Supreme Court dismisses appeal after CJEU clarifies surrender refusal for converted police supervision sentences.

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

THE SUPREME COURT

S:AP:IE:2022:000116

[2025] IESC 11

Dunne J. Charleton J. O'Malley J. Woulfe J. Collins J.

BETWEEN/

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

Appellant

AND

SERGEJS RADIONOVS

Respondent

Judgment of Ms. Justice Dunne delivered the 18th day of February 2026

1. In these proceedings the Minister for Justice and Equality sought an order surrendering the respondent to Latvia on foot of two European Arrest Warrants. 1 The High Court ordered his surrender on one warrant, which related to the proposed prosecution of the respondent on various robbery charges. Surrender was refused on the other warrant, under which the respondent was sought for the purpose of serving a sentence. The sentence as originally imposed involved a post-custodial period under police supervision. Because of the respondent’s failure to comply with the terms of the supervision this period was converted into a custodial sentence, at a rate of one day of deprivation of liberty for every two days of the remaining unserved supervision period. The conversion was effected by court order, after a hearing in which the respondent was not present. The court had a discretion as to whether or not to impose the additional custodial element, but no discretion as to the length if it was imposed.

2. The High Court found that the sentence had been imposed in a hearing held in absentia and that surrender was precluded by virtue of s. 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 and Article 4a of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13th June, 2002, on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States. The Minister appealed.

3. The facts, issues and submissions are fully set out in the judgment of Dunne J., delivered on the 14th December, 2023 ([2023] IESC 37). The Court found that the question whether the particular hearing that resulted in the sentence to be served was the “trial resulting in the decision” within the meaning of Article 4a(1) was not acte claire.

4. The Court accordingly referred the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

It should be noted that in the period since the delivery of the first judgment of this Court in this matter ([2023] IESC 37), the Department of Justice has been renamed the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration pursuant to S.I. No. 242/2025. For the sake of clarity and consistency, however, the original designation of the Department is retained throughout the judgment.

(1) Where the surrender of the requested person is sought for the purpose of serving a custodial sentence imposed on that person as a result of violating the terms of a sentence of police supervision previously imposed on him, in circumstances where the court that imposed that custodial sentence had a discretion whether to impose a custodial sentence (though no discretion as to the duration of the sentence if imposed), are the proceedings leading to the imposition of that custodial sentence part of the ‘trial resulting in the decision’ for the purposes of Article 4a(1) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA?

(2) Was the decision to convert the sentence of police supervision into a custodial sentence in the circumstances set out in (1) above, one that had the purpose or effect of modifying the nature and/or quantum of the sentence previously imposed on the requested person and, in particular, the sentence of police supervision that formed part of his previous sentence, such as to come within the exception referred to in para. 77 of Ardic?

5. The CJEU delivered its judgment on the reference on the 9th October, 2025 (Case C-798/23

– “Abbottly”). It considered the two questions together and answered as follows:

“Article 4a(l) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’, within the meaning of that provision, covers proceedings at the end of which a national court may order, on account of breach of the conditions attached to a sentence of police supervision previously imposed on the person concerned in addition to a custodial sentence, the conversion of the unserved term of that additional sentence into a custodial sentence, whereby two days of police supervision are to count as one day of deprivation of liberty.”

6. The parties have been given an opportunity to make further submissions on foot of the judgment of the CJEU. They have agreed that no further hearing is necessary and that the outcome is that surrender on the warrant must be refused.

7. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.