Appeal dismissed; appellant lacks substantial interest in planning application or procedural regularity.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's judicial review appeal regarding a planning application. The appellant argued he had a substantial interest due to alleged procedural breaches and general participation in the planning process. The court held that mere participation is insufficient and found the specific procedural complaint did not involve an interest peculiar to the appellant.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedPlanning and Development Act 2000, s. 50(4)(b); Mere participation in a planning process is insufficient to establish a substantial interest required for judicial review under the Planning and Development Act 2000.
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THE SUPREME COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Chief Justice
Kearns J.
Finnegan J.
Record No. 18/07
BETWEEN
THOMAS HARDING
APPELLANT/APPLICANT
and
CORK COUNTY COUNTIL AND AN BORD PLEANALA
RESPONDENTS
and
XCES PRODUCTS LIMITED NOW KNOWN AS KINSALE HARBOUR DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED
NOTICE PARTY
Judgment of Mr Justice Finnegan delivered on the 2nd May 2008
The questions certified by the learned High Court judge pursuant to the Planning and Development Act 2000 section 50(4)
(f)(i) raises important and complex issues on the construction of section 50(4)(b) and in particular the criteria by reference to
which a person may be said to have a substantial interest in the matter which is the subject of the application. I have had the
benefit of reading the judgments of the Chief Justice and Mr Justice Kearns. Insofar as the criteria for establishing an
environmental interest is concerned I concur fully with the judgments. In the context of an environmental interest the
appellant has failed to establish a substantial interest and I would dismiss the appeal.
It is also contended by the appellant that there was a procedural deficit in the proceedings of the Planning Authority and that
as a participant in the planning process he has a substantial interest in the regularity of the procedures which attended the
application in issue in these proceedings. He alleges numerous breaches and non-compliances by the Planning Authority with
the Planning and Development Regulations 2001. I agree with the judgments of the Chief Justice and Mr Justice Kearns that
with one exception the breaches and non-compliances relied upon do not involve any interest peculiar or personal to the
appellant and could not therefore satisfy the statutory requirement of substantial interest. The exception is his contention that
there was a failure to comply with the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 Article 35(1). Having regard to the
provisions of the Planning and Development Act 2000 section 250, however, it is clear that the Planning Authority was not
in breach of Article 35(1) of the Regulations. The Regulations in Article 29(1)(b) require that any submission or observation
in relation to a planning application shall state the name and address of a person making the same. Section 250(1) provides
that a notice required by the Act or any Regulation to be served or given to any person may be served or given by sending it
by post in a pre-paid registered letter addressed to him or her at the address for service which has been furnished and that is
what occurred here.
It being the case that the appellant has not established any procedural deficit or irregularity whatsoever which is substantial it
is not necessary that the court on this appeal to determine whether, should there have been a breach of Article 35(1) or
other requirement of the Act or Regulations, the appellant would have been entitled to challenge by judicial review the
decision of the Planning Authority on the basis that his participation in the process could give him a substantial interest. I
would leave over for determination on an appeal in which such a breach has been established the determination of whether
any breach of the Act or Regulations could be the basis of an application for judicial review and if so the criteria by
reference to which it could be said that a person relying on the same has a substantial interest. I am, however, satisfied that
mere participation in the planning process of itself is insufficient to constitute such an interest. If such participation could
constitute an interest for the purposes of section 50 the interest identified of necessity would have to be one peculiar or
personal to the applicant for judicial review to meet the requirement of being substantial. I would leave over consideration of
this issue and, if appropriate, the criteria to a future case in which these issues require to be determined.
Harding v Cork Co. Co. & Ors
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