Investment Services Act (Supervisory Review) Regulations, 2013
Table of Provisions (35)
Statutory Text (35 Articles)
Suppliment tal-Gazzetta tal-Gvern ta’ Malta, Nru. 19,198, 24 ta’ Jannar, 2014
L.N. 30 of 2014
INVESTMENT SERVICES ACT
(CAP. 370)
Investment Services Act (Supervisory Review) Regulations, 2013
IN exercise of the powers conferred by article 12 of the
Investment Services Act and article 20D of the Malta Financial
Services Authority Act, the Minister for Finance, acting on the advice
of the Malta Financial Services Authority, has made the following
regulations:-
(1)
The title of these regulations is the Investment Citation and
purpose.
Services Act (Supervisory Review) Regulations, 2013.
(2) The purpose of these regulations is to implement articles 3
(in part), 4(1), 6, 7, 50, 52, 53(2), 56, 57, 58(1), 58 (3), 59, 60, 61,
74(4), 75(1), 75(3), 77(2), 78(2), 78(3), 78(4), 78(5), 86(3), 91(6),
91(11), 97, 98, 99, 100 to 105 inclusive, 107, 110, 143, 144, 151, 157,
159 of the CRD.
SUPERVISORY REVIEW AND EVALUATION
(Regulation 11)
(1) In addition to credit, market and operational risks, the review and
evaluation performed by the competent authority pursuant to regulation 11 shall
include at least
(a)
the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with
Article 177 of the CRR by investment firms applying an internal ratings
based approach to calculate their credit risk-weighted exposure;
(b)
the exposure to and management of concentration risk by
investment firms including their compliance with the Investment Services
Rules transposing the requirements of the CRD and the requirements set out
in Part Four of the CRR;
(c)
the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the
policies and procedures implemented by investment firms for the
management of the residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit
risk mitigation techniques;
(d)
the extent to which the own funds held by an investment firm in
respect of assets which it has securitised are adequate having regard to the
economic substance of the transaction, including the degree of risk transfer
achieved;
(e)
the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity risk
by investment firms including the development of alternative scenario
analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular the level,
composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective contingency plans
(f)
the impact of diversification effects and how such effects are
factored into the risk measurement system;
(g)
the results of stress tests carried out by investment firms using
an internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements under Part
Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of the CRR;
(h)
the geographical location of investment firm’s exposures;
(i)
the business model of the investment firm;
(j)
the assessment of systemic risk, in accordance with the criteria
set out in regulation 11.
(2) For the purposes of point (e) of paragraph 1 of this Schedule, the
competent authority shall regularly carry out a comprehensive assessment of the
overall liquidity risk management by investment firms and promote the
development of sound internal methodologies. In its review, the competent
authority shall have regard to the role played by investment firms in the financial
markets. The competent authority shall also duly consider the potential impact of
their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States
concerned.
(3) The competent authority shall monitor whether an investment firm has
provided implicit support to a securitisation. If an investment firm is found to have
provided implicit support on more than one occasion the competent authority shall
take appropriate measures reflective of the increased expectation that it will
provide future support to its securitisation thus failing to achieve a significant
transfer of risk.
(4) For the purposes of the determination to be made under regulation
11(3), the competent authority shall consider whether the valuation adjustments
taken for positions or portfolios in the trading book, as set out in Article 105 of the
CRR, enable the investment firm to sell or hedge out its positions within a short
period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions.
(5) The review and evaluation performed by the competent authority shall
include the exposure of investment firms to the interest rate risk arising from non-
trading activities. Measures shall be required at least in the case of investment
firms whose economic value declines by more than 20% of their own funds as a
result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates of 200 basis points or
such change as defined in the EBA guidelines.
(6) The review and evaluation performed by the competent authority shall
include the exposure of investment firms to the risk of excessive leverage as
reflected by indicators of excessive leverage, including the leverage ratio
determined in accordance with Article 429 of the CRR. In determining the
adequacy of the leverage ratio of investment firms and of the arrangements,
strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by investment firms to manage
the risk of excessive leverage, the competent authority shall take into account the
business model of those investment firms.
(7) The review and evaluation conducted by the competent authority shall
include governance arrangements of investment firms, their corporate culture and
values, and the ability of members of the management body to perform their
duties. In conducting that review and evaluation, the competent authority shall, at
least, have access to agendas and supporting documents for meetings of the
management body and its committees, and the results of the internal or external
evaluation of performance of the management body.
(1)
In these regulations, unless the context otherwise Interpretation.
requires
"the Act" means the Investment Services Act;
"CRD" means Directive 2013/36/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC
and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, as amended
from time to time, and includes any implementing measures that have
been or may be issued thereunder;
"credit institution" means a person licensed in terms of the
Banking Act, whose head office is in Malta or an undertaking whose Cap. 371.
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and to grant credits for its own account, authorised by a
European Regulatory Authority in terms of the CRD or authorised by
a European regulatory authority in an EEA Member State;
"CRR" means Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Regulation Mi FIDU) No. 648/2012, as amended from time
to time, and includes any implementing measures that have been or
may be issued thereunder;
"EBA" means the European Banking Authority established by
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of the 24 November 2010;
"EIOPA" means the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority as established by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November, 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority;
"ESCB central banks" shall have the same meaning as that
assigned to it in point 45 of Article 4(1) of the CRR;
"ESFS" means European System of Financial Supervision;
"ESRB" means the European Systemic Risk Board established
by regulation EU No. 1092/2010;
"European investment firm" means a firm as defined in article
4(1)(2) of the CRR, authorised by its European regulatory authority
within the meaning of Article 5 of the MiFID Directive, or authorised
by a European regulatory authority in an EEA State;
"home member state" means
(a)
in the case of an investment firm, within the
meaning of these regulations, Malta;
(b)
in the case of a "European investment firm", within
the meaning of these regulations, the Member State where such
European investment Firm is authorised by its European
regulatory authority;
"host member state" means a Member State or an EEA State
where an investment firm has established a branch or provides
services on a cross border basis in terms of the European Passport
Rights for Investment Firms Regulations;
"investment firm" means a person who holds an investment
services licence issued by the competent authority under the Act, and
which is subject to the requirements of the CRD;
"third country" means a country which is not a Member State or
an EEA State.
(2) Words and expressions used in these regulations which are
also used in the Act shall have the same meaning assigned to them as
in the Act.
SUPERVISORY EXAMINATION PROGRAMME
(Regulation 13)
(1) The annual supervisory examination programme referred to in
regulation 13, shall contain the following
(a)
an indication of how the competent authority intends to carry
out its tasks and allocate its resources;
(b)
an identification of which investment firms are intended to be
subject to enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision
as set out in paragraph 3;
(c)
a plan for inspections at the premises used by an investment
firm, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member
States in accordance with regulation 7 of these regulations and regulations 3,
10, and 19 of the Supervisory Consolidation Regulations.
(2) Supervisory examination programmes shall include the following
investment firms
(a)
investment firms for which the results of the stress tests referred
to in points (a) and (g) of paragraph (1) of Schedule I and regulation 14, or
the outcome of the supervisory review and evaluation process under
regulation 11, indicate significant risks to their on going financial soundness
or indicate breaches of the Act and any regulations and rules issued
thereunder transposing the requirements of the CRD regulations and of the
CRR;
(b)
investment firms that pose systemic risk to the financial system;
(c)
any other investment firm for which the competent authority
deem it to be necessary.
(3) Where appropriate under regulation 11 the following measures shall, in
particular, be taken if necessary
(a)
an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections of
the investment firm;
(b)
a permanent presence of the competent authority at the
investment firm;
(c)
additional or more frequent reporting by the investment firm;
(d)
additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic
or business plans of the investment firm;
(e)
thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely
to materialise.
(4) Adoption of a supervisory examination programme by a home Member
State European regulatory authority with respect to a European Investment Firm
which has established a branch in Malta, shall not prevent the competent authority
in its capacity as the host Member State from carrying out, on a case-by-case basis,
on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of
investment firms in Malta in accordance with the Act and these regulations.
(1)
The Malta Financial Services Authority established Designation and
by the Malta Financial Services Authority Act shall be the designated powers
competent
competent authority in Malta for the purposes of implementing the authority.
relevant provisions of the CRD and the CRR and any reference in
these regulations to the competent authority shall be read and
construed accordingly.
(2) The competent authority shall exercise all the functions,
obligations and powers pursuant to the CRD and the CRR and shall
satisfy all the requirements imposed on competent authorities by the
CRD and the CRR.
SUPERVISORY POWERS
(Regulations 11, 16, 17, paragraph (4) Schedule I, and regulation 15(4))
(1) For the purposes of regulations 11, 16, 17 and paragraph (4) of Schedule
I, regulation 15(4), and the application of the CRR, the competent authority shall
have at least the following powers
(a)
to require investment firms to hold own funds in excess of the
requirements set out in Investment Services Rules transposing the
requirements of Chapter 4 of Title VII of the CRD, and in the CRR relating to
elements of risks and risks not covered by Article 1 of the CRR;
(b)
to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes,
mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with the Investment
Services Rules transposing the requirements of Articles 73 and 74 of the
CRD and regulation 8 of these regulations;
(c)
to require investment firms to present a plan to restore
compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to the Act, regulations or
Investment Services Rules issued thereunder, and to the CRR and set a
deadline for its implementation, including improvements to that plan
regarding scope and deadline;
(d)
to require investment firms to apply a specific provisioning
policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements;
(e)
to restrict or limit the business, operations or network of
institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks
to the soundness of an investment firm;
(f)
to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities,
products and systems of investment firms;
(g)
to require investment firms to limit variable remuneration as a
percentage of net revenues where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a
sound capital base;
(h)
to require investment firms to use net profits to strengthen own
funds;
(i)
to restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an
investment firm to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1
instruments within the meaning of the CRR, where the prohibition does not
constitute an event of default of the investment firm;
(j)
to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements,
including reporting on capital and liquidity positions;
(k)
to impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions
on maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities;
(l)
to require additional disclosures.
(2) The additional own funds requirements referred to in paragraph 1(a) of
this Schedule, shall be imposed by the competent authority at least where
(a)
an investment firm does not meet the requirement set out in the
Investment Services Rules transposing articles 73 and 74 of the CRD and
regulation 8 of these regulations or in Article 393 of the CRR;
(b)
risks or elements of risks are not covered by the own funds
requirements set out in Investment Services Rules transposing the
requirements of Chapter 4 of Title VII of the CRD or in the CRR;
(c)
the sole application of other administrative measures is unlikely
to improve the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies
sufficiently within an appropriate timeframe;
(d)
the review referred to in paragraph (4) of Schedule I and
regulation 15(4), reveals that the non-compliance with the requirements for
the application of the respective approach will likely lead to inadequate own
funds requirements;
(e)
the risks are likely to be underestimated despite compliance with
the applicable requirements of the Act, regulations or the Investment services
Rules issued thereunder, and of the CRR; or
(f)
an investment firm reports to the competent authority in
accordance with Article 377(5) of the CRR that the stress test results referred
to in that Article materially exceed its own funds requirement for the
correlation trading portfolio.
(3) For the purposes of determining the appropriate level of own funds on
the basis of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with these
regulations, the competent authority shall assess whether any imposition of an
additional own funds requirement in excess of the own funds requirement is
necessary to capture risks to which an investment firm is or might be exposed,
taking into account the following
(a)
the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an institution's
assessment process referred to in the Investment services rules;
(b)
an institution's arrangements, processes and mechanisms
referred to in the Investment Services Rules and regulation 8 of these
regulations;
(c)
the outcome of the review and evaluation carried out in
accordance with regulations 11 and 15 of these regulations;
(d)
the assessment of systemic risk.
In the exercise of its duties, the competent authority shall Co-operation
take into account the convergence in respect of supervisory tools and within
European
supervisory practices in the application of the laws, regulations and system
financial
administrative requirements adopted pursuant to the CRD and the supervision.
CRR. For that purpose, the competent authority
(a)
as party to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and
full mutual respect, in particular when ensuring the flow of
appropriate and reliable information between the other parties to
the ESFS in accordance with the principle of sincere
cooperation set out in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European
Union;
(b)
shall participate in the activities of the EBA and, as
appropriate, in the colleges of supervisors;
(c)
shall make every effort to comply with those
guidelines and recommendations issued by the EBA in
accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010
and to respond to the warnings and recommendations issued by
the ESRB pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No. 1092/
2010;
(d)
shall cooperate closely with the ESRB;
(e)
shall not be inhibited by other national legislative
provisions in the performance of its duties as member of the
EBA and the ESRB, or its duties under the CRD and the CRR.
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
(Regulation 22)
(1) The competent authority shall publish the following information
pursuant to regulation 22 herein
(a)
the general criteria and methodologies adopted to review
compliance with Articles 405 to 409 of the CRR;
(b)
without prejudice to the confidentiality provisions in the Act, a
summary description of the outcome of the supervisory review and
description of the measures imposed in cases of non-compliance with
Articles 405 to 409 of the CRR identified on an annual basis.
(2) If the competent authority exercises the discretion laid down in Article
7(3) of the CRR it shall publish the following information
(a)
the criteria it applies to determine that there is no current or
foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own
funds or repayment of liabilities;
(b)
the number of parent investment firms or credit institutions
which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of
the CRR and the number of those which incorporate subsidiaries in a third
country;
(c)
on an aggregate basis for Malta
(i) the total amount of own funds on the consolidated basis of
the parent investment firm or credit institution in Malta, which benefits
from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of the CRR,
which are held in subsidiaries in a third country;
(ii) the percentage of total own funds on the consolidated basis
of parent investment firms in Malta which benefit from the exercise of
the discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of the CRR, represented by own
funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country;
(iii) the percentage of total own funds required under Article 92
of the CRR on the consolidated basis of parent investment firms or
credit institutions in Malta, which benefit from the exercise of the
discretion laid down in Article 7(3) of the CRR, represented by own
funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country.
(3) If the competent authority exercises the discretion laid down in Article
9(1) of the CRR it shall publish all the following
(a)
the criteria it applies to determine that there is no current or
foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own
funds or repayment of liabilities;
(b)
the number of parent investment firms or credit institutions
which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of
the CRR and the number of such parent investment firms which incorporate
subsidiaries in a third country;
(c)
on an aggregate basis for Malta
(i) the total amount of own funds of parent investment firms
which benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article
9(1) of the CRR which are held in subsidiaries in a third country;
(ii) the percentage of total own funds of parent investment
firms or credit institutions which benefit from the exercise of the
discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of the CRR represented by own
funds which are held in subsidiaries in a third country;
(iii) the percentage of total own funds required under Article 92
of the CRR of parent investment firms or credit institutions which
benefit from the exercise of the discretion laid down in Article 9(1) of
the CRR represented by own funds which are held in subsidiaries in a
third country.
The competent authority shall, in the exercise of its general Union
duties, duly consider the potential impact of its decisions on the dimension
supervision.
stability of the financial system in the other Member States concerned
and, in particular, in emergency situations, based on the information
available at the relevant time.
BODIES WITH WHOM THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY MAY
EXCHANGE INFORMATION
(Regulation 6)
The competent authority may exchange information with
(1) Other European regulatory authorities and may transmit information to
the ESRB, EBA, or ESMA in accordance with the CRD, the CRR and with article
15 of Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010, with Articles 31, 35 and 36 of Regulation
(EU) No. 1093/2010 and with Articles 31 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No. 1095/
2010;
(2) Authorities entrusted with the public duty of supervising other financial
sector entities and the authorities responsible for the supervision of financial
markets;
(3) Authorities or bodies charged with responsibility for maintaining the
stability of the financial system in Member States through the use of macro
prudential rules;
(4) Reorganisation bodies or authorities aiming at protecting the stability of
the financial system;
(5) Contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article
113(7) of the CRR;
(6) Bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of institutions and in
other similar procedures;
(7) Persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of
institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions;
(8) Bodies which administer deposit-guarantee schemes and investor
compensation schemes of information necessary for the exercise of their functions;
(9) Authorities responsible for overseeing
(a)
the bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of
institutions and in other similar procedures;
(b)
contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in
Article 113(7) of the CRR;
(c)
persons charged with carrying out statutory audits of the
accounts of institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions;
In the cases referred to sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) above, the exchange of
information shall be subject to the following conditions
(i) that the information is exchanged for the purpose of
performing the tasks referred to;
(ii) (ii) where the information originates in another Member
State, that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the
authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for
the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement;
(10) (a)
Authorities or bodies responsible under law for the detection
and investigation of breaches of company law subject to the following conditions
(i) that the information is exchanged for the purpose of
detecting and investigating breaches of company law;
(ii) where the information originates in another Member State,
that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the authorities
which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes
for which those authorities gave their agreement.
(b)
Where the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph (a)
above perform their task of detection or investigation with the aid, in view of their
specific competence, of persons appointed for that purpose and not employed in
the public sector, information may be exchanged with such persons under the
conditions specified in points (i) and (ii) of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph.
The competent authority shall communicate to the EBA the names of the
authorities or bodies which may receive information pursuant to this Article;
(11) ESCB central banks and other bodies with a similar function in their
capacity as monetary authorities when the information is relevant for the exercise
of their respective statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy and
related liquidity provisions, oversight of payments, clearing and settlement
systems and the safeguarding of stability of the financial system;
(12) Contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article
113(7) of the CRR;
(13) Other public authorities responsible for overseeing payment systems
where appropriate;
(14) The ESRB, EIOPA and ESMA, where that information is relevant for
the exercise of their tasks under Regulations (EU) No 1092/2010, (EU) No 1094/
2010 or (EU) No. 1095/2010;
(15) In an emergency situation as referred to in regulation 5 of the
Supervisory Consolidation Regulations, the competent authority shall
communicate, without delay, information to the ESCB central banks where that
information is relevant for the exercise of their statutory tasks, including the
conduct of monetary policy and related liquidity provision, the oversight of
payments, clearing and settlement systems, and the safeguarding of the stability of
the financial system, and to the ESRB where such information is relevant for the
exercise of its statutory tasks;
(16) (1)
Other departments of Member States central government
administrations responsible for law on the supervision of institutions, financial
institutions and insurance undertakings and to inspectors acting on behalf of those
departments provided that
(a)
such disclosures may be made only where necessary for reasons
of prudential supervision, and prevention and resolution of failing
institutions.
(b)
persons having access to such information shall be subject to
professional secrecy.
(2) In an emergency situation as referred to in Article 114(1) of the CRD, to
disclose information which is relevant to the departments referred to in the first
subparagraph of this article in all Member States concerned;
(17) (1)
Parliamentary enquiry committees, courts of auditors and other
entities in charge of enquiries relating to the prudential supervision of institutions
in Malta, subject to the following conditions
(a)
that the entities have a precise mandate under national law to
investigate or scrutinise the actions of authorities responsible for the
supervision of institutions or for laws on such supervision;
(b)
that the information is strictly necessary for fulfilling the
mandate referred to in sub-paragraph (a);
(c)
the persons with access to the information are subject to
professional secrecy requirements under national law;
(d)
where the information originates in another Member State that it
is not disclosed without the express agreement of the authorities which have
disclosed it and, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their
agreement.
(2) Information received pursuant to paragraphs (1) to (8) inclusive of this
Schedule, and information obtained by means of an on-the-spot check or
inspection referred to in regulation 7 of these regulations, shall not be disclosed to
the bodies referred to in paragraphs 16 and 17(1) of this Schedule save with the
express consent of the authorities which disclosed the information or of the
authorities of the Member State in which such an on-the-spot check or inspection
was carried out.
(18) (1)
Recognised clearing houses or other similar bodies responsible
for the provision of clearing or settlement services in order to ensure the proper
functioning of those bodies in relation to defaults or potential defaults by market
participants of the information referred to in paragraph (1) of this Schedule and
articles 17(7) and 17F of the Act.
(2) The information received under paragraph (1) of this Schedule shall not
be disclosed in the circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph
without the express consent of the competent authorities, which have disclosed it.
€1.17
(1)
The competent authority shall collaborate closely
with European regulatory authorities in order to supervise the
activities of investment firms and operating in particular through a
branch, in one or more Member States other than Malta. The
competent authority shall supply all information concerning the
management and ownership of such investment firms to the relevant
European regulatory authorities in the Member States concerned, that
is likely to facilitate their supervision and the examination of the
conditions for their licensing, and all information likely to facilitate
the monitoring of investment firms, in particular with regard to
liquidity, solvency, the limiting of large exposures, other factors that
may influence the systemic risk posed by the investment firm,
administrative and accounting procedures and internal control
mechanisms.
(2) The competent authority shall provide the European
regulatory authorities of the host Member State immediately with any
information and findings pertaining to liquidity supervision in
accordance with Part Six of the CRR and the Supervisory
Consolidation Regulations, 2013, of the activities performed by an
investment firm through its branches, to the extent that such
information and findings are relevant to the protection of investors in
the host Member State.
(3) The competent authority shall inform the European
regulatory authorities of all the investment firms’ host Member States
immediately where liquidity stress occurs or can reasonably be
expected to occur. That information shall also include details about
the planning and implementation of a recovery plan and about any
prudential supervisory measures taken in that context.
(4) (a)
Where Malta is the home member state of the
investment firm, the competent authority shall communicate and
explain upon request to the European regulatory authorities of the
host Member State of that investment firms’ branch, how information
and findings provided by the latter have been taken into account.
(b)
Where the competent authority disagrees with the
measures to be taken by the European regulatory authority of the host
Member State in relation to the information and findings referred to
in paragraph (a), the competent authority may refer the matter to the
EBA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010.
(c)
Where Malta is the host member state of a branch
belonging to a European investment firm and the competent authority,
following communication by the European regulatory authority of the
said European investment firm, of information and findings relating
to the said European investment firm, maintains that no appropriate
measures have been taken by the said European regulatory authority,
the competent authority may, after informing the European regulatory
authority concerned and the EBA, take appropriate measures to
prevent further breaches in order to protect the interests of investors
and others to whom services are provided or to protect the stability of
the financial system.
(5) The competent authority may refer to the EBA situations
where a request for collaboration to a European regulatory authority,
in particular to exchange information, has been rejected or has not
been acted upon within a reasonable time.
(6) The competent authority may exchange information with
the bodies listed and in the manner specified in Schedule V for the
better carrying out of its supervisory functions in accordance with the
CRD and the CRR
Provided that the information received or exchanged by the
competent authority or by its officers, employees or agents as well as
inspectors, auditors and experts engaged by the competent authority,
from the bodies listed in the said Schedule, shall be treated as
confidential and protected by the duty of professional secrecy.
(1)
Where a European investment firm carries out its On the spot
activities through a branch in Malta, the competent authority may checks
inspection of
permit the European regulatory authority of the home Member State branches
another Member
concerned, after it has notified the competent authority, to carry out, State.
itself or through an intermediary appointed for that purpose, on-the-
spot checks of the information referred to in regulation 6 and
inspections of such branches.
(2) For the purposes of sub-regulation (1), the European
regulatory authority may request the competent authority to carry out
the on-the-spot checks referred to in the said sub-regulation on its
behalf, in accordance with the procedures set out in regulation 12 of
the Supervisory Consolidation Regulations, 2013.
L.N.
(3) The competent authority may carry out, on a case-by-case
basis, on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out
by branches of European investment firms in Malta and require
information from a branch about its activities and for supervisory
purposes, where it considers it relevant for reasons of stability of the
financial system in Malta. Before carrying out such checks and
inspections, the competent authority shall consult the European
regulatory authority of the home Member State concerned.
(4) On-the-spot checks and inspections of branches when
carried out in Malta shall be conducted in accordance with the laws of
Malta.
(5) After the checks and inspections referred to in sub-
regulation (4), the competent authority shall communicate to the
European regulatory authority of the home Member State, the
information obtained and findings that are relevant for the risk
assessment of the investment firm or the stability of the financial
system in Malta.
(6) When determining the supervisory examination
programme referred to in regulation 13, the competent authority shall
duly take into account the information and findings provided by the
European regulatory authority of a host Member State pursuant to its
on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by
branches of investment firms, and shall also have regard to the
stability of the financial system in the host Member State concerned
Provided that the European regulatory authority may also,
for the purposes of the inspection of branches, have recourse to one of
the other procedures set out in regulation 12 of the Supervisory
Consolidation Regulations, 2013.
(1)
The competent authority shall ensure that an
investment firm has in place an appropriate recovery plan for the
restoration of that firm’s financial situation following a significant
deterioration, and that such restoration plans are put into place, as
well as the relevant resolution plans.
(2) The requirements for an investment firm to draw up,
maintain
and
update
recovery
plans
and
for
the
resolution authority to prepare resolution plans after consultation with
the competent authority, may be reduced if, after consultation with
the Central Bank of Malta, the competent authority considers that the
failure of a specific investment firm due, inter alia, to its size, to its
business model, to its inter-connectedness to other institutions, or to
the financial system in general, will not have a negative effect on the
financial markets, o1stn other investment firms or on funding
conditions.
(3) The competent authority shall inform the EBA in advance
of the meetings relating to the development and coordination of
recovery and resolution plans so as to enable the EBA to fully
participate in and contribute to the development and coordination of
effective and consistent recovery and resolution plans. The competent
authority shall inform the EBA of the main issues to be discussed
during the meetings and of the activities to be considered.
(1)
The competent authority shall collect the Oversight of
information disclosed publicly by investment firms in relation to remuneration.
points (g), (h) and (i) of Article 450(1) of the CRR and shall use it to
benchmark remuneration trends and practices and shall provide this
information to the EBA.
(2) The competent authority shall collect information on the
number of natural persons per investment firm that are remunerated
EUR 1 million or more per financial year, in pay brackets of €1
million, including data on their work responsibilities, the business
area involved and the main elements of their salary, including
bonuses, long-service awards and pension contributions, and shall
forward this information to the EBA.
(1)
Where the competent authority chooses to develop Supervisory
specific portfolios of internal approaches permitted to be used by benchmarking
of internal
investment firms, it shall do so in consultation with the EBA and shall approaches.
ensure that investment firms report the results of the calculations for
these specific portfolios separately from the results of the calculations
for the benchmark portfolios required under Article 78 of the CRD.
(2) The competent authority shall, on the basis of the
information submitted by investment firms, monitor the range of risk
weighted exposure amounts or own funds requirements, as
applicable, except for operational risk, for the exposures or
transactions in the benchmark portfolio resulting from the internal
approaches of those investment firms. The competent authority shall
make an assessment at least annually of the quality of those
approaches paying particular attention to
(a)
those approaches that exhibit significant
differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure;
(b)
approaches where there is particularly high or low
diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic
under-estimation of own funds requirements.
(3) Where particular investment firms diverge significantly
from the majority of their peers or where there is little commonality
in approach leading to a wide variance of results, the competent
authority shall investigate the reasons therefor and, if it can be clearly
identified that an investment firm’s approach leads to an
underestimation of own funds requirements which is not attributable
to differences in the underlying risks of the exposures or positions,
the competent authority shall take corrective action.
(4) The competent authority shall ensure that its decisions on
the appropriateness of corrective actions as referred to in sub-
regulation (3) comply with the principle that such actions must
maintain the objectives of an internal approach and therefore do not
(a)
lead to standardisation or preferred methods;
(b)
create wrong incentives; or
(c)
cause herd behaviour.
(1)
The competent authority shall, taking into account
the technical criteria set out in Schedule I, review the arrangements,
strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by investment
firms to comply with the CRR, the Act, regulations or Investment
Services Rules issued thereunder and evaluate
(a)
risks to which investment firms are or might be
exposed;
(b)
risks that an investment firm poses to the financial
system taking into account the EBA’s technical criteria for the
identification and measurement of systemic risk in terms of
Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, or
recommendations of the ESRB, where appropriate; and
(c)
risks revealed by stress testing taking into account
the nature, scale and complexity of an investment firm’s
activities.
(2) The scope of the review and evaluation referred to in sub-
regulation (1) shall cover all requirements of the CRR, the Act,
regulations or Investment Services Rules issued thereunder.
(3) On the basis of the review and evaluation referred to in
sub-regulation (1), the competent authority shall determine whether
the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented
by investment firms and the own funds and liquidity held by them
ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks.
(4) The competent authority shall establish the frequency and
intensity of the review and evaluation referred to in sub-regulation (1)
having regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and
complexity of the activities of the investment firm concerned and
taking into account the principle of proportionality. The review and
evaluation shall be updated at least on an annual basis for investment
firms covered by the supervisory examination programme referred to
in regulation 13.
(5) Where a review shows that an investment firm may pose
systemic risk in accordance with the EBA’s technical criteria for the
identification and measurement of systemic risk established in terms
of Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, the competent
authority shall inform the EBA without delay about the results of the
review.
In carrying out its supervisory review and evaluation the Criteria for
competent authority shall apply the technical and other criteria set out supervisory
review and
in Schedule I.
evaluation.
The competent authority shall adopt an annual supervisory Supervisory
examination programme for the investment firms it supervises. Such examination
programme.
programme shall take into account the supervisory review and
evaluation process referred to in regulation 11, and shall contain the
elements set out in Schedule II.
The competent authority shall carry out as appropriate but Supervisory
at least annually, supervisory stress tests on investment firms it stress testing.
supervises, to facilitate the review and evaluation process under
regulation 11.
(1)
The competent authority shall review on a regular Ongoing review
basis, and at least every three years, investment firms’ compliance of
use internal
with the requirements regarding approaches that require permission approaches.
by the competent authority for the calculation of own funds
requirements in accordance with Part Three of the CRR. In this regard
it shall take cognizance of changes in an investment firm’s business
and to the implementation of those approaches to new products.
Where material deficiencies are identified in risk capture by an
investment firm’s internal approach, the competent authority shall
ensure they are rectified or take appropriate steps to mitigate their
consequences, including by imposing higher multiplication factors, or
imposing capital add-ons, or taking other appropriate and effective
measures.
(2) The competent authority shall in particular review and
assess whether the investment firm uses well developed and up-to-
date techniques and practices for those approaches.
(3) If for an internal market risk model numerous
overshootings as referred to in Article 366 of the CRR indicate that
the model is not or is no longer sufficiently accurate, the competent
authority shall revoke the permission for using the internal model or
impose appropriate measures to ensure that the model is improved
promptly.
(4) If an investment firm has received permission from the
competent authority to apply an approach for the calculation of own
funds requirements in accordance with Part Three of the CRR but no
longer meets the requirements for applying that approach, the
competent authority shall require the investment firm to either
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the
effect of non-compliance is immaterial, where applicable in
accordance with the requirements of the CRR, or present a plan for
the timely restoration of compliance with the requirements and set a
deadline for its implementation. The competent authority shall
require improvements to that plan if it is unlikely to result in full
compliance or if the deadline is inappropriate. If the investment firm
is unlikely to be able to restore compliance within an appropriate
deadline and, where applicable, has not satisfactorily demonstrated
that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial, the permission to use
the approach shall be revoked or limited to compliant areas or those
where compliance can be achieved within an appropriate deadline.
(5) The competent authority shall take into account the
analysis carried out by the EBA in terms of Article 101(5) of the CRD
and the guidelines containing benchmarks on the basis of that
analysis issued by the EBA, for the review of the permissions it grants
to investment firms to use internal approaches for the calculations of
own funds requirements.
(1)
The competent authority shall require an
investment firm to take the necessary measures at an early stage to
address relevant problems in circumstances where
(a)
the investment firm does not meet the requirements
of the Act, regulations or Investment Services Rules issued
thereunder, transposing the requirements of the CRD or of the
CRR;
(b)
the competent authority has evidence that the
investment firm is likely to breach the Act, regulations or
Investment Services Rules issued thereunder, or the provisions
of the CRR, within the following twelve months.
(2) For the purposes of sub-regulation (1), the powers of the
competent authority shall include those contained in Schedule III.
(1)
Where the competent authority determines that Application of
investment firms with similar risk profiles such as similar business supervisory
measures to
models or geographical location of exposures, are or might be institutions
similar risk
exposed to similar risks or pose similar risks to the financial system profiles.
or cause or contribute to systemic risk, it may apply the supervisory
review and evaluation process referred to in regulation 11, to those
investment firms in a similar or identical manner and the competent
authority shall notify the EBA accordingly.
(2) For this purpose, the competent authority shall have the
necessary legal power to impose the requirements under the CRD and
under the CRR on the investment firms referred to in sub-article (1) in
a similar or identical manner, including in particular the exercise of
supervisory powers contained in Schedule III, regulation 18 and
Investment Services Rules transposing the requirements of Article
106 of the CRD.
(3) The type of investment firms referred to in sub-regulation
(1) may be determined in accordance with the criteria referred to in
paragraph (1)(j) of Schedule I.
(1)
For the purposes of determining the appropriate Specific
level of liquidity requirements on the basis of the review and liquidity
requirements.
evaluation carried out in accordance with these regulations, the
competent authority shall assess whether any imposition of a specific
liquidity requirement is necessary to capture liquidity risks to which
an investment firm is or might be exposed, taking into account the
following
(a)
the particular business model of the investment
firm;
(b)
the investment firm’s arrangements, processes and
mechanisms in relation to liquidity risk as referred to in the
Investment services Rules and these regulations;
(c)
the outcome of the review and evaluation carried
out in accordance with regulation 11;
(d)
systemic liquidity risk that threatens the integrity
of the financial markets in Malta.
(2) In particular, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Act, the regulations and the Investment Services Rules transposing
the requirements of Article 67 of the CRD, the competent authority
will consider the need to apply administrative penalties or other
administrative measures, including prudential charges, proportionate
to the disparity between the actual liquidity position of an investment
firm and any liquidity and stable funding requirements established by
the competent authority or at European Union level.
(3) The competent authority shall monitor developments in
relation to liquidity risk profiles, for example, product design and
volumes, risk management, funding policies and funding
concentrations.
(4) The competent authority shall take effective action where
developments referred to in sub-regulation (2) may lead to systemic
instability or instability of the investment firm itself.
(5) The competent authority shall inform the EBA about any
actions carried out pursuant to sub-regulation (3).
The competent authority shall inform the EBA of
(a)
the functioning of its review and evaluation process
referred to in regulation 11;
(b)
the methodology used to reach decisions in relation
to the technical criteria for supervisory review contained in
Schedule I, the supervisory stress testing in regulation 14, the
review of internal approaches in regulation 15, the supervisory
measures in regulation 16, the supervisory powers contained in
Schedule III and the specific liquidity requirements in
regulation 18, when engaging in this process.
(1)
The competent authority shall apply the review and
evaluation process and the supervisory measures referred to in these
regulations in accordance with the level of application of the
requirements of Part One, Title II of the CRR.
(2) Where the competent authority waives the application of
own funds requirements on a consolidated basis as provided for in
Article 15 of the CRR, the requirements of regulation 11 shall apply
to the supervision of investment firms on an individual basis.
(1)
The competent authority shall publish the
following information in accordance with the Commission technical
standards adopted
(a)
the texts of laws, regulations, administrative rules
and general guidance adopted in Malta in the field of prudential
regulation;
(b)
the general criteria and methodologies it uses in the
review and evaluation pursuant to regulation 11;
(c)
the manner of exercise of the options and
discretions available in European Union law;
(d)
without prejudice to the confidentiality provisions
of the Act, aggregate statistical data on key aspects of the
implementation of the prudential framework in Malta, including
the number and nature of supervisory measures taken and of
administrative penalties imposed in terms of the Act.
(2) The information published in accordance with sub-
regulation (1) shall be sufficient to enable a meaningful comparison
of the approaches adopted by the European regulatory authorities.
The disclosures shall be published following a common format and
updated regularly. The disclosures shall be accessible at a single
electronic location.
For the purpose of Part Five of the CRR relating to Publication of
exposures to transferred credit risks, the competent authority shall information
relating to
publish the information set out in Schedule IV.
exposures to
transferred
credit risks.
Miscellaneous
In encouraging certain investment firms to develop Reliance on
internal credit risk assessment capacity and to increase use of internal credit
the purposes of
ratings based approach for calculating own funds requirements, the assessing
creditworthiness
competent authority shall monitor, taking into account the nature, of an entity or
scale and complexity of the investment firms’ activities, that such financial
instrument.
investment firms do not solely or mechanistically rely on external
credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or
financial instrument.
The competent authority shall inform the EBA of any Notification to
authorisations it issues to the members of an investment firm’s the EBA.
management body to hold one additional non-executive directorship
in terms of Article 91 of the CRD.
The competent authority shall collect the information Benchmarking
disclosed in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of the CRR and shall of
practices by the
use it to benchmark diversity practices. The competent authority shall competent
authority.
provide that information to the EBA.
The competent authority, when processing personal data Data protection.
for the purposes of the CRD, shall do so in accordance with Directive
95/46/EC and, where relevant, with Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001.
Transitory Provisions
The provisions of regulation 6, shall not apply until the Applicability of
date on which the liquidity coverage requirement becomes applicable regulation 6.
in accordance with a delegated act adopted by the European
Commission pursuant to Article 460 of the CRR in accordance with
Article 151 of the CRD
Provided that until the date referred to in this regulation,
the provisions of regulation 6 shall be substituted with the following
"The competent authority shall collaborate closely in order
to supervise the activities of investment firms and operating, in
particular through a branch, in one or more Member States other
than Malta. The competent authority shall supply all
information concerning the management and ownership of such
investment firms to the relevant European Regulatory
authorities in the Member states concerned, that is likely to
facilitate their supervision and the examination of the conditions
for their licensing, and all information likely to facilitate the
monitoring of such investment firms, in particular with regard to
liquidity, solvency, the limiting of large exposures,
administrative and accounting procedures and internal control
mechanisms.".
The provisions of regulation 7 shall not apply until the date
on which the liquidity coverage requirement becomes applicable in
accordance with a delegated act adopted by the European
Commission pursuant to Article 460 of the CRR in accordance with
Article 151 of the CRD
Provided that until the date referred to in this regulation,
the provisions of regulation 7 shall be substituted with the following
"(1)
Where a European investment firm carries out its
activities through a branch in Malta, the competent authority
may permit the European regulatory authority of the home
Member State concerned, after it has notified the competent
authority, to carry out, itself or through an intermediary, on-the-
spot checks of the information referred to in regulation 6 of
these regulations.
(2)
The European regulatory authority of the European
investment firm referred to in sub-regulation (1) may also, for
the purposes of the inspection of branches have recourse to one
of the other procedures set out in regulation 12 of the
Supervisory Consolidation Regulations. 2013.
(3)
The provisions of sub-regulations (1) and (2) shall
not affect the right of the competent authority to carry out in the
discharge of its responsibilities under the CRD, on-the-spot
checks of branches established in Malta.".
Revocation
Revokes the
Investment
Services Act
The Investment Services
Act
(Capital
Adequacy)
(Capital
Adequacy
Regulations, 2008 are hereby revoked.
Regulations)
2008. L.N. 87 of 2008.