A general description of and information specifying the location of
nuclear fuel cyclerelated research and development activities not
involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded,
specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of,
Malta.
(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in
effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by Malta, on operational
activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside
facilities where nuclear material is customarily used.
(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use
and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description
shall include a map of the site.
(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the
activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol.
(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated
annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants
and thorium concentration plants in Malta, and the current annual
production of such mines and concentration plants. The Community
shall provide, on request by the Agency, the current annual production
of an individual mine or concentration plant. The provision of this
information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the
composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being
isotopically enriched, as follows
(a) the quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use
of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each
location in the States at which the material is present in quantities
exceeding 10 tonnes of uranium and/or 20 tonnes of thorium, and
for other locations with quantities of more than 1 tonne, the
aggregate for the States as a whole if the aggregate exceeds 10
tonnes of uranium or 20 tonnes of thorium. The provision of this
information does not require detailed nuclear material
accountancy;
(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of
each export from the States to a State outside the Community, of
such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities
exceeding
(1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium
to the same state, each of less than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a
total of 10 tonnes for the year;
(2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium to
the same State, each of less than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a
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total 20 tonnes for the year;
(c) the quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or
intended use of each import into the Sates from outside the
Community of such material for specifically non-nuclear
purposes in quantities exceeding
(1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium
each of less than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 10
tonnes for the year;
(2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium
each of less than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 20
tonnes for the year;
it being understood that there is no requirement to provide
information on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once
it is in its non-nuclear end-use form.
(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of
nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 37
of the Safeguards Agreement;
(b) information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of
estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear material exempted
from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b) of the Safeguards
Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in
quantities exceeding those set out in Article 37 of the Safeguards
Agreement. The provision of this information does not require
detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of
intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched
uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated
pursuant to Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose of
this paragraph, 'further processing` does not include repackaging of the
waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of
elements, for storage or disposal.
(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-
nuclear material listed in Annex II
(a) for each export out of the Community of such equipment and
material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the
receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of
export;
(b) on specific request by the Agency, confirmation by Malta, as the
importing State, of information provided to the Agency by a State
outside of the Community concerning the export of such
equipment and material to Malta.
(x) General plans for the succeeding 10-year period relevant to the
development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel
cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by
the appropriate authorities in Malta.
(b) Malta shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the
following information
(i)
a general description of and information specifying the location of
nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
involving nuclear material which are specifically related to enrichment,
reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-
level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-
233 that are carried out anywhere in Malta but which are not funded,
specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of,
Malta. For the purpose of this paragraph 'processing` of intermediate or
high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its
conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or
disposal.
(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or
entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the Agency
outside a site which the Agency considers might be functionally related
to the activities of that site. The provision of this information is subject
to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation
with the Agency and in a timely fashion.
(c) On request by any or all of the Agency, Malta or the Community, as
appropriate, shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information
provided under this Article, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Article 3
(a) Malta or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the
Agency the information identified in Article 2(a)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii), and
(x) and Article 2(b)(i) within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol.
(b) Malta or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the
Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph
(a) for the period covering the previous calendar year. If there has been no change to
the information previously provided, Malta or the Community, or both, as
appropriate, shall so indicate.
(c) The Community shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the
information identified in Article 2(a)(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the
previous calendar year.
(d) Malta shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information
identified in Article 2(a)(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within 60 days of
the end of each quarter.
(e) The Community and Malta shall provide to the Agency the information
identified in Article 2(a)(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and,
by 15 May of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering
the previous calendar year.
(f) Malta and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the
provision of the information identified in Article 2(a)(ii).
(g) Malta shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2(a)(ix)(b)
within 60 days of the Agency's request.
COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS
Article 4
The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of
complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol
(a)
The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
information referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to
(i)
any location referred to in Article 5(a)(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in
order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities;
(ii) any location referred to in Article 5(b) or (c) to resolve a question
relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided
pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that
information;
(iii) any location referred to in Article 5(a)(iii) to the extent necessary for
the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the Community's, or, as
appropriate, Malta’s declaration of the decommissioned status of a
facility or location outside facilities where nuclear material was
customarily used.
(b)
(i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii), the Agency shall give Malta, or for
access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is
involved, Malta and the Community, advance notice of access of at least
24 hours.
(ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with
design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections
on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so
requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may
be less than two hours.
(c) Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access
and the activities to be carried out during such access.
(d) In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide Malta
and, as appropriate, the Community with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the
resolution of the question or inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided
before a request for access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would
prejudice the purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall
not draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until Malta and, as
appropriate, the Community have been provided with such an opportunity.
(e) Unless otherwise agreed to by Malta, access shall only take place during
regular working hours.
(f) Malta, or for access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear
material is involved, Malta and the Community, shall have the right to have agency
inspectors accompanied during their acc ess by its representatives and, as
appropriate, by Community inspectors provided that Agency inspectors shall not
thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
Article 5
Malta shall provide the Agency with access to
(a)
(i) any place on a site;
(ii) any location identified under Article 2(a)(v) to (viii);
(iii) any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside
facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.
(b) Any location identified by Malta under Article 2(a)(i), Article 2(a)(iv),
Article 2(a)(ix)(b) or Article 2(b), other than those referred to in paragraph (a)(i),
provided that if Malta is unable to provide such access, Malta shall make every
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, through other
means.
(c) Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in
paragraphs (a) and (b), to carry out location-specific environmental sampling,
provided that if Malta is unable to provide such access, Malta shall make every
reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent
locations or through other means.
Article 6
When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities
(a) for access in accordance with Article 5(a)(i) or (iii): visual observation;
collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and
measurement devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper
indicating devices specified in Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective
measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of
which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Board`) and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and Malta.
(b) For access in accordance with Article 5(a)(ii): visual observation; item
counting of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling;
utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of records
relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; collection of
environmental samples; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated
to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and
following consultations between the Agency, the Community and Malta.
(c) For access in accordance with Article 5(b): visual observation; collection of
environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices;
examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other
objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the
use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the
Agency and Malta.
(d) For access in accordance with Article 5(c), collection of environmental
samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at
the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5(c), utilisation at that
location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as
agreed by Malta and, where nuclear material is involved, the Community, and the
Agency, other objective measures.
Article 7
(a) On request by Malta, the Agency and Malta shall make arrangements for
managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemination of
pr o l i f e r a t i o n s e n s i t i v e i n f or m a t i o n, t o m e e t s a f e t y o r p h y s i c a l p r ot e c t i o n
requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Such
arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to
provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and
activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to
the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an
inconsistency relating to that information.
(b) Malta may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform
the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be
applicable.
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
(c) Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements,
Malta may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of
paragraph (a).
Article 8
Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude Malta from offering the Agency access to
locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the
Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The Agency shall,
without delay, make every reasonable effort to act on such a request.
Article 9
Malta shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency
to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if Malta is unable to
provide such access that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency
requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such access until
the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural arrangements
therefor have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the
Agency and Malta.
Article 10
(a) The Agency shall inform Malta concerned and, as appropriate, the
Community of
(i)
the activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect
of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the
attention of Malta and, as appropriate, the Community within 60 days of
the activities being carried out by the Agency.
(ii) The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies
the Agency had brought to the attention of Malta and, as appropriate,
the Community as soon as possible but in any case within 30 days of the
results being established by the Agency.
(b) The Agency shall inform Malta and the Community of the conclusions it has
drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions shall be provided
annually.
DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS
Article 11
(a)
(i) The Director-General shall notify the Community and the States of the
Board's approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector.
Unless the Community advises the Director-General of the rejection of
such an official as an inspector for the States within three months of
receipt of notification of the Board's approval, the inspector so notified
to the Community and Malta shall be considered designated to the
States.
(ii) The Director-General, acting in response to a request by the Community
or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and
the States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an
inspector for the States.
(b) A notification referred to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be received by
the Community and Malta seven days after the date of the transmission by registered
post of the notification by the Agency to the Community and the States.
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VISAS
Article 12
Malta shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the
designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit
and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on
the territory of Malta for the purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas
required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to
cover the duration of the inspector's designation to the States.
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 13
(a) Where Malta or the Community, as appropriate, or the Agency indicate that
it is necessary to specify in subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this
Protocol are to be applied, Malta, or Malta and the Community and the Agency shall
agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within 90 days of the entry into force of this
Protocol or, where the indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is
made after the entry into force of this Protocol, within 90 days of the date of such
indication.
(b) Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the
Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
Article 14
(a) Malta shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for
official purposes between Agency inspectors in Malta and Agency Headquarters and/
or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission of information
generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices. The
Agency shall have, in consultation with Malta concerned, the right to make use of
internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite
systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in Malta. At the request of
Malta, or the Agency, details of the implementation of this paragraph in Malta with
respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information generated by
Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be specified
in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
(b) Communication and transmission of information as provided for in
paragraph (a) shall take du e account of th e need to protect prop rietary o r
commercially sensitive information or design information which Malta regards as
being of particular sensitivity.
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Article 15
(a) The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection
against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other
confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such information
coming to the Agency's knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol.
(b) The regime referred to in paragraph (a) shall include, among others,
provisions relating to
(i)
general principles and associated measures for the handling of
confidential information;
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(ii) conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential
information;
(iii) procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.
(c) The regime referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be approved and
periodically reviewed by the Board.
ANNEXES
Article 16
(a) The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the
purposes of amendment of Annexes I and II, the term 'Protocol` as used in this
instrument means this Protocol and the Annexes together.
(b) The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and
material specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board on the advice of an
open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. any such amendment
shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board.
(c) Annex III to this Protocol specifies how measures in this Protocol shall be
implemented by the Community and the States.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
Article 17
(a) This Protocol shall enter into force on the day on which the Agency receives
from the Community and the States written notification that their respective
requirements for entry into force have been met.
(b) The States and the Community may, at any date before this Protocol enters
into force, declare that they will apply this Protocol provisionally.
(c) The Director-General shall promptly inform all Member States of the
Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force
of, this Protocol.
DEFINITIONS
Article 18
For the purpose of this Protocol
(a) 'nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities' means those
activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect
of any of the following
-
conversion of nuclear material,
-
enrichment of nuclear material,
-
nuclear fuel fabrication,
-
reactors,
-
critical facilities,
-
reprocessing of nuclear fuel,
-
processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the
separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high-
level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-
233,
but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical,
hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and
improved maintenance.
(b) 'Site' means that area delimited by the Community and Malta in the relevant
design information for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant
information on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily
used, including a closed-down location outside facilities where nuclear material was
customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related
to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). 'Site'
shall also include all installations, colocated with the facility or location, for the
provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for processing irradiated
materials not containing nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and
disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by the
State concerned under Article 2(a)(iv).
(c) 'Decommissioned facility' or 'decommissioned location outside facilities'
means an installation or location at which residual structures and equipment
essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used
to store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilise nuclear material.
(d) 'Closed-down facility' or 'closed-down location outside facilities' means an
installation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material
removed but which has not been decommissioned.
(e) 'High enriched uranium' means uranium containing 20% or more of the
isotope uranium-235.
(f) 'Location-specific environmental sampling' means the collection of
environmental samples (e.g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the
immediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting
the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or
nuclear activities at the specified location.
(g) 'Wide-area environmental sampling' means the collection of environmental
samples (e.g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the
Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the
absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area.
(h) 'Nuclear material' means any source or any special fissionable material as
defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be
interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under
Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol
which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable
material shall have effect under this Protocol only on acceptance by the Community
and the States.
(i)
'Facility' means
(i)
a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a
reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage
installation, or
(ii) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one
effective kilogram is customarily used.
(j)
'Location outside facilities' means any installation or location, which is not a
facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective
kilogram or less.
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ANNEX I
List of activities referred to in Article 2(a)(iv) of the Protocol
(i)
The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas
centrifuges.
Centrifuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described at point 5.1.1(b)
of Annex II.
Gas centrifuges means centrifuges as described in the introductory note to point
5.1 of Annex II.
(ii)
The manufacture of diffusion barriers.
Diffusion barriers means thin, porous filters as described in point 5.3.1(a) of
Annex II.
(iii) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems.
Laser-based systems means systems incorporating those items as described in
point 5.7 of Annex II.
(iv) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators.
Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in point 5.9.1 of
Annex II containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1(a) of Annex II.
(v)
The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.
Columns or extraction equipment means those items as described in points 5.6.1,
5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Annex II.
(vi) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes.
Aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes means separation nozzles and
vortex tubes as described respectively in points 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II.
(vii) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems.
Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium
plasma as described in point 5.8.3 of Annex II.
(viii) The manufacture of zirconium tubes.
Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in point 1.6 of Annex II.
(ix) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium.
Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and
any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms
exceeds 1:5 000.
(x)
The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite.
Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than five parts
per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm 3 .
(xi) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel.
A flask or irradiated fuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of
irradiated fuel which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and
dissipated decay heat during handling, transportation and storage.
(xii) The manufacture of reactor control rods.
Reactor control rods means rods as described in point 1.4 of Annex II.
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(xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels.
Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in points 3.2 and
3.4 of Annex II.
(xiv) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines.
Irradiated fuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in point
3.1 of Annex II.
(xv) The construction of hot cells.
Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 m3 in volume
with shielding equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0,5 m of concrete, with a
density of 3,2 g/cm 3 or greater, outfitted with equipment for remote operations.
ANNEX II
List of specified equipment and non-nuclear material for the reporting of exports
and imports according to Article 2(a)(ix)
1. REACTORS AND EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
1.1. Complete nuclear reactors
Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining
fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as
reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding
100 grams per year.
Explanatory note
A 'nuclear reactor` basically includes the items within or attached directly to the
reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the
components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the
primary coolant of the reactor core.
It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of
modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year.
Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of
their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as 'zero energy reactors`.
1.2. Reactor pressure vessels
Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which
are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as
defined in paragraph 1.1 and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of
the primary coolant.
Explanatory note
A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2 as a major shop-
fabricated part of a pressure vessel.
Reactor internals (e.g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel
internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser
plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain
internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel.
These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of
the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so
that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would
not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of these unique,
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not
necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of
supply is considered unlikely.
1.3. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines
Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing
fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 capable of on-load operation or
employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow
complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or
access to the fuel is not normally available.
1.4. Reactor control rods
Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a
nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1.
Explanatory note
This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or
suspension structures therefor is supplied separately.
1.5. Reactor pressure tubes
Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the
primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 at an operating pressure in
excess of 5,1 MPa (740 psi).
1.6. Zirconium tubes
Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in
quantities exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or
prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1, and in which the relation of
hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight.
1.7. Primary coolant pumps
Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for
nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1.
Explanatory note
Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elabor ate sealed or
multisealed systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps,
and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified
to NC-1 or equivalent standards.
2. NON-NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR REACTORS
2.1. Deuterium and heavy water
Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in
which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear
reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium
atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
2.2. Nuclear grade graphite
Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and
with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in
paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 3 x 104 kg (30 tonnes) for any one recipient
country in any period of 12 months.
Note
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
For the purpose of reporting, the government will determine whether or not the
exports of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use.
3. PLANTS FOR THE REPROCESSING OF IRRADIATED FUEL
ELEMENTS, AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED
THEREFOR
Introductory note
Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from
intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different
technical processes can accomplish this separation. However, over the years purex
has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the
dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the
uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of
tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.
Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated
fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor
storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate,
conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product
waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the
specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may
differ between purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of
irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the
recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into
the design of the facility.
A 'plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements` included the equipment
and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the
irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing
streams.
These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and
plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid
criticality (e.g. by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity
hazards (e.g. by containment).
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase
'and equipment especially designed or prepared` for the reprocessing of irradiated
fuel elements include
3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines
Introductory note
This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear
material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most
commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used.
Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a
reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated
nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods.
3.2. Dissolvers
Introductory note
Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe
vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining
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hulls removed from the process stream.
Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially
designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for
dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot,
highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained.
3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment
Introductory note
Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers
and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission
products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating
parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or
adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility
for variations in process conditions.
Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse
columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the
reprocessing of irradiated fuel.
Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent
extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special
welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of
low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials.
3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels
Introductory note
Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding
or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows
(a) the pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and
passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide.
This oxide is reused in the nuclear fuel cycle;
(b) the intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally
concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This
concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form
suitable for storage or disposal;
(c) the pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending
its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage
vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality
problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this
stream.
Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for
the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant
to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally
fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or
other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote
operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of
nuclear criticality
(1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least 2%, or
(2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7″) for cylindrical vessels, or
(3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3″) for either a slab or annular
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vessel.
3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system
Introductory note
In most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the
plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this
process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor
separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and
process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium
nitrate to plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and
radiation effects and to minimise toxicity hazards.
3.6. Plutonium oxide to metal production system
Introductory note
This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the
fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride,
to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity
calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main
functions involved in this process are: fluorination (e.g. involving equipment
fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (e.g. employing ceramic
crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and
process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium
metal, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to
minimise toxicity hazards.
4. PLANTS FOR THE FABRICATION OF FUEL ELEMENTS
A 'plant for the fabrication of fuel elements' includes the equipment
(a) which normally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or
controls, the production flow of nuclear material, or
(b) which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.
5. PLANTS FOR THE SEPARATION OF ISOTOPES OF URANIUM AND
EQUIPMENT, OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS, ESPECIALLY
DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase
'equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared' for
the separation of isotopes of uranium include
5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or
prepared for use in gas centrifuges
Introductory note
The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) of between 75
mm (3″) and 400 mm (16″) diameter contained in a vacuum
environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with
its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction
for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the
rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to
very close tolerances in order to minimise the imbalance. In contrast to other
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centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterised by having
within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube
arrangement for feeding and extracting to UF6 gas and featuring at least three
separate channels, of which two are connected to scoops extending from the rotor
axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum
environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although
they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out
of unique materials. A centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these
components, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
5.1.1. Rotating components
(a)
Complete rotor assemblies
Thin-walled cylinders, or a number of interconnected thin-walled cylinders,
manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials
described in the explanatory note to this section. If interconnected, the cylinders are
joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in Section 5.1.1.(c)
following. The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s) and end caps, as described in
Section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly
may be delivered only partly assembled.
(b)
Rotor tubes
Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm
(0,5″) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 mm
(16″), and manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density
ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this section.
(c)
Rings or bellows
Components especially designed or prepared to give localised support to the rotor
tube or to join together a number of rotor tubes. The bellows is a short cylinder of
wall thickness 3 mm (0,12″) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm
(3″) and 400 m (16″), having a convolute, and manufactured from one
of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to
this section.
(d)
Baffles
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 m (16″)
diameter especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor
tube, in order to isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and,
in some cases, to assist the UF6 gas circulation within the main separation chamber
of the rotor tube, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio
materials described in the explanatory note to this section.
(e)
Top caps/bottom caps
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 (16″)
diameter especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so
contain the UF6 within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain
as an integrated part an element of the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating
elements of the motor and lower bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one
of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to
this section.
Explanatory note
The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are
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(a) maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2,05 x 109 N/m 2
(300 000 psi) or more,
(b) aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0,46 x 109 N/m 2
(67 000 psi) or more,
(c) filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a
specific modulus of 12,3 x 106 m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength
of 0,3 x 106 m or greater ('Specific Modulus' is the Young's Modulus in N/m 2
divided by the specific weight in N/m 3 ; 'Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength' is the
ultimate tensile strength in N/m 2 divided by the specific weight in N/m 3 .
5.1.2. Static components
(a)
Magnetic suspension bearings
Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular
magnet suspended within a housing containing a damping medium. The housing will
be manufactured from a UF6-resistant material (see explanatory note to Section 5.2).
The magnet couples with a pole piece or a second magnet fitted to the top cap
described in Section 5.1.1.(e). The magnet may be ring-shaped with a relation
between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1,6:1. The magnet may be in a
form having an initial permeability of 0,15 H/m (120 000 in CGS units) or more, or a
remanence of 98,5% or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/m 3 (107
gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that
the deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small
tolerances (lower than 0,1 mm or 0,004 in) or that homogeneity of the material of the
magnet is specially called for.
(b)
Bearings/dampers
Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot/cup assembly
mounted on a damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a
hemisphere at one end with a means of attachment to the bottom cap described in
section 5.1.1.(e) at the other. The shaft may however have a hydrodynamic bearing
attached. The cup is pellet-shaped with a hemispherical indentation in one surface.
These components are often supplied separately to the damper.
(c)
Molecular pumps
Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded
helical grooves and internally machines bores. Typical dimensions are as follows: 75
mm (3″) to 400 mm (16″) internal diameter, 10 mm (0,4″) or
more wall thickness, with the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The
grooves are typically rectangular in cross-section and 2 mm (0,08″) or more
in depth.
(d)
Motor stators
Especially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC
hysteresis (or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the
frequency range of 600-2 000 Hz and a power range of 50-1 000 VA. The stators
consist of multiphase windings on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin
layers typically 2,0 mm (0,08″) thick or less.
(e)
Centrifuge housing/recipients
Components especially designed designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube
assembly of a gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall
thickness up to 30 mm (1,2″) with precision machined ends to locate the
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bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel
to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder’s longitudinal axis to within 0,05° or
less. The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure to accommodate several
rotor tubes. The housings are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion
by UF6.
(f)
Scoops
Especially designed or prepared tubes up to 12 mm (0,5″) internal diameter
for the extraction of UF6 gas from within the rotor tube by a pilot tube action (that
is, with an aperture facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for
example by bending the end of a radially disposed tube) and capable of being fixed
to the central gas extraction system. The tubes are made of or protected by materials
resistant to corrosion by UF6.
5.2. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and
components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants
Introductory note
The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment
plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the centrifuges, to link the
individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for
progressively higher enrichments and to extract the 'product' and 'tails' UF6 from the
centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to
control the plant.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is
distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework.
The 'product' and 'tails' UF6 gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also
passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K
(-70 °C)) where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers
for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many
thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometres of cascade
header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of
repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated
to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems including
-
feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF6 to the centrifuge
cascades at up to 100 kPa (15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more,
-
desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the cascades at up
to 3 kPa (0,5 psi) pressure. The desublimers are capable of being chilled
to 203 K (-70 °C) and heated to 343 K (70°C),
-
'product' and 'tails' stations used for trapping UF6 into containers.
This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF6-resistant
materials (see explanatory note to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum
and cleanliness standards.
5.2.2. Machine header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling
UF6 within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the 'triple'
header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a
substantial amount of repetition in its form. It is wholly made of UF6-resistant
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materials (see explanatory note to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum
and cleanliness standards.
5.2.3. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers
capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams
and having all of the following characteristics
1. unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel
plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. having a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.2.4. Frequency changers
Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or
prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2(d), or parts, components and
sub-assemblies of such frequency changers having all of the following
characteristics
1. a multiphase output of 600 to 2 000 Hz;
2. high stability (with frequency control better than 0,1%);
3. low harmonic distortion (less than 2%), and
4. an efficiency of greater than 80%.
Explanatory note
The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or
directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to
centrifuge and cascade to cascade.
Materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium,
aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.
5.3. Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in
gaseous diffusion enrichment
Introductory note
In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main
technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger
for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and
control valves, and pipelines. Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses
uranium hexafluoride (UF6), all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces
(that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in
contact with UF6. A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these
assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
5.3.1. Gaseous diffusion barriers
(a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100-
1 000 Å (angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0,2″) or less, and for tubular
forms, a diameter of 25 mm (1″) or less, made of metallic, polymer or
ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, and
(b) especially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such
filters. Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60% or
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more nickel, aluminium oxide, or UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon
polymers having a purity of 99,9% or more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and
a high degree of particle size uniformity, which are especially prepared for the
manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers.
5.3.2. Diffuser housings
Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater
than 300 mm (12″) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35″) in
length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet
connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 mm
(2″) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or
lined with UF6-resistant m aterials and designed for horizontal or vertical
installation.
5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement
compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of 1 m 3 /min. or more of
UF6 and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi), designed
for long-term operation in the UF6 environment with or without an electrical motor
of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas
blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and
6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF6.
5.3.4. Rotary shaft seals
Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust
connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor
with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the
inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF6. Such seals
are normally designed for a buffer gas inleakage rate of less than 1 000 cm 3 /min (60
in 3 /min).
5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF6
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF6-
resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of
those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Pa
(0,0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kPa (15 psi).
5.4. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and
components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment
Introductory note
The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion
enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the gaseous
diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblies to each other to form cascades
(or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the 'product'
and 'tails' UF6 from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of
diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their
shutdown, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant
maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from
accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a
gaseous diffusion plant. All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large
number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is
distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework.
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
The 'product' and 'tails' UF6 gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by
way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations
where the UF6 gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for
transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant consists of a
large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many
kilometres of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with
substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping
systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.4.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures
of 300 kPa (45 psi) or less, including
-
feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF6 to the gaseous
diffusion cascades,
-
desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from diffusion
cascades,
-
liquefaction stations where UF6 gas from the cascade is compressed and
cooled to form liquid UF6,
-
'product' or 'tails' stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.4.2. Header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling
UF6 within the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the
'double' header system with each cell connected to each of the headers.
5.4.3. Vacuum systems
(a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers
and vacuum pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m 3 /min. (175 ft 3 /min.) or more.
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres
made of, or lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60% nickel.
These pumps may be either rotary or positive, may have displacement and
fluorocarbon seals, and may have special working fluids present.
5.4.4. Special shut-off and control valves
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows
valves made of UF6-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1 500 mm (1,5 to
59″) for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion
enrichment plants.
5.4.5. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers
capable of taking on-line samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and
having all of the following characteristics
1. unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel
plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
Explanatory note
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or
directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact
with the process gas are wholly made of, or lined with, UF6-resistant materials. For
the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials
resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys,
aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant
fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.5. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use
in aerodynamic enrichment plants
Introductory note
In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and light gas
(hydrogen of helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements
wherein isotopic separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal
forces over a curved-wall geometry. Two processes of this type have been
successfully developed: the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube process.
For both processes the main components of a separation stage include cylindrical
vessels housing the special separation elements (nozzles or vortex tubes), gas
co m p r e s so r s a n d h ea t e x c h a n g e r s t o r e m o v e t h e h e a t o f c o m p r e s s i o n . A n
aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide
an important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use UF6 all
equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas)
must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6.
Explanatory note
The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the UF6
process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come
into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or protected by UF6-resistant
materials. For the purpose of the section relating to aerodynamic enrichments items,
the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel,
aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and
UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.5.1. Separation nozzles
Especially designed or prepared separation nozzles and assemblies thereof. The
separation nozzles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of
curvature less than 1 mm (typically 0,1 to 0,05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF6
and having a knife-edge within the nozzle that separates the gas flowing through the
nozzle into two fractions.
5.5.2. Vortex tubes
Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof. The vortex
tubes are cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to
corrosion by UF6, having a diameter of between 0,5 cm and 4 cm, a length to
diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one or more tangential inlets. The tubes may
be equipped with nozzle-type appendages at either or both ends.
Explanatory note
The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes
or at numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube.
5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
compressors or gas blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion
by UF6 and with a suction volume capacity of 2 m 3 /min. or more of UF6/carrier gas
(hydrogen or helium) mixture.
Explanatory note
These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1.2:1
and 6:1.
5.5.4. Rotary shaft seals
Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust
connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower
rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of
process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor
or gas blower which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture.
5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by
materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
5.5.6. Separation element housings
Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or
protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, for containing vortex tubes or
separation nozzles.
Explanatory note
These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and
greater than 900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable
dimensions, and may be designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
5.5.7. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment
plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including
(a) feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the
enrichment process;
(b) desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment
process for subsequent transfer upon heating;
(c) solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the
enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or
solid form;
(d) 'product' or 'tails' stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.5.8. Header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by
materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 for handling UF6 within the aerodynamic
cascades. This piping network is normally of the 'double' header design with each
stage or group of stages connected to each of the headers.
5.5.9. Vacuum systems and pumps
(a) Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity
of 5 m 3 /min or more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum
pumps, and designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres.
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF6-bearing
atmospheres and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
These pumps may use fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.
5.5.10. Special shut-off and control valves
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows
valves made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 with a
diameter of 40 to 1 500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of
aerodynamic enrichment plants.
5.5.11. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers
capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, 'product' or 'tails', from UF6 gas streams
and having all of the following characteristics
1. unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel
plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.5.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems
Especially designed or prepared systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas
(hydrogen or helium).
Explanatory note
These systems are designed to reduce the UF6 content in the carrier gas to 1 ppm
or less and many incorporate equipment such as
(a) cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of temperatures
of -120°c or less, or
(b) cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120°C or less,
or
(c) separation nozzle or vortex tube units for the separation of UF6 from
carrier gas, or
(d) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of -20°C or less.
5.6. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use
in chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants
Introductory note
The slight difference in mass between the isotopes of uranium causes small
changes in chemical reaction equilibria that can be used as a basis for separation of
the isotopes. Two processes have been successfully developed: liquid-liquid
chemical exchange and solid-liquid ion exchange.
In the liquid-liquid chemical exchange process, immiscible liquid phases (aqueous
and organic) are countercurrently contacted to give the cascading effect of thousands
of separation stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric
acid solution; the organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium
chloride in an organic solvent. The contactors employed in the separation cascade
can be liquid-liquid exchange columns (such as pulsed columns with sieve plates) or
liquid centrifugal contactors. Chemical conversions (oxidation and reduction) are
required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to provide for the reflux
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
requirements at each end. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the
process streams with certain metal ions. Plastic, plastic-lined (including use of
fluorocarbon polymers) and/or glass-lined columns and piping are therefore used.
In the solid-liquid ion-exchange process, enrichment is accomplished by uranium
adsorption/desorption on a special, very fast-acting, ion-exchange resin or
adsorbent. A solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical agents is
passed through cylindrical enrichment columns containing packed beds of the
adsorbent. For a continuous process, a reflux system is necessary to release the
uranium from the adsorbent back into the liquid flow so that 'product' and 'tails' can
be collected. This is accomplished with the use of suitable reduction/oxidation
chemical agents that are fully regenerated in separate external circuits and that may
be partially regenerated within the isotopic separation columns themselves. The
presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process requires that
the equipment be made of or protected by special corrosion-resistant materials.
5.6.1. Liquid-liquid exchange columns (chemical exchange)
Countercurrent liquid-liquid exchange columns having mechanical power input
(i.e., pulsed columns with sieve plates, reciprocating plate columns, and columns
with internal turbine mixers), especially designed or prepared for uranium
enrichment using the chemical exchange process. For corrosion resistance to
concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns and their internals are made
of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or
glass. The stage residence time of the columns is designed to be short (30 seconds or
less).
5.6.2. Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors (chemical exchange)
Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors especially designed or prepared for uranium
enrichment using the chemical exchange process. Such contactors use rotation to
achieve dispersion of the organic and aqueous streams and then centrifugal force to
separate the phases. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid
solutions, the contactors are made of or are lined with suitable plastic materials
(such as fluorocarbon polymers) or are lined with glass. The stage residence time of
the centrifugal contactors is designed to be short (30 seconds or less).
5.6.3. Uranium reduction systems and equipment (chemical exchange)
(a) Especially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells to reduce
uranium from one valence state to another for uranium enrichment using the
chemical exchange process. The cell materials in contact with process solutions must
be corrosion resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions.
Explanatory note
The cell cathodic compartment must be designed to prevent reoxidation of
u r a n i u m t o i t s h i g h e r v a l e n c e s t a t e . To k e e p t h e u r a n i u m i n t h e c a t h o d i c
compartment, the cell may have an impervious diaphragm membrane constructed of
special cation exchange material. The cathode consists of a suitable solid conductor
such as graphite.
(b) Especially designed or prepared systems at the product end of the cascade
for taking the U4+ out of the organic stream, adjusting the acid concentration and
feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells.
Explanatory note
These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for stripping the U4+ from
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
the organic stream into an aqueous solution, evaporation and/or other equipment to
accomplish solution pH adjustment and control, and pumps or other transfer devices
for feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells. A major design concern is to
avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with certain metal ions. Consequently,
for those parts in contact with the process stream, the system is constructed of
equipment made of or protected by suitable materials (such as glass, fluorocarbon
polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite).
5.6.4. Feed preparation systems (chemical exchange)
Especially designed or prepared systems for producing high-purity uranium
chloride feed solutions for chemical exchange uranium isotope separation plants.
Explanatory note
These systems consist of dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange
equipment for purification and electrolytic cells for reducing the uranium U6+ or
U4+ to U3+. These systems produce uranium chloride solutions having only a few
parts per million of metallic impurities such as chromium, iron, vanadium,
molybdenum and other bivalent or higher multi-valent cations. Materials of
construction for portions of the systems processing high-purity U3+ include glass,
fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate or polyether sulfone plastic-lined and
resin-impregnated graphite.
5.6.5. Uranium oxidation systems (chemical exchange)
Especially designed or prepared systems for oxidation of U3+ to U4+ for return to
the uranium isotope separation cascade in the chemical exchange enrichment
process.
Explanatory note
These systems may incorporate equipment such as
(a) equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with the aqueous effluent
from the isotope separation equipment and extracting the resultant U4+ into the
stripped organic stream returning from the product end of the cascade,
(b) equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that the water and
the concentrated hydrochloric acid may be reintroduced to the process at the proper
locations.
5.6.6. Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (ion exchange)
Fast-reacting ion-exchange resins or adsorbents especially designed or prepared
for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process, including porous
macroreticular resins, and/or pellicular structures in which the active chemical
exchange groups are limited to a coating on the surface of an inactive porous support
structure, and other composite structures in any suitable form including particles or
fibres. These ion exchange resins/adsorbents have diameters of 0,2 mm or less and
must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions as well as
physically strong enough so as not to degrade in the exchange columns. The resins/
adsorbents are especially designed to achieve very fast uranium isotope exchange
kinetics (exchange rate half-time of less than 10 seconds) and are capable of
operating at a temperature in the range of 100°C to 200°C.
5.6.7. Ion exchange columns (ion exchange)
Cylindrical columns greater than 1 000 mm in diameter for containing and
supporting packed beds of ion exchange resin/adsorbent, especially designed or
prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process. These columns are
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
made of or protected by materials (such as titanium or fluorocarbon plastics)
resistant to corrosion by concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions and are capable of
operating at a temperature in the range of 100°C to 200°C and pressures above 0,7
MPa (102 psia).
5.6.8. Ion exchange reflux systems (ion exchange)
(a) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction
systems for regeneration of the chemical reducing agent(s) used in ion exchange
uranium enrichment cascades.
(b) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation
systems for regeneration of the chemical oxidising agent(s) used in ion exchange
uranium enrichment cascades.
Explanatory note
The ion exchange enrichment process may use, for example, trivalent titanium
(Ti3+) as a reducing cation in which case the reduction system would regenerate
Ti3+ by reducing Ti4+. The process may use, for example, trivalent iron (Fe3+) as
an oxidant in which case the oxidation system would regenerate Fe3+ by oxidising
Fe2+.
5.7. Expecially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use
in laser-based enrichment plants
Introductory note
Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories
those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapour and those in which the
process medium is the vapour of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for
such processes include: first category, atomic vapour laser isotope separation
(AVLIS or SILVA); second category, molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or
MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation (CRISLA). The
systems, equipment and components for laser enrichment plants embrace
(a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapour (for selective photo-ionisation) or
devices to feed the vapour of a uranium compound (for photo-
dissociation or chemical activation);
(b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as 'product` and
'tails' in the first category, and devices to collect dissociated or reacted
compounds as 'product` and unaffected material as 'tails' in the second
category;
(c) process laser systems to selectively excite the uranium-235 species, and
(d) feed preparation and product conversion equipment. The complexity of
the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require
incorporation of any of a number of available laser technologies.
Explanatory note
Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium
metal vapour or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF6 or a mixture of UF6 and
other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF6 are wholly
made of or protected by corrosion-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section
relating to laser-based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by the
vapour or liquid of uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite
and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper,
stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.7.1. Uranium vaporisation systems (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared uranium vaporisation systems which contain
high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the
target of more than 2,5 kW/cm.
5.7.2. Liquid uranium metal handling systems (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium
or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.
Explanatory note
The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten
uranium and uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable
corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated
graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.
5.7.3. Uranium metal 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies for
uranium metal in liquid or solid form.
Explanatory note
Components for these assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to
the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapour or liquid (such as yttria-coated
graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, 'gutters', feed-throughs,
heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation
methods.
5.7.4. Separator module housings (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular vessels for containing
the uranium metal vapour source, the electron beam gun, and the 'product' and 'tails'
collectors.
Explanatory note
These housings have multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs,
laser beam windows, vacuum pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and
monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow refurbishment of
internal components.
5.7.5. Supersonic expansion nozzles (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling
mixtures of UF6 and carrier gas to 150 K or less and which are corrosion resistant to
UF6.
5.7.6. Uranium pentafluoride product collectors (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared uranium pentafluoride (UF5) solid product
collectors consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations
thereof, and which are corrosion resistant to the UF5/UF6 environment.
5.7.7. UF6/carrier gas compressors (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared compressors for UF6/carrier gas mixtures,
designed for long term operation in a UF6 environment. The components of these
compressors that come into contact with process gas are made of or protected by
materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
5.7.8. Rotary shaft seals (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust
connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor with the driver
motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage
of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor which is filled with a
UF6/carrier gas mixture.
5.7.9. Fluorination systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared systems for fluorinating UF5 (solid) to UF6 (gas).
Explanatory note
These systems are designed to fluorinate the collected UF5 powder to UF6 for
subsequent collection in product containers or for transfer as feed to MLIS units for
a d di t i on a l e n r i c h m e n t . I n on e a pp r o a c h , t he fl u o ri n a t i on r e a c t io n m a y b e
accomplished within the isotope separation system to react and recover directly off
the 'product' collectors. In another approach, the UF5 powder may be removed/
transferred from the 'product' collectors into a suitable reaction vessel (e.g.,
fluidised-bed reactor, screw reactor or flame tower) for fluorination. In both
approaches, equipment for storage and transfer of fluorine (or other suitable
fluorinating agents) and for collection and transfer of UF6 are used.
5.7.10. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers
capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, 'product' or 'tails', from UF6 gas streams
and having all of the following characteristics
1. unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel
plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.7.11. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment
plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including
(a) feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the
enrichment process;
(b) desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment
process for subsequent transfer upon heating;
(c) solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the
enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or
solid form;
(d) 'product' or 'tails' stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.7.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF6 from carrier
gas. The carrier gas may be nitrogen, argon, or other gas.
Explanatory note
These systems may incorporate equipment such as
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
(a) cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of temperatures of
-120°C or less, or
(b) cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120°C or less,
or
(c) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of -20°C or less.
5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA)
Lasers or laser systems especially designed or prepared for the separation of
uranium isotopes.
Explanatory note
The laser system for the AVLIS process usually consists of two lasers: a copper
vapour laser and a dye laser. The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO2 or
excimer laser and a multipass optical cell with revolving mirrors at both ends. Lasers
or laser systems for both processes require a spectrum frequency stabiliser for
operation over extended periods of time.
5.8. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for
use in plasma separation enrichment plants
Introductory note
In the plasma separation process, a plasma of uranium ions passes through an
electric field tuned to the U-235 ion resonance frequency so that they preferentially
absorb energy and increase the diameter of their corkscrew-like orbits. Ions with a
large-diameter path are trapped to produce a product enriched in U-235. The plasma,
which is made by ionising uranium vapour, is contained in a vacuum chamber with a
high-strength magnetic field produced by a superconducting magnet. The main
technological systems of the process include the uranium plasma generation system,
the separator module with superconducting magnet and metal removal systems for
the collection of 'product' and 'tails'.
5.8.1. Microwave power sources and antennae
Especially designed or prepared microwave power sources and antennae for
producing or accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: greater than
30 GHz frequency and greater than 50 kW mean power output for ion production.
5.8.2. Ion excitation coils
Especially designed or prepared radio frequency ion excitation coils for
frequencies of more than 100 kHz and capable of handling more than 40 kW mean
power.
5.8.3. Uranium plasma generation systems
Especially designed or prepared systems for the generation of uranium plasma,
which may contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered
power on the target of more than 2,5 kW/cm.
5.8.4. Liquid uranium metal handling systems
Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium
or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.
Explanatory note
The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten
uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable
corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.
5.8.5. Uranium metal 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies
Especially designed or prepared 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies for
uranium metal in solid form. These collector assemblies are made of or protected by
materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapour, such as yttria-
coated graphite or tantalum.
5.8.6. Separator module housings
Cylindrical vessels especially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation
enrichment plants for containing the uranium plasma source, radio-frequency drive
coil and the 'product' and 'tail' collectors.
Explanatory note
These housings have a multiplicity of ports for electrical feed-throughs, diffusion
pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have
provi si on s fo r open ing and cl osure to al low for refurbi sh men t o f int ern al
components and are constructed of a suitable non-magnetic material such as stainless
steel.
5.9. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use
in electromagnetic enrichment plants
Introductory note
In the electromagnetic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionisation of a
salt feed material (typically UCl4) are accelerated and passed through a magnetic
field that has the effect of causing the ions of different isotopes to follow different
paths. The major components of an electromagnetic isotope separator include: a
magnetic field for ion-beam diversion/separation of the isotopes, an ion source with
its acceleration system, and a collection system for the separated ions. Auxiliary
systems for the process include the magnet power supply system, the ion source
high-voltage power supply system, the vacuum system, and extensive chemical
handling systems for recovery of product and cleaning/recycling of components.
5.9.1. Electromagnetic isotope separators
Electromagnetic isotope separators, especially designed or prepared for the
separation of uranium isotopes, and equipment and components therefor, including
(a)
ion sources
Especially designed or prepared single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting
of a vapour source, ioniser, and beam accelerator, constructed of suitable materials
such as graphite, stainless steel, or copper, and capable of providing a total ion beam
current of 50 mA or greater;
(b)
ion collectors
Collector plates consisting of two or more slits and pockets especially designed or
prepared for collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams and constructed
of suitable materials such as graphite or stainless steel;
(c)
vacuum housings
Especially designed or prepared vacuum housings for uranium electromagnetic
separators, constructed of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel and
designed for operation at pressures of 0,1 Pa or lower;
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
Explanatory note
The housings are specially designed to contain the ion sources, collector plates
and water-cooled liners and have provision for diffusion pump connections and
opening and closure for removal and reinstallation of these components.
(d)
Magnet pole pieces
Especially designed or prepared magnet pole pieces having a diameter greater than
2 m used to maintain a constant magnetic field within a electromagnetic isotope
separator and to transfer the magnetic field between adjoining separators.
5.9.2. High voltage power supplies
Especially designed or prepared high-voltage power supplies for ion sources,
having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuous operation, output
voltage of 20 000 V or greater, output current of 1 A or greater, and voltage
regulation of better than 0,01% over a period of eight hours.
5.9.3. Magnet power supplies
Especially designed or prepared high-power, direct current magnet power supplies
having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuously producing a
current output of 500 A or greater at a voltage of 100 V or greater and with a current
or voltage regulation better than 0,01% over a period of 8 hours.
6. PLANTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY WATER, DEUTERIUM
AND DEUTERIUM COMPOUNDS AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED
OR PREPARED THEREFOR
Introductory note
Heavy water can be produced by a variety of processes. However, the two
processes that have proven to be commercially viable are the water-hydrogen
sulphide exchange process (GS process) and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange
process.
The GS process is based upon the exchange of hydrogen an deuterium between
water and hydrogen sulphide within a series of towers which are operated with the
top section cold and the bottom section hot. Water flows down the towers while the
hydrogen sulphide gas circulates from the bottom to the top of the towers. A series
of perforated trays are used to promote mixing between the gas and the water.
Deuterium migrates to the water at low temperatures and to the hydrogen sulphide at
high temperatures. Gas or water, enriched in deuterium, is removed from the first
stage towers at the junction of the hot and cold sections and the process is repeated
in subsequent stage towers. The product of the last stage, water enriched up to 30%
in deuterium, is sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor grade heavy water, i.e.,
99,75% deuterium oxide.
The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can extract deuterium from synthesis
gas through contact with liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst. The synthesis
gas is fed into exchange towers and to an ammonia converter. Inside the towers the
gas flows from the bottom to the top while the liquid ammonia flows from the top to
the bottom. The deuterium is stripped from the hydrogen in the synthesis gas and
concentrated in the ammonia. The ammonia then flows into an ammonia cracker at
the bottom of the tower while the gas flows into an ammonia converter at the top.
Further enrichment takes place in subsequent stages and reactor grade heavy water is
produced through final distillation. The synthesis gas feed can be provided by an
ammonia plant that, in turn, can be constructed in association with a heavy water
ammonia-hydrogen exchange plant. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
also use ordinary water as a feed source of deuterium.
Many of the key equipment items for heavy water production plants using GS or
the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes are common to several segments of the
chemical and petroleum industries. This is particularly so for small plants using the
GS process. However, few of the items are available 'off-the shelf'. The GS and
ammonia-hydrogen processes require the handling of large quantities of flammable,
corrosive and toxic fluids at elevated pressures. Accordingly, in establishing the
design and operating standards for plants and equipment using these processes,
careful attention to the materials selection and specifications is required to ensure
long service life with high safety and reliability factors. The choice of scale is
primarily a function of economics and need. Thus, most of the equipment items
would be prepared according to the requirements of the customer.
Finally, it should be noted that, in both the GS and the ammonia-hydrogen
exchange processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially
designed or prepared for heavy water production can be assembled into systems
which are especially designed or prepared for producing heavy water. The catalyst
production system used in the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process and water
distillation systems used for the final concentration of heavy water to reactor-grade
in either process are examples of such systems.
The items of equipment which are especially designed or prepared for the
production of heavy water utilising either the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange
process or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process include the following
6.1. Water - hydrogen sulphide exchange towers
Exchange towers fabricated from fine carbon steel (such as ASTM A516) with
diameters of 6 m (20') to 9 m (39'), capable of operating at pressures greater than or
equal to 2 MPa (300 psi) and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or greater,
especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the water-
hydrogen sulphide exchange process.
6.2. Blowers and compressors
Single stage, low head (i.e., 0,2 MPa or 30 psi) centrifugal blowers or compressors
for hydrogen-sulphide gas circulation (i.e., gas containing more than 70% H2S)
especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the water-
hydrogen sulphide exchange process. These blowers or compressors have a
throughput capacity greater than or equal to 56 m3/second (120,000 SCFM) while
operating at pressures greater than or equal to 1,8 MPa (260 psi) suction and have
seals designed for wet H2S service.
6.3. Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers
Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers greater than or equal to 35 m (114,3' in
height with diameters of 1,5 m (4,9' to 2,5 m (8,2') capable of operating at pressures
greater than 15 MPa (2225 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water
production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. These towers also
have at least one flanged axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part
through which the tower internals can be inserted or withdrawn.
6.4. Tower internals and stage pumps
Tower internals and stage pumps especially designed or prepared for towers for
heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. Tower
internals include especially designed stage contactors which promote intimate gas/
liquid contact. Stage pumps include especially designed submersible pumps for
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
circulation of liquid ammonia within a contacting stage internal to the stage towers.
6.5. Ammonia crackers
Ammonia crackers with operating pressures greater than or equal to 3 MPa (450
psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the
ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.
6.6. Infrared absorption analysers
Infrared absorption analysers capable of on-line hydrogen/deuterium ratio analysis
where deuterium concentrations are equal to or greater than 90 %.
6.7. Catalytic burners
Catalytic burners for the conversion of enriched deuterium gas into heavy water
especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-
hydrogen exchange process.
7. PLANTS FOR THE CONVERSION OF URANIUM AND EQUIPMENT
ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR
Introductory note
Uranium conversion plants and systems may perform one or more transformations
from one uranium chemical species to another, including: conversion of uranium ore
concentrates to UO3, conversion of UO3 to UO2, conversion of uranium oxides to
UF4 or UF6, conversion of UF4 to UF6, conversion of UF6 to UF4, conversion of
UF4 to uranium metal, and conversion of uranium fluorides to UO2. Many of the key
equipment items for uranium conversion plants are common to several segments of
the chemical process industry. For example, the types of equipment employed in
these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidised bed reactors, flame
tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid extraction
columns. However, few of the items are available 'off-the-shelf', most would be
prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some
instances, special design and construction considerations are required to address the
corrosive properties of some of the chemicals handled (HF, F2, CIF3, and uranium
fluorides). Finally, it should be noted that, in all of the uranium conversion
processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or
prepared for uranium conversion can be assembled into systems which are especially
designed or prepared for use in uranium conversion.
7.1. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore
concentrates to UO3
Explanatory note
Conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 can be performed by first
dissolving the ore in nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl nitrate using a solvent
such as tributyl phosphate. Next, the uranyl nitrate is converted to UO3 either by
concentration and denitration or by neutralization with gaseous ammonia to produce
ammonium diuranate with subsequent filtering, drying, and calcining.
7.2. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UF6
Explanatory note
Conversion of UO3 to UF6 can be performed directly by fluorination. The process
requires a source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride.
7.3. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UO2
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
Explanatory note
Conversion of UO3 to UO2 can be performed through reduction of UO3 with
cracked ammonia gas or hydrogen.
7.4. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO2 to UF4
Explanatory note
Conversion of UO2 to UF4 can be performed by reacting UO2 with hydrogen
fluoride gas (HF) at 300-500°C.
7.5. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to UF6
Explanatory note
Conversion of UF4 to UF6 is performed by exothermic reaction with fluorine in a
tower reactor. UF6 is condensed from the hot effluent gases by passing the effluent
stream through a cold trap cooled to -10°C. The process requires a source of fluorine
gas.
7.6. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to U
metal
Explanatory note
Conversion UF4 to U metal is performed by reduction with magnesium (large
batches) or calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures
above the melting point of uranium (1 130°C).
7.7. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UO2
Explanatory note
Conversion of UF6 to UO2 can be performed by one of three processes. In the
first, UF6 is reduced and hydrolysed to UO2 using hydrogen and steam. In the
second, UF6 is hydrolysed by solution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate
ammonium diuranate, and the diuranate is reduced to UO2 with hydrogen at 820 °C.
I n t h e t h i r d p r o c e s s , g a s e o u s U F 6 , C O 2 a n d N H 3 a r e c o m b i n e d i n w a t e r,
precipitating ammonium uranyl carbonate. The ammonium aranyl carbonate is
combined with steam and hydrogen at 500-600 °C to yield UO2.
UF6 to UO2 conversion is often performed as the first stage of a fuel fabrication
plant.
7.8. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UF4
Explanatory note
Conversion of UF6 to UF4 is performed by reduction with hydrogen.
ANNEX III
To the extent that the measures in this Protocol involve nuclear material declared
by the Community and without prejudice to Article 1 of this Protocol, the Agency
and the Community shall cooperate to facilitate implementation of those measures
and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of activities.
The Community shall provide the Agency with information relating to transfers,
for both nuclear and non-nuclear purposes, from each State to another Member State
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
of the Community and to such transfers to each State from another Member State of
the Community that corresponds to the information to be provided under Article
2(a)(vi)(b) and under Article 2(a)(vi)(c) in relation to exports and imports of source
material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel
fabrication or for being isotopically enriched.
Each State shall provide the Agency with information relating to transfers to or
from another Member State of the Community that corresponds to the information
on specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of this Protocol
to be provided under Article 2(a)(ix)(a) in relation to exports and, on specific request
of the Agency, under Article 2(a)(ix)(b) in relation to imports.
With regard to the Community's Joint Research Centre, the Community shall also
implement the measures which this Protocol sets out for States, as appropriate in
close collaboration with the State on whose territory an establishment of the centre is
located.
The Liaison Committee, established under Article 25(a) of the Protocol referred to
in Article 26 of the Safeguards Agreement, will be extended in order to allow for
p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e St a t e s a n d a d j u s t m e n t t o t h e n e w
circumstances resulting from this Protocol.
For the sole purposes of the implementation of this Protocol, and without
prejudice to the respective competences and responsibilities of the Community and
its Member States, each State which decides to entrust to the Commission of the
European Communities implementation of certain provisions which under this
Protocol are the responsibility of the States, shall so inform the other Parties to the
Protocol through a side letter. The Commission of the European Communities shall
inform the other Parties to the Protocol of its acceptance of any such decisions.
In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires -
"the Agency" means the International Atomic Energy Agency;
"the Community" means the European Atomic Energy
Community;
"Euratom Safeguards Regulation" means Commission
Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 of 8th February 2005, on the
application of Euratom Safeguards;
"the Protocol" means the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards
Agreement;
"Radiation Protection Board" means the Radiation Protection
Board established by virtue of regulation 9 of the Nuclear Safety
and Radiation Protection Regulations;
"the Safeguards Agreement" means the Agreement between the
States, the Community and the Agency in implementation of
Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Agreement 78/164/Euratom);
"the States" means European Union non-nuclear-weapon member
states.
(1) The Radiation Protection Board shall be responsible
for the implementation of the obligations arising out of the Euratom
Safeguards Regulations and the Protocol, and it has all such powers
as are necessary to fulfill such obligations.
(2) The Radiation Protection Board shall have the right to
nominate any representative or representatives to accompany any
Agency Inspector during any visit to any site or location as
specified in the Protocol.
Any Inspector designated by the Agency shall have access
to any site or location as specified in Articles 5 to 9 of the Protocol,
and under such terms and conditions as specified in Article 4 of the
Protocol.
No person shall refuse access to any Agency Inspector or
in any other way threaten, molest or disturb Agency Inspectors and
any Radiation Protection Board representative or representatives in
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)
the performance of their duties.
No person shall, in connection with any matter under these
regulations -
(a) furnish any information which that person knows to be
false in a material particular, or recklessly furnish any
information which is false in a material particular; or
(b) with intent to deceive, produce, furnish, send or
otherwise make use of any document which is false in
a material particular; or
(c) wilfully refuse or without lawful excuse, the proof
whereof shall lie on that person, withhold any material
information; or
(d) knowingly or recklessly make any incorrect statement
or entry in any record or return or on any document
furnished under these regulations; or
(e) unlawfully refuse or fail to answer to the best of that
person’s knowledge any question made to him or her
by an Agency Inspector or a Radiation Protection
Board representative in the exercise of their functions;
or
(f)
unlawfully refuse or fail to comply with any
requirement duly provided under these regulations.
The Schedule to these regulations, including the Annexes
thereto, shall have the force of law in Malta.
(1) Any person who acts in contravention of the provisions
of regulations 6 and 7, and any person who conspires or attempts,
or aids, abets, counsels or procures any other person, to contravene
the regulations aforementioned, shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Any person who commits an offence against these
regulations shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a
pe ri od of not m o re th an fi ve years o r to a fine ( multa ) no t
exceeding one hundred and sixteen thousand and four hundred and
sixty-eight euro and sixty-seven cents (116,468.67), or to both such
fine and imprisonment.
The Court of Magistrates (Malta) and the Court of
Magistrates (Gozo) as courts of criminal judicature, sha ll,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 370 of the Criminal Code,
be competent to try all offences against these regulations.
Where the facts constituting a breach of any of the above
provisions also constitute a breach of any other law prohibited by
the particular regulations, proceedings shall not be taken in respect
of the breach of the regulations hereabove, but only in respect of
the breach of the other law.
The text of the Protocol is being published in the English
language in the Schedule to these regulations.
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL)