Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against sentence for child sexual abuse where intellectual disability was a mitigating factor.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal against a ten-year sentence with three years suspended for child sexual abuse. The Circuit Court judge acknowledged the grave nature of the offences but applied significant mitigation due to the victim's special needs and the appellant's intellectual disability. The appellate court found no error in principle, noting that the judge correctly balanced the aggravating factors against the appellant's low intellectual functioning and guilty plea.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedCriminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006, s. 2(1); Where an offender suffers from intellectual disability, the court must consider this as a significant mitigating factor when determining the appropriate sentence for sexual offences against a child.
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THE COURT OF APPEAL
Birmingham J.
Sheehan J.
Mahon J.
258/13
The People at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
V
B.D.
Appellant
JUDGMENT of the Court (ex tempore) delivered on the 25th day of July, 2016
by Mr. Justice Birmingham
1. This is an appeal against severity of sentence. The sentence appealed is one of ten years imprisonment with the final three years
suspended that was imposed in the Circuit Court in Offaly on the 22nd November, 2012. The sentences were imposed in respect of
offences of defilement of a child under fifteen years contrary to s. 2(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006.
Background
2. The offences in question involved acts of buggery committed by the appellant against his son. The offending took place between
2009 and 2011. At that stage the injured party was between nine years and eleven years. The appellant had sole custody of his son
who lived with him. It should be noted that his son has long term special needs. The abuse in this instance involved buggery, having
his son penetrate him, mutual masturbation and introducing his son to pornography. The abuse occurred two or three times a week
over a two year period.
3. The matter came to light in July 2011, when the young boy disclosed what was happening to his aunt who went to the authorities.
Some nine days thereafter the appellant went to Tullamore garda station where he made voluntary admissions.
Background and personal circumstances
4. In terms of the background and personal circumstances of the appellant he was born on the 7th February, 1971, and was the
youngest of six children. At the time of sentencing he had been unemployed for a number of years, but had earlier worked for a period
in a meat factory. He had been in a relationship with the mother of the injured party and they had two children together, a boy and a
girl and they came to an arrangement that the boy, the injured party in this case, should be in the sole custody of the appellant,
while his former partner would look after their daughter. Previously he had been in at least two other relationships and there were
three children from those earlier relationships.
5. This was a case where a considerable number of reports were put before the court. These included a number of reports from Ms.
Eileen Finnegan, Clinical Director with One in Four which dealt with the involvement of Mr. D with the Phoenix Programme provided by
that organisation. There was a report from Dr. Fiona Weldon, Clinical Director of the Rutland Centre and a psychiatric report from Dr.
Brenda Wright. Finally, there was a probation report.
Grounds of appeal
6. The grounds of appeal submitted have focused on the fact that not enough regard was had by the sentencing judge to the expert
evidence that there was as to the extent of mental/intellectual disability of the appellant. It is said too that not enough attention
was given to his bona fide efforts to secure treatment and/or help and his resolve to continue in that regard. This is a reference to
his participation in the Phoenix Programme with One in Four. Again, it is said that the sentence is too severe for someone who was in
effect a first time offender.
7. There is no doubt that the appellant had a mental/intellectual disability. That was clear from the various reports but perhaps
equally significance it was also the evidence of the investigating garda who interacted with him, who said that he was not surprised
to hear that Mr. D had an intellectual disability and had himself realised that. There were references in the report to the fact that Mr.
D had a full scale IQ of 63 and the fact that the IQ falls within the extremely low range of intellectual function and within the mild
range of intellectual disability.
The judge’s approach to sentence.
8. The judge in the Circuit Court was clearly conscious that he was dealing with a difficult and sensitive case and there were two
sentence hearings at which evidence was heard and the judge took some time for consideration.
9. In the course of his sentencing remarks the judge referred to the fact that the offending took place over a protracted period, that
the offences were committed by someone in a position of parental authority and therefore involved a fundamental breach of trust. He
stated that it is was his view that having regard to the nature and duration of the abuse and the aggravating factors that were
present that it was a case that fell in a scale well above the median, but he then referred to the fact that there were a number of
mitigating factors present. In that regard he instanced how the accused had met the investigation and the prosecution. He saw the
main mitigating factor in relation to the offences as being the fact that Mr. D had been assessed as a person who functions within a
low range on the intellectual scale. He also took into account the fact that there were no relevant previous convictions. Such
previous convictions as there were, were very minor and entirely irrelevant in the context of the enormity of the offending in this
case. The judge indicated that it was a case where he saw the plea of guilty as very important or, “ultra important” because if the
injured party was required to give evidence in front of a jury of strangers that would to compound the situation enormously. The
judge then said that he felt that ordinarily the headline sentence would be fourteen years. But that having regard to the defendant’s
intellectual difficulties, and his previous good character, that he would mitigate that figure down to ten years and that he would then
reflect the plea of guilty and the cooperation with the investigation by partly suspending the sentence and he then as we have seen,
proceeded to suspend three years of the sentence.
10. In the court’s view the judge was correct in identifying that the offending here was very grave indeed and would ordinarily attract
a very significant sentence. However the judge was also correct in taking the view that there were significant mitigating factors
present, in particular the fact that Mr. D functions within a low range on the intellectual scale. The real issue in the case is whether
sufficient credit was given for the mitigating factors. It is accepted that there was credit, but the issue was, was that credit
sufficient.
11. Counsel on behalf of the appellant has made the point that the fact that Mr. D functions at a low level is a relevant factor when
considering how the admissions, the plea that was entered and the efforts at rehabilitation should be viewed.
12. In this case the judge moved from the sentence of fourteen years that he felt would ordinarily be appropriate, to one of ten years
and then to one of ten years with three years suspended. In effect a net sentence of seven years. The net sentence finally arrived
at is a 50% reduction from the starting point. In those circumstances the court is unable to identify any error in principle in the
approach that was taken and the court must in these circumstances dismiss the appeal.