Judicial review dismissed for lack of evidence that cling film treatment destroyed fingerprints on packets.
Ireland (IE)
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review application against the Director of Public Prosecutions and Circuit Criminal Court Judges. The applicant argued that evidence of fingerprints on packets was inadmissible because cling film treatment destroyed them, but failed to prove this would likely occur. The court held that without expert evidence showing the treatment caused the loss of fingerprints, the case was academic and the applicant had no viable claim for relief.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedEvidence Act 2001, s. 10; Judicial Review Act 2008, s. 10: An applicant seeking judicial review must provide firm evidence that a specific procedural error occurred; without such proof, the case is considered academic and relief is denied.
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THE SUPREME COURT
310/2005
Denham J.
Hardiman J.
Macken J.
BETWEEN:
JOHN KELLY
APPLICANT/APPELLANT
AND
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
AND
THE JUDGES OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT delivered the 21st day of December, 2007, by Mr. Justice Hardiman.
1. I agree with the judgment which has been delivered by Mrs. Justice Denham.
2. In my view, the applicant has not engaged with the facts of this case sufficiently to make out a case that would entitle him to
relief. In particular he has failed to adduce evidence to show:
(a) That a person handling the packets covered in cling film in the manner he is alleged to have done would, as a matter
of probability, leave a visible fingerprint on them.
(b) That, again as a matter of probability, it was the treatment of the packets by the gardaí or those scientific personnel
to whom they gave them, and the effect of such treatment on the cling film, that caused the fingerprints, otherwise
probably available, to cease to be visible or available at the time the packaging was eventually examined for fingerprints.
3. In the absence of firm evidence of these points I find it difficult to regard the case advanced by the applicant as anything other
than academic, or moot. The onus on the applicant is not a high one and evidence in relation to the fingerprinting of various materials
is expert evidence of a sort which is readily available. The applicant would be entitled, if he wishes, to deploy it at his trial. But in its
absence he has no case for relief by way of judicial review.
4. I agree with the judgment of Mrs. Justice Denham and the order she proposes.