District Court grants care order under Child Care Act 1991 s18 due to impaired welfare and lack of reunification path.

[2014] IEDC 02

AN CHUIRT DUICHE THE DISTRICT COURT

CHILD AND FAMILY AGENCY

APPLICANT

-V-

K

RESPONDENT

CHILD CARE ACT, 1991— SECTION 18

IN THE MATTER OF A CHILD

17THE JANUARY 2014

1. This is an application under s 18 of the Child Care Act 1991 (the CCA) for a care order in respect of a child (A). The relevant parts

of section 18 of the CCA provide:-

(1) Where, on the application of the Child and family Agency with respect to a child, the court is satisfied that—

(a) the child has been or is being assaulted, ill-treated, neglected or sexually abused, or

(b) the child’s health, development or welfare has been or is being avoidably impaired or neglected,

or

(c) the child’s health, development or welfare is likely to be avoidably impaired or neglected,

and that the child requires care or protection which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes an order

under this section , the court may make an order (in this Act referred to as a “care order”) in respect of the child.

(2) A care order shall commit the child to the care of the Health Service Executive for so long as he remains a

child or for such shorter period as the court may determine and, in such case, the court may, of its own motion

or on the application of any person, extend the operation of the order if the court is satisfied that grounds for the

making of a care order continue to exist with respect to the child.

2. I am satisfied that this District Court has jurisdiction, as at the date of institution of the proceedings A resided in this court

district, and mother currently resides in this court district.

3. In relation to father, there is insufficient information to locate the father. There has been no application from him. The evidence is

that he at least knew of the pregnancy, but as I understand it from the evidence he has not been in contact with the mother or the

Child and Family Agency (CFA) in relation to A. Therefore, noting the foregoing, I am satisfied to proceed.

4. This matter was heard over a number of days. I have heard evidence from general practitioner Dr G who was sworn to the truth of

the contents of his letters and reports, copies of which are contained in the book of documents provided, and who also gave oral

evidence.

5. I have heard evidence from social worker E, who was sworn to the truth of the contents of reports authored or co authored by

her, copies of which are contained in the book of documents provided, and who also gave oral evidence.

6. I have heard evidence from social care worker J, who gave oral evidence only.

7. I have heard evidence from Dr M, clinical psychologist, who was sworn to the truth of the report written by her, a copy of which is

contained in the book of documents provided, and who also gave oral evidence.

8. I have heard evidence from Garda C, who gave oral evidence only.

9. I have heard evidence from mother.

10. I have heard evidence from A’s Guardian ad Litem, who was sworn to the truth of the contents of reports written by him, copies

of which are contained in the book of documents provided or were submitted to the court in the course of the hearing, and who also

gave oral evidence.

11. In the course of the hearing I have also made an order pursuant to section 29 (5A) of the CCA in respect of attendance at the

hearing by a bona fide representative of the press. That order is recorded separately.

12. A is a child, within the meaning of the CCA.

13. The mother deeply loves A and there is a good bond between them. The CFA recognises that the mother is affectionate towards

A and that she wants to care for A full time.

14. It is acknowledged that the CFA recognises as a strength that the mother was agreeable to partaking in assessments, including

cognitive and parenting assessments, and was co-operative throughout in relation to those matters.

15. I find that the mother has had, in the past, a chronic drug addiction. She clearly had difficulties and behaviours such as

aggression and manipulation around prescriptions, behaviour which is not untypical of such an addiction. It is not clear on the

evidence, since the mother’s disengagement with Dr G in July 2013, whether the previously existing chronic drug addiction continues.

However, I accept the evidence of what Garda C said the mother said to him about her taking Zimmovane in May of 2013. I accept

the evidence of Dr G about the incident which occurred around an appointment to deal with urinalysis on the 5th July 2013, and I

accept the evidence that there has been disengagement by the mother with Dr G and no apparent engagement with any other

medical service or GP. In those circumstances I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the addiction issue and abuse of

drugs issue, are unlikely to have been fully resolved, and therefore are likely to present a risk to the health development and welfare

of A in the future.

16. The mother in evidence and submissions stated that she does not have a learning or intellectual disability. I am satisfied that the

mother has a mild learning disability, as set out in the evidence and the report of Dr M. I accept that Dr M’s opinion is based on the

WAIS IV testing which is described by her as the “gold standard” and which is regularly relied upon by experts in this court. It is not

clear whether there was any prior formal diagnosis of the mother, although the existence of a “borderline intellectual disability” is

referred to by Dr G, and is also referred to in the letter from a consultant psychiatrist included in the book of documents (which letter

was not formally proved but was relied upon by both sides). The finding of a mild learning disability is in my view corroborated by the

observations of the witnesses and in particular the observations of Dr G, social worker E and social care worker J.

17. The social work department of the CFA is entitled and I believe obliged to consider referrals and reports from other professionals.

However, the social work department must then carry out its own assessment, on the basis of its own observations and or the

observations of whatever expert might be employed. On the evidence given by social worker E and social care worker J of their direct

observations of the mother and child, I accept their evidence of their observations. I don’t doubt the mother’s subjective assessment

that her interaction with A goes well. However the objective assessment is that even in a limited and supervised scenario only a high

level of supervision and intervention ensures that basic care needs are met, for example feeding, hygiene and basic safety such as

supervision while changing, temperature of bottles etc.

18. I accept the evidence of the CFA personnel and in particular social worker E and social care worker J, that they have by

repetition of instruction, appropriately delivered, attempted to teach or improve these care skills. Regrettably no real capacity has

been demonstrated by the mother to learn or retain basic care skills. The observed inability and incapacity is on all fours with the

assessment of mild learning disability. I accept that there is no likelihood of improvement in such capacity, whatever the motivation.

19. If the mother is unable to adequately provide basic care or demonstrate basic care skills in respect of an infant, I accept that this

is likely (in the legal sense of that term as it is used in section 18(1) (c) of the CCA) to continue in respect of the changing but

inevitably increasingly complex needs of A into the future.

20. Both social worker E and Dr M have given evidence, and it is generally recognised and is specifically accepted in this court, that

mild intellectual disability by itself does not determine ability to care for a child. Dr M in particular expressed what in my view is

correct, that the challenges of parenthood can be met with adequate supports. I accept Dr M’s evidence that in this case adequate

support is “24/7” support in every aspect of care. I understand that to include basic care and conceptual / intellectual matters such

as future planning, decision making etc. Such support would typically be from a partner (regrettably, the mother does not have a

partner to provide such support), or from close family members. While mother has asserted that named close family members would

help, I accept from the social worker’s evidence that the said named family members have expressed that they do not think that they

would be willing or able to provide support at the necessary level. Social work evidence from social worker E is that it would not be

possible for the CFA or other agency to provide “24/7” support of the type that might be necessary. Although not explored in the

evidence it is clear that such “24/7” support would require an almost constant presence by another person or persons. Even if such a

service were available on any particular level, it would not in my view be in A’s interest now or in the long term to be parented (if it

can be described as such) in that way and I accept the conclusion in the parenting capacity assessment by social worker E that:-

“… The level of support required to sustain a placement with his mother is not realistic and ultimately, unfair on A

himself”.

21. The GAL represents A in this case. The GAL fully supports the CFA application and is of the firm belief that the interests and

welfare of A require that a care order be made.

22. I accept that the mother has given her evidence in good faith. However as stated above and for the reasons given I prefer the

evidence of the various witnesses called by the CFA, and of the GAL.

23. I accept that the mother has not been able to consistently engage with the CFA and has displayed aggressive behaviour.

Whether this is a conscious unwillingness to engage or is born of frustration, it is in any event an unfortunate barrier between mother

and the various professionals in this case. Objectively from A’s point of view this gap in communication between mother and the CFA

exacerbates the situation by rendering it difficult to provide such supports as might be available. However this is not determinative of

the case.

24. I am of the view that a care order to 18 years of age is a proportionate order. At present there is no demonstrable path to

reunification. A’s interests are best protected by a care order to 18 years of age. Mother’s interests are protected by the child in care

review process, which must consider reunification or the prospects for reunification at each child in care review, and also by section

22 of the CCA.

25. I therefore make a care order pursuant to s 18 (1) (c ) of the CCA in respect of A to A’s eighteenth birthday.

26. There has been reference in the course of the hearing to access between mother and child. In accordance with section 37 of the

CCA access arrangements are to be made now in light of this order. I am specifically not making any further order at this stage with

regard to access other than access in accordance with section 37.

27. The matter is to be re-entered before the court and the Guardian ad Litem reappointed

• If there is no allocated social worker for a period of 6 weeks;

• If there is no allocated fostering link social worker for a period of 6 weeks;

• If child in care reviews not held in accordance with the statutory timetable;

• If there is no social work visit to the child for a period of 6 months;

• If there is a change of placement; or

• After care review on A’s sixteenth birthday or the next business day.

28. Guardian ad Litem to be discharged today.