Supreme Court held s. 30(3A) of Offences Against the State Act 1939 does not allow detention for unrelated offences.

THE SUPREME COURT

[Appeal No: 428/2012]

Murray J.

Hardiman J.

Fennelly J.

Clarke J.

MacMenamin J.

Between/

The People at the suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Prosecutor/Appellant

and

M.C.

Defendant/Respondent

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Fennelly delivered the 9th day of April, 2014.

1. The Director of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter “the Director”) has, pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, referred

to this Court a question of interpretation of s. 30(3A) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 ("the Act of 1939”), as inserted by

s. 21 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009. Section 34 of the Act of 1967 provides as follows:

(1) Where, on a question of law, a verdict in favour of an accused person is found by direction of the trial judge, the

Attorney General may, without prejudice to the verdict in favour of the accused, refer the question of law to the Supreme

Court for determination.

(2) The statement of the question to be referred to the Supreme Court shall be settled by the Attorney General after

consultation with the judge by whom the direction was given and shall include any observations which the judge may wish

to add.

(3) The Supreme Court shall assign counsel to argue in support of the decision.

2. The question referred is necessarily one of law which has led to the acquittal of a person. In the present case, the respondent was

acquitted by order of the Special Criminal Court on an interpretation of s. 30(3A) of the Offences against the State Act 1939.

3. The trial of the respondent took place in the Special Criminal Court over four days in November 2011 on a single count of unlawful

possession of an explosive substance. The only evidence against him was a statement of admission made in answer to garda

questions while he was detained pursuant to the provisions of the Act of 1939. On 29th November that Court gave its ruling

acquitting him. The reason for the decision was that, in the opinion of the Court, the Respondent had been in unlawful custody when

he made the statements of admission. The circumstances in which those statements were made needs, therefore, to be described.

4. On the 11th September 2010 the Respondent was arrested by a member of the Garda Síochána pursuant to s. 30 of the Act of

1939 on suspicion that he was a member of an unlawful organisation contrary to the provisions of s. 21 of that Act. This arrest

followed a search of the respondent’s home during which the Gardaí discovered an electrical grinder and a quantity of ammonium

nitrate, an explosive material. The respondent was taken to Monaghan Garda Station. He was introduced to the member in charge and

detained. The member in charge was informed that the respondent had been arrested on suspicion of membership of an unlawful

organization.

5. At first the respondent was questioned in relation to the membership charge. At a certain stage during his detention, he was

informed that he was then going to be questioned in relation to the explosives that had allegedly been found at his home. Having

initially declined to answer any questions, he changed his position and made a statement in which he accepted responsibility for

possession of both the electric grinder and the explosive (ammonium nitrate). This was the evidence on which the prosecution relied.

6. Counsel on behalf of the Respondent argued that his detention had become unlawful at the point at which the Gardaí commenced

to question him about an offence other than the one for which he had been arrested, namely membership of an unlawful organisation.

Counsel argued that, if the Respondent was going to be questioned about another suspected offence, it was essential that the Gardaí

comply with the provisions of section 30(3A) of the Act of 1939, which had not been done.

7. Counsel for the Director argued that compliance with s. 30(3A) was not required. The Gardaí, it was argued, had the right to

question the respondent about any offence as long as they continued to hold the reasonable suspicion that he was a member of an

unlawful organization.

8. The Court ruled that the Respondent’s detention for the purpose of questioning him about the possession of explosive substances,

being an offence other than the one of which he had originally been suspected and which formed the basis for his arrest and

detention, was not lawful, in the absence of compliance with the requirements of s. 30(3A) of the Act. The Court, therefore, ruled

that the respondent’s confession was inadmissible.

9. It is in the context of that ruling of the Special Criminal Court, that the Director has referred a question of law to this Court. That

question, corrected for a number of typographical errors, reads:

“WHEREAS the defendant stood trial before the Special Criminal Court on Bill of Indictment SCC 12/2010 charging one

count of unlawful possession of an explosive substance contrary to Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Acts, 1883 as

amended by Section 15 (4) of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998.

AND WHEREAS the admissibility of a confession (and the prosecution case) stood to be determined upon the Special

Criminal Court's construction of Section 30 (3A) of the Offences against the State Act, 1939 as inserted by Section 21 of

the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 2009 which provides

"(3A) If at any time during the detention of a person pursuant to this Section a member of the Garda Síochána, with

reasonable cause, suspects that person of having committed an offence (the "other offence') referred to in subsection

(1) of this section, being an offence other than the offence to which the detention relates, and –

(a) The member of the Garda Síochána then in charge of the Garda station, or

(b) (Not applicable)

has reasonable grounds for believing that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the proper investigation

of the other offence, the person may continue to be detained in relation to the other offence as if that offence was the

offence for which the person was originally detained, but nothing in this subsection authorises the detention of a person

for a period that is longer than the period which is authorised by or under the other provisions of this Section."

AND WHEREAS the Defendant had been lawfully arrested on suspicion of membership of an unlawful organisation and the

Special Criminal Court holding that the said suspicion still subsisted at the time he was interrogated in relation to the said

offence of unlawful possession of explosives.

AND WHEREAS the prosecution submitted that the provisions of the said Section 30 (3A) only arose when the original

suspicion justifying arrest and detention had dissipated.

AND WHEREAS the Special Criminal Court ruled that the provisions of the said subsection applied and as "there was no

evidence from the member in charge relating to "reasonable grounds for believing" as referred to in the section "that the

continued detention of the accused for the purpose of questioning him in relation to offences other than membership of

an unlawful organisation and his questioning in relation to such other offences was unlawful.

AND THERE being no other evidence the Court directed an acquittal of the Defendant. The Director of Public Prosecutions

pursuant to Section 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 and without prejudice to the verdict, now refers the following

question of law to the Supreme Court:

"Was the Special Criminal Court correct in its construction of Section 30 (3A) of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939

as amended by Section 21 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 2009?"

10. The question referred is essentially a question of interpretation of s. 30 of the Act of 1939. It is essential to commence by setting

out in their entirety the parts of the section which deal with powers of detention. Including sub-section (3A), inserted in 2009, those

parts read:

(1) A member of the Garda Síochána (if he is not in uniform on production of his identification card if demanded) may

without warrant stop, search, interrogate, and arrest any person, or do any one or more of those things in respect of any

person, whom he suspects of having committed or being about to commit or being or having been concerned in the

commission of an offence under any section or sub-section of this Act or an offence which is for the time being a

scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V of this Act or whom he suspects of carrying a document relating to the

commission or intended commission of any such offence as aforesaid or whom he suspects of being in possession of

information relating to the commission or intended commission of any such offence as aforesaid.

(2) Any member of the Gárda Síochána (if he is not in uniform on production of his identification card if demanded) may,

for the purpose of the exercise of any of the powers conferred by the next preceding sub-section of this section, stop

and search (if necessary by force) any vehicle or any ship, boat, or other vessel which he suspects to contain a person

whom he is empowered by the said sub-section to arrest without warrant.

(3) Whenever a person is arrested under this section, he may be removed to and detained in custody in a Gárda Síochána

station, a prison, or some other convenient place for a period of twenty-four hours from the time of his arrest and may, if

an officer of the Gárda Síochána not below the rank of Chief Superintendent so directs, be so detained for a further

period of twenty-four hours.

(3A) If at any time during the detention of a person pursuant to this section a member of the Garda Síochána, with

reasonable cause, suspects that person of having committed an offence (the “other offence”) referred to in subsection

(1) of this section, being an offence other than the offence to which the detention relates, and—

(a) the member of the Garda Síochána then in charge of the Garda Síochána station, or

(b) in case the person is being detained in a place of detention, other than a Garda Síochána station, an officer of

the Garda Síochána not below the rank of inspector who is not investigating the offence to which the detention

relates or the other offence,

has reasonable grounds for believing that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the proper investigation

of the other offence, the person may continue to be detained in relation to the other offence as if that offence was the

offence for which the person was originally detained, but nothing in this subsection authorises the detention of the person

for a period that is longer than the period which is authorised by or under the other provisions of this section.

(4) An officer of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent may apply to a judge of the District Court for a

warrant authorising the detention of a person detained pursuant to a direction under subsection (3) of this section for a

further period not exceeding 24 hours if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such further detention is necessary

for the proper investigation of the offence concerned.

11. Section 30, therefore, authorises any member of the Garda Síochána firstly to arrest and secondly to detain in a Garda Station

any person whom that member suspects of having committed an offence under the Act. The period of detention so authorised is a

maximum of 24 hours. Any extension of that period requires the authority of a Chief Superintendent. That is all in connection with the

offence in respect of which the arresting Garda held the original suspicion. Subsection (3A), since 2009, authorises the continued

detention of a person so arrested and detained for the purpose of investigating suspicion that the person detained has committed

another offence contrary to the Act of 1939, but on condition that the member in charge of the Garda Station forms the opinion that

the further detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the other offence.

12. The Director, in her submissions, emphasises that there was clear evidence that the arresting member believed that the

Respondent was a member of an unlawful organisation at the time he invoked the powers of arrest pursuant to section 30 of the Act

and, crucially, that this suspicion persisted throughout the period of the Respondent’s detention. Her central legal submission is that

that s. 30(3A) should be interpreted to the effect that, if the suspicion grounding the original arrest is dissipated during the currency

of the s. 30 detention or if the detention of the suspect is no longer necessary for the proper investigation of the original offence, the

Gardaí may continue to detain him for the remaining period of that detention for the investigation of another offence under the Act of

which he is reasonably suspected at that time, provided the member in charge of the Garda station “has reasonable grounds for

believing that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the proper investigation of the other offence.” On the facts of

the present case, the Gardaí continued to suspect the Respondent of the original offence of membership of an unlawful organisation.

Thus, it is submitted, there was no obligation on the Gardaí to seek the authority of the member in charge to question him about an

offence other than the offence for which he had been arrested.

13. The Director also submits that s. 30(3A) should be interpreted as being in pari material with a number of other statutory provisions

which provide for detention on suspicion of commissions of offences of different types.

14. Part 4 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 2009, which includes section 21 which inserts inter alia sub-section (3A) into s.

30 of the Act, shows, it is said, that the intent of the legislature was to bring some element of uniformity to the re-arrest and

detention powers of the Gardaí under a number of statutes. That Part concerns amendments, not only to s. 30 of the Offences

against the State Act 1939 but also to s. 2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996, section 50 of the Criminal Justice Act,

2007 and s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984. These three pieces of legislation authorise the arrest and detention for questioning of

persons suspected of having committed certain crimes. The amendments made by Part 4 of the 2009 Act concern the circumstances

in which a person may be re-arrested.

15. It is submitted, on behalf of the Director, that an examination of the provisions of s. 2, subsections 5 and 6 of the Criminal Justice

(Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, section 50(6) and (7) of the Criminal Justice Act, 2007 and section 4(5A) of the Criminal Justice Act,

1984 (which was inserted by the Criminal Justice Act 1999), demonstrates that each provision allows for a person who was detained

on suspicion of having committed a certain offence, to be further detained and questioned regarding another offence, where the

suspicion on which the original arrest and detention was based no longer exists or where the continued detention of the accused is no

longer required for the investigation of the original offence.

16. The Director relies on the following passage from David Dodd on Statutory Interpretation in Ireland (Tottel Publishing, 2008),

p213:

“Where Acts are in pari materia, they are to be taken together as forming one system, and interpreting and enforcing

each other. Understanding the other Act may aid in identifying the scheme established by the legislature and thus may aid

interpretation of individual provisions. Where Acts are in pari materia, it is assumed that universality of language and

meaning is intended.”

17. The Director’s argument is that the insertion of subsection (3A) in s. 30 of the Act of 1939 brings that legislation into line with the

other provisions. The other sections provide for the release of the person when the suspicion or the need for investigation has gone

but for the possibility of continued detention in a case where the Gardaí genuinely suspect him of committing another offence and

wish to continue to detain him for the purpose of investigating, presumably by questioning him, in relation to his involvement that

other offence. Thus, subsection (3A) should be read as applying only to cases such as those provided for expressly in the other acts

and, therefore, not applying at all in cases where, as here, the original suspicion remains.

18. In this connection, the Director relies on the decision of this Court, particularly on the statement of Walsh J in People (Director of

Public Prosecutions v Howley [1989] ILRM 629. That statement is as follows:

“It is already well established by the decision of this Court in The People v Kelly, that it is quite permissible for members of

the Garda Síochána to put questions to a person in custody, under section 30 of the Act of 1939, in respect of offences

other than that for which he was arrested….There is nothing in the decision of any Irish court to suggest that the

lawfulness of the detention or, as in this case, the extension of the detention is dependent upon the offence or the

suspected offence which is the occasion of the detention, being the dominant concern of the members of the Garda

Síochána, when, as the occasion arises they may wish to question such detained person in respect of offence or offences

other than that in respect of which the detention order was made”.

19. It is submitted that this is a clear statement of the law which must continue to form the basis for the Court’s interpretation of

section 30(3A) of the Act of 1939.

20. The respondent submitted essentially that the words used in the Section must be given their ordinary and natural meaning, which

is that the requirements of subsection (3A) must be complied with if the detained person is to be questioned concerning suspicion of

commission of an offence other than the one in respect of which he was originally arrested and detained. That means that the

member in charge must form the opinion that his continued detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the second or other

offence.

21. The nub of the point, it is said, is that the law had been changed by the enactment of Section 30 (3A) of the Act of 1939,

affected by the passing into law of s. 21 of the Act of 2009. The respondent accepts that, prior to the enactment of that section,

the law was as stated in Howley. The position then was that, under s. 30 of the Act of 1939, a Garda with the requisite suspicion

could arrest and detain a person for a given offence for a period of 24 hours. The detention could be extended by a Chief

Superintendent for a further period of 24 hours. The person detained could also be questioned about other offences provided the

arresting Garda still had a bona fide suspicion in relation to the original offence for which the person was arrested.

22. This position in law, it is submitted continued, in spite of the passing of the sections, which the Director says are in pari material

with s. 30, namely s. 2(5) and (6) of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, s. 50(6) and (7) of the Criminal Justice Act,

2007 or s. 4(5A) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984. While those enactments were in force contemporaneously with s. 30 of the Act of

1939, no provision was made for any role for the member in charge in respect of the detention or continued detention of a person

detained under s. 30 of the Act of 1939.

23. The situation was changed by the insertion of subsection (3A) by of s. 21 of the Act of 1939. A role is allotted to the member in

charge of the Garda Station in respect of the continued detention of a person detained under s. 30 where that person is suspected of

having committed an offence different from that on which he was originally arrested and detained. The Respondent could not have

continued to be detained in accordance with law for the purpose of questioning him about an offence other than that in respect of

which he was originally detained without the intervention of the member in charge and that member having “reasonable grounds for

believing that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the proper investigation of the other offence”.

24. The respondent responds to the submission of the Director that subsection (3A) applies only where the original suspicion which

grounded the arrest has ceased and therefore that the original power to detain is at an end, by observing that this involves implying

words and meanings into the section by reference to the use of provisions in other unrelated statutes. This would also involve

departure from the normal rules for the construction of any statute and in particular the strict construction of a penal statute which

affects the liberty of citizens.

25. The respondent does not accept that the Offences against the State Act 1939 can be construed as being in pari material with

other statutes. That Act with its amendments has always being regarded by the Courts as forming a separate code with very

different rules and procedures, when compared to ordinary criminal investigation.

Discussion and conclusion

26. It is not disputed that any statements of admission made by the respondent while he was in unlawful custody would be

inadmissible in evidence against him. The Special Criminal Court founded its decision to acquit the respondent on its view that, at the

relevant time, he had been in unlawful detention.

27. It is not in doubt either that s. 30 of the Act of 1939, being an incursion into the right of liberty of the individual must be strictly

interpreted. Insofar as it lays down rules and procedures governing the arrest and detention of individuals the courts insist that they

be properly and completely complied with.

28. The question of law which has been referred to this court by the Director poses a straightforward question of interpretation of s.

30 of the Act of 1939, in its amended form. More precisely, it asks whether the requirement imposed by subsection (3A), namely that

the member in charge form the requisite opinion that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the investigation of a

second offence, must be observed in every case. The Director argues that the subsection must be observed only in cases where the

detained person is no longer suspected of the original offence or his detention is no longer considered necessary for its investigation.

In other words, it need not be observed in a case where the original suspicion persists. Where the Gardaí to continue to suspect that

person of committing the offence in respect of which he was originally arrested and detained, it is said, there is no need to observe

the provisions of the subsection.

29. An Act of the Oireachtas is interpreted, at any given time, with all such amendments as have been made by the legislature. In the

present case, it is appropriate to commence by looking at s. 30 as it was at the time of the facts relevant to this case. That means

that it includes subsection (3A). Looked at in that way subsection (1) authorises a member of the Garda Síochána to arrest any

person whom, inter alia, he suspects of having committed an offence under any provision of the Act. Subsection (3) authorises the

person’s detention in a Garda Station for a period of twenty-four hours, which may be extended by a Chief Superintendent. Up to this

point, it is clear that the person is being detained only in respect of the suspicion of having committed or being involved in the

commission of the first offence.

30. Subsection (3A) then authorises the person’s continued detention, if a member of the Garda Síochána, with reasonable cause,

suspects the person of having committed another offence. However, if that power is to be exercised, the member in charge of the

Garda Station must have reasonable grounds for believing that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the proper

investigation of the other offence. At the risk of oversimplification, in practical terms, the continued detention must be authorised by

the member in charge.

31. The Director submits, however, that, even though the Gardaí are now embarking on the investigation of a new or other offence

and the person’s continued detention is necessary to investigate that issue, both of which conditions apply here, there is no need to

obtain the opinion or authorisation of the member in charge. The Director says that a distinction must be made. The requirement

applies only where the suspicion of the original offence has, to use the Director’s phrase “dissipated” or there is no longer any

necessity for the detention for the purpose of investigating the original offence.

32. The difficulty for this submission is that the subsection says nothing about it. On its face the subsection requires that the opinion

of the member in charge be obtained in every case where the Gardaí embark on investigation of another offence. It seems to me

obvious that, if the section stood on its own, without any reference to previous case law, the interpretation is that the opinion of the

member of charge is a pre-condition to any continued detention for the purpose of investigating a different offence. A legislative

requirement of that sort in a provision authorising the detention of a person would nearly always require to be strictly observed.

33. I can see a possible argument that, if the original suspicion persists, that could, on a narrow reading, suffice to justify the

detention and that no further authority is required. However, regard must be had to the fact that the person is being detained on the

authority of the State for the purpose of investigating a crime of which he is suspected, but in respect he must be presumed

innocent. In the slightly different context of the continued detention of a person in custody pending the arrival of his solicitor at the

Garda Station, Clarke J had this to say in his recent judgment in Director of Public Prosecutions v Gormley [2014] IESC 17, at

paragraph 8.8:

“However, I am persuaded that the point at which the coercive power of the State, in the form of an arrest, is exercised

against a suspect represents an important juncture in any potential criminal process. Thereafter the suspect is no longer

someone who is simply being investigated by the gathering of whatever evidence might be available. Thereafter the

suspect has been deprived of his or her liberty and, in many cases, can be subjected to mandatory questioning for various

periods and, indeed, in certain circumstances, may be exposed to a requirement, under penal sanction, to provide forensic

samples. It seems to me that once the power of the State has been exercised against a suspect in that way, it is proper

to regard the process thereafter as being intimately connected with a potential criminal trial rather than being one at a

pure investigative stage. It seems to me to follow that the requirement that persons only be tried in due course of law,

therefore, requires that the basic fairness of process identified as an essential ingredient of that concept by this Court in

State (Healy) v. Donoghue applies from the time of arrest of a suspect.

34. I would read subsection (3A) as requiring observation of the procedure it lays down in all the situations to which it refers. The

person’s detention is authorised by s. 30 on suspicion of having committed an original offence and for the investigation of that

offence. If the purpose of the detention is to be extended to include another offence, it is right to interpret the section as requiring

that the member in charge be of opinion that his detention is also required in respect of that second offence. It would superimpose an

additional requirement on the existing authorisation. To interpret it otherwise would deprive the provision of almost all meaning. In any

event, the Director’s argument involves writing words into the provision which are not there.

35. I turn then to consider the implications of Howley. As the respondent accepts, that decision is clear authority for the proposition

that, provided the person is genuinely being detained for the purpose of investigation of the original offence, the Gardaí may question

him in respect of the suspected commission of other offences. What Walsh J said at page 635 of the Judgment was:

“On the findings of fact in this case the detention during the period of the extension of the original detention was in

accordance with law because it was in respect of an offence which that Garda Síochána were genuinely investigating

even though at the same time they were investigating and were even more interested in a much more serious offence and

were questioning a detailed person in respect of that more serious offence. In my view, therefore, at all relevant times

the detention in question was in accordance with law and insofar as the admissions and statements of the appellant

depend for their admissibility on the lawfulness of that detention they were admissible.”

36. However, the Court in Howley was not interpreting a section which contained subsection (3A). If I am right in my view that the

amended section clearly requires the intervention of the member of charge before the detained person is questioned in relation to

another offence and thus his continued detention is required in relation to the investigation of the other offence, the Court would

have decided Howley differently if the amended section had been before it.

37. This does not mean that Howley was not correctly decided. It merely follows from the fact that the section, in its present form,

did not exist and was not interpreted in Howley.

38. Finally, I turn to the Director’s submission that s. 30(3A) should be interpreted in the light of a number of statutory provisions said

to be in pari materia with it. Those provisions are s. 2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996, section 50 of the Criminal

Justice Act, 2007 and s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984. Each of these provisions authorises the detention of persons suspected of

having committed offences. The Act of 1984 authorises detention for investigation of any offence for which the maximum penalty is a

term of imprisonment for a term of five years or more. The Act of 1996 relates to drug trafficking offences and that of 2007 to a

number of serious offences including murder. Each of these Acts provides separately for particular periods of detention and for their

possible extension. While s. 4 of the Act of 1984 provides that, if at any time during the detention of a person pursuant to the

section, there are no longer reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has committed an offence in respect of which he is detained,

he is to be released from custody forthwith. Each of the other provisions says the release is to take place if “there are no longer

reasonable grounds for believing that his or her detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence to which the

detention relates.” Thus it is only in the case of the Act of 1984 that the release takes place on the “dissipation” of the suspicion.

39. Section 50 Criminal Justice Act 2007 authorises detention in connection with the investigation of serious offences, including

murder. Subsections 6 and 7 provide:

“(6) If at any time during the detention of a person pursuant to this section there are no longer reasonable grounds for

believing that his or her detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence to which the detention relates,

he or she shall, subject to subsection (7), be released from custody forthwith unless he or she is charged or caused to be

charged with an offence and is brought before a court as soon as may be in connection with such charge or his or her

detention is authorised apart from this Act.

(7) If at any time during the detention of a person pursuant to this section a member of the Garda Síochána, with

reasonable cause, suspects that person of having committed an offence to which this section applies, other than the

offence to which the detention relates and the member of the Garda Síochána then in charge of the Garda Síochána

station has reasonable grounds for believing that the continued detention of the person is necessary for the proper

investigation of that other offence, the person may continue to be detained in relation to the other offence as if that

offence was the offence for which the person was originally detained.”

40. As I understand the argument for the Director, this provision should aid the interpretation of s. 30. It is true that subsection (3A)

was introduced into s. 30 only in 2009. It is also true that it contains a provision involving the member in charge in authorising an

extension of the detention which is similar to that contained in s. 50 of the Act of 2007 and, indeed, to other statutory provisions. It

is suggested that the statutory intent in s. 30 as amended should be interpreted in the light of those other sections. Those sections

contain express provision for release in the event that either the original suspicion is “dissipated” (the Act of 1984) or detention is not

necessary for further investigation. However, s. 30 has at no time, either prior to or subsequent to amendment, contained either form

of provision.

41. For a number of reasons, I cannot accept that the different statutes should be treated as being in pari materia. This is not a case

of a single body of legislation dealing with one subject. The Oireachtas has legislated separately for the detention of persons

suspected of having committed different types of offences. While there are many similarities, there are also differences. Each of the

provisions deals with a different type of offence; each provides separately for a period or periods of detention, some similar, some

different; in the case of s. 30 of the Act of 1939, the opinion of the arresting garda alone is sufficient to justify both arrest and

detention, whereas, in the case of the other three provisions, the opinion of the member in charge is required; officers of different

rank, whether inspector, superintendent or chief superintendent are required to either to authorise or extend the period. It does not

appear to me that the principle of interpretation of provisions in pari material applies. The Oireachtas did not enact a single piece of

legislation dealing with detention of suspects. It legislated separately for detention on suspicion of having committed different types

of offence. It did not, it seems to me, intend that the provisions of one Act should be read into the other.

42. I do not, in particular, accept that the Court should read provisions of other statutes dealing with the detention of suspected

persons into the Offences against the State Act.

43. I would answer the question referred by saying that the Special Criminal Court was correct in its interpretation of s. 30(3A) of the

Offences against the State Act 1939 as amended by s. 21 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009.