Supreme Court dismisses appeal on surrender grounds overtaken by recent precedent Balmer v Minister for Justice. Appeal fails due to lack of new argument. Court refuses adjournment for new EU exit argument.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, recognizing that the original grounds were overtaken by the recent decision in Balmer v Minister for Justice. The appellant sought an adjournment to raise a new argument regarding the prospective exit of the UK from the EU and its impact on the European Arrest Warrant Scheme. The Court refused this request, noting that the Minister's position allows arguments based on new circumstances arising after a s. 16 order is made, rendering the existing order not a bar to such arguments.
Legislator headnote
AI generateds. 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003; s. 18 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003: A respondent may argue that surrender is not permitted by reason of new circumstances which arise after a s. 16 order is made and before surrender, and the fact that there is a pre-existing s. 16 order will not be a bar.
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THE SUPREME COURT
Appeal No. 75/2009 SC
Denham C. J.
O’Donnell J.
McKechnie J.
Clarke J.
Dunne J.
Charleton J.
O’Malley J.
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
APPLICANT/RESPONDENT
AND
PERRY WHARRIE
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
Ruling of the Court (ex tempore) delivered on the 27th October, 2016, by Denham C.J.
1. Counsel for the respondent/appellant recognised that the grounds of appeal in this case have been overtaken by the recent
decision of this Court in Balmer v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IESC 25 and that the appeal as formulated must fail.
2. Counsel for the respondent/appellant applied to the Court for an adjournment to bring an application to seek to amend the notice
of appeal so as to raise a new argument related to the prospective exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union and therefore
the European Arrest Warrant Scheme, given that his surrender had been postponed pursuant to s. 18 of the European Arrest Warrant
Act, 2003, while he serves a sentence in this jurisdiction which will not be spent until 2020 approximately.
3. During the course of discussions, counsel for the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform stated that a respondent may argue
that surrender is not permitted by reason of new circumstances which arise after a s. 16 order is made and before surrender, and the
fact that there is a pre-existing s. 16 order will not be a bar. On that basis the Court refuses the application for an adjournment.
4. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the appeal.