United Nations Sanctions (Iran)

L.N. 372 of 2010

NATIONAL INTEREST (ENABLING POWERS) ACT

(CAP. 365)

United Nations Sanctions (Iran)

(Further Sanctions) Regulations, 2010

IN exercise of the powers conferred by article 3 of the

National Interest (Enabling Powers) Act, the Prime Minister has

made the following regulations:-

The title of these regulations is the United Nations

Sanctions (Iran) (Further Sanctions) Regulations, 2010.

In these regulations, unless the context otherwise Interpretation.

requires –

“the Act” means the National Interest (Enabling Powers)

Act;

“Annex I” means Annex I to the Resolution referred to

in regulation 3;

“Annex II” means Annex II to the Resolution referred to

in regulation 3;

“Annex III” means Annex III to the Resolution referred

to in regulation 3;

“the Committee” means the Committee of the Security

Council of the United Nations referred to in the United

Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations;

“the IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy

Agency;

“Iran” means the Islamic Republic of Iran;

“the IRGC” means the Islamic Revolutionary Guard

Corps referred to in paragraph 12 of the Resolution referred

to in regulation 3;

“the IRISL” means the Islamic Republic of Iran

Shipping Lines referred to in paragraph 19 of the Resolution

referred to in regulation 3;

“prohibited items” means the items referred to in

Regulation 4 of the United Nations Sanctions (Iran)

Regulations, Regulation 6 of the United Nations Sanctions

(Iran) (Further Sanctions) Regulations, and Regulation 7

of the United Nations Sanctions (Iran) (Further Sanctions)

(2008) Regulations;

“the Resolution” means the Resolution referred to in

regulation 3;

“the Security Council” means the Security Council of

the United Nations.

For the purpose of article 3 (4) of the Act, Resolution

number 1929 (2010) adopted by the Security Council of the United

Nations on the 9th June, 2010 is published in the English language

in the Schedule to these regulations.

It shall be unlawful for citizens of Malta, or companies

registered in Malta, or using Malta’s flag vessels or aircraft, or

for persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction,

to engage in any commercial activity involving uranium mining,

production or use of nuclear materials and technology as designated

by the IAEA, with Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in

Iran or subject to its jurisdiction.

It shall be unlawful to supply, sell or transfer directly

or indirectly from Malta or by citizens of Malta, using Malta’s

flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and

whether or not originating from Malta, of

a) any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large

calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,

warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the

purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional

Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts or items as

determined by the Security Council or the Committee;

b) any technical training, financial resources or

services, advice, other services or assistance related to the

supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or

use of such arms and related materiel; or

c) any transfer of technology or technical assistance

related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear

weapons;

d) any items that could contribute to enrichment-

related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to

the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

(1) The entry into or transit through the territory of Prohibition of

Malta of persons referred to in Regulation 4 (1) of the United entry

Nations Sanctions (Iran) (Further Sanctions) (2008) Regulations, of Malta.

or of persons designated in Annexes I and II, or by the Security

Council or the Committee shall be prohibited

Provided such entry or transit is not for activities directly

related to the provision to Iran of

(a) equipment for light water reactors; or

(b) low-enriched uranium when it is incorporated in

assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-regulation (1) shall

oblige Malta from refusing entry into its territory to any of its own

citizens.

(3) The measures imposed by sub-regulation (1) shall

not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis

that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need,

including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes

that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the

Resolution.

(1) Any funds, other financial assets and economic Freezing of funds

resources which are in Malta on or after the 9th June, 2010 and and assets.

that are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the IRGC, the

IRISL, or the persons or entities designated in Annexes I, II and

III, or any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their

direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as well as those

of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council

or by the Committee, shall be immediately frozen and shall remain

so frozen until such time as the Security Council or the Committee

removes such persons or entities from the Annex.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any citizen of Malta or any

persons or entities in Malta to make available any funds, financial

assets or economic resources to or for the benefit of the persons

and entities mentioned in sub-regulation (1).

(3) The provisions of this regulation shall not apply to

funds, other financial assets and economic resources that have been

determined by the authorities of Malta

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including

payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and

medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public

utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable

professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses

associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or

service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen

funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after

notification to the Committee of the intention to authorise,

where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial

assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative

decision by the Committee within five working days of such

notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses,

provided that such determination has been notified to the

Committee and approved by it; or

(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or

arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other

financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy

that lien or judgement

Provided that such lien or judgement was entered into

prior to the 9th June, 2010 and is not for the benefit of a

person or entity designated pursuant to regulation 6 or sub-

regulation (1), and that it has been notified to the Committee.

(4) Nothing contained in sub-regulation (1) shall

prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due

under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or

entity, provided that

(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited

nuclear weapon-related items, assistance, training, financial

assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in

regulations 4 and 5; and

(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received

by a person or entity designated pursuant to sub-regulation

(1).

It shall be unlawful to provide, from Malta or by Prohibition of

citizens of Malta, or using Malta’s flag vessels or aircraft, bunkering services.

bunkering services, including the provision of fuel or supplies,

or other servicing of vessels, to vessels owned or contracted by

Iran, including chartered vessels, where such vessels are carrying

prohibited items

Provided that the provision of such services is not

necessary for humanitarian purposes.

It shall be unlawful to provide financial services, Prohibition of

including insurance or re-insurance, or to transfer to, through, provision

or from the territory of Malta, or to or by citizens of Malta or

companies registered in Malta, or persons or financial institutions

operating in the territory of Malta, of any financial or other assets

or resources, where such services, assets or resources could

contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the

development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

It shall be unlawful for banks registered in Iran to open Prohibition of opening

new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices in Malta, as of

well as to provide financial services, establish new joint ventures,

take an ownership interest in or establish or maintain correspondent

relationships with banks in Malta, where such activities could

contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the

development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

It shall be unlawful for financial institutions in Malta

or registered in Malta from opening representative offices or

subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran, where such financial

services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear

activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

Any person found guilty of an offence against these

regulations shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine (multa) not

exceeding one hundred and sixteen thousand and four hundred and

sixty-eight euro (116,468).

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S /RES/1929 (2010)

United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General

9 June 2010

Resolution 1929 (2010)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on

9 June 2010

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions

1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009)

and reaffirming their provisions,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their

obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and

II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),

which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global

non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of

weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February

2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006

(GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007

(GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48),

15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008

(GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008

(GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35),

28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February

2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and

sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy

water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747

(2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the

Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining

issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military

dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the

IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council

*1039679*

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resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are

essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built

in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding

positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have

made on Iran,

Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic

Revolution”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006),

Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran’s

proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon

delivery systems,

Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at

Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and

that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent

with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,

Also noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82),

which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the

facility’s purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to

confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or

authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been

declared to the IAEA,

Noting with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and

did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing

safeguards procedures,

Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify

design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified

Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards

Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the

IAEA’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which

is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material

at, a facility,

Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly

supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for

its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme,

Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of

resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the

requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a

diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for

exclusively peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a

negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for

peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards

an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a

confidence-building measure,

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Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of

Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,

Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United

Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on

exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through

negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June

2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting the confirmation by these countries that

once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner

as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to

assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737

(2006) and 1803 (2008), and recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance

over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as

to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities,

or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable

growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran’s

revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-

sensitive nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and

materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those

required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,

Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean

activities,

Calling for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by

Iran at an early date,

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to

persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007)

and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s

development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile

programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives

of these resolutions have been met,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear

programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United

Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or

actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the

threat of force,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Affirms that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA

1. Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747

(2007) and 1803 (2008);

Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the

2. IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which

are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear

programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns

raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its

obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further

affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph

2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

Reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding

3. issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military

dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access

without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the

IAEA, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary

resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;

Requests the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the

4. Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;

Decides that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without

5. qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the

application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards

Agreement, calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the

Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on

18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and

reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran’s Safeguards

Agreement, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including

modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and notes

that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the

provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;

Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous

6. resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related

activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment,

reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing

construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related

facility;

Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity

7. in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials

and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium-

enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology-

related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further

decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their

jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its

jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or

by entities owned or controlled by them;

Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or

8. transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals

subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not

originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large

calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or

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missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of

Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as

determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to

resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall

prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of

technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or

assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance

or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to

exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision,

manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic

9. missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic

missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the

transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the

entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D

and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of

resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security

Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006),

except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to

Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in

accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), underlines that nothing in

this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory,

and decides that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the

Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the

grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the

Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of

this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of

resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in

Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or

at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through

illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the

Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions

of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803

(2008) or this resolution;

12. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of

resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

(IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”)

individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities

acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by

them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance

over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s

proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon

delivery systems;

Decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3,

4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be

superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and

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resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9

of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian

purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed

of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal

economic activities;

Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national

authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law

of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from

Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has

information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the

supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of

resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of

resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of

ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law

of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of

the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is

information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items

the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of

resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of

resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of

ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and

dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring

to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the

supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of

resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of

resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in

inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is

not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council

resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties

to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to

paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an

initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the

inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was

provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States

to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing

relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the

transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if

this information is not in the initial report;

Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or

from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or

other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including

chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to

believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is

prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of

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resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9

of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian

purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed

of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal

economic activities;

Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of

resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting

on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them,

including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to

have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of,

resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee any

information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air’s cargo division or vessels

owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other

companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in

violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or

this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and

requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations

pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution,

to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or

the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities

organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial

institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they

have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services,

assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear

activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by

freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that

hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that

hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or

activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in

accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to

their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their

jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in

Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and

any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities

owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have

information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could

contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of

nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747

(2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their

territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of

Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint

ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining

correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision

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of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to

believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear

activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial

institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening

representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have

information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services

could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the

development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

Deplores the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution

1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of

resolution 1747 (2007), and commends States that have taken action to respond to

these violations and report them to the Committee;

Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the

measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this

resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate individuals and entities

who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in

violating the provisions of, these resolutions;

Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full

implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this

resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance,

investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the

Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;

Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of

resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008),

shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive

reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;

Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year,

in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of

Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks

(a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of

resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and

analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested

parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737

(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of

non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the

Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant

measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than

90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than

30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and

recommendations;

Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested

parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular

by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the

measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this

resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

B

Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the

adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing

effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and

24;

Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian

Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic

efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with

Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with

Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-

term and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China,

France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United

States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and

wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of

international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear

programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the

June 2008 proposal, and acknowledges with appreciation that the June 2008

proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;

Encourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of

political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant

proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom

and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks,

and encourages Iran to respond positively to such proposals;

Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009

proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the

Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for

Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of

Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded

constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to

continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in

furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;

Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the

necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the

Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities

designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person

claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with

any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of

the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and

this resolution;

Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA

on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities

mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian

compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with

other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this

resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council

for its consideration;

Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to

in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend

the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-

related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified

by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and

mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in

paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2,

4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of

resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,

19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report

referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations

under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of

the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with

resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further

appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United

Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of

the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such

additional measures be necessary;

Decides to remain seized of the matter.

B

Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic

missile activities

Entities

Amin Industrial Complex: Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature

1. controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production

facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,

the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737

(2006).

Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage

Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran; Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St.,

Mashad, Iran

A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company

Armament Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG)

2. manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including

large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority

of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.

Location: Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10, Iran; Pasdaran Ave.,

P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

Defense Technology and Science Research Center: Defense Technology and

3. Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,

Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees

Iran’s defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.

Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

Doostan International Company: Doostan International Company (DICO)

4. supplies elements to Iran’s ballistic missile program.

Farasakht Industries: Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act

5. on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or

controlled by MODAFL.

Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran Freeway, Shahin

Shahr, Esfahan, Iran

First East Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or

6. controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank

Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian

nuclear, missile, and defense entities.

Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan,

Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number

LL06889 (Malaysia)

Kaveh Cutting Tools Company: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or

7. controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.

B

Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4

of Khalaj Road, End of Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549,

Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St.,

Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran

M. Babaie Industries: M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad

8. Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of

Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile

organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri

Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran

Malek Ashtar University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL.

9. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center

(PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents

under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible

military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.

Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran

10. Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export

(MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in

contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or

related materiel.

Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of

Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran

11. Mizan Machinery Manufacturing: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is

owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.

Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: 3MG

12. Modern Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique

Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy

water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of

the IR-40 heavy water reactor.

Location: Arak, Iran

A.K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company,

Rahkar Sanaye Novin

13. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: The Nuclear

Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research

component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was

designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI’s center for the

development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.

Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran

A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji

Agricultural and Medical Research Center

B

14. Pejman Industrial Services Corporation: Pejman Industrial Services

Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran

Sabalan Company: Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.

15. Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

16. Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO): SAPICO is a

cover name for SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

17. Shahid Karrazi Industries: Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled

by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Tehran, Iran

18. Shahid Satarri Industries: Shahid Sattari Industries is owned or controlled

by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Southeast Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: Shahid Sattari Group Equipment Industries

19. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries

(SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.

Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway,

Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835,

Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran

20. Special Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of

DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

21. Tiz Pars: Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz

Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which

could make a material contribution to Iran’s missile program, on behalf of SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

22. Yazd Metallurgy Industries: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a

subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran

16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd,

Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran

A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy

Industries,

Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries

Individuals

Javad Rahiqi: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan

Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB

Marshad).

Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps

Fater (or Faater) Institute: Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has

1. worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC

projects in Iran.

Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or

2. controlled by KAA.

Ghorb Karbala: Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.

3. Ghorb Nooh: Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA

4. Hara Company: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

5. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute: Owned or controlled by, or acts

6. on behalf of, KAA.

Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: Khatam al-Anbiya

7. Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large

scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It

undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects.

In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the

uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.

Makin: Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a

8. subsidiary of KAA.

Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

9.

10. Oriental Oil Kish: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on

behalf of KAA.

Rah Sahel: Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

11.

12. Rahab Engineering Institute: Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on

behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.

Sahel Consultant Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

13. Sepanir: Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

14.

15. Sepasad Engineering Company: Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or

controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

B

Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic

Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

Irano Hind Shipping Company

1. Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-

e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of

Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran

IRISL Benelux NV

2. Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number

BE480224531 (Belgium)

South Shipping Line Iran (SSL)

3. Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran;

Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran

Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France,

Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and

the European Union

Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran

Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran

In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian

nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building

further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the

table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China,

France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined

by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably

suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and

OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect

Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China,

France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European

Union High Representative state their readiness

to recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;

to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear

Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively

peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.

Nuclear Energy

– Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful

purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.

– Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran’s

peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical

cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.

– Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.

– Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually

restored.

– Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.

– Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

Political

– Improving the six countries’ and the EU’s relations with Iran and building up

mutual trust.

– Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.

– Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international

affairs.

B

– Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security

and stabilization issues.

– Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building

measures and regional security.

– Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.

– Support for a conference on regional security issues.

– Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to

non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of

weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.

– Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their

international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner

inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

– Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight

against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan

refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan;

cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.

Economic

Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving

Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical

support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade

Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran

and trade with Iran.

Energy Partnership

Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy

establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between

Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical

applications/measures.

Agriculture

– Support for agricultural development in Iran.

Facilitation of Iran’s complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in

modern technology.

Environment, Infrastructure

– Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure,

science and technology, and high-tech

– Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport

corridors.

– Support for modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure,

including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

Civil Aviation

– Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on

manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran

– Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;

– Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety

standards.

Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues

– Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social development

and humanitarian need.

– Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran

– Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such

as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;

– Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public

health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration,

history and philosophy.

– Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response

capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).

– Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among civilizations”.

Implementation mechanism

– Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future

agreement.

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