High Court accepts father's undertakings for child return under Hague Convention, rejecting mother's excessive demands.

[2026] IEHC 92

RECORD NUMBER 2025/19/HLC

THE HIGH COURT

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF

CUSTODY ORDERS ACT 1991

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF

INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

AND

IN THE MATTER OF G, A MINOR

BETWEEN

G

APPLICANT

AND

G (No. 2)

RESPONDENT

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Michael Twomey delivered on the 11th day of February, 2026

1. This is a follow up decision to the judgment which was delivered in G v G (Child abduction: consent; grave risk) [2026] IEHC 45 (the “Principal Judgment”) and this judgment should be read in conjunction with that judgment.

2. This judgment relates to the form of undertakings to be given, once a decision has been made that a child should be returned from Ireland to another country, being the child’s habitual residence pursuant to the Hague Convention.

3. In this regard, the Court has been provided with undertakings which are being suggested by the mother (who unlawfully removed the child from the US to Ireland). The mother claims that these undertakings should be given by the father (who remains in the US). These undertakings are contained in a letter sent by the mother’s solicitors to the father’s solicitors after the Principal Judgment was delivered. In that letter, the mother states that nine separate undertakings ‘were required’ in order to give effect to the order of the Court to return the child to Kansas.

4. These nine undertakings ranged from the father providing an undertaking to discharge the costs of the mother obtaining a further Green Card (after she let her previous Green Card lapse) to an undertaking that the father pay $35,000 for ‘up to six months maintenance and/or financial support’. Indeed, one of undertakings, which was stated to be ‘required’ for the child to be returned to the country from where she was abducted, was an undertaking from the father that: ‘any property will have to be appropriately furnished and have the proper furnishings for a two year old child such as a small bed, toys, a buggy or pushchair, highchair and all other essential items required for a two year old.’

5. To support her claim for such extensive undertakings, counsel for the mother relied on the Supreme Court decision in P v B [1994] 3 IR 507 and the undertakings which were offered in that case, which primarily consisted of the father paying weekly maintenance for the mother and the child, paying 5 months’ maintenance into the wife’s account and paying rent in respect of an apartment.

6. It was submitted by the mother’s counsel that this case is authority for this Court making an order in the form of the nine undertakings sought by the mother in this case.

7. This Court does not agree with this interpretation of P v B. It seems to this Court that the P v B case is simply authority for the fact that the undertakings which were offered on the particular facts of that case were acceptable. It is not authority for the fact that such undertakings are the norm in Hague Convention cases.

8. In fact, the principle from the P v B case, which is of general application and so applicable to this case, is that the purpose of the undertakings is not ‘to usurp the jurisdiction’ of the local courts to deal with child welfare and maintenance issues.

9. The mother also relied on the Court of Appeal case of CMW v SJF [2019] IECA 227. However, it seems to this Court that the general principle to be taken from that case is that undertakings are simply mechanisms to secure the return of the child until the courts in the country of habitual residence take over all issues concerning the welfare of the child and maintenance of the mother, and they are not intended to provide ‘long term solutions’.

10. As it was submitted that the mother’s proposed undertakings were required in light of the risk to the child, it is important to remember that, as is clear from the Principal Judgment, this Court has no evidence of risk to the child. All it has are allegations by the mother and denials by the father and hearsay evidence. This is not a basis upon which this Court can require any particular form of undertaking.

11. In addition, there is no evidence before this Court that local courts in Kansas would not be able to deal with matters regarding the childcare costs and maintenance of the mother (or indeed child protection issues, if there were any) within a short time after the arrival of the child back in Kansas.

12. For all these reasons, and bearing in mind that the mother previously had a Green Card and employment in the US, immediately before she removed the child from the US, it seems to this Court that a period of 3 months is more than a reasonable period for her to get back into the position she was in, before she left the US, i.e. with her visa status established, an apartment of her choosing, and employment.

13. On this basis, this Court has considered the proposed undertakings sought by the mother and the ones offered by the father and regards the undertakings offered by the father to be acceptable, subject to the following minor revisions (primarily extending the duration of the undertakings from one month to three months):

• An undertaking that he provides and pays for the rental of a lease of a property for a period of 3 months in Wichita, Kansas, unless otherwise varied by the Kansas courts;

• An undertaking to pay $1,500 per month, for a period of 3 months, in respect of maintenance of the mother and childcare expenses, commencing on the date of the child’s arrival in Kansas, unless otherwise varied by the Kansas courts;

• An undertaking not to make any referral to childcare services and/or the police and/or immigration/ICE in respect of the child’s unlawful removal to Ireland (which undertaking was agreed between the parties); and

• An undertaking to discharge all reasonable costs, of circa €1,500, of flying the mother and child from Dublin to Kansas.

14. This Court has no evidence upon which to conclude that these undertakings by the father will not be honoured. For this reason, it does not require that a stay be put on the return of the child (as sought by the mother) until evidence is provided of money being paid into an account or compliance with the undertakings.

15. More generally, it is important to remember that while this Court accepts that the mother was acting in what she believed was the best interests of the child in removing the child to live in, no doubt, a loving home with the mother and the child’s grandparents in Ireland, this Court has decided that in removing the child, without the knowledge of the father, the child was wrongfully removed by the mother.

16. For this reason, the focus now is on the return of the child as soon as possible. Any other issues, whether regarding the mother’s costs of obtaining a visa, or who pays for a buggy and highchair, are not matters to be dealt with by this Court, which is dealing with the return of the child. Rather, these are matters to be dealt with by the courts in Kansas, if the parties cannot reach agreement on those issues (which agreement should be possible).

17. As the father is not seeking his costs, there will be no order as to costs and, since it was sought by the mother, a stay of 2 weeks will be put on the order, to enable the bringing of an appeal, should the mother choose to do so.