Appeal allowed where inquiry report affected reputation, permitting judicial review under constitutional fair procedures rights.
Ireland (IE)
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding the Minister's inquiry report amenable to judicial review due to its direct impact on the applicant's reputation. The applicant argued the inquiry breached his constitutional right to fair procedures, while the respondent maintained the process was within ministerial powers. The court decided the report was reviewable because it critically assessed the applicant's conduct as Minister, thereby engaging his protected right to good name.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedConstitutional right to fair procedures; constitutional right to good name and reputation: A report by a Minister investigating complaints against him is amenable to judicial review where the inquiry and its outcome directly affect the subject's reputation and fair procedure rights.
Keywords
AI generatedFull text
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Neutral Citation Number: [2016] IECA 318
[2015 321]
The President
Finlay Geoghegan J.
Irvine J.
BETWEEN
ALAN SHATTER
APPLICANT/APPELLANT
AND
SEAN GUERIN
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Irvine delivered on the 10th day of November 2016
1. I have had the opportunity of reading in draft form the judgments which have been prepared by the President and Finlay
Geoghegan J. in these proceedings and am in full agreement with their conclusions.
2. I nonetheless take this opportunity to fully endorse the views expressed by Finlay Geoghegan J. at para. 31 of her judgment where
she refers to the need for judicial restraint in any expansion of the types of inquiries or other processes that may be amenable to
challenge by way of judicial review. In particular, I favour her conclusion that the respondent’s Report in the present case is only
amenable to judicial review because both the process undertaken by him and the outcome of his inquiry were concerned with and had
the ability to directly affect Mr. Shatter’s constitutionally-protected right to his good name and reputation.
3. It is clear beyond doubt that the terms of reference directly concerned matters relating to Mr. Shatter’s reputation and good
name, namely, the adequacy of any investigation carried out by him as Minister and whether there was reason to be concerned as to
whether he, enjoying as he did a number of relevant statutory powers that he had been asked to deploy, had taken the appropriate
steps to investigate and address certain specified complaints. Likewise, the outcome of the inquiry, leaving aside altogether the
consequences that the Report had for Mr. Shatter as these may well have been influenced by political considerations, was destined
to impact on his constitutionally protected right to his good name.
4. Accordingly, in the relatively unique circumstances which arise in the present case, like my colleagues, I am satisfied that the
Report prepared by the respondent is amenable to judicial review. That being so, for the reasons already fully outlined by my
colleagues, I too am satisfied that the appeal must be allowed.
5. Concerning the relief to be afforded to Mr. Shatter, I agree with the President and Finlay Geoghegan J. that he is clearly entitled to
a declaration that the conclusions and opinions in the Report which were critical of him when Minister for Justice and Equality were
reached in breach of his right to fair procedures. As to his entitlement to any further relief, in the complex circumstances advised by
Finlay Geoghegan J. in the concluding paragraphs of her judgment, any such decision should be postponed to afford the parties the
opportunity to make such submissions to the Court as they deem appropriate.