Legislator Case Law & Legislation
DE FR IT EN
Analyze in Legislator
IESC 34 ECLI:IE:SC:2008:34 AI generated

Appeal dismissed; no real risk of unfair trial found despite serious prosecution delay.

Case Number IESC 34
Court / Authority
Jurisdiction Ireland (IE)
Decision Date
Outcome Dismissed
Machine-readable Markdown (.md)

Legislator summary

AI generated

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against a stay of criminal proceedings, agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that no real and substantial risk of an unfair trial existed. The applicant argued for a stay due to serious delay in prosecution, but the court found no exceptional circumstances warranting such relief. Consequently, the trial was allowed to proceed as the delay did not compromise the administration of justice or the accused's rights.

Legislator headnote

AI generated

Articles 38.1 and 38.2 of the Constitution; A serious delay in prosecution does not alone justify staying proceedings unless it causes specific consequences for the accused or the administration of justice, and no real risk of an unfair trial must be established.

Keywords

AI generated
serious prosecution delay stay of criminal proceedings real and substantial risk unfair trial standard administration of justice

Need to analyze how this precedent applies to your matter?

Cross-reference this judgment against statutes, commentaries, and subsequent citing case law inside Legislator AI.

Open in Legislator →

Full text

[2008] IESC 34

THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal No. 353/2006

Murray C.J.

Denham J.

Hardiman J.

Geoghegan J.

Fennelly J.

Between

BRIAN RATTIGAN

APPLICANT / APPLICANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Murray C.J. delivered the 7th day of May 2008

1. I agree with the conclusions of Geoghegan J. for the reasons set out in his Judgment and I just wish to add a few brief

observations. If the appellant had established that there was a real and substantial risk of an unfair trial, that would determine the

appeal in his favour according to the well established case-law of this Court as cited by Geoghegan J., none of which has been put in

issue in this appeal. According to that case-law there are no exceptional circumstances which would permit a trial to proceed in the

face of such a finding. However, for the reasons set out in that judgment including the actual “fade factor” referred to by Geoghegan

J., I do not think that there is such a risk, in the circumstances of this case.

2. I also agree that serious delay in proceeding with a prosecution is not on its own a ground for restraining a criminal trial for grave

crimes from proceeding unless there are certain consequences for the accused or the administration of justice which have been laid

down by this Court in successive authorities and referred to by Geoghegan J., in his judgment. As the authorities demonstrate there is

no reluctance on the part of this Court or the Judiciary generally to stay proceedings setting out the reasons for such a stay,

irrespective of whose conduct is involved, where the law and the interests of justice so require.

3. Finally, in accord with Geoghegan J., I would express no view on the admissibility of any evidence at the trial since that will be a

matter exclusively for the trial Judge. In particular I leave over for another case the circumstances, if any, in which a statement of an

accused which has not been electronically recorded might be excluded from evidence at a trial for that reason alone, when and if that

matter arises for determination by this Court.