Court mitigates multiple rape and assault sentences for C.F. based on remorse and cooperation.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe High Court sentenced C.F. to concurrent prison terms for five counts of sexual offences committed in 2007. The court acknowledged the severity of the crimes but applied statutory mitigation due to the accused's remorse, cooperation with police, and willingness to engage in rehabilitation. Consequently, the original sentences were reduced from eight and five years to six and four years respectively, with the remaining counts adjusted accordingly.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedSection 10 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001; Section 10 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 2006: The court may mitigate sentences for sexual offences where the accused demonstrates genuine remorse, cooperates with authorities, and accepts rehabilitative measures, balancing the punitive nature of the Sex Offenders Register against the specific circumstances of the offender.
Keywords
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AI generatedFull text
Neutral Citation Number: [2011] IECCC 5
THE HIGH COURT
CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT
[2008] NO 88. CC
Between
THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)
Prosecutor
v.
C.F.
Accused
Judgment of Mr. Justice Garrett Sheehan delivered on the 28th October 2011
[1] Overview
[1.1] On the 22nd July 2011 a jury convicted C.F. in relation to all five counts on the indictment; namely rape, attempted rape, rape
contrary to s.4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 and false imprisonment in relation to the complainant B.K. and a
count of sexual assault against C.M.
[2] Factual background
[2.1] All the offences occurred in the early hours of the 16th September 2007. The circumstances of the sexual assault on C.M. were
as follows. C.M. met the accused, C.F., in a fast food restaurant in the town following an evening socialising in pubs and a nightclub.
She accepted an offer of a lift home with the accused, went to his car and the next thing she remembered was waking up in the car
in a field. The accused was kissing her. She had his penis in her hand and he was touching her vagina. She told him to stop and he
did so. He drove her home and he asked her for her telephone number, whereupon she gave him a telephone number and he later
gave this to the gardaí when he was arrested in respect of the offences against B.K. the following day. As a result of this the gardaí
contacted C.M.
[2.2] Having left C.M. to her home, C.F. returned to the town where he encountered B.K., who had been out socialising with her then
partner in some public houses and a nightclub. She had an argument with her partner and was trying to get a lift home on her own.
She had no shoes on and she recalled a car stopping on the street which she got into. The accused, instead of driving her straight
home, stopped the car in a country lane and prevented her from getting out. A struggle ensued in the course of which she broke the
windscreen with her feet. She was screaming at the accused but calmed down when he said he would drive her home. However, he
drove on and stopped again a short while later with the passenger door against a brick wall. The accused jumped on the complainant
and a further struggle ensued. She tried to fight him off but was unable to do so as he was stronger than her. He pulled down her
jeans and raped her. He did not ejaculate and he then asked her to perform oral sex on him which she did out of fear saying that she
believed she would be killed if she did not. He did not ejaculate and then attempted to have anal sex with her. She kept screaming
and eventually he stopped trying. He then drove her home. In the course of her struggle with the accused, B.K. suffered considerable
bruising to her breasts, chest, arms and legs and she also had bruising on her face.
[3] Facts arising from the sentencing hearing
[3.1] This Court has taken into account the submissions of counsel for the accused, the probation report furnished to the Court, a
number of certificates in respect of courses completed by the accused, the reference of the prison chaplain and the letter the
accused himself wrote to the Court. With regard to the victim impact report of B.K., the Court notes her courage and the hopeful
note on which she ends her statement. Since the event she has got married and has had two children. The Court also notes the
contents of the victim impact report of C.M. who also ends her statement on a hopeful note.
[3.2] With regard to the risk assessment reports contained in the probation report these are, as counsel for the accused rightly points
out, made in the context of the absence of interventions that would enable the accused to become fully reintegrated into society.
What is surprising about the probation report is that, while anticipating the imposition of a prison sentence, no reference is made to
the rehabilitation programmes available in Irish prisons today and no reference is made to the fact that while in prison since the
commission of these offences the accused has already completed a number of courses. The Court refers in particular to the two
certificates the defendant received from the Alternatives to Violence Project Ireland as well as the Samaritans Listener Course which
he attended while in Wheatfield Prison. It is also surprising that the probation officer was unaware that the accused had engaged
with the counselling services available to him in prison.
[4] Determining the appropriate sentence in sexual offence cases
[4.1] In determining the appropriate sentence in this case, the Court has considered the submissions of counsel on behalf of the
Director of Public Prosecutions who told the Court that it was the view of the Director that the appropriate sentence for the sexual
assault on C.M. was in the four to seven year range and that the appropriate sentence for the rape of B.K. was in the nine to fifteen
year range. Counsel referred the Court to the judgment of Charleton J. in the Director of Public Prosecutions v. W.D. [2007] I.E.H.C.
310, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Director of Public Prosecutions v. Richard Finn [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 96 and four
copies of newspaper reports of cases in which sentences were imposed by the Central Criminal Court, two of which related to one
case. I have read and considered all these cases. It is clear that in the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions v. Richard Finn
there were aggravating features which were far more serious than in the present case. Obviously, the personal circumstances of the
accused in this case are also considerably different to those of the accused in the Director of Public Prosecutions v. Richard Finn.
[4.2] In considering the question of imprisonment, this Court is mindful of the recent reports of Judge Michael Reilly, the Inspector of
Prisons. It is clear from these reports that Irish prisons are seriously overcrowded at present and that this is impacting adversely on
the services available to prisoners. It is also clear from these reports that those in prison today are subject to risks to their physical
and mental health over and above what one would normally associate with a sentence of imprisonment. One is led to conclude that
the punitive aspect of a prison sentence today is aggravated by the conditions referred to by the Inspector of Prisons. This Court
considers the submissions in this case in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Tiernan [1988] 1 I.R. 250 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Director of Public Prosecutions v. M [1994] 3 I.R. 306. In the
course of his judgment in the Director of Public Prosecutions v. Tiernan, Finlay C.J. stated at p.254 that:- “Having regard to the
fundamental necessity for judges in sentencing in any form of criminal case to impose a sentence which in their discretion
appropriately meets all the particular circumstances of the case (and very few criminal cases are particularly similar), and the
particular circumstances of the accused, I would doubt that it is appropriate for an appellate court to appear to be laying down any
standardisation or tariff of penalty for cases”.
[4.3] In the Director of Public Prosecutions v. M [1994] 3 I.R. 306, Denham J. stated that sentences must be proportionate to the
crime and the personal circumstances of the offender. In that case, Egan J. considered the correct manner in which a sentencing
judge should determine a sentence in respect of an offender and concluded at p. 315 that:- “One should look first at the range of
penalties applicable to the offence and then decide whereabouts on the range the particular case should lie. The mitigating
circumstances should then be looked at and an appropriate reduction made.” In the Director of Public Prosecutions v. McCormack
[2000] 4 I.R. 356, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated at p. 359 that: - "Each case must depend upon its special circumstances. The
appropriate sentence depends not only upon its own facts, but also upon the personal circumstances of the accused. The sentence
to be imposed is not the appropriate sentence for the crime, but the appropriate sentence for the crime because it has been
committed by that accused”.
[4.4] The Court in considering the appropriate penalty in this case is obliged to bear in mind the principle of proportionality and to
reconcile that with the aim of rehabilitation. In the Director of Public Prosecutions v. M [1994] 3 I.R. 306, Denham J. held that any
sentence imposed must be proportionate to the circumstances of the case having regard to the nature of the offence, its effect on
the victim and the circumstances of the convicted person. A relevant and necessary factor to be considered in this context is the
prospect of successfully rehabilitating the convicted person so that he would not have any propensity to reoffend. This leads the
Court on to a consideration of the particular prospects of this accused successfully rehabilitating. It is clear, first of all, from the
letter he wrote to the Court that he is remorseful for the crimes he committed and that his apology to the victims is sincere even if
he needs to develop his capacity for greater empathy. The letter from the chaplain speaks of his excellent behaviour in prison, his
respectful and courteous attitude to her, his willingness to engage in counselling and that he has already started this counselling. This
letter also refers to his seriously dysfunctional childhood, his parents' excessive drinking and the sexual abuse perpetrated on him by
someone outside his family during his young years.
[4.5] With regard to the mitigating and aggravating factors this Court concludes the following. The Court considers the injuries
suffered by B.K. and her detention in the car against her will as aggravating factors. The Court considers the following to be the
mitigating factors: first, C.F's remorse and apology; secondly his personal circumstances and these are outlined above; thirdly his
willingness to engage in a real way with whatever rehabilitative opportunities are offered to him and in particular to avail of
counselling services; fourthly the degree of cooperation with the gardaí and, to a lesser extent, the absence of relevant previous
convictions and in this regard the Court refers to the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Richard Finn [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 96 where this was held to be a mitigating factor.
[4.6] The other matter that is relevant to sentencing in this case is the placing of the accused on the Sex Offenders Register. This is
a very real punishment which will impact upon the accused's life. Section 10 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001 requires the accused to
notify the gardaí of certain information for an indefinite period if he is sentenced to a period of imprisonment in excess of two years. It
is necessary to notify the gardaí of his name, including any names by which he is known, his home address, any change of name or
address, any return to the State having been abroad for seven days or more, any intention to leave the State for seven days or more
together with the address he will be staying at or having left the State for less than seven days the fact of a change involving an
extension beyond seven days and the address at which he is residing. Other obligations also arise in relation to informing potential
employers of his conviction in certain situations which might involve unsupervised access to, or contact with, children or a mentally
impaired person. This applies to the accused in this case even though there is no suggestion that he represents a threat to children
and may even be more punitive here given his expressed desire to emigrate on his release from prison. This Court has considered
whether or not it should impose a post-release supervision order and it does not propose to do so.
[5] Decision
[5.1] Taking all matters into consideration, this Court holds that the appropriate sentences before mitigation are as follows: eight
years imprisonment for the rape of B.K.; eight years imprisonment for the oral rape of B.K.; five years imprisonment for the attempted
rape of B.K.; five years imprisonment for the false imprisonment of B.K. and two years imprisonment for the sexual assault on C.M. In
view of the mitigating factors which have already been outlined, the sentences that this Court has identified will be mitigated as
follows; in respect of the two eight year sentences, this Court will mitigate those sentences to six years imprisonment. In respect of
the sentences of five years imprisonment, which this Court has identified as being appropriate, the Court will mitigate those sentences
to four years and in respect of the sexual assault on C.M., this Court imposes a sentence of eighteen months imprisonment. Taking
into account the principle of totality, this Court will direct that these sentences are to run concurrently. The sentences will also be
backdated to the time the accused went into custody following his conviction on the 22nd July 2011.