Appeal dismissed for failing to plead a cause of action and for being frivolous and vexatious proceedings.

THE SUPREME COURT

Denham J.

Kearns J.

Clarke J.

[S.C. No. 350 of 2007]

BETWEEN

THOMAS TALBOT

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

AND

HIBERNIAN GROUP PLC.

FIRST NAMED DEFENDANT

AND

AMICUS THE UNION

SECOND NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Kearns delivered on the 26th day of March, 2009

This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff against the order of the High Court (Irvine J.) made on 14 November, 2007

dismissing his claim against the second named defendant under both Order 19, Rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts

and under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The involvement of the first named defendant in these proceedings arises by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff worked as a

claims handler for Hibernian Insurance from 1956 until 2001. In the last ten years of his employment, unhappy differences

arose between the plaintiff and his employers concerning both the nature and volume of work which the plaintiff was

required to do and the levels of remuneration which he received. At all material times the second named defendant was the

Union representing employees in the plaintiff’s position and the plaintiff in these proceedings contends that the second

named defendant failed to adequately defend or vindicate his rights in its exchanges with his employers and further

conspired with his employers to defeat or damage his rights and entitlements.

The plaintiff may nowadays perhaps be better described as a serial litigant. He has engaged in one or other form of litigation

over the past twenty years. Some of this litigation arose from the break up of his marriage, but lengthy and protracted

proceedings were also undertaken by or on behalf of the plaintiff against his employers, his trade union and even his golf

club. His multiple complaints deriving from his employment were the subject of hearings before the Rights Commissioner,

the Labour Court and the Employment Appeals Tribunal. While voluminous papers have been lodged by the plaintiff for the

purpose of this appeal, many consist of newspaper clippings, internal communications within the insurance company for

which he worked and other documentation with little or no relevance to the issue which this Court must decide. However, a

useful summary of the nature of the dispute which existed between the plaintiff and his employers is set out in the decision

of the Labour Court on 18th June, 2001 where the dispute was characterised in the following terms:-

“WORKERS ARGUMENTS:

1. The worker concerned has over 44 years unbroken service. The problems associated with his employment commenced

in 1980, when the worker was forced to join liability claims to assist with the volume of work which he completed

efficiently and competently. His colleagues in that section received far higher remuneration for a lesser workload. The

worker was resented and treated unfairly by his immediate manager and denied opportunities for promotion. He was

harassed and victimised over a long number of years and has been issued with a number of dismissal notices (details

supplied to the Court).

2. The re- grading offered to the worker was totally inadequate and insufficient given his vast experience and his

expertise as senior claims handler going back to 1974. The appellant undertook a very significant volume of work in a

very stressful environment. The salary of the worker does not reflect his duties and responsibilities over many years. The

worker’s claim is for a pension, index linked to inflation, equal to his present salary, and loss of earnings, which he

claims are deserved and were denied as follows: £30,000 for five years 1984 – 1989, £35,000 for five years 1990 – 1995

and £40,000 for five years 1996 – 2001.

COMPANY’S ARGUMENTS:

1. The current grading system, including the appeals procedure, was agreed between the company and MSF. The worker

was a member of the union at the time of the agreement. The system is a fair and equitable one and applies to all staff.

Other equivalent workers to the appellant are graded similarly.

2. The appellant sought an appeal of his assigned grade through the agreed procedure. He was represented by MSF

during the appeals process and was regraded to a higher grade applicable to the duties and responsibilities of his

position. The grading being sought by the appellant (Grade E1) is not applicable in any way to his role as a Claims

Adviser.

3. The appellant has refused to sign the authority charter for his position and has also refused to co-operate with the

company’s performance appraisal system. This served only to adversely impact on his earnings potential.”

While the Labour Court proceeded to disallow the plaintiff’s claim, I do not wish to be taken as expressing a view one way

or another as to the correctness of that decision. I merely insert this short summary to convey the gist of the plaintiff’s

complaints. Furthermore, given that the plaintiff has not in any way contested the factual summary contained in the

judgment delivered by the High Court in this matter (apart from a minor detail in respect of one person’s relationship to Mr.

Gerry Shanahan, a member of the respondent union) it is unnecessary to refer to the factual background in any greater

detail. Further, no argument was advanced during the course of the hearing of this appeal to suggest that incorrect legal

principles were applied by the learned trial judge. The plaintiff’s essential complaints are that the learned trial judge wrongly

exercised her discretion to dismiss the proceedings and, secondly, that she was biased against the plaintiff during, but more

particularly at the conclusion, of the hearing before her.

In April, 2006 the plaintiff instituted proceedings against the above defendants seeking to ventilate voluminous claims against

both defendants arising from his employment over the later part of his employment term. In July, 2006 a new endorsement

of claim detailing the complaints against the union Amicus was delivered and in that document Mr. Talbot alleged that Mr.

Gerry Shanahan, an employee of Amicus, “abandoned” his obligations to take care of the plaintiff’s interests both in respect

of his position and salary entitlements. He complained that in 1999 in particular Mr. Shanahan’s behaviour contributed to

the unsatisfactory position he found himself in with regard to his pension and entitlements as of the date of his retirement.

The defendants in those proceedings brought applications in the High Court to have same dismissed under the same

provisions and jurisdiction invoked in the current proceedings. By order of the High Court (Dunne J.) made 11th January,

2007, those proceedings against both defendants were dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. They were not

dismissed on the basis they were either vexatious or an abuse of process.

Immediately following upon the order of Dunne J., Mr. Talbot issued the present proceedings against the same defendants.

A plenary summons was issued on 22nd January, 2007. Between then and October, 2007 the plaintiff proceeded to deliver

no less than seven documents purporting to set out details of his “statement of claim”. An appearance on behalf of the

second named defendant was entered on 24th January, 2007. Subsequently a motion to dismiss the proceedings was issued

on 22nd February, 2007. Before the hearing in the High Court, the second named defendant delivered its defence on 4th

May, 2007.

As is evident from her judgment, Irvine J. gave careful consideration to all of the documents setting out details of the

plaintiff’s claim when hearing the application brought by the second named defendants herein. She also compared the

statement of claim to the pleas made by the plaintiff in his earlier proceedings which were dismissed by Dunne J. in January,

2007. She noted that the present proceedings again asserted wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Talbot’s employers in terms of

the nature and volume of work which he was required to undertake and also the level of remuneration received by him for

such work. She noted that Mr. Talbot complained about the manner in which his complaints were dealt with by his

employers and how the same were dealt with by means of an internal appeals system in 1999 followed by the processing of

further complaints through the Labour Court in 2001 and the Employment Appeals Tribunal in 2002. The learned trial judge

noted the assertion made by the plaintiff that he is due extensive payments in respect of arrears of salary from 1984 up to

the date of his retirement and significant pension and lump sum payments based upon uplifted salary payments with effect

from 31st November, 2001. She further noted that interspersed with this claim in respect of salary, lump sum entitlement

and pension, the plaintiff had also brought serious allegations of fraud, malicious intent, defamation, theft, collusion,

conspiracy, bribery and corruption against his former employers and furthermore asserted that the respondent union not

only failed to protect him from such activities but actively colluded and conspired to act against his interests through the

agency of Mr. Shanahan. The judgment noted Mr Talbot’s allegation that Mr. Shanahan negotiated against the plaintiff’s

interests and as proof of his “corruption” the plaintiff had referred - pace the judgment - to an appointment alleged to have

been procured by Mr. Shanahan for his ‘wife’s nephew’ in the Claims Department of the Hibernian Insurance Group in

Cork. This detail is a matter I referred to earlier. It is an error in the judgment of the learned trial judge possibly based on

her acceptance of a statement to that effect contained in written submissions prepared by counsel on behalf of the

respondent wherein the particular relationship was so characterised. In fact it was some other individual (a Mr. O’Leary)

whose wife’s nephew was allegedly appointed as a result of some alleged intervention by Mr. Shanahan. It is impossible to

relate this allegation to any actionable complaint which the plaintiff may have against the respondent but I will return to this

matter later when dealing with the allegation of bias raised against the trial judge.

In the High Court, Mr. James Devlin, counsel on behalf of the respondent, contended:-

1. That the plaintiff’s claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

2. The action was frivolous and vexatious.

3. The pleadings delivered by the plaintiff were prolix.

4. The endorsement of claim should be struck out or amended so as to insure that the same did not prejudice, embarrass or

delay the trial of the action.

Having reviewed the relevant legal authorities, Irvine J. stated as follows (at p.7 of her judgment):-

“This court is of the belief that the claim being made as against the second named defendant is one

which is bound to fail even if the court is to accept fully all of the facts pleaded by the plaintiff in

his statement of claim. Whilst the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of his ability to prove the

facts pleaded at the trial, the court does not have to accept the truth of the assertions, implications

and inferences which it is asked to draw from these facts. For example, whilst the court, for the

purpose of this application, may have to accept that Mr. Gerry Shanahan negotiated a deal which

was unfavourable to the Union’s members including the plaintiff, the court does not have to accept

as fact that his actions resulted from a deliberate conspiracy or collusion with the Hibernian

Insurance Company. Similarly, whilst the court must accept that the plaintiff will prove as fact that

Mr. Shanahan procured a position in the Hibernian Insurance Company for his wife’s nephew, it

does not have to accept as fact that this amounts to proof of the corruption alleged against Mr.

Shanahan. Further, even in the event of the plaintiff being in a position to establish such corruption

in terms of such appointment the same would not afford Mr. Talbot any cause of action against

Amicus. The height of the evidence which Mr. Talbot will be in a position to educe at trial will be

his own evidence and the court cannot accept that he has any possibility of establishing claims of

this nature even if he were in the position to overcome issues such as the statute of limitations and

other formal objections to his claim.”

The learned trial judge was thus satisfied that the plaintiff had failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action

against the second named defendant. She was also satisfied that the plaintiff’s action was both frivolous and

vexatious within the meaning of Order 19, Rule 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and also concluded that,

in the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, she should for these various reasons dismiss the claim against

the second named defendant.

Again, because it arises in the context of another complaint advanced by the plaintiff in the course of this appeal,

it is important to note what the learned trial judge determined in relation to costs. At p.9 of her judgment, Irvine

J. stated:-

“The court will make an order providing for the second named defendant’s costs of the proceedings

as against the plaintiff and will grant a stay on such an order which will only be lifted in the event

of the plaintiff instituting fresh proceedings under a new record number against Amicus Limited,

the Union.”

DECISION

Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 provides:-

“The Court may order any pleading to be struck out, on the ground that it discloses no reasonable

cause of action or answer and in any such case or in case of the action or defence being shown by

the pleadings to be frivolous or vexatious, the Court may order the action to be stayed or dismissed,

or judgment to be entered accordingly, as may be just”

In addition the Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to ensure that an abuse of the process of the courts does not take

place. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings will be stayed. They will also be stayed if it is clear that the plaintiff’s claim must

fail.

In the course of the appeal before this Court, I have heard nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions to suggest that the learned

trial judge erred in any way in reaching the conclusion which she did. She found that the various claims, contained in

numerous handwritten documents, which purport to set out a claim against Amicus remain completely amorphous and are

not pleaded in accordance with the Rules of the Superior Courts. I agree. Nor do his pleadings in any way set out facts or

contentions which are adequately particularised so as to support any maintainable cause of action. The learned trial judge

was, in my view, restrained in her characterisation and comments about the documentation furnished by the plaintiff. I am

in this context adverting not only to the seven statements of claim advanced by the plaintiff, but also to his voluminous

submissions, including those filed following the conclusion of the appeals herein. The same are in my view prolix, unfocused

and irrational to a high degree and almost entirely unrelated to the issue before the Court. There is no attempt made to

engage with the reasoning of the learned trial judge or to provide grounds for challenging her conclusions both that the

proceedings are frivolous and vexatious and that they fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action. For this simple and basic

reason the plaintiff’s appeal must fail.

There then remains the allegation that the learned trial judge was biased. This is partly based upon the suggestion that the

learned trial judge in reaching her conclusions took on board the misdescription of a family relationship between a particular

appointee to an insurance company and Mr. Shanahan. Because this characterisation corresponded with a similar error in

written submissions filed by Mr. Devlin, the plaintiff assumes and contends that it must inevitably follow that counsel

“wrote” the judgment for the learned trial judge or influenced her in some improper way to write a judgment which was to

his liking. I reject this contention as manifestly absurd and indicative of the irrationality to which I have previously referred.

When writing judgments, it is not uncommon or unusual for a trial judge to incorporate information contained in submissions

filed in court. If the trial judge did so, and I am not so finding, that course is in no way suggestive of bias on the part of the

judge in question, particularly when, as in the instant case, it relates only to a purely minor factual detail, and one which was

of no significance in the resolution of the issue before the court. Other allegations raised by Mr. Talbot that the learned trial

judge deferred excessively to counsel, agreeing with everything he said, while exhibiting hostility towards the plaintiff, are

not substantiated in any way. I would unhesitatingly reject all complaints of bias in this case as utterly unfounded.

I would dismiss the appeal.