MT
Safeguards and Additional Protocol) Regulations, 2007
Table of Provisions (14)
Statutory Text (14 Articles)
L.N. 182 of 2007
NATIONAL INTEREST (ENABLING POWERS) ACT
(CAP. 365)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Euratom
Safeguards and Additional Protocol) Regulations, 2007
IN exercise of the powers conferred by article 3 of the National
Interest (Enabling Powers Act), the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs have made the following regulations>-
(1) The title of these regulations is the Treaty on the Non- Citation and
commencement.
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Euratom Safeguards and Additional
Protocol) Regulations, 2007.
(2) These regulations shall come into force on the 1st of
July, 2007.
In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires -
(Regulation 11)
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic,
Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the
European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in
implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
weapons.
(notified under document number COM(1998) 314)
(1999/188/Euratom)
PREAMBLE
Whereas the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark,
the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden (hereinafter referred to
as 'the States`) and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Community`) are parties to an Agreement between the States, the Community and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the 'the Agency`) in
implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the 'Safeguards Agreement`), which entered into force on
21 February 1997;
Aware of the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear non-
proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's
safeguards system;
Recalling that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of safeguards
the need to avoid hampering the economic and technological development in the Community
or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, to respect health, safety,
physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals, and to
take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as
other confidential information coming to its knowledge;
Whereas the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be
kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and
improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards;
Now therefore the Community, the States and the Agency have agreed as follows
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT
Article 1
The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they
are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of conflict between
the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this
Protocol shall apply.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION
Article 2
(a) Malta shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in
sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv), (ix) and (x). The Community shall provide the Agency with a
declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (v), (vi) and (vii). Malta
and the Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information
identified in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (viii).
(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-
related research and development activities not involving nuclear material carried out
anywhere that are funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of,
Malta.
(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness or
efficiency, and agreed to by Malta, on operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities
and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used.
(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent
from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site.
(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified
in Annex I to this Protocol.
(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual production
capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants in Malta,
and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants. The Community
shall provide, on request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or
concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear
material accountancy.
(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and purity
suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, as follows
(a) the quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use of such material, whether
in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in the States at which the material is present in
quantities exceeding 10 tonnes of uranium and/or 20 tonnes of thorium, and for other locations
with quantities of more than 1 tonne, the aggregate for the States as a whole if the aggregate
exceeds 10 tonnes of uranium or 20 tonnes of thorium. The provision of this information does
not require detailed nuclear material accountancy;
(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of each export from the States
to a State outside the Community, of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in
quantities exceeding
(1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium to the same state, each of less
than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 10 tonnes for the year;
(2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium to the same State, each of less
than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a total 20 tonnes for the year;
(c) the quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each
import into the Sates from outside the Community of such material for specifically non-nuclear
purposes in quantities exceeding
(1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium each of less than 10 tonnes, but
exceeding a total of 10 tonnes for the year;
(2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium each of less than 20 tonnes, but
exceeding a total of 20 tonnes for the year;
it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information on such material
intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its non-nuclear end-use form.
(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted
from safeguards pursuant to Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement;
(b) information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of estimates) and uses at
each location, of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b) of the
Safeguards Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in quantities exceeding those
set out in Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement. The provision of this information does not
require detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level
waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have
been terminated pursuant to Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose of this
paragraph, 'further processing` does not include repackaging of the waste or its further
conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.
(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed
in Annex II
(a) for each export out of the Community of such equipment and material: the identity,
quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected
date, of export;
(b) on specific request by the Agency, confirmation by Malta, as the importing State, of
information provided to the Agency by a State outside of the Community concerning the
export of such equipment and material to Malta.
(x) General plans for the succeeding 10-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear
fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities)
when approved by the appropriate authorities in Malta.
(b) Malta shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following
information
(i) a general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related
research and development activities not involving nuclear material which are specifically
related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-
level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out
anywhere in Malta but which are not funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or
carried out on behalf of, Malta. For the purpose of this paragraph 'processing` of intermediate
or high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving
the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.
(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or entity carrying out such
activities, at locations identified by the Agency outside a site which the Agency considers
might be functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this information is
subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation with the
Agency and in a timely fashion.
(c) On request by any or all of the Agency, Malta or the Community, as appropriate, shall
provide amplifications or clarifications of any information provided under this Article, in so far
as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Article 3
(a) Malta or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency the
information identified in Article 2(a)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii), and (x) and Article 2(b)(i)
within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol.
(b) Malta or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May
of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph (a) for the period covering the
previous calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided,
Malta or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall so indicate.
(c) The Community shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information
identified in Article 2(a)(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous calendar year.
(d) Malta shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information identified in Article
2(a)(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within 60 days of the end of each quarter.
(e) The Community and Malta shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article
2(a)(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year,
information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year.
(f) Malta and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the provision of the
information identified in Article 2(a)(ii).
(g) Malta shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2(a)(ix)(b) within 60 days of
the Agency's request.
COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS
Article 4
The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of complementary access
under Article 5 of this Protocol
(a) The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information
referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to
(i) any location referred to in Article 5(a)(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in order to assure the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities;
(ii) any location referred to in Article 5(b) or (c) to resolve a question relating to the
correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an
inconsistency relating to that information;
(iii) any location referred to in Article 5(a)(iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to
confirm, for safeguards purposes, the Community's, or, as appropriate, Malta’s declaration of
the decommissioned status of a facility or location outside facilities where nuclear material was
customarily used.
(b) (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii), the Agency shall give Malta, or for access under
Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is involved, Malta and the
Community, advance notice of access of at least 24 hours.
(ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design information
verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice
shall, if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may
be less than two hours.
(c) Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities
to be carried out during such access.
(d) In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide Malta and, as
appropriate, the Community with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the
question or inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access,
unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the
access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the question or
inconsistency until Malta and, as appropriate, the Community have been provided with such an
opportunity.
(e) Unless otherwise agreed to by Malta, access shall only take place during regular working
hours.
(f) Malta, or for access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is
involved, Malta and the Community, shall have the right to have agency inspectors
accompanied during their access by its representatives and, as appropriate, by Community
inspectors provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded
in the exercise of their functions.
Article 5
Malta shall provide the Agency with access to
(a) (i) any place on a site;
(ii) any location identified under Article 2(a)(v) to (viii);
(iii) any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear
material was customarily used.
(b) Any location identified by Malta under Article 2(a)(i), Article 2(a)(iv), Article 2(a)(ix)(b)
or Article 2(b), other than those referred to in paragraph (a)(i), provided that if Malta is unable
to provide such access, Malta shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency
requirements, without delay, through other means.
(c) Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs (a) and
(b), to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if Malta is unable to
provide such access, Malta shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements,
without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means.
Article 6
When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities
(a) for access in accordance with Article 5(a)(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of
environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; application
of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in Subsidiary
Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically
feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Board`) and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and Malta.
(b) For access in accordance with Article 5(a)(ii): visual observation; item counting of nuclear
material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilisation of radiation detection and
measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition
of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other objective measures which have
been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the
Board and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and Malta.
(c) For access in accordance with Article 5(b): visual observation; collection of environmental
samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of safeguards
relevant production and shipping records; and other objective measures which have been
demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and
following consultations between the Agency and Malta.
(d) For access in accordance with Article 5(c), collection of environmental samples and, in the
event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the
Agency pursuant to Article 5(c), utilisation at that location of visual observation, radiation
detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by Malta and, where nuclear material is
involved, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures.
Article 7
(a) On request by Malta, the Agency and Malta shall make arrangements for managed access
under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information,
to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially
sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting
activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear
materials and activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question
relating to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an
inconsistency relating to that information.
(b) Malta may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform the Agency of
the places at a site or location at which managed access may be applicable.
(c) Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, Malta may have
recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph (a).
Article 8
Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude Malta from offering the Agency access to locations in
addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the Agency to conduct
verification activities at a particular location. The Agency shall, without delay, make every
reasonable effort to act on such a request.
Article 9
Malta shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out
wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if Malta is unable to provide such access that
State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements at alternative
locations. The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area environmental
sampling and the procedural arrangements therefor have been approved by the Board and
following consultations between the Agency and Malta.
Article 10
(a) The Agency shall inform Malta concerned and, as appropriate, the Community of
(i) the activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any questions or
inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of Malta and, as appropriate, the
Community within 60 days of the activities being carried out by the Agency.
(ii) The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had
brought to the attention of Malta and, as appropriate, the Community as soon as possible but in
any case within 30 days of the results being established by the Agency.
(b) The Agency shall inform Malta and the Community of the conclusions it has drawn from
its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions shall be provided annually.
DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS
Article 11
(a) (i) The Director-General shall notify the Community and the States of the Board's approval
of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless the Community advises the Director-
General of the rejection of such an official as an inspector for the States within three months of
receipt of notification of the Board's approval, the inspector so notified to the Community and
Malta shall be considered designated to the States.
(ii) The Director-General, acting in response to a request by the Community or on his own
initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and the States of the withdrawal of the
designation of any official as an inspector for the States.
(b) A notification referred to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be received by the
Community and Malta seven days after the date of the transmission by registered post of the
notification by the Agency to the Community and the States.
VISAS
Article 12
Malta shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated
inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas,
where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of Malta for the
purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year
and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector's designation to the
States.
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 13
(a) Where Malta or the Community, as appropriate, or the Agency indicate that it is necessary
to specify in subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be
applied, Malta, or Malta and the Community and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary
Arrangements within 90 days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of
the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol,
within 90 days of the date of such indication.
(b) Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall
be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
Article 14
(a) Malta shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for official purposes
between Agency inspectors in Malta and Agency Headquarters and/or Regional Offices,
including attended and unattended transmission of information generated by Agency
containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices. The Agency shall have, in
consultation with Malta concerned, the right to make use of internationally established systems
of direct communications, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication,
not in use in Malta. At the request of Malta, or the Agency, details of the implementation of
this paragraph in Malta with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information
generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
(b) Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph (a) shall take
due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information or design
information which Malta regards as being of particular sensitivity.
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Article 15
(a) The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against
disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential
information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the Agency's
knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol.
(b) The regime referred to in paragraph (a) shall include, among others, provisions relating to
(i) general principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential information;
(ii) conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information;
(iii) procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.
(c) The regime referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be approved and periodically reviewed
by the Board.
ANNEXES
Article 16
(a) The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes of
amendment of Annexes I and II, the term 'Protocol` as used in this instrument means this
Protocol and the Annexes together.
(b) The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material specified
in Annex II, may be amended by the Board on the advice of an open-ended working group of
experts established by the Board. any such amendment shall take effect four months after its
adoption by the Board.
(c) Annex III to this Protocol specifies how measures in this Protocol shall be implemented by
the Community and the States.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
Article 17
(a) This Protocol shall enter into force on the day on which the Agency receives from the
Community and the States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into
force have been met.
(b) The States and the Community may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force,
declare that they will apply this Protocol provisionally.
(c) The Director-General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any
declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol.
DEFINITIONS
Article 18
For the purpose of this Protocol
(a) 'nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities` means those activities
which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the
following
- conversion of nuclear material,
- enrichment of nuclear material,
- nuclear fuel fabrication,
- reactors,
- critical facilities,
- reprocessing of nuclear fuel,
- processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the separation of
elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium,
high enriched uranium or uranium-233,
but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to research and
development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural
applications, health and environmental effects and improved maintenance.
(b) 'Site` means that area delimited by the Community and Malta in the relevant design
information for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a
location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closed-down
location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is limited to
locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or
reprocessing were carried out). 'Site` shall also include all installations, colocated with the
facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for
processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; installations for the treatment,
storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by
the State concerned under Article 2(a)(iv).
(c) 'Decommissioned facility` or 'decommissioned location outside facilities` means an
installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use have
been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no longer be used to
handle, process or utilise nuclear material.
(d) 'Closed-down facility` or 'closed-down location outside facilities` means an installation or
location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which has
not been decommissioned.
(e) 'High enriched uranium` means uranium containing 20 % or more of the isotope uranium-
235. (f) 'Location-specific environmental sampling` means the collection of environmental samples
(e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location
specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the
absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location.
(g) 'Wide-area environmental sampling` means the collection of environmental samples (e. g.
air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose
of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material
or nuclear activities over a wide area.
(h) 'Nuclear material` means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in
Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore
or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency
after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source
material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Protocol only on acceptance
by the Community and the States.
(i) 'Facility` means
(i) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an
isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation, or
(ii) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is
customarily used.
(j) 'Location outside facilities` means any installation or location, which is not a facility, where
nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.
ANNEX I
List of activities referred to in Article 2(a)(iv) of the Protocol
(i) The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges.
Centrifuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described at point 5.1.1(b) of Annex II.
Gas centrifuges means centrifuges as described in the introductory note to point 5.1 of Annex
II.
(ii) The manufacture of diffusion barriers.
Diffusion barriers means thin, porous filters as described in point 5.3.1(a) of Annex II.
(iii) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems.
Laser-based systems means systems incorporating those items as described in point 5.7 of
Annex II.
(iv) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators.
Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in point 5.9.1 of Annex II
containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1(a) of Annex II.
(v) The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.
Columns or extraction equipment means those items as described in points 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3,
5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Annex II.
(vi) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes.
Aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes means separation nozzles and vortex tubes as
described respectively in points 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II.
(vii) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems.
Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma as
described in point 5.8.3 of Annex II.
(viii) The manufacture of zirconium tubes.
Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in point 1.6 of Annex II.
(ix) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium.
Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other
deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5 000.
(x) The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite.
Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than five parts per million
boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3.
(xi) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel.
A flask or irradiated fuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel
which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and dissipated decay heat during
handling, transportation and storage.
(xii) The manufacture of reactor control rods.
Reactor control rods means rods as described in point 1.4 of Annex II.
(xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels.
Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in points 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex
II.
(xiv) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines.
Irradiated fuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in point 3.1 of
Annex II.
(xv) The construction of hot cells.
Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 m3 in volume with shielding
equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0,5 m of concrete, with a density of 3,2 g/cm3 or
greater, outfitted with equipment for remote operations.
ANNEX II
List of specified equipment and non-nuclear material for the reporting of exports and imports
according to Article 2(a)(ix)
1. REACTORS AND EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
1.1. Complete nuclear reactors
Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission
chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a
designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.
Explanatory note
A 'nuclear reactor` basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel,
the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which
normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor
core.
It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to
produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for
sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium
production, are not considered as 'zero energy reactors`.
1.2. Reactor pressure vessels
Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are
especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph
1.1 and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant.
Explanatory note
A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2 as a major shop-fabricated part
of a pressure vessel.
Reactor internals (e.g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals,
control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are
normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components
are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel. These items are sufficiently critical to the
safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and
liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for
the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of
these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not
necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is
considered unlikely.
1.3. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines
Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a
nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 capable of on-load operation or employing
technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling
operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally
available.
1.4. Reactor control rods
Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as
defined in paragraph 1.1.
Explanatory note
This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension
structures therefor is supplied separately.
1.5. Reactor pressure tubes
Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary
coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 at an operating pressure in excess of 5,1 MPa
(740 psi).
1.6. Zirconium tubes
Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities
exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a
reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less
than 1:500 parts by weight.
1.7. Primary coolant pumps
Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors
as defined in paragraph 1.1.
Explanatory note
Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multisealed systems to
prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps, and pumps with inertial mass
systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to NC-1 or equivalent standards.
2. NON-NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR REACTORS
2.1. Deuterium and heavy water
Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the
ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in
paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country
in any period of 12 months.
2.2. Nuclear grade graphite
Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a
density greater than 1,50 g/cm3 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 in
quantities exceeding 3 x 104 kg (30 tonnes) for any one recipient country in any period of 12
months.
Note
For the purpose of reporting, the government will determine whether or not the exports of
graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use.
3. PLANTS FOR THE REPROCESSING OF IRRADIATED FUEL ELEMENTS, AND
EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR
Introductory note
Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely
radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can
accomplish this separation. However, over the years purex has become the most commonly
used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric
acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent
extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.
Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element
chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be
equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide
or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage
or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these
functions may differ between purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and
quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the
recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of
the facility.
A 'plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements` included the equipment and
components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel
and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams.
These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium
metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g. by
geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g. by containment).
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase 'and equipment
especially designed or prepared` for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include
3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines
Introductory note
This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to
dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed,
although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used.
Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant
as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies,
bundles or rods.
3.2. Dissolvers
Introductory note
Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the
irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the
process stream.
Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared
for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear
fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be
remotely loaded and maintained.
3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment
Introductory note
Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the
organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent
extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long
operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement,
simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions.
Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer
settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel.
Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are
normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and
quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium,
zirconium, or other high quality materials.
3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels
Introductory note
Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage
vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows
(a) the pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration
process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is reused in the nuclear fuel cycle;
(b) the intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation
and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and
converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal;
(c) the pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further
process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to
avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream.
Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the
reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive
effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as
low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or
storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the
following features for control of nuclear criticality
(1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least 2 %, or
(2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7″) for cylindrical vessels, or
(3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3″) for either a slab or annular vessel.
3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system
Introductory note
In most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium
nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this process are: process
feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, calcination, product
handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to
plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to
minimise toxicity hazards.
3.6. Plutonium oxide to metal production system
Introductory note
This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the fluorination of
plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium
fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic
plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main functions involved in this process are
fluorination (e.g. involving equipment fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal
reduction (e.g. employing ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation,
waste management and process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium metal, in
particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimise toxicity
hazards.
4. PLANTS FOR THE FABRICATION OF FUEL ELEMENTS
A 'plant for the fabrication of fuel elements` includes the equipment
(a) which normally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the
production flow of nuclear material, or
(b) which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.
5. PLANTS FOR THE SEPARATION OF ISOTOPES OF URANIUM AND EQUIPMENT,
OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS, ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR
PREPARED THEREFOR
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase 'equipment,
other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared` for the separation of
isotopes of uranium include
5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or prepared for use in
gas centrifuges
Introductory note
The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) of between 75 mm
(3″) and 400 mm (16″) diameter contained in a vacuum environment and spun
at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order
to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a
high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components,
have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimise the imbalance. In
contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterised by
having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube
arrangement for feeding and extracting to UF6 gas and featuring at least three separate
channels, of which two are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the
periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number
of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not
difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A centrifuge facility
however requires a large number of these components, so that quantities can provide an
important indication of end use.
5.1.1. Rotating components
(a) Complete rotor assemblies
Thin-walled cylinders, or a number of interconnected thin-walled cylinders, manufactured
from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory
note to this section. If interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or
rings as described in Section 5.1.1.(c) following. The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s)
and end caps, as described in Section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the
complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled.
(b) Rotor tubes
Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm (0,5″)
or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 mm (16″), and manufactured
from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory
note to this section.
(c) Rings or bellows
Components especially designed or prepared to give localised support to the rotor tube or to
join together a number of rotor tubes. The bellows is a short cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm
(0,12″) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 m (16″),
having a convolute, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials
described in the explanatory note to this section.
(d) Baffles
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 m (16″) diameter
especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor tube, in order to
isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and, in some cases, to assist the
UF6 gas circulation within the main separation chamber of the rotor tube, and manufactured
from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the explanatory note to this
section.
(e) Top caps/bottom caps
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3″) and 400 (16″) diameter
especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so contain the UF6
within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain as an integrated part an
element of the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating elements of the motor and lower
bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials
described in the explanatory note to this section.
Explanatory note
The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are
(a) maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2,05 x 109 N/m2 (300 000 psi) or
more,
(b) aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0,46 x 109 N/m2 (67 000 psi) or
more,
(c) filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus
of 12,3 x 106 m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of 0,3 x 106 m or greater
('Specific Modulus` is the Young's Modulus in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3;
'Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength` is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m2 divided by the
specific weight in N/m3.
5.1.2. Static components
(a) Magnetic suspension bearings
Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended
within a housing containing a damping medium. The housing will be manufactured from a
UF6-resistant material (see explanatory note to Section 5.2). The magnet couples with a pole
piece or a second magnet fitted to the top cap described in Section 5.1.1.(e). The magnet may
be ring-shaped with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1,6:1. The
magnet may be in a form having an initial permeability of 0,15 H/m (120 000 in CGS units) or
more, or a remanence of 98,5 % or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/m3 (107
gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that the
deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small tolerances
(lower than 0,1 mm or 0,004 in) or that homogeneity of the material of the magnet is specially
called for.
(b) Bearings/dampers
Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot/cup assembly mounted on a
damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a hemisphere at one end with a
means of attachment to the bottom cap described in section 5.1.1.(e) at the other. The shaft
may however have a hydrodynamic bearing attached. The cup is pellet-shaped with a
hemispherical indentation in one surface. These components are often supplied separately to
the damper.
(c) Molecular pumps
Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded helical
grooves and internally machines bores. Typical dimensions are as follows: 75 mm (3″)
to 400 mm (16″) internal diameter, 10 mm (0,4″) or more wall thickness, with
the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves are typically rectangular in cross-
section and 2 mm (0,08″) or more in depth.
(d) Motor stators
Especially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC hysteresis
(or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the frequency range of
600-2 000 Hz and a power range of 50-1 000 VA. The stators consist of multiphase windings
on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin layers typically 2,0 mm (0,08″)
thick or less.
(e) Centrifuge housing/recipients
Components especially designed designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube assembly of a
gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 mm
(1,2″) with precision machined ends to locate the bearings and with one or more flanges
for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder's
longitudinal axis to within 0,05° or less. The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure
to accommodate several rotor tubes. The housings are made of or protected by materials
resistant to corrosion by UF6.
(f) Scoops
Especially designed or prepared tubes up to 12 mm (0,5″) internal diameter for the
extraction of UF6 gas from within the rotor tube by a pilot tube action (that is, with an aperture
facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for example by bending the end
of a radially disposed tube) and capable of being fixed to the central gas extraction system. The
tubes are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
5.2. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas
centrifuge enrichment plants
Introductory note
The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the
systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to
each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to
extract the 'product` and 'tails` UF6 from the centrifuges, together with the equipment required
to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in
gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The 'product` and 'tails`
UF6 gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header
pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K (-70 °C)) where they are condensed prior to
onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment
plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometres
of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of
repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high
vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems including
- feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF6 to the centrifuge cascades at up to 100 kPa
(15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more,
- desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the cascades at up to 3 kPa (0,5 psi)
pressure. The desublimers are capable of being chilled to 203 K (-70 °C) and heated to 343 K
(70 °C),
- 'product` and 'tails` stations used for trapping UF6 into containers.
This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials
(see explanatory note to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness
standards.
5.2.2. Machine header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within
the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the 'triple` header system with each
centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a substantial amount of repetition in
its form. It is wholly made of UF6-resistant materials (see explanatory note to this section) and
is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.3. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking
'on-line` samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the
following characteristics
1. unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. having a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.2.4. Frequency changers
Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to
supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2(d), or parts, components and subassemblies of such
frequency changers having all of the following characteristics
1. a multiphase output of 600 to 2 000 Hz;
2. high stability (with frequency control better than 0,1 %);
3. low harmonic distortion (less than 2 %), and
4. an efficiency of greater than 80 %.
Explanatory note
The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly
control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to
cascade.
Materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys,
nickel or alloys containing 60 % or more nickel.
5.3. Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous diffusion
enrichment
Introductory note
In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological
assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas
(which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control valves, and pipelines.
Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UF6), all equipment,
pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of
materials that remain stable in contact with UF6. A gaseous diffusion facility requires a
number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
5.3.1. Gaseous diffusion barriers
(a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100-1 000 Å
(angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0,2″) or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter of 25
mm (1″) or less, made of metallic, polymer or ceramic materials resistant to corrosion
by UF6, and
(b) especially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters. Such
compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60 % or more nickel, aluminium
oxide, or UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers having a purity of 99,9 % or
more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and a high degree of particle size uniformity, which
are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers.
5.3.2. Diffuser housings
Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm
(12″) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35″) in length, or rectangular
vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections
all of which are greater than 50 mm (2″) in diameter, for containing the gaseous
diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials and designed for horizontal or
vertical installation.
5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors, or
gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of 1 m3/min. or more of UF6 and with a discharge
pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi), designed for long-term operation in the UF6
environment with or without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate
assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a
pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF6.
5.3.4. Rotary shaft seals
Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for
sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as
to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or
gas blower which is filled with UF6. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-
leakage rate of less than 1 000 cm3/min (60 in3/min).
5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF6
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials
(except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a
leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Pa (0,0015 psi) per hour under a pressure
difference of 100 kPa (15 psi).
5.4. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in
gaseous diffusion enrichment
Introductory note
The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are
the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the
individual assemblies to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively
higher enrichments and to extract the 'product` and 'tails` UF6 from the diffusion cascades.
Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation,
and especially their shutdown, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant
maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and
precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant. All
this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and
controlling systems.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in
gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework. The 'product` and 'tails`
UF6 gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework
to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF6 gas is liquefied prior to onward
transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant consists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in
cascades, there are many kilometres of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of
welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping
systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.4.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kPa
(45 psi) or less, including
- feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF6 to the gaseous diffusion cascades,
- desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from diffusion cascades,
- liquefaction stations where UF6 gas from the cascade is compressed and cooled to form
liquid UF6,
- 'product` or 'tails` stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.4.2. Header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within
the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the 'double` header system
with each cell connected to each of the headers.
5.4.3. Vacuum systems
(a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum
pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min. (175 ft3/min.) or more.
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres made of, or
lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60 % nickel. These pumps may be
either rotary or positive, may have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and may have special
working fluids present.
5.4.4. Special shut-off and control valves
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves
made of UF6-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1 500 mm (1,5 to 59″) for
installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.
5.4.5. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking
on-line samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following
characteristics
1. unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
Explanatory note
The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly
control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas
are wholly made of, or lined with, UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections
relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless
steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60 % or
more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.5. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in
aerodynamic enrichment plants
Introductory note
In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and light gas (hydrogen of
helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements wherein isotopic
separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal forces over a curved-wall
geometry. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the separation nozzle
process and the vortex tube process. For both processes the main components of a separation
stage include cylindrical vessels housing the special separation elements (nozzles or vortex
tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove the heat of compression. An
aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide an
important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use UF6 all equipment, pipeline
and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that
remain stable in contact with UF6.
Explanatory note
The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or
directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the
process gas are wholly made of or protected by UF6-resistant materials. For the purpose of the
section relating to aerodynamic enrichments items, the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6
include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60 %
or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.5.1. Separation nozzles
Especially designed or prepared separation nozzles and assemblies thereof. The separation
nozzles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of curvature less than 1 mm
(typically 0,1 to 0,05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF6 and having a knife-edge within the
nozzle that separates the gas flowing through the nozzle into two fractions.
5.5.2. Vortex tubes
Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof. The vortex tubes are
cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, having
a diameter of between 0,5 cm and 4 cm, a length to diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one
or more tangential inlets. The tubes may be equipped with nozzle-type appendages at either or
both ends.
Explanatory note
The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes or at
numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube.
5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement compressors or gas
blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 and with a suction
volume capacity of 2 m3/min. or more of UF6/carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) mixture.
Explanatory note
These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1.2:1 and 6:1.
5.5.4. Rotary shaft seals
Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections,
for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower rotor with the driver
motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or
seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with a
UF6/carrier gas mixture.
5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by materials resistant to
corrosion by UF6.
5.5.6. Separation element housings
Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or protected by
materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, for containing vortex tubes or separation nozzles.
Explanatory note
These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and greater than
900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, and may be
designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
5.5.7. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems
Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of
or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including
(a) feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process;
(b) desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for
subsequent transfer upon heating;
(c) solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by
compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form;
(d) 'product` or 'tails` stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.5.8. Header piping systems
Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by materials
resistant to corrosion by UF6 for handling UF6 within the aerodynamic cascades. This piping
network is normally of the 'double` header design with each stage or group of stages connected
to each of the headers.
5.5.9. Vacuum systems and pumps
(a) Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min or
more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps, and designed for
service in UF6-bearing atmospheres.
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres
and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6. These pumps may use
fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.
5.5.10. Special shut-off and control valves
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves
made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 with a diameter of 40 to 1 500
mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enrichment plants.
5.5.11. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking
'on-line` samples of feed, 'product` or 'tails`, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the
following characteristics
1. unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.5.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems
Especially designed or prepared systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas (hydrogen or
helium).
Explanatory note
These systems are designed to reduce the UF6 content in the carrier gas to 1 ppm or less and
many incorporate equipment such as
(a) cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of temperatures of -120 °c or less, or
(b) cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120 °C or less, or
(c) separation nozzle or vortex tube units for the separation of UF6 from carrier gas, or
(d) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of -20 °C or less.
5.6. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in chemical
exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants
Introductory note
The slight difference in mass between the isotopes of uranium causes small changes in
chemical reaction equilibria that can be used as a basis for separation of the isotopes. Two
processes have been successfully developed: liquid-liquid chemical exchange and solid-liquid
ion exchange.
In the liquid-liquid chemical exchange process, immiscible liquid phases (aqueous and
organic) are countercurrently contacted to give the cascading effect of thousands of separation
stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric acid solution; the
organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium chloride in an organic solvent. The
contactors employed in the separation cascade can be liquid-liquid exchange columns (such as
pulsed columns with sieve plates) or liquid centrifugal contactors. Chemical conversions
(oxidation and reduction) are required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to
provide for the reflux requirements at each end. A major design concern is to avoid
contamination of the process streams with certain metal ions. Plastic, plastic-lined (including
use of fluorocarbon polymers) and/or glass-lined columns and piping are therefore used.
In the solid-liquid ion-exchange process, enrichment is accomplished by uranium
adsorption/desorption on a special, very fast-acting, ion-exchange resin or adsorbent. A
solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical agents is passed through
cylindrical enrichment columns containing packed beds of the adsorbent. For a continuous
process, a reflux system is necessary to release the uranium from the adsorbent back into the
liquid flow so that 'product` and 'tails` can be collected. This is accomplished with the use of
suitable reduction/oxidation chemical agents that are fully regenerated in separate external
circuits and that may be partially regenerated within the isotopic separation columns
themselves. The presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process
requires that the equipment be made of or protected by special corrosion-resistant materials.
5.6.1. Liquid-liquid exchange columns (chemical exchange)
Countercurrent liquid-liquid exchange columns having mechanical power input (i.e., pulsed
columns with sieve plates, reciprocating plate columns, and columns with internal turbine
mixers), especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange
process. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns
and their internals are made of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon
polymers) or glass. The stage residence time of the columns is designed to be short (30 seconds
or less).
5.6.2. Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors (chemical exchange)
Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment
using the chemical exchange process. Such contactors use rotation to achieve dispersion of the
organic and aqueous streams and then centrifugal force to separate the phases. For corrosion
resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, the contactors are made of or are lined
with suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or are lined with glass. The
stage residence time of the centrifugal contactors is designed to be short (30 seconds or less).
5.6.3. Uranium reduction systems and equipment (chemical exchange)
(a) Especially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells to reduce uranium from
one valence state to another for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. The
cell materials in contact with process solutions must be corrosion resistant to concentrated
hydrochloric acid solutions.
Explanatory note
The cell cathodic compartment must be designed to prevent reoxidation of uranium to its
higher valence state. To keep the uranium in the cathodic compartment, the cell may have an
impervious diaphragm membrane constructed of special cation exchange material. The cathode
consists of a suitable solid conductor such as graphite.
(b) Especially designed or prepared systems at the product end of the cascade for taking the
U4+ out of the organic stream, adjusting the acid concentration and feeding to the
electrochemical reduction cells.
Explanatory note
These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for stripping the U4+ from the organic
stream into an aqueous solution, evaporation and/or other equipment to accomplish solution pH
adjustment and control, and pumps or other transfer devices for feeding to the electrochemical
reduction cells. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with
certain metal ions. Consequently, for those parts in contact with the process stream, the system
is constructed of equipment made of or protected by suitable materials (such as glass,
fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite).
5.6.4. Feed preparation systems (chemical exchange)
Especially designed or prepared systems for producing high-purity uranium chloride feed
solutions for chemical exchange uranium isotope separation plants.
Explanatory note
These systems consist of dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange equipment for
purification and electrolytic cells for reducing the uranium U6+ or U4+ to U3+. These systems
produce uranium chloride solutions having only a few parts per million of metallic impurities
such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molybdenum and other bivalent or higher multi-valent
cations. Materials of construction for portions of the systems processing high-purity U3+
include glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate or polyether sulfone plastic-lined and
resin-impregnated graphite.
5.6.5. Uranium oxidation systems (chemical exchange)
Especially designed or prepared systems for oxidation of U3+ to U4+ for return to the uranium
isotope separation cascade in the chemical exchange enrichment process.
Explanatory note
These systems may incorporate equipment such as
(a) equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with the aqueous effluent from the isotope
separation equipment and extracting the resultant U4+ into the stripped organic stream
returning from the product end of the cascade,
(b) equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that the water and the
concentrated hydrochloric acid may be reintroduced to the process at the proper locations.
5.6.6. Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (ion exchange)
Fast-reacting ion-exchange resins or adsorbents especially designed or prepared for uranium
enrichment using the ion exchange process, including porous macroreticular resins, and/or
pellicular structures in which the active chemical exchange groups are limited to a coating on
the surface of an inactive porous support structure, and other composite structures in any
suitable form including particles or fibres. These ion exchange resins/adsorbents have
diameters of 0,2 mm or less and must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid
solutions as well as physically strong enough so as not to degrade in the exchange columns.
The resins/adsorbents are especially designed to achieve very fast uranium isotope exchange
kinetics (exchange rate half-time of less than 10 seconds) and are capable of operating at a
temperature in the range of 100 °C to 200 °C.
5.6.7. Ion exchange columns (ion exchange)
Cylindrical columns greater than 1 000 mm in diameter for containing and supporting packed
beds of ion exchange resin/adsorbent, especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment
using the ion exchange process. These columns are made of or protected by materials (such as
titanium or fluorocarbon plastics) resistant to corrosion by concentrated hydrochloric acid
solutions and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100 °C to 200 °C and
pressures above 0,7 MPa (102 psia).
5.6.8. Ion exchange reflux systems (ion exchange)
(a) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction systems for
regeneration of the chemical reducing agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment
cascades.
(b) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation systems for
regeneration of the chemical oxidising agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment
cascades.
Explanatory note
The ion exchange enrichment process may use, for example, trivalent titanium (Ti3+) as a
reducing cation in which case the reduction system would regenerate Ti3+ by reducing Ti4+.
The process may use, for example, trivalent iron (Fe3+) as an oxidant in which case the
oxidation system would regenerate Fe3+ by oxidising Fe2+.
5.7. Expecially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser-
based enrichment plants
Introductory note
Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which
the process medium is atomic uranium vapour and those in which the process medium is the
vapour of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include: first
category, atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA); second category,
molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope
selective laser activation (CRISLA). The systems, equipment and components for laser
enrichment plants embrace
(a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapour (for selective photo-ionisation) or devices to feed the
vapour of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation);
(b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as 'product` and 'tails` in the first
category, and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as 'product` and unaffected
material as 'tails` in the second category;
(c) process laser systems to selectively excite the uranium-235 species, and (d) feed
preparation and product conversion equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium
atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any of a number of available laser
technologies.
Explanatory note
Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapour or
liquid or with process gas consisting of UF6 or a mixture of UF6 and other gases. All surfaces
that come into contact with the uranium or UF6 are wholly made of or protected by corrosion-
resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser-based enrichment items, the
materials resistant to corrosion by the vapour or liquid of uranium metal or uranium alloys
include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6
include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60 %
or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
5.7.1. Uranium vaporisation systems (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared uranium vaporisation systems which contain high-power strip
or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2,5 kW/cm.
5.7.2. Liquid uranium metal handling systems (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium
alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.
Explanatory note
The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium and
uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance.
Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth
oxides or mixtures thereof.
5.7.3. Uranium metal 'product` and 'tails` collector assemblies (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared 'product` and 'tails` collector assemblies for uranium metal in
liquid or solid form.
Explanatory note
Components for these assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and
corrosion of uranium metal vapour or liquid (such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum) and
may include pipes, valves, fittings, 'gutters`, feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector
plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation methods.
5.7.4. Separator module housings (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular vessels for containing the uranium
metal vapour source, the electron beam gun, and the 'product` and 'tails` collectors.
Explanatory note
These housings have multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs, laser beam
windows, vacuum pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They
have provisions for opening and closure to allow refurbishment of internal components.
5.7.5. Supersonic expansion nozzles (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling mixtures of UF6 and
carrier gas to 150 K or less and which are corrosion resistant to UF6.
5.7.6. Uranium pentafluoride product collectors (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared uranium pentafluoride (UF5) solid product collectors
consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations thereof, and which are
corrosion resistant to the UF5/UF6 environment.
5.7.7. UF6/carrier gas compressors (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared compressors for UF6/carrier gas mixtures, designed for long
term operation in a UF6 environment. The components of these compressors that come into
contact with process gas are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.
5.7.8. Rotary shaft seals (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections,
for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a
reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner
chamber of the compressor which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture.
5.7.9. Fluorination systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared systems for fluorinating UF5 (solid) to UF6 (gas).
Explanatory note
These systems are designed to fluorinate the collected UF5 powder to UF6 for subsequent
collection in product containers or for transfer as feed to MLIS units for additional enrichment.
In one approach, the fluorination reaction may be accomplished within the isotope separation
system to react and recover directly off the 'product` collectors. In another approach, the UF5
powder may be removed/transferred from the 'product` collectors into a suitable reaction vessel
(e.g., fluidised-bed reactor, screw reactor or flame tower) for fluorination. In both approaches,
equipment for storage and transfer of fluorine (or other suitable fluorinating agents) and for
collection and transfer of UF6 are used.
5.7.10. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking
'on-line` samples of feed, 'product` or 'tails`, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the
following characteristics
1. unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. electron bombardment ionisation sources;
4. collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.7.11. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of
or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including
(a) feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process;
(b) desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for
subsequent transfer upon heating;
(c) solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by
compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form;
(d) 'product` or 'tails` stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.
5.7.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas. The
carrier gas may be nitrogen, argon, or other gas.
Explanatory note
These systems may incorporate equipment such as
(a) cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of temperatures of -120 °C or less, or
(b) cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120 °C or less, or
(c) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of -20 °C or less.
5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA)
Lasers or laser systems especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes.
Explanatory note
The laser system for the AVLIS process usually consists of two lasers: a copper vapour laser
and a dye laser. The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO2 or excimer laser and a
multipass optical cell with revolving mirrors at both ends. Lasers or laser systems for both
processes require a spectrum frequency stabiliser for operation over extended periods of time.
5.8. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in plasma
separation enrichment plants
Introductory note
In the plasma separation process, a plasma of uranium ions passes through an electric field
tuned to the U-235 ion resonance frequency so that they preferentially absorb energy and
increase the diameter of their corkscrew-like orbits. Ions with a large-diameter path are trapped
to produce a product enriched in U-235. The plasma, which is made by ionising uranium
vapour, is contained in a vacuum chamber with a high-strength magnetic field produced by a
superconducting magnet. The main technological systems of the process include the uranium
plasma generation system, the separator module with superconducting magnet and metal
removal systems for the collection of 'product` and 'tails`.
5.8.1. Microwave power sources and antennae
Especially designed or prepared microwave power sources and antennae for producing or
accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: greater than 30 GHz frequency and
greater than 50 kW mean power output for ion production.
5.8.2. Ion excitation coils
Especially designed or prepared radio frequency ion excitation coils for frequencies of more
than 100 kHz and capable of handling more than 40 kW mean power.
5.8.3. Uranium plasma generation systems
Especially designed or prepared systems for the generation of uranium plasma, which may
contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target
of more than 2,5 kW/cm.
5.8.4. Liquid uranium metal handling systems
Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium
alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.
Explanatory note
The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or
uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance.
Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth
oxides or mixtures thereof.
5.8.5. Uranium metal 'product` and 'tails` collector assemblies
Especially designed or prepared 'product` and 'tails` collector assemblies for uranium metal in
solid form. These collector assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the
heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapour, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.
5.8.6. Separator module housings
Cylindrical vessels especially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation enrichment
plants for containing the uranium plasma source, radio-frequency drive coil and the 'product`
and 'tail` collectors.
Explanatory note
These housings have a multiplicity of ports for electrical feed-throughs, diffusion pump
connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening
and closure to allow for refurbishment of internal components and are constructed of a suitable
non-magnetic material such as stainless steel.
5.9. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in
electromagnetic enrichment plants
Introductory note
In the electromagnetic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionisation of a salt feed
material (typically UCl4) are accelerated and passed through a magnetic field that has the
effect of causing the ions of different isotopes to follow different paths. The major components
of an electromagnetic isotope separator include: a magnetic field for ion-beam
diversion/separation of the isotopes, an ion source with its acceleration system, and a collection
system for the separated ions. Auxiliary systems for the process include the magnet power
supply system, the ion source high-voltage power supply system, the vacuum system, and
extensive chemical handling systems for recovery of product and cleaning/recycling of
components.
5.9.1. Electromagnetic isotope separators
Electromagnetic isotope separators, especially designed or prepared for the separation of
uranium isotopes, and equipment and components therefor, including
(a) ion sources
Especially designed or prepared single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting of a vapour
source, ioniser, and beam accelerator, constructed of suitable materials such as graphite,
stainless steel, or copper, and capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or
greater;
(b) ion collectors
Collector plates consisting of two or more slits and pockets especially designed or prepared for
collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams and constructed of suitable materials
such as graphite or stainless steel;
(c) vacuum housings
Especially designed or prepared vacuum housings for uranium electromagnetic separators,
constructed of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel and designed for
operation at pressures of 0,1 Pa or lower;
Explanatory note
The housings are specially designed to contain the ion sources, collector plates and water-
cooled liners and have provision for diffusion pump connections and opening and closure for
removal and reinstallation of these components.
(d) Magnet pole pieces
Especially designed or prepared magnet pole pieces having a diameter greater than 2 m used to
maintain a constant magnetic field within a electromagnetic isotope separator and to transfer
the magnetic field between adjoining separators.
5.9.2. High voltage power supplies
Especially designed or prepared high-voltage power supplies for ion sources, having all of the
following characteristics: capable of continuous operation, output voltage of 20 000 V or
greater, output current of 1 A or greater, and voltage regulation of better than 0,01 % over a
period of eight hours.
5.9.3. Magnet power supplies
Especially designed or prepared high-power, direct current magnet power supplies having all
of the following characteristics: capable of continuously producing a current output of 500 A
or greater at a voltage of 100 V or greater and with a current or voltage regulation better than
0,01 % over a period of 8 hours.
6. PLANTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY WATER, DEUTERIUM AND
DEUTERIUM COMPOUNDS AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR
PREPARED THEREFOR
Introductory note
Heavy water can be produced by a variety of processes. However, the two processes that have
proven to be commercially viable are the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process (GS
process) and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.
The GS process is based upon the exchange of hydrogen an deuterium between water and
hydrogen sulphide within a series of towers which are operated with the top section cold and
the bottom section hot. Water flows down the towers while the hydrogen sulphide gas
circulates from the bottom to the top of the towers. A series of perforated trays are used to
promote mixing between the gas and the water. Deuterium migrates to the water at low
temperatures and to the hydrogen sulphide at high temperatures. Gas or water, enriched in
deuterium, is removed from the first stage towers at the junction of the hot and cold sections
and the process is repeated in subsequent stage towers. The product of the last stage, water
enriched up to 30 % in deuterium, is sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor grade heavy
water, i.e., 99,75 % deuterium oxide.
The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can extract deuterium from synthesis gas through
contact with liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst. The synthesis gas is fed into
exchange towers and to an ammonia converter. Inside the towers the gas flows from the bottom
to the top while the liquid ammonia flows from the top to the bottom. The deuterium is
stripped from the hydrogen in the synthesis gas and concentrated in the ammonia. The
ammonia then flows into an ammonia cracker at the bottom of the tower while the gas flows
into an ammonia converter at the top. Further enrichment takes place in subsequent stages and
reactor grade heavy water is produced through final distillation. The synthesis gas feed can be
provided by an ammonia plant that, in turn, can be constructed in association with a heavy
water ammonia-hydrogen exchange plant. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can also
use ordinary water as a feed source of deuterium.
Many of the key equipment items for heavy water production plants using GS or the ammonia-
hydrogen exchange processes are common to several segments of the chemical and petroleum
industries. This is particularly so for small plants using the GS process. However, few of the
items are available 'off-the shelf`. The GS and ammonia-hydrogen processes require the
handling of large quantities of flammable, corrosive and toxic fluids at elevated pressures.
Accordingly, in establishing the design and operating standards for plants and equipment using
these processes, careful attention to the materials selection and specifications is required to
ensure long service life with high safety and reliability factors. The choice of scale is primarily
a function of economics and need. Thus, most of the equipment items would be prepared
according to the requirements of the customer.
Finally, it should be noted that, in both the GS and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes,
items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for heavy water
production can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for
producing heavy water. The catalyst production system used in the ammonia-hydrogen
exchange process and water distillation systems used for the final concentration of heavy water
to reactor-grade in either process are examples of such systems.
The items of equipment which are especially designed or prepared for the production of heavy
water utilising either the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process or the ammonia-hydrogen
exchange process include the following
6.1. Water - hydrogen sulphide exchange towers
Exchange towers fabricated from fine carbon steel (such as ASTM A516) with diameters of 6
m (20') to 9 m (39'), capable of operating at pressures greater than or equal to 2 MPa (300 psi)
and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or greater, especially designed or prepared for heavy
water production utilising the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process.
6.2. Blowers and compressors
Single stage, low head (i.e., 0,2 MPa or 30 psi) centrifugal blowers or compressors for
hydrogen-sulphide gas circulation (i.e., gas containing more than 70 % H2S) especially
designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the water-hydrogen sulphide
exchange process. These blowers or compressors have a throughput capacity greater than or
equal to 56 m3/second (120,000 SCFM) while operating at pressures greater than or equal to
1,8 MPa (260 psi) suction and have seals designed for wet H2S service.
6.3. Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers
Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers greater than or equal to 35 m (114,3' in height with
diameters of 1,5 m (4,9' to 2,5 m (8,2') capable of operating at pressures greater than 15 MPa
(2225 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-
hydrogen exchange process. These towers also have at least one flanged axial opening of the
same diameter as the cylindrical part through which the tower internals can be inserted or
withdrawn.
6.4. Tower internals and stage pumps
Tower internals and stage pumps especially designed or prepared for towers for heavy water
production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. Tower internals include
especially designed stage contactors which promote intimate gas/liquid contact. Stage pumps
include especially designed submersible pumps for circulation of liquid ammonia within a
contacting stage internal to the stage towers.
6.5. Ammonia crackers
Ammonia crackers with operating pressures greater than or equal to 3 MPa (450 psi) especially
designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange
process.
6.6. Infrared absorption analysers
Infrared absorption analysers capable of on-line hydrogen/deuterium ratio analysis where
deuterium concentrations are equal to or greater than 90 %.
6.7. Catalytic burners
Catalytic burners for the conversion of enriched deuterium gas into heavy water especially
designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange
process.
7. PLANTS FOR THE CONVERSION OF URANIUM AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY
DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR
Introductory note
Uranium conversion plants and systems may perform one or more transformations from one
uranium chemical species to another, including: conversion of uranium ore concentrates to
UO3, conversion of UO3 to UO2, conversion of uranium oxides to UF4 or UF6, conversion of
UF4 to UF6, conversion of UF6 to UF4, conversion of UF4 to uranium metal, and conversion
of uranium fluorides to UO2. Many of the key equipment items for uranium conversion plants
are common to several segments of the chemical process industry. For example, the types of
equipment employed in these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidised bed
reactors, flame tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid
extraction columns. However, few of the items are available 'off-the-shelf`, most would be
prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some instances,
special design and construction considerations are required to address the corrosive properties
of some of the chemicals handled (HF, F2, CIF3, and uranium fluorides). Finally, it should be
noted that, in all of the uranium conversion processes, items of equipment which individually
are not especially designed or prepared for uranium conversion can be assembled into systems
which are especially designed or prepared for use in uranium conversion.
7.1. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to
UO3
Explanatory note
Conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 can be performed by first dissolving the ore in
nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl nitrate using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate.
Next, the uranyl nitrate is converted to UO3 either by concentration and denitration or by
neutralization with gaseous ammonia to produce ammonium diuranate with subsequent
filtering, drying, and calcining.
7.2. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UF6
Explanatory note
Conversion of UO3 to UF6 can be performed directly by fluorination. The process requires a
source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride.
7.3. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UO2
Explanatory note
Conversion of UO3 to UO2 can be performed through reduction of UO3 with cracked
ammonia gas or hydrogen.
7.4. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO2 to UF4
Explanatory note
Conversion of UO2 to UF4 can be performed by reacting UO2 with hydrogen fluoride gas
(HF) at 300-500 °C.
7.5. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to UF6
Explanatory note
Conversion of UF4 to UF6 is performed by exothermic reaction with fluorine in a tower
reactor. UF6 is condensed from the hot effluent gases by passing the effluent stream through a
cold trap cooled to -10 °C. The process requires a source of fluorine gas.
7.6. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to U metal
Explanatory note
Conversion UF4 to U metal is performed by reduction with magnesium (large batches) or
calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures above the melting point of
uranium (1 130 °C).
7.7. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UO2
Explanatory note
Conversion of UF6 to UO2 can be performed by one of three processes. In the first, UF6 is
reduced and hydrolysed to UO2 using hydrogen and steam. In the second, UF6 is hydrolysed
by solution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate ammonium diuranate, and the diuranate
is reduced to UO2 with hydrogen at 820 °C. In the third process, gaseous UF6, CO2 and NH3
are combined in water, precipitating ammonium uranyl carbonate. The ammonium aranyl
carbonate is combined with steam and hydrogen at 500-600 °C to yield UO2.
UF6 to UO2 conversion is often performed as the first stage of a fuel fabrication plant.
7.8. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UF4
Explanatory note
Conversion of UF6 to UF4 is performed by reduction with hydrogen.
ANNEX III
To the extent that the measures in this Protocol involve nuclear material declared by the
Community and without prejudice to Article 1 of this Protocol, the Agency and the Community
shall cooperate to facilitate implementation of those measures and shall avoid unnecessary
duplication of activities.
The Community shall provide the Agency with information relating to transfers, for both
nuclear and non-nuclear purposes, from each State to another Member State of the Community
and to such transfers to each State from another Member State of the Community that
corresponds to the information to be provided under Article 2 (a)(vi)(b) and under Article
2(a)(vi)(c) in relation to exports and imports of source material which has not reached the
composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched.
Each State shall provide the Agency with information relating to transfers to or from another
Member State of the Community that corresponds to the information on specified equipment
and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of this Protocol to be provided under Article
2(a)(ix)(a) in relation to exports and, on specific request of the Agency, under Article
2(a)(ix)(b) in relation to imports.
With regard to the Community's Joint Research Centre, the Community shall also implement
the measures which this Protocol sets out for States, as appropriate in close collaboration with
the State on whose territory an establishment of the centre is located.
The Liaison Committee, established under Article 25(a) of the Protocol referred to in Article
26 of the Safeguards Agreement, will be extended in order to allow for participation by
representatives of the States and adjustment to the new circumstances resulting from this
Protocol.
For the sole purposes of the implementation of this Protocol, and without prejudice to the
respective competences and responsibilities of the Community and its Member States, each
State which decides to entrust to the Commission of the European Communities
implementation of certain provisions which under this Protocol are the responsibility of the
States, shall so inform the other Parties to the Protocol through a side letter. The Commission
of the European Communities shall inform the other Parties to the Protocol of its acceptance of
any such decisions.
Mitbug[ fl-Istamperija tal-Gvern — Printed at the Government Printing Press
Lm1.84 (€4.29)
Interpretation.
“the Agency” means the International Atomic Energy Agency<
“the Community” means the European Atomic Energy
Community<
“Euratom Safeguards Regulation” means Commission
Regulation (Euratom) No. 302#2005 of 8th February 2005, on the
application of Euratom Safeguards<
“the Protocol” means the Additional Protocol to the
Safeguards Agreement<
“Radiation Protection Board” means the Radiation Protection
Board established by virtue of regulation 9 of the Nuclear Safety
and Radiation Protection Regulations, 2003<
L.N. 44 of 2003.
“the Safeguards Agreement” means the Agreement between
the States, the Community and the Agency in implementation of
Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Agreement 78#164#Euratom)<
“the States” means European Union non-nuclear-weapon
member states.
(1) The Radiation Protection Board shall be responsible for
the implementation of the obligations arising out of the Euratom
Safeguards Regulations and the Protocol, and it has all such powers as
are necessary to fulfill such obligations.
(2) The Radiation Protection Board shall have the right to
nominate any representative or representatives to accompany any
Agency Inspector during any visit to any site or location as specified in
the Protocol.
Any Inspector designated by the Agency shall have access to
any site or location as specified in Articles 5 to 9 of the Protocol, and
under such terms and conditions as specified in Article 4 of the Protocol.
No person shall refuse access to any Agency Inspector or in
any other way threaten, molest or disturb Agency Inspectors and any
Radiation Protection Board representative or representatives in the
performance of their duties.
No person shall, in connection with any matter under these
regulations>
(a) furnish any information which that person knows to be
false in a material particula, or recklessly furnishes any information
which is false in a material particular< or
(b) with intent to deceive, produce, furnish, send or
otherwise make use of any document which is false in a material
particular< or
(c) wilfully refuse or without lawful excuse, the proof
whereof shall lie on that person, withhold any material information<
or
(d) knowingly or recklessly make any incorrect statement
or entry in any record or return or on any document furnished
under these regulations< or
(e) unlawfully refuse or fail to answer to the best of that
person’s knowledge any question made to him or her by an Agency
Inspector or a Radiation Protection Board representative in the
exercise of their functions< or
(f) unlawfully refuse or fail to comply with any requirement
duly provided under these regulations.
The Schedule to these regulations, including the Annexes Schedule
force of law.
thereto, shall have the force of law in Malta.
(1) Any person who acts in contravention of the provisions Offences and
penalties.
of regulations 6 and 7, and any person who conspires or attempts, or
aids, abets, counsels or procures any other person, to contravene the
regulations aforementioned, shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Any person who commits an offence against these
regulations shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a period
of not more than five years or to a fine (multa) not exceeding fifty
thousand liri, or to both such fine and imprisonment.
The Court of Magistrates (Malta) and the Court of Magistrates Procedures before
Malta and Gozo
(Gozo) as courts of criminal judicature, shall, notwithstanding the Courts.
provisions of article 370 of the Criminal Code, be competent to try all
offences against these regulations.
Where the facts constituting a breach of any of the above Proceedings in
respect of any other
provisions also constitute a breach of any other law prohibited by the law.
particular regulations, proceedings shall not be taken in respect of the
breach of the regulations hereabove, but only in respect of the breach of
the other law.
The text of the Protocol is being published in the English Text of Protocol.
language in the Schedule to these regulations.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Revokes L.N. 237
of 2005.
(Application of Safeguards) Regulations, 2005, are hereby being
revoked.