Supreme Court allows appeal to prevent absurd statutory interpretation where dependents can separately appeal lump sum awards.

THE SUPREME COURT

Murray, C.J.

Kearns, J.

Finnegan, J.

[231/2005]

BETWEEN

RC, JC, BC, SC, TC, EB, JC, AC, TC, SC, MC & TC

RESPONDENTS/CLAIMANTS

AND

THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH AND CHILDREN

RESPONDENT

AND

THE HEPATITIS C AND HIV COMPENSATION TRIBUNAL

APPELLANT

AND

KW, KC & SC

NOTICE PARTIES

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Kearns delivered the 7th day of May, 2008

Some very simple propositions of statutory interpretation are outlined in Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation (4th Edition) at

Part XXI. The chapter is entitled “Construction against Absurdity” and recites in that context a number of presumptions

and principles which should be applied when interpreting legislation.

Firstly, there is a presumption that an “absurd” result is not intended by the legislature. As Bennion states (at p.831):-

“The court seeks to avoid a construction that produces an absurd result, since this is unlikely to have been

intended by Parliament. Here the courts give a very wide meaning to the concept of ‘absurdity”, using it to

include virtually any result which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile

or pointless, artificial, or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief.”

On the page following (p.832) Bennion states:-

“The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result,

since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament.”

Further, the court seeks to avoid a construction that causes unjustifiable inconvenience to persons who are subject to the

enactment, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament (p.839).

Finally, Bennion also states (at p.845) that:-

“The court seeks to avoid a construction that creates an anomaly or otherwise produces an irrational or

illogical result.”

An award under S. 5 (2A) (b) of the Act is one made in respect of the general damages which the deceased would have

been entitled for pain and suffering, personal injury, loss of/or diminution or expectation of life or happiness, which the

deceased suffered during his or her lifetime and to which the deceased would have been entitled if he or she had survived

and brought a claim for compensation to the Tribunal. It equates to an award to which the deceased alone would have been

entitled.

I am quite satisfied that the terminology of this sub-section, which follows on immediately after a sub-section dealing with

the Civil Liability Act, 1961, contemplates a unitary award such as is indeed provided for by the Civil Liability Act, 1961 in

respect of a fatal claim. Sub-section (b) does not refer to multiple awards. It provides that the amount of the award, which is

described exclusively in the singular, shall be divided amongst the dependents in such manner as the Tribunal thinks just.

Again, this language closely tracks the language contained in the Civil Liability Act, 1961 and puts in place a scheme to be

operated in the same manner. If separate claims had been intended one would have expected explicit statutory language so

providing. To put it another way, if multiple awards had been intended words such as “awards” or “the aggregate amount

of the awards must not exceed the total sum to which the deceased would have been entitled” would have been deployed

in the relevant sub-section. Such words do not appear.

Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the dependents are to be seen as separate individual claimants, the following

inevitable consequences would follow:-

(a) Each such appellant would be entitled to appeal both the adequacy of the lump sum award and the division or

apportionment thereof. If there were multiple dependents this would lead to multiple appeals where the lump sum might

require to be assessed repeatedly even though the closest and main dependents were happy with it. If any appeal the lump

sum might be reduced: what happens then?

(b) Each appellant would be entitled to challenge the apportionment, thereby opening up to possible revision the

apportionment made to other dependents who are content with the sum apportioned to them.

(c) The bringing of an appeal by a dependent who may have only the most peripheral interest in the apportionment would

have the effect of delaying payment to all other dependents, including a main dependent, all of whom may be satisfied to

accept the apportionment made amongst them. This is what has happened in the instant case.

(d) The rejection by a minority dependent of an apportionment made in his or her favour, unaccompanied by any appeal,

would have the effect that all dependents, including the claimant or claimants, being the spouse and child of the deceased

herein, would be deemed to have rejected the lump sum award and would thereafter be confined to their remedy in

common law.

(e) The claimant may have no prospect of winning a common law claim for compensation and would thus be altogether

deprived of his or her share in the apportionment of the lump sum award.

I would see these consequences as comprehensively fitting the description of an absurd, illogical and unworkable

construction of the statutory scheme.

Of course there are unsatisfactory anomalies in the existing statutory provisions, but to a large degree these anomalies are

also inherent in the provisions of the Civil Liability Act, 1961. There might be grounds for arguing that a statutory provision

which permits an appeal to the claimant but not the other dependents fails constitutional scrutiny but the constitutionality of

the present legislation is not an issue in these proceedings. Also it is important to bear in mind that the interpretation adopted

by the Tribunal, consistent with the scheme of the 1961 Act, ensures a sensible, practical and efficient system for the

disposal of dependency claims.

The statutory language is not so clear as to suggest that the legislature really intended that each dependent should have a

separate and distinct claim, nor is the literal meaning of the statutory scheme so clear and unambiguous as to compel one to

that conclusion. In my view the legislature should not be taken as having intended an absurdity, although I do accept that the

statutory scheme requires re-visitation in the light of the differing views expressed by members of this Court in relation to

the interpretation of Section 5(2A)(b).

I would allow the appeal and would answer the questions posed on the specified questions as follows:-

(a) No

(b) Yes

(c) Does not arise