District Court grants care order for child due to parental domestic violence, substance misuse, and mental health issues.

[2014] IEDC 17

AN CHUIRT DUICHE THE DISTRICT COURT

Tusla: Child and Family Agency

Applicant

-And-

AC

first named respondent

And

TK

Second named Respondent

CHILD CARE ACT 1991 - SECTION 18(1)

In the matter of Child 4

5 November 2014

1. This is an application for a care order under section 18 of the Child Care Act 1991 (herein after referred to as ‘the 1991 Act’) in

respect of a child aged approximately 2 years. In the anonymised version of this decision the child shall be referred to as Child 4 as

the fourth child of the respondents and as nothing must be reported concerning this case which would serve to identify the child or

the parents who are the subject of these proceedings.

2. The child has three older siblings born between 2000 and 2008. All three siblings are now in the full time care of the Child and

Family Agency (the Agency). They shall be referred to as Child 1, Child 2 and Child 3 in order of their respective dates of birth.

3. The Agency submits that the evidence in this case establishes that Child 4’s parents operate under the cloud of the toxic trio of

domestic violence, substance misuse and associated mental health problems which impact on their ability to provide consistent care

for Child 4.

4. It is the Agency’s position that the mother has a history of substance misuse which is linked to her relationship with Child 4’s father

who has a history of criminality resulting in his repeated imprisonment and episodes of homelessness. The mother has been the victim

of domestic violence within this relationship and her mental health has suffered. The Agency asserts that when the mother remains

apart from the father she can provide good basic care for the child but this care becomes inconsistent when she becomes involved

with the father again.

5. The Agency has been involved with the family since 2003 and the couple’s three older children are now in long term care of the

Agency.

6. The Agency’s case is that they made efforts to prevent Child 1 and Child 2 coming into care and thereafter attempted to reunify

the family post the making of care orders. When Child 3 was born even greater efforts were made to avoid that child going into care.

Unfortunately the earlier toxic pattern re-emerged when the mother again became involved in substance misuse following the renewal

of her relationship with the father and so Child 3 came into long term care. Accordingly it is the Agency’s case that the parents’

pattern of sporadic ‘good enough parenting’ followed by ‘poor parenting’ has never changed.

7. When the mother became pregnant again for the fourth time the Agency endeavoured to ensure that Child 4 remained in the care

of the mother. On the release of the father from prison however the earlier pattern again re-emerged. The mother advised them that

she could not cope and nominated her sister as Child 4’s relative foster carer, ultimately however this fostering arrangement was not

approved by the Agency. Child 4 came into statutory care in the earlier part of the year. Even before then however the mother could

not escape the destructive dynamic of her relationship with the father to the extent necessary to ensure ‘good enough’ consistent

parenting for Child 4. Change achieved in the past could not be sustained by her.

8. The mother did not visit Child 4 for a three month period placed by her in the care of a family member. It is the Agency’s case that

Child 4 now needs to be assured of long term care in his current non kinship foster placement which is culturally appropriate and

already accommodates the parents’ older sibling, Child 3.

9. The mother was present in court and legally represented in these proceedings by her solicitor.

10. The father was present in court on foot of a production order and accompanied by two members of the Irish Prison Service. He

was initially without representation but having been afforded time to instruct a solicitor the father participated in the proceedings

throughout.

11. Child 4’s separate interests in the proceedings were highlighted by the Guardian ad Litem who instructed counsel to appear on her

behalf.

12. I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this application.

SUBSTANCE OF MATTERS AT ISSUE: “PROPORTIONALITY”

13. The Court was informed at the commencement of the hearing that each parent now conceded that the Agency has established

the threshold criteria of section 18(1) of the 1991 Act and they would each consent to a care order being made in respect of Child 4

for a two year period.

14. The Court was informed that the parents now acknowledge that their future relationship must be as separated parents rather

than as a cohabiting couple and that they will no longer reside as a couple together on the father’s imminent release from prison.

15. The Court was further informed that each parent now feels able to deal with their respective substance misuse issues and intends

to do so comprehensively.

16. Their case is that a care order limited to a period of two years would not prejudice Child 4 in any way. Child 4 is 26 months old

and not aware of whether he/she is in long term care or is potentially in long term care. It is submitted that an order of this duration

is a more proportionate response to Child 4’s needs as it allows the mother to undertake rehabilitation from her addiction with the

confidence of reunification in two years and this will give her light at the end of the tunnel.

17. I have heard the evidence of:

a) Dr PQ of the Drug Treatment Centre;

b) Ms RG the Allocated Social Worker form 10 December 2012 until November 2013;

c) Ms MM the Allocated Social Worker from December 2013 to date;

d) Mr K the Respondent father; and

e) The Guardian Ad Litem.

18. I need not rehearse the evidence in detail save to say that the Dr PQ’s professional opinion is that he has treated the mother for

the past two years and her addiction is, in his view, a relatively simple addiction to opiates namely heroin. Her biological drug

dependence is not huge. In his professional opinion the dosage of methadone prescribed earlier was too low and she self medicated

with heroin. Residential detoxification should in his view take about three weeks in her case. His assessment of the overarching

concern for the mother is her need to tackle the complex issues which underpin her chemical addiction. The mother has been on

antidepressants due to a very low mood and it is a positive that she is not an impulsive person. She has been resistant to methadone

in the past which has exacerbated her problem. Self detoxification is dangerous and has proved to be so for her in the past. In his

view this mother can overcome her addiction with motivation and the fact that she has secure housing is hugely advantageous.

19. The position of the father is very different in Dr PQ’s view. He treated him until March 2014 but his behaviour at the clinic became

problematical. He would be welcome back to treatment if he behaved peaceably. In his professional opinion the father will need to

attend a residential treatment programme in order to detoxify. On his exit from the programme he needs to have a secure base as

going into the homeless population will inevitably begin the cycle again.

20. Both Ms RG and Ms MM gave detailed evidence of their period of oversight as the allocated social worker for the family for the

periods indicated above. They had read the social work file detailing family functioning from 2003. They each spoke about the

admitted patterns of domestic violence and admitted substance misuse and the associated low mood of the mother and their fears for

her stability should she become involved with the father again on his release from prison. Ms MM indicated that when in prison the

father appeared to gain an insight into his pattern of behaviour and she recalled that in January 2013 she heard all the same

assurances as to the future as have been outlined to the Court now. For this reason she had no confidence that there would be any

change which would cause her to reassess her assessment of the risk to this child. She formed the professional view that the mother

was ambivalent in her views about her relationship with the father. At times she has stated that the relationship was abusive and

that she had been subject to serious domestic violence. However the dynamic of resumed cohabitation, substance misuse and

consequent low mood on the part of the mother has become an ingrained way of functioning which has not changed. This factor in

her opinion has deprived the mother of the opportunity of being a consistent parent to this child and her other children.

21. Both social workers outlined the efforts which each of them made during their periods as allocated social worker to calibrate the

risk, define its constituent elements and make the links to the provision of relevant services which could help to avoid the children

coming into care. They each considered that the mother has had many disadvantages in her own life yet is a very nice and

personable woman. Both Ms RG and Ms MM expressed the view that the mother loves the children. They each formed the view that

as a mother she struggled to maintain any progress when support services were provided and ultimately failed to sustain an adequate

standard of good enough care to the detriment of Child 4. They both expressed the professional opinion that Child 4 requires assured

consistency of care and that this is only achievable in this case by making a care order until age of eighteen years. They each

considered the option of an order for two years to be unsatisfactory on the basis that Child 4 requires consistency of care until

adulthood.

22. The father’s evidence was clear. The father’s position is that he recognises past failures, he acknowledged that he was violent

and abusive towards the mother in the past. He acknowledged that he has been less than a good father to the children. He

acknowledged his drug addiction and past relationship with drugs. He acknowledged episodes of homelessness and a co-dependent

and dysfunctional relationship with the mother. He pointed out that these admissions related to the past and did not represent his

position now. His stated position now is that his relationship with the mother must cease if she is to address her substance misuse,

keep her accommodation and be able to care for Child 4. He indicated that while the social work evidence is that this has been said in

the past; it has not been said by him to either social worker. He acknowledged that his addiction is a long standing one and that he

hopes to overcome it, but he cannot assure anyone that he will. He has however now gained insight into this dynamic in his life. He

now wants to give up drugs but not because of any outside pressure. He expressed the view if he walks away from the relationship

and with “the right help” the mother will in two years time have recovered from addiction and be able to provide consistency of care

for Child 4. He stated that he will not seek any form of joint custody of Child 4 and now concedes sole custody to the mother. He also

noted that the mother wants to have a chance to parent and in his view she would have that chance without him.

23. The father indicated that on his release from prison it his intention to live separately from the mother and seek to build up a

relationship with his children through access and that he intends to engage with the social workers to work out an access plan.

24. The father also spoke about the long term care order made in respect of the older two children together in a “culturally

appropriate placement” on the basis that it would provide them with a secure placement. However these children are now separated

and each child is exhibiting emotional and behavioural problems and each has experienced placement moves in care. It was his firm

view that Child 4 should have the opportunity of being cared for by his mother at the expiration of a two year order. It was also his

view that Child 4’s placement had no greater chance of being secure than had his older siblings. In his view the Agency care system

failed him and the mother as they each shared the experience of feeling unwanted and adrift within the care system themselves as

young people. In his view nothing will change for his children within the same system. His stated apprehension was that Child 4 will

experience harm by reason of foster placement disruption and associated negativities through being a child in long term care.

25. The Guardian Ad Litem supports the making of a full care order until Child 4 reaches the age of eighteen years. She has filed

reports which contain her reasoning. She does not regard a short term care order as a feasible care placement for Child 4. In her view

Child 4 has now spent a significant period of his/her life in foster care. Child 4 has now developed an attachment to his/her foster

carers and Child 3. In her view Child 4 is thriving in his/her placement. It is also her professional opinion that Child 4 has not retained

any familiarity with his/her mother with whom he/she spent the first seven months of his/her life. This is very distressing for the

mother and in the Guardian’s opinion the mother has been supported to renewing her relationship with Child 4 through supervised

access visits. The Guardian further stated that Child 4 needs to be assured in an age appropriate manner that he/she is now with “his

forever parents” and that his/her biological parents love him/her but are not able to care for him/her. Child 3 the older sibling who is in

long term care with these foster carers will be engaging in “life story” work giving him/her this very message and the Guardian believes

that it will be impractical if not impossible to shield Child 4 from asking questions about his/her status. If Child 4’s status is a care

order for two years then this could introduce uncertainty as between the siblings. The Guardian’s opinion and recommendation to the

Court is that Child 4’s developmental needs in two years time will be such that a removal from his/her primary attachment figure,

namely Child 4’s foster mother would be inimical to the child’s welfare.

THE LEGAL POSITION

26. The relevant law to be applied is well established. In summary:

(i) The burden of proof lies on the Agency and the standard of proof is the on the balance of probabilities.

(ii) The threshold to be established by the Agency is set out in section 18 (1) of the 1991 Act.

(iii) The Court must determine whether the threshold has been reached in the case having regard to the evidence

adduced and having regard to the rights of the parents whether under the Constitution or otherwise and the rights

of the child.

(iv) Even where the threshold for State intervention has been reached the Court must consider the issue of the

proportionality of the order granted.

27. The Court must have regard to the principle or aim underlying the 1991 Act as amended which accords with that in the

Constitution and also with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, namely to try and keep families together or to

rehabilitate families who have experienced difficulties and whose children must be cared for by the State. However it is recognised by

this jurisprudence that in some cases the balancing or judgmental exercise of weighing the competing factors will result in an order

that has the effect that it parts a child from his or her family, or members of that family, or reduces the access rights and family life

between the child and a member, or members of his or her family.

FINDINGS OF FACT

28. Having heard the evidence set out above I make the following findings of fact:

a) Each of the parents has long standing substance misuse issues which is more entrenched in the case of the

father;

b) There is a co-dependency dynamic to the parents substance misuse;

c) The parents have a dysfunctional relationship marred by episodes of domestic violence;

d) The relationship has endured for two decades with periods of ambivalence and some awareness of its

dysfunction;

e) Neither parent has been able to maintain consistency in abstaining from substance misuse;

f) Neither parent can offer consistency of good parenting to Child 4 at this time;

g) The Agency has provided support services for the mother with the goal of family preservation;

h) The mother has not been able to avail of such services consistently;

i) Child 4 has experienced harm in the form of neglect as a result of exposure to parental substance abuse while in

the care of his mother and harm through the abrupt detachment from his mother who failed to have any access or

contact with him for three months following his initial reception into relative foster care. Child 4 also experienced

harm as a result in the move from this placement to his current foster placement with Child 3 his older sibling;

j) The parents have each been open and honest in disclosing their addiction to the Agency and each now have

expressed a desire to tackle their respective substance misuse;

k) Though it has been disrupted Child 4 has a bond with the mother which has endured from birth until he/she came

into Agency care.

CONCLUSION

29. I conclude on the evidence adduced by the Agency that on the balance of probabilities that Child 4’s health, development and

welfare is likely to be avoidably impaired or neglected into the future unless the court makes an order under this section in respect of

him and that it is necessary for a care order to be granted under section 18(1)(c) of the 1991 Act as amended. At this time neither

parent is able either separately or together to provide Child 4 with the safety, protection and consistent good care that he deserves.

PROPORTIONALITY OF ORDER

30. The remaining issue to be determined is the duration of the care order necessary to ensure the rights of all the parties to the

proceedings.

31. The Agency and the Guardian Ad Litem say that the appropriate order should be until Child 4 is eighteen years of age and that

and proceedings need to be brought to a conclusion so that there is certainty as to where and with whom Child 4 will be living for the

rest of his/her childhood.

32. In the event that the parents gain traction on their addiction and co-dependency the Agency point out that they can come back

to Court and seek to have the order discharged if that is in the best interests of Child 4 at that time. In addition the potential for

reunification must be assessed continuously by the Agency at each child in care review and so the parent’s rights under the

Constitution and otherwise are met and assured through these measures.

33. The Guardian Ad Litem has approved the care plan prepared by the Agency and is of the opinion that Child 4 is now in an

excellent placement with his older sibling, Child 3, and Child 4 is forming attachments to his foster carers in a culturally appropriate

placement. The Guardian’s position is that this placement should be a permanent one.

34. The parents say that they acknowledge that neither of them can adequately care for Child 4 at this time and that it will take the

mother two years to gain traction on her substance addiction and attend counselling to address the myriad of underlying issues which

have contributed to her addiction.

35. It is submitted on their behalf that although they had the possibility of doing this before Child 4 was received into care neither of

them was ready to acknowledge the power of their addiction or the dynamic of their co-dependency and abusive relationship with

each other and with drugs then. However the veil of self delusion has now been removed and real progress is now possible for the

first time.

36. The Court is not a court of social engineering and these are not adoption proceedings. As acknowledged in the case of N & Anor.

-v- HSE & Ors. [2006] IEHC 278 the position of a foster parent is not analogous to that of a prospective adoptive parent. It is of

fundamental importance that there is discipline in the approach to how the Court assess the duration of the order having regard to

the specific facts of each case and the welfare of child now and into the future. The Court may not decide these matters by

considering whether, on an individual judge's analysis, a child might be considered to be 'better off' in care than with the parents. Nor

may the Court aim to achieve a standard of ‘optimal care' since there would be many parents who would fail that test. The true test

as set out in N -v- Health Service Executive [2006] IESC 60 appears to be whether there is coercive or strong reason to believe that

the proper nurturing of the child in the natural family is not possible. It is conceded that this is the admitted reality in this case but

the parents believe that this will no longer be the situation in two years time. Child 4’s position in foster care is by its very nature

insecure and there is no way of guarding against further litigation in the future concerning either his continuing care and custody or

the extent of access to his natural parents.

37. I cannot fully accept the father’s proposition that a placement in foster care – even a long term foster placement offers no

additional level of security or stability to a child. The experience of harm of a child coming into care may inhibit their ability to form a

further secure attachment in care and lead to foster placement disruption. Furthermore the assurance that the mother will be able to

provide consistent safe and secure care for Child 4 in two years time is an optimistic prediction rather than a certainty bearing in mind

past outcomes.

38. The father also challenged the adequacy of services made available to him on his release from prison or that upon detoxification

he would become homeless either immediately or after a brief period. In his experience the fact of homelessness would inevitably hook

him back into to a substance abusing milieu. On the other hand he noted that the mother’s position was quite different as her

addiction is less embedded and she has housing available to her and he is committed to remaining separate from her. He says that he

is motivated to do this now because his own experience in foster care placements was one of displacement and disadvantage and he

wants this to change that for this child. I accept that he is genuine in this desire and that the mother is equally genuine.

39. The father acknowledged that Child 4 should have the opportunity of an available long term alternative if he/she cannot be

reunified with his/her mother in two years time. In his view there is nothing which prevents the Agency making long term plans now

taking a pessimistic approach to the parent’s proposal. This in his view is achievable through a care order for a two year period

acknowledging the Court’s option to extend the two year order before it expires if the mother has not been able to achieve her goal

of recovery and rehabilitation in that time frame. Sufficient access can be arranged to restore the bond between the mother and child

during that period so a phased return to her care could be achieved in a child centred manner.

40. While this is a reasonable and realistic position in broad terms the Court must have regard to the evidence adduced as to the

historical context in this case. The neglect in this case is inextricably linked to substance abuse, co-dependency and the dynamic of

a dysfunctional and enduring parental relationship. Periods of insight have in the past been overtaken by these issues and become

cyclical. Absence of consistency in maintaining access with the children in care has negatively impacted on them in the very recent

past. It has not been possible for the mother to consistently engage in access with this child.

41. The child in care does not enjoy a normal family life in the parent’s view. This is true to the extent that the child in care has the

continued involvement of social workers in his life. His social activities as he grows older are necessarily subject to monitoring and the

need for An Garda Síochána checks if he wishes to stay overnight with a friend as he grows older. Before foster parents may make a

significant decision for a child in care they must check with the Agency. The child’s contact with his parents and relatives may

highlight the child’s care status in the mind of the child as he grows older. Overall there are a great many procedural requirements

which differentiate the foster child from other children. Sometimes placements intended to be long term are not.

42. It is also true that changes in foster placement are rarely preceded by psychological evaluation and attachment assessments to

assess the adequacy of the new foster placement for the child before a move is made. Foster parents have the right to terminate a

foster placement. All of these realities must be factored into the risk assessment undertaken by social workers and guardians so that

the court has the benefit of realistic professional assessments about the relative merits of all placement options proposed.

43. It is difficult to understand the Guardian Ad Litem’s position that Child 4 should be told that his current foster carers are now his

“forever family” when patently this is not the case. There is an overarching legal duty on the Agency to consider family reunification

on an ongoing basis. Even a long term foster placement is at best a substitute form of care for so long as it is considered:

(a) to meet the best interests of the child in the view of the Agency;

(b) that the foster parents chose to undertake the role of foster parents; and

(c) that the child requires foster care as an alternative to care by his parents.

The rights of the parents are not terminated on the making of a care order. Foster care is not the same as adoption.

44. The proposed foster placement in this case is fully approved and culturally appropriate and respectful to the role of the parents

and the children’s identity. Child 4’s needs are likely to be met in a consistent way in this placement where he is loved and cared for.

The child will have the society of Child 3 to whom he has become attached. Child 4 has experienced far less episodes of intermittent

neglect than his older siblings and so the risk of placement breakdown is less likely in his case, though it would seem that Child 3 is

already exhibiting behavioural issues which place a strain on the placement. None the less the future is uncertain.

45. I am satisfied on the evidence in this case however that the care order under section 18(2) of the 1991 Act should be until Child

4 reaches eighteen years of age with a review in two years time to assess the position of the parents at that time. In the event that

they have endured in their commitments as expressed to the Court it is open to them to list an application under section 22 of the

1991 Act to discharge the care order at that time so that they have confidence that the issue of reunification is fully considered by

the Court at that time also.

46. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the parents through their respective legal representatives. However I am

satisfied that this decision is proportionate for the following reasons:

a) The parents have thus far failed to follow through with commitments made in the past in respect of their

substance misuse, co-dependency and their personal relationship;

b) The parents have acknowledged that these issues continue to prevent them providing consistent care for their

children and in particular this child at this time;

c) Section 24 of the 1991 Act requires the Court to given priority to the welfare of the child in the Constitutional

and Statutory balancing of rights exercise. Child 4 is at a critical developmental stage and needs to be assured of

consistency of care in a safe environment;

d) If the mother can persist in re-establishing a consistent pattern of access within the next two years and attain

recovery and independence the scales may tip in favour of phased reunification. However unlike the fact in Child

and Family Agency –v- CG and Anor (Care Order-Proportionality) [2014] IEDC 06 the parents in this case have not

moved beyond aspiration to concrete action and have not been able to maintain consistent access to Child 4 to the

extent that this child does not exhibit proximity seeking behaviour to the mother as an attachment figure, but seeks

out the foster mother in that role. The facts of this case may also be distinguished from those pertaining in the

case of Child and Family Agency –v- PW and PA (unreported, District Court, 16 September 2014) because the

relationship between the mother and child in this case is more remote and she has not even begun to address the

psychological counselling which underpins her substance misuse;

e) For these reasons I believe that the order necessary to assure the welfare of the child in this case must be a

long term one. This essentially places the onus on the mother to establish they she has undertaken the necessary

steps and availed of the requisite supports to warrant a recalibration of the risk which has led to the intervention by

the Agency. The Agency was obliged to intervene in order to protect the rights and interests of the child as

required by the Constitution, the European Convention of Human Rights, the European Charter of Fundamental

Rights and section 3 of the 1991 Act. However the Agency is equally under a positive obligation to consider family

reunification (as emphasized in the case of Olsson v Sweden (1989) 11 EHRR 259) and to regard reunification as the

goal where possible and to provide access to the child in care for the parents unless such access is detrimental to

the well being of the child.

47. I approve the care plan and note the Guardian Ad Litem’s approval of same. However I do not accept that it is in the best

interests of Child 4 to be told that he/she is now with “forever parents”. The child is not ‘freed for adoption’ by virtue of this order

and the foster parents are not his adoptive parents. Where there is a possibility of the child returning home it is difficult to see how a

child can be given concrete assurance of permanence. While even a young child requires to be given an age appropriate explanation

of their care status when asked, the scope for the child to become extremely confused seems to be acute if the foster placement

ends for whatever reason after social workers or a guardian has unintentionally given them a false promise of permanence.

SECTION 47 DIRECTIONS

A. I direct that this case is reviewed in November 2016 to assess the progress made by each parent in terms of addressing their

substance misuse issues and attending at access with Child 4.

B. The Agency is directed to provide each parent with all supports necessary to assist each of them participating meaningfully in

access visits with Child 4 having regard to his/her care plan based on the child’s best interests.

C. I direct that the Agency provide the mother with all necessary remedial and therapeutic services as identified in the social work

court report dated 16 October 2014 and by the parenting capacity assessment of RF Psychologist in 2011 and 2013 so that the

mother can be assisted to the greatest extent possible in achieving her goal of reunification with Child 4. This support may also

include parenting classes in child development and parenting techniques appropriate to the child’s developmental stage and age.

D. The Agency should also provide the mother and father individually with all necessary therapeutic supports and linkages to such

supports if provided by other agencies in order to assist each of them maintaining a consistent relationship with Child 4 through

supported access so that the child has the benefit of consistent and supported access to each of his/her parents.

E. I direct that the Agency provide Child 4 with appropriate psychological and attachment specialism to provide advice in the context

of family reunification and reconnection, access and life story work. In the event of such reunification the parents and child are to be

provided with transitional services and ongoing assessment of their adjustment.

F. I direct that the case be re-entered before the Court in April 2015 should Child 4’s current placement not be matched as his/her

long term placement at that time. If the placement has not been matched by in February 2015 then the Guardian Ad Litem is to be

re-appointed to advise the Court regarding outstanding issues on the date of re-entry. Furthermore I direct the case to be re-entered

before the Court in April 2015 also should the Agency fail to nominate a suitably qualified attachment specialist as envisaged at E

above to undertake an assessment of needs of Child 4 in relation to his/her attachment.

G. Under section 47 of the 1991 Act I direct that the case is to be re-entered before the Court by the Agency (on notice to the

Guardian Ad Litem) in the event that:

(i) The case becomes unallocated to social worker for a period of four weeks;

(ii) The case becomes unallocated to a fostering link worker for Child 4’s foster parents for a period of four weeks;

(iii) The Agency (for any reason) failure to adhere to the statutory care planning regulations in respect of Child 4;

(iv) The Child 4’s current foster placement breaks down or should the Agency seek to change Child 4’s current

foster placements.

H. The case is to be re-entered before the Court by the Agency (on notice to the Guardian Ad Litem) for the purposes of after care

review services in September 2028 should Child 4 remain in the care of the Agency at that time.

I. The Guardian Ad Litem is to be re-appointed in July 2026 in advance of the date of re-entry for after care review.

J. If the Guardian Ad Litem in this case is no longer available at that time then the Agency is to bring an application to the Court

pursuant to section 23 of the 1991 Act for the purposes of having a Guardian Ad Litem appointed.

K. In terms of reporting this case nothing is to be reported or broadcast which would lead members of the public to identify the child

or any of the parties involved in the child care proceedings as stipulated by the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act

2013.

L. I Discharge the Guardian Ad Litem at this date.

Judge Rosemary Horgan

District Court Judge