Supreme Court dismisses appeal on surrender postponement, ruling s.42 EAW Act does not apply to pending charges.

THE SUPREME COURT

Macken, J. [S.C. No. 4 of 2010]

O’Donnell, J.

McKechnie, J.

BETWEEN

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY & LAW REFORM

Applicant/Respondent

AND

JOHN RICHARD MURRELL

Respondent/Appellant

Judgment of the Court delivered by Macken J. on the 29th day of July, 2011

On the 16th December, 2010, the High Court (Peart, J.) granted an Order in favour of the respondent, pursuant to s.18 of the

European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended, (“the Act of 2003”) postponing the surrender of the appellant to the United Kingdom

pending the determination of certain domestic offences in respect of which the appellant has been charged. By Order dated the same

day, the High Court postponed the Order for the appellant’s surrender, pursuant to s.16 of the Act, made on the 28th November,

2007, as confirmed by Order of this Court on the 3rd February, 2009, until the final determination of the charges against him, and in

the event of his being sentenced to a term of imprisonment upon conviction in respect of such charges, or later, if sentenced to

imprisonment.

From the determination of the High Court, and the Order made thereon, the appellant, by a Notice of Appeal dated 6th January, 2010,

appealed from the same on the following grounds:

1. The learned High Court judge erred in law in determining that the surrender order granted under s.16 of the European

Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 remained operative, and the learned trial judge so erred in postponing, or further postponing,

the said surrender.

2. The learned High Court judge failed to have regard to the fact that the time of effecting the surrender of the appellant,

prescribed by statute and by Counsel Framework Decision of the 13th June, 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the

surrender procedures between member states had passed, or had expired, and that it was not legally possible to bring the

proceedings back to life in order to grant a postponement thereof and/or to effect the surrender.

3. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the learned trial judge erred in his interpretation and construction of the terms of

the postponement order granted by this honourable court on the 3rd February, 2009, which was and could only have

related to the proceedings then in being and pending against the appellant before the District Court, namely, the charge

preferred against the appellant on 31st January, 2009, the subject matter of charge sheet No. 8909389.

4. The learned judge failed to have regard to the express provisions of s.42 of the European Arrest Warrant Act opened in

court, and failed to interpret the decision of this honourable court in that light, such that the surrender of the appellant

would have been prohibited, and could not have been ordered, if the Director of Public Prosecutions was considering

further charges against the appellant.

5. The learned trial judge failed to have regard to the fact that there was no proceeding then pending before the Dublin

District Court, and such proceeding as had been pending before that court were no longer so pending after the 25th May,

2009. New charges were preferred on that date and the appellant was sent forward on those charges to the Central

Criminal Court. The pre-existing charge, the subject matter of the order of this honourable court was struck out and was

no longer pending. The postponement purportedly granted by the learned judge exclusively concerns the new charges

preferred on the 25th May, 2009.

6. In all the circumstances the learned judge erred in his determination that a postponement order was not required, and

further erred in ordering postponement of the surrender in respect of all charges contained in the Bill before the Central

Criminal Court.

Of particular importance in the context of the appeal are the terms of the Order of this Court dated 3rd February, 2009. By that Order

this Court (Murray, C.J., Geoghegan and Kearns, JJ.) directed postponement of the appellant’s surrender in the following terms:

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the surrender of the respondent, John Richard Murrell, be postponed under s.18(3) of the

European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended, until the date of his conviction or acquittal for the said offence of

wilfully assaulting, ill-treating, neglecting, abandoning or exposing a child in a manner likely to cause unnecessary

suffering contrary to s.246(1) and (2) of the Children Act, 2001 in proceedings entitled D.P.P. at the Suit of Sergeant

Thomas J. Harte v. John Richard Murrell, pending before Dublin District Court, and in the event of conviction until he is

no longer required to serve any part of any term of imprisonment, consequent upon said conviction”.

Background

On the 28th November, 2007, upon an application made by the respondent, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of 2003, the High

Court (Peart, J.) made an order pursuant to s.16(1) thereof for the surrender of the appellant to the United Kingdom. That was in

response to a European Arrest Warrant issued by the United Kingdom judicial authorities on the 27th September, 2007 in respect of

offences occurring there. The precise offences are of no great significance in the context of the present appeal. The Order for his

surrender to the United Kingdom was appealed by the appellant, but was affirmed by this Court on the 3rd February, 2009, when this

Court also made the Order above referred to. Between the time when the appellant appealed the decision of the High Court for his

surrender of the 3rd February, 2009, the appellant had, in fact, been charged, on the 31st January, 2009 in respect of an offence

contrary to s.246(1) and (2) of the Children Act, 2001, which gave rise to the above postponement term being included in the Order

made on the appeal.

That offence, as charged at that time, was the subject of a charge sheet bearing number 8476499. Particulars of the offence in

question are recited in the following terms:

“On a date unknown between 19/05/2006 and 28/09/2007 at a place or places unknown within the State in the [sic]

being a person having custody/charge/care of a child, namely, S.A.M., did wilfully assault, ill-treat, neglect, abandon,

expose the said child in a manner to cause unnecessary suffering to the child’s health, or seriously to affect her

wellbeing, contrary to s.246(1) and (2) of the Children Act, 2001”.

Sometime after the above events, on the 27th May, 2009, the appellant was faced with new charges. On the same day, the above

charge sheet was struck out, but was substituted immediately by charge sheet No. 8907492 relating to the same offence but with

some minor changes to better particularise the same. The offence was now stated to have occurred “between 01/12/2006 and

28/09/2009” (which should in fact be 2007, as is agreed) in comparison to the broader date provided for in the first charge sheet. The

second difference is that instead of stating that the offence occurred “at a place or places unknown”, it is stated that the offence

had occurred “at Athy Kildare”. The additional charges preferred against the appellant on the same day were of a serious nature, also

under the Children Act and other legislation, the details of which it is not necessary to consider in the course of this judgment.

On the 3rd November, 2009 an application was made to the High Court (Peart, J.) for postponement of his surrender. There is a

dispute concerning the extent of the application made for postponement, the appellant saying it arose from all six extant charges, the

respondent arguing it only was in reliance on the five new charges. This will be dealt with in when considering the argument of the

parties, and my conclusions. The application was acceded to. It is from the Order of the 16th December, 2009 that this appeal lies.

The Judgment of the High Court

Having heard the parties on the 3rd November, 2009, the High Court (Peart, J.) delivered judgment on the 16th December, 2009.

Having set out the terms of the postponement granted by order of this Court on the 3rd February, 2009, the learned High Court judge

considered the question of the charge sheet, its replacement and the impact of these on the application being made. He found that

while the charge sheet was struck out at the District Court on the 27th May, 2009, it was immediately replaced by another charge

sheet in respect of the same offence, and noted the refinement of the particulars. He took the view that the striking out of the

earlier charge sheet did not amount to an acquittal in respect of that offence, and in that regard accepted what was said by

McGuinness, J., in her judgment in Kennelly v. Cronin [2002] 4 I.R. 292. The learned High Court judge found that Kennelly v. Cronin,

supra., is not, however, authority for the proposition, made on behalf of the appellant, that the striking out of the original charge

sheet was a disposal of that case, in the sense of being an acquittal in respect of the offence (murder) in question. He considered

that, in the same way in the present case, the fact that the first charge sheet was struck out on the 27th May, 2009 did not operate

as an acquittal. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court’s postponement order of the 3rd February, 2009 did not lapse, or cease to

operate, and the order for postponement of his surrender still applied to the appellant. The learned High Court judge also found that,

strictly speaking, it was unnecessary for any further postponement order to be obtained in respect of the new offences, the subject

of the struck out charge sheet, but no reason existed why such a postponement order could not be made. In the circumstances, he

made the order pursuant to s.18 of the Act for the postponement of the surrender of the appellant.

The Arguments on the Appeal

Mr. Peart, senior counsel on behalf of the appellant, argues that the learned High Court judge was wrong in law in his findings. He

relies very much on the same arguments as were put forward in the High Court by Mr. Kelly, junior counsel then acting on behalf of

the appellant. In essence, what is argued is that, relying on the case of Kennelly v. Cronin, supra., and having regard to the terms of

the order of the Supreme Court of the 3rd February, 2009, the only proceedings “pending before the District Court” on that date

were those contained in charge sheet No. 8476499, being the charge sheet reflecting the offence as originally charged. Although a

“strike out” of that charge sheet is not expressly referred to in the Supreme Court order cited above, the true purport of the

respondent’s application on the 3rd February, 2009, and the clear intention of this Court, was to postpone the appellant’s surrender

until the conclusion of the only District Court proceedings then pending, pursuant to that specific charge sheet, and, in the event of

a conviction, until the conclusion of any prison sentence that might flow from it. It is said that an interpretation in accordance with

the intention of this Court, as contended for, and which it is said is in conformity with Article 24 of the Framework Decision, makes it

clear that the postponement is operative only until the “disposal” of those pending proceedings, which had occurred.

Based on the decision in Kennelly v. Cronin, supra., Mr. Peart argues that the striking out of the charge sheet is “a due disposal of

the charge against the appellant according to law”, within the true meaning of the order of this Court. Further, it is said that the

subsequent history of the application supports this approach. Since it is clear that the respondent sought a further postponement,

not only of the new charges, but also of the charge in issue, the subject matter of a substituted charge sheet, this latter further

postponement would not have been necessary, unless the respondent was himself satisfied that the offence appearing on the new

charge sheet was, in reality, a fresh offence, and that the striking out of the charge on the earlier charge sheet was a disposal in

law.

Furthermore, it must be the case that the Director of Public Prosecutions was, at the time this Court had seizin of the appellant’s

surrender proceedings in February, 2009, considering whether to charge the appellant with further offences, in circumstances where

s.42 of the Act of 2003 became applicable, and according to which the Act specifically prohibits surrender. If this Court had been

made aware, on the 31st January, 2009, that the Director was considering further charges against the appellant, it is highly unlikely

that surrender would have been permitted at all, and no postponement order would have been made. In the foregoing circumstances,

the appellant should not have been the subject of an affirmed Order for his surrender by this Court on the 3rd February, 2009, having

regard to the s.42 argument. In such circumstances, there was no proper basis for the postponement of the appellant’s surrender,

the postponement has, in fact, lapsed, and the appellant should have been surrendered to the United Kingdom at the latest by the

7th June, 2009. The learned High Court judge was wrong to conclude by his judgment of the 16th December, 2009, that

postponement was proper.

For the respondent, the entire of the foregoing arguments are challenged. According to the written submissions, the respondent

applied to the learned High Court judge to extend the order of postponement to include all offences, the Court stating that it was not

required to make any further order in respect of the offence specified in the order of this Court of the 3rd February, 2009, and the

order of postponement granted by the High Court on the 16th December, 2009 extended to those other offences. In the course of

the hearing before this Court, Mr. Barron, senior counsel for the respondent, clarified that, in fact, no application was made to the

High Court to further postpone or extend the order of the 3rd February, 2009 to the offence originally charged, as struck out and

substituted on the 27th May, 2009. He asked that the Court accept the transcript of the hearing of the 3rd November, 2009 in

support of his contention that the application made was in respect only of the new offences.

Apart from that preliminary matter, Mr. Barron argues that the postponement order of the 3rd February, 2009 was referable to a

specified offence, which is clear from the charge sheet. Order 17 of the District Court Rules, 1997, Rule 1, provides:

“Whenever a person is arrested and brought to a Garda Siochana Station and is being charged with an offence, or where

an offence is alleged against a person who is already on remand to the Court and a summons in respect of the offence

is not issued, particulars of the offence alleged against that person shall be set out on a charge sheet.”

The status of a charge sheet is considered in the case of Attorney General (McDonnell) v. Higgins [1964] I.R. 374, in which it was

stated:

“The charge sheet on which it (a complaint or information) is entered initiates as a purely police document and the

entry of the offences charged is necessary for the protection of the Garda to show that such offences justify arrest and

detention in the barracks without warrant.”

Further, the question of what is meant by “offence” in the context of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, has been determined in

Minister for Justice v. S.M.R. [2007] IESC 54, where it was held by this Court that the offence refers to the generic offence with

which a person is charged, and that the same meaning must be given to the word throughout the Act, unless the contrary appears

from the context.

Having regard to the foregoing, it is submitted that this Court, in its order of the 3rd February, 2009, unequivocally refers to an

offence contrary to s.246(1) & (2) of the Children Act, 2001, and specifies the particular events which could trigger the end of the

postponement, being either acquittal or conviction. The order is not framed, and correctly so, by reference to any particular charge

sheet.

As to the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant, that the striking out of the charge sheet is one which leads to the

determination or disposal of the proceedings, counsel argues that such a contention cannot properly flow from the judgment in

Kennelly v. Cronin, supra., which made it clear that the striking out of the original charge, even in that case, was not “a disposal” (as

the learned High Court judge in this case had also pointed out).

Mr. Barron also draws the Court’s attention to the rule against double jeopardy as being of assistance in assessing the appellant’s

submissions that the mere striking out of the charge sheet is, in effect, “a disposal” of an offence. A person cannot be tried for an

offence for which they have already been acquitted or convicted, and if, therefore, a strike out of the charge on the charge sheet

amounts to an acquittal, the prosecution would be precluded in the future from recharging the accused with the same offence. Upon

the strike out of the charge sheet, the appellant was recharged with the same offence on a separate charge sheet. Counsel draws

the Court’s attention to the decision of the High Court in Dunne v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2008] IECH 1, arising from the

striking out of a charge in circumstances where there was a failure to serve the Book of Evidence in good time. This decision makes it

clear that even if an accused in such circumstances is “at liberty”, the striking out does not preclude the appellant being proceeded

against afresh, and to another case, Carpenter v. Kirby [1990] I.L.R.M. 794, in which the High Court considered the entitlement of

the Director of Public Prosecutions to recharge an accused with the same offence, having previously withdrawn a charge due to

perceived deficiencies in its wording, the High Court (Barr, J.) stating that “although the order had been made, the Director was

entitled to recharge the applicant with the same offence”.

Finally, as to s.42 of the Act of 2003 is concerned, the respondent contends that it has no bearing on the proceedings. Insofar as a

charge had been laid against the appellant on the 31st January, 2009, the section has no effect, since the charge already existed.

Insofar as concerns the charges laid on the 27th May, 2009, there is no factual basis for the appellant’s contention that the Director

of Public Prosecutions was, or might have been, considering those, or any, further charges against the appellant on the relevant date,

namely, 3rd February, 2009.

Conclusion

The Postponement Issue

It seems to the Court that the starting point for a proper consideration of the legal issues which arise for consideration in this case, is

Article 24 of the Framework Decision, which forms an Annex to the Act of 2003.

Article 24(1) states:

“The executing judicial authority may, after deciding to execute the European arrest warrant, postpone the surrender of

the requested person so that he or she may be prosecuted in the executing Member State or, if he or she has already

been sentenced, so that he or she may serve, in its territory, a sentence passed for an act other than that referred to

in the European arrest warrant.”

By the provisions of Article 24(2), instead of postponing the surrender, the judicial authority may temporarily surrender the requested

person to the issuing Member State, on agreement between the two states, made in writing, and subject to binding conditions on the

issuing Member State.

The terms of Article 24 of the Framework Decision are transposed into Irish law by the clear provisions of s. 18 of the Act of 2003.

The provisions of that section, mirroring as they do the provisions of Article 24 make clear that the appellant was properly postponed

as to his surrender, provided that there were charges against him in being at the time when the postponement order was made. The

logic of this provision is unassailable. It would be quite extraordinary if, instead of facing charges in the requested State, a person the

subject of a surrender order, would first have to be surrendered to the requesting State, since it would follow inexorably that the

requested State would thereafter have to set in train a later application for his surrender, to take effect at the end of any judicial

proceedings, or service of a sentence, in the issuing State, thereby doubling the time, effort and expenditure in regularising the

charging and disposal of criminal offences in more than one jurisdiction.

True it is that the Framework Decision permits an alternative by Article 24(2), but it seems clear to me that this is so as to provide

for the exceptional or unusual case in which it is considered appropriate or necessary not to postpone surrender.

I am satisfied therefore there was, in principle, no difficulty in the learned High Court judge postponing the surrender of the appellant

until after the charges – assuming they were extant – were disposed of by acquittal or conviction, and in the case of conviction, until

after service of any sentence.

Whether there were extant charges

There are two issues for determination under this heading:

(a) whether the original charge was no longer before the District Court or had been. in law, disposed of finally;

(b) whether the “additional charges” were in the contemplation of the Director of Public Prosecutions at the relevant

date, in this case, the 3rd November 2009.

The chronology of events is as follows:

27th September 2007 European arrest warrant issued.

28th September 2007 Appellant arrested.

28th November 2007 High Court Surrender Order.

13th January 2009 Supreme Court Appeal Hearing.

31st January 2009 Domestic charge preferred.

3rd February 2009 Supreme Court Judgement.

3rd February 2009 Postponement of Surrender Order.

27th May 2009 Pending domestic charge struck out and replaced by

a new charge.

27th May 2009 Additional charges preferred.

7th June 2009 Possible expiry of 10 day time limit for surrender.

3rd November 2009 Further application for postponement.

16th December 2009 Postponement granted.

The sequence is clear. The appellant was originally arrested on the European arrest warrant on the 28th September 2007, and was

ordered to be surrendered on the 28th November 2007. He appealed that order to this Court. On the 31st January 2009 he was

charged with an offence in this jurisdiction, to which I will refer in a moment in more detail. Because he was facing a charge for that

offence, this Court postponed his surrender, pursuant to s.18 of the Act of 2003. The terms of the Order of this Court made on the

3rd February, 2009 postponing his surrender have already been set out.

A few months later, on the 27th May 2009 the appellant was charged with five further offences. In relation to the then extant

charge, this was struck out on that date and a fresh charge laid immediately. That charge was in respect of an offence contrary to

s.246(1) and (2) of the Children Act 2001, which was exactly the same offence, save that there was some greater particularity in the

second charge sheet, as already explained. The appellant did not at any time suggest to this Court that both charge sheets did not

relate to the same offence, under the same provisions of the above Act

The appellant’s only objection is based on the following proposition: when the first charge sheet in respect of the offence was struck

out at the District Court on the 27th May 2009, this constituted a formal “disposal” of the charge. In consequence, the postponement

order of the 3rd February 2009 came to an end, in light of its terms. In turn, the latest date by which the appellant could have been

lawfully surrendered, was ten days after the 27th May 2009, and the surrender order, not having been executed within the time

limited by the Act, namely prior to the 7th June 2009, thereupon lapsed.

The legal basis for the Appellant’s argument is founded entirely on the proposition that, in law, the charge in the District Court was

“disposed of”, and that sufficed to conclude that there was no longer any charge before the Supreme Court, within the terms of its

order of the 3rd February, 2009. Mr. Peart makes a strong and eloquent argument on that point, on the basis it is said, of the

judgment of McGuinness, J. in Kennelly v. Cronin, supra. He contends that the striking out of the relevant charge against the

appellant on 27th May 2009 amounted to “a due disposal of the charges against him according to law”. With respect, I cannot find

any support for the argument that a charge or charge sheet which has been struck out and immediately thereafter substituted by a

new charge sheet in respect of the same offence – precisely the same offence – can, under the circumstances of this appeal,

constitutes “a determination” of the offence against an accused, or even “a disposal” of the charge. That is what the appellant asks

this Court to accept.

The postponement order of this Court of the 3rd February, 2010 is worded so as to survive until the “acquittal or conviction” of the

Appellant in respect of the stated offence. The postponement of the original surrender remained extant where the offence was the

subject of an immediately substituted charge sheet in the District Court, unless the appellant can establish that he was otherwise

acquitted of the offence.

It seems to me that the starting point is to consider the terms of the Order itself. By the Order of the 3rd February, 2009 this Court:

(a) Postponed the surrender pursuant to s.18(3) of the Act of 2003 on terms;

(b) The terms were:

(i) The postponement would endure until the date of his conviction or acquittal;

(ii) of an offence of wilfully assaulting, ill-treating, neglecting, abandoning or exposing a child, etc., contrary to

s.246(1)(2) of the Children Act, 2001;

(iii) in proceedings entitled DPP at the suit of Sergeant Thomas J. Harte v. John Richard Murrell;

(iv) pending before Dublin District Court;

(iv) and would further endure, in the event of conviction, until he is no longer required to serve any part of any

term of imprisonment.

At the date of the making of that order, and subsequently, until the High Court postponement proceedings, and subsequently again,

the appellant was:

(a) Charged with an offence under the above sections of the Children Act, 2001;

(b) in proceedings brought by the DPP at the suit of Sergeant Thomas J. Harte, against the appellant;

(c) pending before the District Court;

(d) the date of his conviction or acquittal of the said offence had not been reached.

I am satisfied that, without going further, the postponement by the High Court on the 16th December, 2009 of the appellant’s

surrender was wholly lawful, and was fully within the ambit of the above Order.

The only remaining issue, therefore, which requires to be considered is whether or not the acts which took place, and the Orders

which were made on the 27th May, 2009 affected the above position. For the reasons which I now set out, I am satisfied that

nothing which occurred on that date, or subsequently, affected the terms of the above Order, or indeed the status of the appellant

and the above offence with which he was charged. On the 27th May, 2009 a series of further charges (including more serious

charges, although this does not affect the outcome of this appeal) were laid against the appellant. The extant offence described

above was the subject matter of a specific charge sheet. This is, as is clear from Attorney General (McDonnell) v. Higgins, supra., is

an administrative document, or “a purely police document”, as described in that case, used for the purposes of ensuring that

appropriate procedures are in place to justify arrest and detention. As the learned High Court judge pointed out, the particulars of the

same offence, in respect of which the appellant was charged, were more precise and slightly more limited, it not being necessary to

cite again the manner in which this was evidenced by the second charge sheet The existence of a particularly numbered charge sheet

on which details of the offence are recorded does not merge with the offence itself, and the substitution of a charge sheet by

another charge sheet, recording the charge for the same offence, cannot bring to an end the offence the subject of an earlier charge

sheet. On the 27th May, 2009 the charge as recorded on the first charge sheet was struck out, and immediately substituted, or

replaced, by a charge sheet in respect of precisely the same offence, carrying a different charge sheet number. The striking out and

immediate replacement of one charge sheet with another, recording precisely the same offence against the appellant, is neither an

acquittal nor a conviction, nor does it constitute any other form of “disposal” of an offence with which the appellant had been

charged. That is so when considering either the general law, or the terms of this Court’s Order of the 3rd February, 2009.

Mr. Peart, on behalf of the appellant, however, invokes in support of his argument, not an argument that the events which occurred

on the 27th May, 2009 constituted either a conviction or acquittal – the conditions specifically mentioned in this Court’s Order of the

3rd February, 2009 – but rather contends that the events nevertheless constitute “a disposal” of the charge for the purposes of the

general law. I take it that when speaking about “a disposal of the charge” counsel is contending that the offence was disposed of

finally by the District Court on the 27th May, 2009. I consider this argument to be unsustainable, notwithstanding the invocation by

Mr. Peart of Kennelly v. Cronin, supra. The decision in that case arose pursuant to a case stated from the Circuit Court to this Court

for its opinion as to:

(a) Whether the recognisance entered into by the respondent expired when the charge sheet was struck out by the

District Court judge, and

(b) Whether those recognisances were revived upon the same charge sheet being re-entered.

A third question arose in respect of non-notification to other bailpersons, which does not require to be considered in the present

appeal, save in one respect. In this Court it was determined, unanimously, that the recognisances of the respondent expired when

the District Court judge struck out the charge sheet. The first thing to be said about the case is that it arose peculiarly and

specifically in the context of a bail application, where bail having existed, and recognisance having been entered, the charge sheet

was struck out. The primary requirement of the recognisance entered was that the person “going bail” would appear before the court

in question on a specific date, and indeed on any adjournment, “until his presence is no longer required”. Once the order striking out

the charge was made, the presence of that bail person was no longer required and he/she was free to leave, the duty of the bail

person having been discharged.

In Kennelly v. Cronin, supra., the District Court judge, in accordance with a previous warning, and in the face of the continued

absence of the book of evidence, struck out the charges against the accused, who was then free to go. On this event, the

recognisances entered into by the bailpersons expired, and they were no longer bound by them. Later, in the same day, however, the

accused was re-arrested at his home on new charges relating to the same offences, and brought before the District Court. The

District Court judge re-entered the charge. Nothing in this Court’s decision in Kennelly v. Cronin, supra., suggests, intimates, or in any

way can be understood as indicative of the accused having been acquitted of the charge which he was facing under the first charge

sheet by the fact that it was struck out in the apparent absence (although incorrect, in fact) of the book of evidence. The most that

is said in the judgment of McGuinness, J., in relation to the foregoing events is that “the re-entry of the charge was a fresh step by

the court which brought about a new situation”. All that was, of course, in the context of whether or not bailpersons were bound by

the subsequent re-entry of the charge, under the bail terms relating to the charge as originally laid.

I can find nothing in the judgment of McGuinness, J. to support the contention that anything akin to a final determination of the

offence is to be found in her judgment. The position is very simply and clearly put by Geoghegan, J., in his concurring judgment, in

which, arising from the above facts, he states “the first respondent was brought back into the court on foot of an arrest for the

purposes of a new criminal proceeding in relation to the same charge. The only real question which can arise in this case is whether

on a revival of the original proceeding, a recognizance can continue”. (emphasis added). In respect of the bailpersons who had not

been present in the court, and therefore who had not expressly agreed to the reinstatement of the original charge, he found that,

had they been present “I think that they would have continued to be bound by their recognizances as they would have

acknowledged that the proceeding was not finally disposed of” (emphasis added). I am satisfied that this was a correct classification

of the status of the proceedings real issue, as pointed by Geoghegan, J., and also by Fennelly, J., being that the second and third

bailpersons, who had not been in court to hear what was going on, were entitled to be heard.

Nothing in the judgments in this Court in Kennelly v. Cronin, supra., can be taken to support the argument adduced on behalf of the

appellant, that on the 27th May, 2009 the striking out of the charge sheet, or even of the charge, constituted a “disposal” of the

offence with which he was charged. Nothing in the events which occurred by the striking out, and immediate replacement, of the

struck out charge sheet with a fresh charge sheet, could be taken as escaping the terms of the Order of this Court of the 3rd

February, 2009. The terms of the Order of that date continued to bind the appellant in respect of the offence, the subject matter of

the replacement charge sheet. I disagree entirely with the suggestion that the Order should be understood as referring, in reality,

only to the disposal of the particular charge on the particularly numbered charge sheet which was struck out, on the grounds it is

said, that this was the only charge “pending” before the District Court. This is against the plain wording of the Order. While that was

the only charge pending, it was not the appellant’s acquittal or conviction for the offence represented on the charge sheet which the

Order circumscribed.

This ground of appeal cannot succeed.

The next issue to be considered is the appellant’s argument that, on the application made on the 3rd February, 2009 for the

postponement of surrender, the subject matter of the judgment leading to this appeal, the respondent himself accepted that the

offence was disposed of by the striking out of the charge on the 27th May, 2009. This argument arises because it is the appellant’s

contention that on the 3rd November, 2009, when the application for the postponement was made, it was made in respect of all six

charges, that is to say, the five additional charges which came before the Court on the 27th May, 2009, as well as the offence the

subject of the replacement charge sheet of the same date. The argument appears to be that since an application was made for

postponement of surrender in respect of all six charges appearing on the respective charge sheets, this affects their legal status. This

is a point not explored to any extent in the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant, but, in any event, it is countered by

the respondent’s argument, supported by the transcript of the hearing before the High Court on the 3rd November, 2009, that only

the additional charges were the subject matter of an application for a further postponement. It was acknowledged by the respondent

that this was, strictly speaking, not necessary, since the extant postponement, the subject of this Court’s Order of the 3rd

November, 2009, survived at least until conviction or acquittal of that offence which order would likely be sufficient to endure to

conviction or acquittal on any of the other five offences also.

I am satisfied that there is no legal basis upon which the appellant, quite apart from my above findings, can rely on the application

made on the 3rd November, 2009 to support his contention that the respondent considered that the earlier postponement could not,

in law, continue upon the striking out of the charge, or charge sheet, on the 27th May, 2009. Whether or not the respondent was of

that opinion, it is a question of law as to whether or not the Order of this Court of the 3rd February, 2009 continued, which, in turn,

depends on whether or not there was a formal and final disposal of the offence by acquittal or conviction. Since I have already found

that there was no formal disposal of the charges, and, therefore, certainly no conviction or acquittal, the respondent’s subjective

opinion is of no relevance. In any event, I do not consider, having regard to the transcript, which both parties agreed should be

before the Court, that the respondent was, in fact, of that opinion. Counsel’s submissions appearing on the transcript make it clear

that the respondent contended for the continuance of this Court’s Order, and was seeking, as a matter of precaution, a

postponement of surrender on the charge appearing on the European Arrest Warrant, pending the determination of the five other

charges laid on the 27th May, 2009.

In the circumstances, this ground of appeal cannot succeed.

The s.42 Issue

Finally, there is the applicant’s argument that on the events which occurred, and the date sequence in particular, the charging of the

appellant on the 31st January, 2009, a few days prior to the date of this Court’s Order of the 3rd February, 2009, and his subsequent

charging on the 27th May, 2009 on further charges, lead inevitably to the conclusion that the respondent must have had an intention

on the 3rd February, 2009, at least, of charging the appellant with some, or those further offences. If that were the case, it is

argued, s.42 of the European Arrest Warrant Act comes into play.

Counsel for the respondent contends that s.42(a) cannot apply to the first offence as the appellant was already charged and submits

that there is no evidence that the Director of Public Prosecutions, on the 3rd February, 2009, was considering any other offences.

Conclusion

Section 42 of the Act is in the following terms:

“A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if –

(a) the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney General is considering, but has not yet decided, whether to

bring proceedings against the person for an offence,

…”

This section of the Act speaks for itself.

Clearly, as the respondent contends, this section cannot apply to the offence in respect of which the appellant was charged on the

31st January, 2009, but could only apply, if at all, to the offences with which he was charged on the 27th May, 2009, several months

later.

Without having to consider in any detail the arguments made in respect of this ground of appeal, it seems to me it can be disposed of

very simply. If there were any basis, in fact, upon which the appellant could suggest that the Director of Public Prosecutions had in

mind, or was considering, further proceedings against the appellant, it seems unlikely that the appellant would have no indication

whatsoever of the same, but rather on appearing in court on the 27th May, 2009, was suddenly faced with five additional offences,

of which neither he nor his legal advisers had the slightest indication. This may be the case, but if it were so it seems clear that the

appellant would have sworn to the same or, in the alternative, would have addressed the same in submissions made to the High

Court, whether written or oral. There is not the slightest indication that the fresh charges being laid against the appellant on the 27th

May, 2009 were a complete and utter surprise to him. Nor is there any evidence, or factual matters from which it could be implied,

that prior to the 31st January, 2009, or the 3rd February, 2009, when the appeal against his surrender was finally disposed of by this

Court, that any consideration was being given by the Director of Public Prosecutions to any further charges being laid against the

appellant. In the circumstances, there is no basis upon which this ground, pursuant to s.42(a), can be sustained.

Having regard to the foregoing, I would dismiss the appeal and affirm the Order of the High Court.