Appeal against second-instance judgment dismissed as inadmissible due to lack of statutory grounds under ZKP. The court rejected the appeal because the statute of limitations did not apply to the final judgment. The court ruled the appeal was inadmissible as it did not fall under the specific provision of the Criminal Procedure Act. The appeal was dismissed because the statute of limitations argument was irrelevant to the final judgment's validity. The court applied the correct legal interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding appeals. The decision confirms that appeals against final judgments require specific statutory grounds to be admissible.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe Supreme Court of Ljubljana dismissed the appellant's appeal against the first-instance court's rejection of her appeal against the second-instance judgment. The appellant argued that the prosecution had expired four years after the alleged offense, while the prosecution office confirmed the rejection based on the Criminal Procedure Act. The court ruled the appeal inadmissible because the statute of limitations provision cited by the appellant does not apply to appeals against final judgments, rendering the objection legally unfounded.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedArticle 398, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 402, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act: An appeal against a final judgment is inadmissible if it does not fall within the specific grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Article 398 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
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AI generatedFull text
Pritožba obsojenke se zavrne kot neutemeljena.
[JEDRO]
Pravilno je sodišče prve stopnje pritožbo obsojenke zoper sodbo sodišča druge stopnje zavrglo kot nedovoljeno, saj ne gre za primer iz 1. odst. 398. čl. ZKP.
[OBRAZLOŽITEV]
Z v uvodu navedenim sklepom je sodišče prve stopnje kot nedovoljeno zavrglo pritožbo obsojenke, katero je vložila zoper sodbo Višjega sodišča v Ljubljani opr.št. I Kp 256/97 z dne 8.5.1997. Zoper sklep se je obsojenka pritožila. V pritožbi navaja, da je minilo že štiri leta od dejanja ter je pregon zastaral.
Višje državno tožilstvo v Ljubljani je v svojem pisnem mnenju, podanem skladno z določbo 2. odst. 445. čl. ZKP predlagalo zavrnitev pritožbe.
Pritožba ni utemeljena.
S sodbo Okrajnega sodišča na Jesenicah opr.št. K 20/95 z dne 3.12.1996 v zvezi s sodbo Višjega sodišča v Ljubljani opr.št. I Kp 256/97 z dne 8.5.1997 je bila obsojenka spoznana za krivo in obsojena za kaznivo dejanje po čl. 71/1 KZ RS. Ker je sodba, s katero je bila obsojenka spoznana za krivo in obsojena postala pravnomočna dne 8.5.1997, so navedbe obsojenke v zvezi z zastaranjem kazenskega pregona za očitano ji kaznivo dejanje neutemeljene. Pravilno pa je sodišče prve stopnje z izpodbijanim sklepom pritožbo obsojenke zoper sodbo sodišča druge stopnje zavrglo kot nedovoljeno, saj ne gre za primer iz 1. odst. 398. čl. ZKP. Zato je sodišče druge stopnje pritožbo obsojenke zoper navedeni sklep sodišča prve stopnje kot neutemeljeno zavrnilo (3. odst. 402. čl. ZKP).