High Court dismisses student's claim that university academic plan violated her rights after special grades award.

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 57

[Record No. 2024 3929 P]

BETWEEN

MM

PLAINTIFF

AND

A UNIVERSITY

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger dated the 3rd day of February 2026

Gilchrist Order

1. All parties including the witnesses, the University and the school are to be anonymised. This judgment cannot be published on courts.ie, the worldwide web or any public media other than in its current anonymised form or in a manner that might directly or indirectly identify any of the anonymised persons or entities.

The plaintiff’s case

2. The plaintiff is a student at the defendant university since 2021, who encountered difficulties in completing her second year modules in 2022/2023. In October 2023, she was awarded special grades in respect of six of her stage 2 modules that she had not passed. The plaintiff took issue with how the university required her to remediate those modules. In particular, the plaintiff pleaded that:

- the university was not allowed to impose an academic plan on her in October 2023, having accepted her exceptional circumstances application and awarded her special grades;

- she was entitled to a prompt opportunity to alleviate the stage 2 modules assessments for which she was awarded special grades;

- she was entitled to progress to stage 3 of her degree programme, despite not having remediated her stage 2 modules;

- she was entitled to be heard following the award of special grades;

- she was entitled to register for stage 4 of her degree programme. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's treatment of her had caused her; “damage and loss including loss of opportunity to complete all stages of her undergraduate studies by the end of the academic year 2027/2028 in accordance with the projected academic trajectory of the undergraduate class with which she commenced her studies in academic year 2021/2022, and consequential losses arising therefrom" (as per para.15 of her statement of claim).

3. In her amended statement of claim, the plaintiff seeks extensive reliefs as follows: "(1) An order pursuant to the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 section 27 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court prohibiting the publication or broadcast of any matter that would, or would be likely to, identify the Plaintiff as a person suffering from a medical condition or as a person who was subject to assault;

(2) A Declaration that:

(a) the Plaintiff was entitled to, and/or the Defendant University was required to make, an award of special grades in October 2023 without conditions in respect of the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded absent or fail grades in the May 2023 examinations and without a requirement that she follow one of three academic plans and/or that she accept that she could submit no further Exceptional Circumstances PPApplications based on the fact of her pregnancy and its termination or on the workload that she would be undertaking, by reference to the Academic Regulations for AY2022/2023 and/or 2023/2024; and/or

(b) the Defendant University, in breach of its duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, delayed unreasonably and unnecessarily in communicating to the Plaintiff the decision made on 12 October 2023 to award her special grades in respect of the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded ABS or FAIL grades in the May 2023 examinations; and/or

(c) the Plaintiff was entitled to, and/or the Defendant University was required to, provide and/or arrange for, remediating end of module assessments in respect of the second stage modules for which she had been awarded special grades in October 2023 in a prompt and/or timely manner in accordance with its duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner and/or the failure and/or refusal so to do was in breach thereof; and/or

(d) on the award of the special grades on 12 October 2023 in respect of the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded ABS or FAIL grades in the May 2023 examinations, the Plaintiff was entitled to have them uploaded to her academic record in a prompt and/or timely manner in accordance with the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner and/or the Defendant University was required so to do and/or the failure and/or refusal so to do was in breach thereof; and/or

(e) on the award to the Plaintiff of the special grades on 12 October 2023 in respect of the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded ABS or FAIL grades in the May 2023 examinations, the Plaintiff was entitled to be permitted to register for stage 3 of her degree programme in accordance with the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner and in accordance with its Academic Regulations for AY2022/2023 and/or AY2023/024 and/or the Defendant University was required so to do and/or the failure and/or refusal so to do was in breach thereof; and/or

(f) the blocking of the Plaintiff’s access to disability supports for AY2023/2024 was in breach of the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and/or unreasonable; and/or

(g) the refusal of permission to the Plaintiff to undertake any stage 3 end of module assessments and/or to register for or undertake any elective modules during stage 3 was in breach of the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and/or in breach of its Academic Regulations for AY2022/2023 and/or AY2023/2024, and/or unreasonable; and/or

(h) if necessary, the Plaintiff is entitled to special grades for the stage 3 end of module assessments that she was not permitted to undertake in accordance with the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner and/or its Academic Regulations and/or the failure and/or refusal to award such grades is in breach thereof; and/or

(i) further if necessary, the Plaintiff is entitled to, and/or the Defendant University is required to, provide and/or arrange for, remediating assessments for the stage 3 end of module assessments, that the Plaintiff was not permitted to take, in a prompt and/or timely manner in accordance with its duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner and/or its Academic Regulations and/or the failure and/or refusal so to do is in breach thereof; and/or

(j) the delay in the unconditional award to the Plaintiff of special grades in respect of the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded ABS or FAIL grades in the May 2023 examinations until in or about the month of August/September 2024 was in breach of the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and/or unreasonable; and/or

(k) the failure and/or refusal to make reasonable accommodation for the Plaintiff in respect of assessments to remediate the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded ABS or FAIL grades in the May 2023 examinations, and offered to her in September 2024, and/or the failure and/or refusal to provide access to the study materials required and necessary therefore, and despite a request therefore, before the module assessments were scheduled to commence, and/or the delay in providing those materials until after the last of the scheduled assessments had, in fact, taken place was in breach of the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and/or unreasonable and/or in breach of its assumed obligations to the Plaintiff where a requirement for a number of specific accommodations for her course of studies had already been determined by its Access and Lifelong Learning office; and/or

(l) if necessary, the refusal of permission to the Plaintiff to undertake and/or register for any Sstage 4 modules is, in all of the circumstances, in breach of the Defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and/or in breach of its Academic Regulations for AY2023/2024 and/or AY2024/2025 and/or unreasonable;

(3) If necessary, a Declaration that the failure and/or refusal to provide any, or any proper or adequate or sufficient reasons to the Plaintiff as to why the award of special grades in October 2023 was subject to the conditions prescribed and/or to engage with or hear any submissions from her, in that regard, was in breach of the Plaintiff’s right to reasons in respect of a matter that affected her right to the personal and private life, whether at common law, or under the Constitution of Ireland and the European Convention on Human rights and her right to be heard on a matter affecting such rights;

(4) If necessary, a Declaration that the invoking of the Defendant University’s School of Medicine Fitness to Practise Policy in or about September 2023 was in breach of that policy and/or there were no grounds therefore;

(5) An Order, if necessary, restraining the Defendant University from re-classifying the Plaintiff’s special grades awarded in October 2023 as absent or fail pending the determination of these proceedings;

(6) Further, or in the alternative, damages for negligence, breach of duty and/or the negligent and/or intentional breach of agreement and consequential loss and/or damage;

(7) Interest pursuant to the provisions of the Courts Act 1981 section 22;

(8) Further or other Order;

(9) Costs.”

4. The case was described at the outset by the plaintiff's counsel as centring on two issues:

(i) The correct interpretation and deployment of the University's Academic Regulations which govern the plaintiff's agreement with the University.

(ii) Whether the plaintiff's treatment after she was awarded special grades in October 2023, was lawful and in accordance with the terms of her agreement with the University.

5. The University denies all allegations of wrongdoing and says that it was entitled and obliged to monitor the plaintiff’s workload including by imposing an academic plan on her that required her to complete the remediation of at least some of her outstanding stage 2 modules before she could progress to stage 3. They say that how the special grade modules are to be remediated is a decision involving academic judgment for the school to make and is not a matter on which the plaintiff is entitled to input or agreement.

6. In this judgment, I will look at the history of the proceedings, the relevant evidence of the plaintiff’s and the University’s witnesses, the University's Academic Regulations and policies made thereunder which the plaintiff says form the basis of her agreement and relationship with the University and how academic judgment applies to the issues raised.

The history of these proceedings

7. This case was commenced by plenary summons on 30 July 2024, on the same day as an ex parte application for short service was made. The matter was returned to 1 August 2024 to seek urgent relief similar to undertakings that had been sought by the plaintiff’s solicitors in correspondence dated 29 July 2024. The matter was case managed by O’Connor J over the following months and a Gilchrist order was made by O'Connor J on 12 November 2024, which order was continued by this court. On 19 November 2024, the plaintiff withdrew her injunction application. In February 2025, she was given liberty to serve an amended statement of claim which abandoned the injunctive relief that had previously been sought and sought the reliefs set out above.

8. The original proceedings had claimed various breaches by the University in their treatment of the plaintiff leading up to the grant of special grades in October 2023. The reliefs now sought focus on the legality of the plaintiff’s treatment since the special grades were granted in October 2023 and specifically on how the University required the plaintiff to remediate her six outstanding stage 2 modules and the prohibition on progressing to stage 3 until some of those modules were remediated. The plaintiff asserts, having regard to the terms of the Academic Regulations and other policies and documents that she says applied to her circumstances, that she was entitled to remediate those modules immediately and to progress to stage 3 whilst carrying the six unremediated modules.

Developments since the institution of the proceedings

9. Since the proceedings were amended, the plaintiff was afforded two opportunities to sit exams for the six unremediated modules, in September 2024 and again in May 2025. The plaintiff did not sit the exams on either occasion for reasons I explore further below.

10. The plaintiff has invoked a number of different internal university complaints procedures against some of the University's academic staff with whom she has had dealings throughout her time in university, arising from their treatment of her since early 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “the internal complaints”). Some of those complaints are on hold and may or may not fall to be considered in the future. Such a situation where evidence is put before a court that has also been, or may be, put before an internal decision maker, more commonly arises in an interlocutory application where it is not the function of the court to determine the factual issues between the parties, such as occurred recently in Burke v. O’Longáin [2025] IECA 148. However, this was a plenary hearing.

11. Some of the internal complaints made by the plaintiff were repeated in her evidence before this court, including in her detailed correspondence that she attached to her witness statement. The plaintiff also told the court that she believed decisions made by the University about her were made in bad faith. Those allegations were all denied by the University’s witnesses in their evidence. The plaintiff’s counsel submits that this evidence was adduced as “context” to the plaintiff’s impugned treatment from October 2023 onwards. However, the plaintiff is not entitled to avoid this court making factual determinations on the evidence put before it, where relevant to do so, by asserting that she made and repeated serious allegations merely to provide “context” to her evidence about her treatment since she was granted special grades in October 2023.

12. The plaintiff has also brought proceedings before the Workplace Relations Commission relating to her rights to reasonable accommodation under the Equal Status Acts 2000-2018. At para. (c) of the particulars in her statement of claim she pleads that the University acted unlawfully in "causing and/or allowing and/or permitting the plaintiff’s disability supports to be blocked in AY 2023/2024 and when it was, in all of the prevailing circumstances, unreasonable to do so". The plaintiff seeks the following declaration at para. 2(k) of the reliefs; “The failure and/or refusal to make reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff in respect of assessments to remediate the second stage end of module assessments for which she had been awarded ABS or FAIL grades in the May 2023 examinations, and offered to her in September 2024, and/or the failure and/or refusal to provide access to the study materials required and necessary therefor, and despite request therefor, before the module assessments until after the last of the scheduled assessments had, in fact, taken place was in breach of the defendant University’s duty, and the agreement between it and the plaintiff, to operate its Regulations, Codes and Policies in a fair, equitable and transparent manner, and/or unreasonable and/or in breach of its assumed obligations to the Plaintiff where a requirement for a number of specific accommodations for her course of studies had already been determined by its Access and Lifelong Learning office”.

13. The plaintiff has not pleaded a breach of the Equal Status Acts (quite properly given her separate proceedings before the WRC) and therefore, it seems she claims a failure to provide the accommodations granted to her as part of her contractual agreement with the University as a breach of that agreement before this court, rather than as a breach of the Equal Status Acts.

The University’s Regulations and Procedures

(i) The Academic Regulations

14. The Academic Regulations applicable to this claim are those for 2023/24. The following definitions of issues relevant to the within proceedings are set out at page 6 of those Regulations: “Academic Regulation: High level, overarching rules governing the academic programmes of the University, e.g. minimum requirements for an award, number of credits to be completed, calculation of degree classification. Exemption based on Exceptional Circumstances: Unusual circumstances might require a deviation from a module descriptor during the delivery of the relevant module (e.g. a change to the teaching or assessment strategy) or prevent the completion of a task on schedule (e.g. grades might be entered into university systems or students might receive feedback after the scheduled date). In such instances, an Exemption based on Exceptional Circumstances may be approved by the Vice Principal for Teaching and Learning in the relevant College, on the recommendation that necessitated the Exemption based on Exceptional Circumstances and a strategy to avoid future occurrence. An annual report of all applications for Exemptions based on Exceptional Circumstances shall be submitted by each School to the Academic Council or its relevant committee. Governing Board: All programmes in the University are overseen by a Programme Board, Graduate School Board, Graduate Research Board, Board of Studies, or Joint Academic Programme Board (hereafter referred to as a Governing Board), which is responsible for monitoring the overall performance and progression of students registered to its programmes and ensuring their academic welfare. Governing Boards are established by Academic Council.”

15. The Regulations provide for programme governance and, in particular, at Regulation 1.6, it sets out that the governing board responsibilities in relation to, inter alia, the students registered to the programmes include the following; “(d) Ensuring that assessment strategy is appropriate and measures achievement of programme outcomes;

…

(j) Academic welfare of the students registered to the programmes and identifying students whose academic welfare is of concern;

(k) Consideration of exceptional circumstances and approval of appropriate actions;

(l) Progression of students within the programme.”

16. Regulation 1.9 allows the Academic Council to delegate authority to a Governing Board to establish Programme Examination Boards as subcommittees of the Governing Boards to be responsible for, inter alia, “(b) approval of the progression of students on taught programmes;

(c) consideration of exceptional circumstances and approval of appropriate actions;

…

(e) reflection on student performance, grade distributions and other assessment matters.”

17. Regulation 3 sets out the academic calendar, modules and programme structures. Regulation 3.5 provides for the teaching, learning and assessment activities associated with a module to be completed during a single trimester unless certain criteria are met. There is a subheading of "Workload" as follows: “3.6 A programme may not require a student to take more than 30 credits per trimester (including elective credit).

3.7 A student may not register to more than 40 credits in any trimester. In determining workload, credits from resits and repeats shall be counted by a Governing Board.

3.8 Governing Boards shall monitor student workloads and where, in the opinion of a Governing Board, a student’s workload is unsustainable, it may, following appropriate consultation with the student, require that the student’s workload be reduced to sustainable levels.”

18. There is a later subheading of "Modules" which provides; “3.12 Schools offer subjects and Schools and Boards of Studies offer individual modules to programmes. Schools and Boards of Studies are responsible for the design, delivery and assessment of these modules, the quality of the teaching provided in these modules and the academic welfare of the students enrolled to those modules. All subjects shall have subject extern examiners, appointed in accordance with university policy as determined by Academic Council.

3.13 Each module shall have a named Module Coordinator appointed by, and accountable to, the Head of School or Chair of the Board of Studies to oversee the design, delivery, assessment and grading of the module on behalf of the School or Board of Studies. The Module Coordinator also acts as the Principal Examiner of that module, a function that may not be delegated.” The reference at 3.13 to the module coordinator’s function as principal examiner as a function that may not be delegated, was relied on by the plaintiff to contend that any function of a module coordinator, including their function in relation to remediation, could not be delegated. That is not so. Regulation 3.13 simply applies to the responsibility given to the module coordinator to set their own examinations. It does not confer exclusive responsibility for remediation on the module coordinator.

19. The conferring of special grades is set out at Regulation 4.31. There are various consequences of obtaining a special grade, including that the grade when remediated is not capped and there is no cost for resitting an exam. Regulation 4.31 sets out the following in relation to remediation of a module for which a special grade has been awarded; "The student must complete the component (or components) of assessment or complete some equivalent assessed assessment(s) set by the School, within two trimesters of the initial attempt".

(ii) The Exceptional Circumstances Policy

20. The exceptional circumstances policy sets out what exceptional circumstances for the grant of a special grade are or might be and how a special grade is granted by the governing board, which is expressly stated to be a matter of academic judgment. The policy includes an infographic confirming the process for mandating a special grade and confirms that the school sets remedial assessments and timing. Under “Process for Dealing with Applications for Exceptional Circumstances”, it states; "schools monitor the prescribed time period and submit final grades to Assessment, recorded on a Change of Grade Form signed by the Head of School". Other parts of the policy and the student and separate staff guide also refer to the role of the school in monitoring time periods and other elements of remediation.

21. The plaintiff placed heavy emphasis on an infographic included in a guide to the policy which says that a student is required “to contact your module coordinator directly to discuss how to remediate the [special] grade”. For the reasons set out below, I do not consider this gives rise to the right of direct communication between a student granted a special grade and the module coordinator, for which the plaintiff contends.

(iii) Progression Explained

22. The plaintiff relied on a document from the school entitled "Progression Explained" which refers to Academic Regulation 3.7 and confirms that special grades are not counted in terms of academic workload per Regulation 3.7. Regulation 3.7 is separate to Regulation 3.8 and does not preclude the application of special grades in monitoring a student’s workload per Regulation 3.8. At no time has the University sought to rely on Regulation 3.7 to explain its treatment of the plaintiff or the basis for the imposition of an academic plan on her and has consistently relied on its obligations under Regulation 3.8 to explain its treatment of the plaintiff.

23. The “Progression Explained” document also states that students with multiple special grades will be on a bespoke academic plan.

The evidence

24. The court heard from the plaintiff, a number of academic staff from the school and some non-academic staff involved in pastoral student support and student disability services who had dealings with the plaintiff. The court also heard from two former members of the University’s students’ union who were critical of the school’s general approach to the grant of special grades and referred to how other unnamed students had been treated in this school and other schools. Neither of them gave evidence specific to the plaintiff and the remediation of her six stage 2 modules.

25. In 2021, the plaintiff commenced a professional degree programme which leads to a qualification that is approved by the Irish regulatory body for that profession. The degree programme is required to satisfy domestic and European statutory criteria for recognition of the qualification in other jurisdictions.

The plaintiff’s disability

26. The plaintiff has a hearing disability and was, therefore, entitled to apply for reasonable accommodation. She initially chose not to access disability supports when she started university in 2021 but later engaged with the University’s disability access office in February 2023 about classroom and examination accommodations. There is an important distinction between the classroom accommodations and examination accommodations that may be required by a disabled student. Classroom accommodations are provided in relation to classroom learning and might include additional tutoring, access to course material and physical accommodations in the room such as looped hearing devices. Examination accommodations are provided to assist in taking the examinations and might include additional time, a room with no other or fewer students and accessible exam papers. I identify those only as possible accommodations to illustrate the difference between classroom and examination accommodation and not specifically about any of the accommodations that may have been required by or provided to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s difficulties prior to February 2023

27. The plaintiff said in her witness statement that she progressed without any difficulty in her first year and did not encounter any challenges until her second year. However, early in her first year in university, in November 2021, the plaintiff requested a meeting with someone in her school to discuss an immediate leave of absence. The plaintiff was advised to contact the chair of the school programme, Prof S, and she met with him in February 2022. At that meeting, she claims Prof S referred to her disability and said it was too much for her and that she should withdraw from the degree programme. In his evidence, Prof S initially denied having ever said that, but later during re-examination, he said that the plaintiff had raised her disability at a meeting to discuss a possible transfer to another university. He suggested that meeting took place in November 2021 whereas she had said the statement was made at a meeting of February 2022. Prof S said he did not have a strong recollection of the February meeting (Transcript Day 6, at p. 29) but did recall the plaintiff talking about "her disabilities and issues" but that the point of the meeting was about "attending and family commitments and work and all of that having an impact on her studies".

28. The plaintiff continued to communicate with Prof S following their February 2022 meeting and never expressed any concern about him until after her first application for special grades had been refused in April 2023. She later lodged an internal complaint against Prof S claiming that he was biased against her. She repeated this allegation in her evidence when she said Prof S was biased against her because she was deaf and had previously had a speech impediment (transcript day 2, page 91).

29. I am satisfied, having heard the evidence, that any reference by Prof S to the plaintiff’s disability arose from the plaintiff having initiated a discussion about the academic and personal issues she was encountering in her education. At no time did Prof S demonstrate anything that any reasonable person would have interpreted as bias against the plaintiff as a person with a hearing disability and/or speech impediment. Prof S sought to support the plaintiff. The many emails between them that were put into evidence confirm that the plaintiff engaged positively and appreciatively with his efforts.

30. In Autumn 2022, the plaintiff’s mother suffered an injury in an accident which required the plaintiff to care for her at home and this affected her attendance at university. In December 2022, she failed three of her exams. She was sent a letter dated 2 February 2023, which she described as the first academic plan. Dr G was appointed as her student mentor and she first met with him in February 2023 and told him about having two full-time jobs, and economic difficulties. She proposed that she would be assessed other than by examination in respect of the three modules she had failed. There was frequent email correspondence between the plaintiff and Dr G over the following months, demonstrating an engaged and cordial relationship between them and in which the plaintiff repeatedly expressed appreciation for the support and advice she was receiving from him. Dr G made it clear to the plaintiff that he was not an expert on the university’s regulatory provisions and was not part of the decision-making process for exceptional circumstances applications for special grades.

Exceptional Circumstances Applications; February and April 2023

31. The plaintiff made her first exceptional circumstances application, seeking special grades for her three failed modules, on 9 February 2023 in which she reiterated her wish to secure an alternative assessment method. She said in her application that she had spent the majority of her time during the autumn term either at work or helping her injured mother. The plaintiff said she had put in an enormous effort to keep afloat in all classes but "this did not end up being the case". She set out her aspiration to have a "strong finish to a difficult year". That application was refused because it was submitted late and because one of the grounds relied upon, the plaintiff’s full-time work commitments, was not permitted as a ground for a full-time student such as the plaintiff.

32. The plaintiff made a second application in April 2023, in which she, once again, set out her mother's injuries and explained that she had two separate full-time jobs at the time she had failed the December 2022 exams. She described the effect her situation had on her emotional well-being at that time, which she said prevented her from attending "a substantial number of classes" and affected her ability to study. She said that she was "constantly struggling" with her education due to her hearing loss "as well as outside influences" and that she was under significant financial pressure during the 2022 trimester which contributed to her "negative emotional well-being". That application was refused for the same reasons as previously.

33. I highlight the contents of those applications as they confirm, on the plaintiff’s own account, that the plaintiff was experiencing negative emotional well-being and was struggling with her education before February 2023. By February 2023, she had failed three core modules, had not attended the majority of her classes in the previous term, had been given an academic plan, was assigned to an academic mentor and was looking to be assessed in a manner other than resitting the exams she had failed in December.

Events between February and May 2023

34. Between February and May 2023, the plaintiff experienced very traumatic events. I will use the language from the Gilchrist order of O’Connor J in saying that the plaintiff makes an allegation of assault by an unidentified student in late February 2023, which had consequences for her studies and exams. In May 2023, she availed of medical services following the alleged assault. She was due to sit eight exams between 8 and 18 May, some of which clashed with the aforesaid medical services. The plaintiff passed two of her exams and either failed or did not attend six, including some of the modules she had previously failed in December 2022. That left her with six outstanding modules for stage 2 that she needed to remediate, representing half of her total modules for the year. The evidence confirmed that this was an unusually high number of unremediated modules for a student to be carrying, well above the more usual circumstances in which a student might have to remediate one or some modules. Ms F, the Director of the University’s disability support service, said: “There are very, very occasions, if any, that I can think of in my 25 years where a student has been looking to remediate so many modules. I’ve never come across it” (transcript, day 5, page 134/135).

Exceptional Circumstances Application; May 2023

35. On 24 May 2023, the plaintiff made a fresh exceptional circumstances application relating to the May exams. She submitted a very brief letter from her GP who said they had been informed that the plaintiff had been recently unwell during the exam period and that the plaintiff felt her performance was impaired by her health. Whilst the plaintiff said in her subsequent application for exceptional circumstances that her GP had declared her "categorically and medically unfit" to sit her exams, the GP's letter that the plaintiff had relied on in her application of 25 May 2023, did not confirm any such certification or diagnosis. That application was refused.

36. The court was furnished with a copy of a separate letter from the plaintiff's GP dated from the same period addressed to the Department of Social Protection which, unlike the letter relied on by the plaintiff in her 24 May exceptional circumstances application, set out a far more detailed account of the plaintiff’s medical situation and the services and treatment that she availed of at the time of her May exams. The plaintiff suggested that there were GDPR reasons for her GP not giving the same amount of information to the University. Her GP also referred in a subsequent letter to the policy of the practice not to state medical conditions on sick notes to school/college or employers due to GDPR concerns. Whatever the reasons may have been for privacy concerns in one letter that were apparently of no concern in another, it remained a matter for the plaintiff to put her best case forward in making her exceptional circumstances application. The plaintiff could have explored addressing her GP's apparent GDPR concerns by giving her consent to the disclosure of the nature of her medical condition in circumstances where she knew or ought to have known that the University required far more detail than the brief account of her situation in May 2023 that had been previously provided by her GP and had already been found by the university committee to be insufficient for the grant of special grades. She could also have advised the committee herself of the nature of her medical condition.

37. The plaintiff sought to blame Dr G and, to a lesser extent, her GP, for not having provided more information for her in her application for exceptional circumstances. I do not accept either as a valid or fair criticism for the plaintiff to make. The plaintiff had been through a very distressing experience, but it remained her responsibility to process her application for exceptional circumstances that she wished to make and to ensure that the committee had all the relevant information to make a decision, including, if necessary, by sharing the nature of her medical condition with the committee and/or by consenting to her GP sharing that information with them.

38. Neither do I accept the plaintiff’s criticism (set out at para. 14 of her witness statement) of Prof S for having requested Dr G to continue as the plaintiff’s academic mentor in June 2023. The plaintiff claims that was premature before her exceptional circumstances application had "gone through the full review process". Asking Dr G to continue to give up some of his time to mentor the plaintiff was part of the University's attempts to support the plaintiff and was not in any way a breach of her entitlements.

Attempts to support the plaintiff; July – September 2023

39. On 11 July 2023, the plaintiff was given another academic plan which required her to remediate some of her six outstanding modules before proceeding to stage 3 of her degree programme. The plaintiff was unhappy with this plan and declined to follow it, even though there was nothing in the plan that suggested it was advisory rather than a direction to her from her school. As a result, in September 2023, Prof S invoked the Fitness to Practice Policy and Procedures, which states at 4.2:- "Student fitness to practice issues that arise should be discussed early and addressed locally between students and relevant staff". Prof S described this as a level 1 procedure with the aim of identifying appropriate supportive measures for students. He arranged the fitness to practice meeting with the plaintiff for 7 September 2023 which was attended by the plaintiff and her student adviser, Ms K. Prof S advised the plaintiff that they were meeting because of:

- the three applications she had made for special grades;

- workload and progression issues;

- stage 2 not complete;

- the need to remediate in Autumn 2023/2024 including two repeats;

- the concern of the programme board regarding her learning;

- the need to follow academic advice.

40. Prof S was entitled, in those circumstances, to arrange that level 1 meeting to identify appropriate support for the plaintiff. During the meeting, Prof S referred to the possibility of the programme board escalating matters to level 2. The plaintiff said she wanted to progress to level 2 of the fitness to practice policy, despite any such escalation being for the programme board and not for a student.

41. The plaintiff may understandably have found it distressing to be asked to attend a fitness to practice meeting, but that does not render it unlawful. It was a reasonable step for the University to take in circumstances where the plaintiff was refusing to comply with her academic plan and the academic advice contained therein. The University was dealing with a student who was struggling academically, had missed a number of classes in 2022, had failed several exams and on her own account, was both stressed and distressed. The fitness to practice process was an opportunity for the university to address the clear issues of concern with the plaintiff locally, and to seek to identify appropriate support for her.

Exceptional Circumstances Application; September 2023

42. The plaintiff made another exceptional circumstances application on 18 September 2023 and relied on a more detailed letter from her same GP in which it was confirmed that the plaintiff had suffered an unexpected illness in May 2023 which severely affected her ability to perform her activities of daily living and made her “categorically, medically unfit” to sit her examinations. The GP confirmed that it was not practice policy to state medical conditions on sick notes to school or college due to “GDPR concerns”. The plaintiff also submitted a letter from her then student adviser Ms K supporting her application for special grades who said that the plaintiff had explained to her why she was unable to attend her exams and had asked for privacy around her situation. In her letter accompanying that application for special grades, the plaintiff referred to being unhappy with her academic plan and her wish to secure a new one that would enable her to be registered for stage

3 "as soon as possible". She referred to having become "incredibly upset, stressed and worn down with this entire process".

43. The board decided that, because the nature of the plaintiff’s medical condition was not disclosed, they had no evidence to justify overturning the original decision to refuse special grades.

The decision stated:-

“At a minimum the student needs to repeat [subject X] and resit [subject Y] this semester, irrespective of the outcome of our meeting. Repeating and re-attending [subject X] will cause a clash with core stage 3 material… In this case it means the student must prioritise the old module and she cannot therefore complete stage 3 this academic year.”

44. It is clear, whether special grades were granted or not, there was always an issue with the immediate remediation of the plaintiff’s stage 2 failed modules and her desire to progress to stage

3 in September 2023. The plaintiff’s wish and/or expectation to progress to stage 3 was never viewed by the University as a realistic, viable or appropriate option for her, given her academic situation at that time.

45. The plaintiff made allegations of bias in relation to the refusal of her those three applications for special grades which she seemed to base on the fact that her applications were refused and vague criticisms of what she was told by Dr G about the process. She has also criticised Prof S, who had a role on the committee that refused her previous applications but had, quite properly, recused himself from any decision-making role due to his involvement with the plaintiff as her academic mentor. The plaintiff suggested that Prof S had, somehow, influenced the remainder of the committee. She drew an analogy to how, she claimed, a schoolteacher might label a child as ‘bold’, thereby negatively influencing other teachers’ perceptions of them. Both suggestions demonstrate the plaintiff’s misunderstanding of professional relationships at university and primary school level, and of the concept of actual or perceived bias as assessed by an objective test.

46. The committee's provisional decision was to reject the plaintiff’s third application for special grades, with the final ratification pending at the standing committee of the programme board meeting on 12 October 2023. There is no basis for criticising the plaintiff’s treatment by the University in relation to those applications prior to the disclosure to the committee in October 2023 of the nature of her medical treatment at the time of the May exams. Disclosure of medical treatment and resulting grant of special grades

47. On 12 October 2023, the plaintiff informed the student adviser, Ms K, with whom she had been engaging on a confidential basis, of the nature of her medical treatment in May 2023 and gave Ms K permission to disclose this to the University. Almost immediately on this information being brought to the attention of the school and the relevant committee, the plaintiff’s exceptional circumstances application was granted and on 20 October 2023, she was informed that she was granted special grades in respect of her six outstanding stage 2 modules.

Engagement with the plaintiff coming up to 20 October 2023

48. Dr M, who has been Associate Dean for Student Affairs for the School since May 2023, was appointed as the point of contact between the plaintiff and the school in relation to the implementation of the plaintiff’s academic plan and her remediation prior to the grant of special grades in October 2023. There are a huge number of emails between Dr M and the plaintiff setting out Dr M’s extensive efforts to advise and support the plaintiff at this time, in consultation with the plaintiff’s module coordinators and the other academics with whom the plaintiff had had dealings since she first failed her exams in December 2022. The plaintiff had been told in early October, before the grant of the special grades, that she could not progress to stage 3 because of the level of remediation required for stage 2. That was and always has been the University’s position, i.e. until the plaintiff remediated a sufficient number of stage 2 failed modules, she would not progress to stage 3.

49. The plaintiff was left under no illusion by Dr M that her academic plan was not open to negotiation, albeit Dr M offered to meet with her to explain it to her if she wished (email of 9 October 2023). In that email, Dr M advised the plaintiff to consider either following the academic plan or withdraw from the degree programme. The plaintiff was very critical of what she described as "conditions" to her academic plan, which displays her misunderstanding of a student’s relationship with their school. The plaintiff was being directed about what she needed to do to remediate her failed modules and to progress to stage 3, which direction was formulated by the school having regard to the plaintiff’s workload in having to remediate six of her stage 2 modules. Rather than engage with what she was being directed to do, the plaintiff repeatedly sought what she referred to in her emails to Dr M as “resolutions” or “solutions agreeable to all”, misunderstanding the clear difference between directions given by an academic to a student and the right to input towards an agreed way of doing something.

50. Before she even met with Dr M, the plaintiff expressed herself in an unfortunate manner in claiming that Dr M had "preconceived decisions prior to the meeting". Understandably, Dr M required those comments to be withdrawn, and they were. Dr M agreed to meet and sent the plaintiff further correspondence on 19 October 2023 about the amended academic plan which Dr M told the plaintiff was prepared having regard to Academic Regulation 3.8 in relation to her workload. The following day, the plaintiff was advised that she had been granted special grades. This must have been a welcome development for her as she had been actively looking for this since February 2023. However, the grant of special grades did not and could not change the fact that the school had concerns about the plaintiff’s workload in having to remediate six of her stage 3 modules and were not willing to allow her to progress to stage 3 carrying all six unremediated modules.

The academic plan of 20 October 2023

51. Following on from the grant of special grades to the plaintiff, fresh consideration was given to how the plaintiff would remediate the six special grades, having regard to the university’s concern about her workload. This is where the case reached what the plaintiff's counsel referred to as “the critical inflection” point (transcript, day 1, page 37). Dr M said in her evidence, that she communicated with the module coordinators for each of the modules to be remediated and then formulated an academic plan for the plaintiff. That plan, dated 20th October 2023, contains a lot of detail and set out three options for the plaintiff. All of those options required full or partial remediation of the outstanding stage 2 modules before the plaintiff could progress to stage 3, which was consistent with how the school had always approached the plaintiff’s remediation of her six unremediated modules. By the time this plan was drawn up, the University had already determined that the high number of unremediated stage 2 modules precluded the plaintiff from progressing into stage 3. That was clearly an academic decision made having regard to both the plaintiff’s academic needs and the integrity of the degree programme. The plaintiff’s traumatic personal circumstances between February and May 2023 could not and did not alter that reality. Remediation is a separate and different process to the grant of special grades, but both require the exercise of academic judgment.

52. The academic plan of October 2023 did not require remediation of all six outstanding modules in order to progress, but delayed the plaintiff’s progress to stage 3 until a specified number of modules had been successfully remediated, which inevitably resulted in a change to the plaintiff’s anticipated progress through her degree programme and her planned graduation in 2027. That is the consequence of a significant number of failed modules, regardless of the grant of special grades or the circumstances that gave rise to them.

53. It is very clear from the detail of the plan and the evidence given by the academic staff involved, that the plan represented a substantial amount of work and was done to support the plaintiff in managing her workload and to try to ensure her success rather than more of the academic failure she had experienced in December 2022 and again in May 2023 at a time when she admitted to having difficulties attending class and studying.

54. Dr M said that she negotiated with all six of the plaintiff’s module coordinators for each of the modules for which special grades were granted. This was not disputed. The plaintiff's contention was that any such engagement should have been directly between her and the module coordinators. This is not only logistically inefficient (albeit it might work on some occasions but that is a matter for the university), but it is not in accordance with the Academic Regulations that clearly require at 4.31 for remediation to be determined "by the School". That is consistent with the school being responsible for the assessment of the modules, as confirmed by Regulation 3.12 which states: “Schools and Boards of Studies are responsible for the design, delivery and assessment of these modules, the quality of the teaching provided in these modules and the academic welfare of the students enrolled to those modules.”

55. It is a matter for the School as to how remediation of any module, whether a special grade has been awarded or not, is to be done and how module coordinators will input into the process. This may involve many moving parts such as dates, availability of academics to set and correct exam papers and potentially the further attendance of a student at class, labs etc. or whatever else may be required by the School. Dr C, one of the plaintiff’s module coordinators, said in her evidence that module coordinators “have absolutely no input in when [special grade] exams are scheduled” (transcript, day 6, page 74). Prof S also confirmed in his evidence that a student could approach the module coordinator to discuss the best way to prepare for a remediation exam (transcript, day 6, page 15). Similar evidence was given by Dr R, another of the plaintiff’s module coordinators, who said that students could contact her and ask what materials were going to be examined (transcript, day 6, page 88) and that the plaintiff could have contacted her but didn’t (transcript, day 6, page 90).

56. The engagement Dr M had with the plaintiff’s module coordinators involved at least two of them indicating that their modules “proved difficult for [the plaintiff] last year” (as set out in the academic plan). The terms of the 20 October academic plan did not require the plaintiff to remediate all six modules to progress to stage 3. It allowed the plaintiff to progress to stage 3 carrying some, but not all, of her stage 2 unremediated modules. The plan undoubtedly was going to delay the plaintiff in progressing to stage 3 in October 2023, as she wished to do, but for entirely legitimate reasons and in line with the University’s consistent approach that the plaintiff could not progress to stage 3 until she had remediated at least some of stage 2 modules because it was too much for her to progress to stage 3 carrying six unremediated stage 2 modules.

57. The University delayed posting the plaintiff’s special grades because of the delay envisaged by the terms of the academic plan, which required the plaintiff to elect between three separate options, and to ensure the plaintiff did not fall foul of the requirement to achieve remediation within two trimesters of the grades being posted. This was entirely legitimate and designed to assist the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s view of her right to progress with unremediated special grades

58. The plaintiff’s view is that the special grades rendered her immune from any workload review or any delay in progressing to stage 3 in October 2023. This is groundless and reflects a misunderstanding of the relevant Academic Regulations and policies, the plaintiff’s rights within her degree programme and the university’s right to monitor her workload, direct her progress and ensure the integrity of her degree. Any student who experiences difficulties in achieving academic requirements, whether examinations, assignments, placement or whatever, may find themselves delayed in their academic progress with all the consequences that may involve (as occurred in Galbraith v DCU [2022] IEHC 520). However, that is the nature of achieving a degree that denotes academic excellence, as determined by the University rather than by the student. The University may be required to answer to external regulatory bodies and comply with domestic and international statutory requirements for international recognition, as is required for this degree. A delay in progressing through a degree programme may have negative consequences for a student, which may have to be addressed by the University depending on the circumstances, but the fact that there is a negative consequence does not and cannot entitle a student to be subjected to a lesser academic rigour or a lesser monitoring of their workload, as applied by the student’s academic superiors in the exercise of their academic judgment.

59. The plaintiff asserts that the academic plan had no academic or regulatory basis (witness statement at para. 108) which she bases on comments made to her by Ms S, Deputy Director of Assessment. The plaintiff said that Ms S explained in an address to students, that where special grades are assigned under Academic Regulation 4.31, the student must complete the components of assessment or some equivalent assessment set by the school, within two trimesters of the initial attempt. The plaintiff says that Ms S clarified that the exceptional circumstances process and the workload review by the governing board are two separate processes. The plaintiff is correct that a workload review and the grant of special grades are two separate processes and are governed by two different parts of the Academic Regulations. However, the plaintiff then went on to conduct her own analysis of what she had heard from Ms S and stated at para. 109 of her witness statement: “I understand [Ms S’s] view to be that the workload review should not impact the application of [special] grades once the application has been approved. This contradicts the condition set out in the letter I received on 20 October 2023, which stated that my acceptance of an academic plan was prerequisite for the award of [special] grades”. The plaintiff’s understanding, whether of the Academic Regulations or how they were explained by Ms S as precluding a workload review once special grades are granted, is patently incorrect. The workload review of Regulation 3.8 is a stand-alone obligation of the governing board that is not qualified or limited by the grant of special grades or the provision made for that by Regulation

4.31. Any other analysis would leave a student who had been granted special grades, regardless of how many, free to progress to the next stage of their degree programme with a potentially enormous workload that could not be monitored by the university. The undesirability and unworkability of such a situation is illustrated by the plaintiff’s evidence that her analysis of the Regulations and her apparent understanding of them could lead to a situation whereby a first year student who had failed all their modules and secured special grades in respect of each of them, could proceed to stage 2 carrying all of their outstanding modules and have to attend to their new stage 2 modules at the same time as remediating all of their stage 1 modules. This is not in accordance with the Academic Regulations and would, in any event, be an irresponsible way for a university to deal with their students and could even be a breach of the duty of care those students are owed by their university.

Engagement with the plaintiff; October 2023 – April 2024

60. After she was given the academic plan of 20th October 2023, the plaintiff tried to register for stage 3 modules in disregard of the clear direction given to her not to do so. On 26 October 2023, Dr M proposed a Zoom meeting with the plaintiff, Dr G and Ms K, her student adviser to discuss which of the three options set out in her 20 October academic plan that she wished to choose. The meeting was scheduled for 15 minutes but the plaintiff was accommodated with a longer period of some 35 minutes. Dr G said he tried to explain that the purpose of the meeting was for the plaintiff to confirm which of the three options she wished to select but instead the plaintiff insisted on having input into the plan and to progress to stage 3. Dr G described the plaintiff’s approach as “disrespectful”. Dr M said she tried repeatedly to explain to the plaintiff that she could not progress to stage 3, that the university was entitled to monitor her workload, the academic plan was not for negotiation and that she needed to choose one of three options offered to her in the plan. These points were reiterated by Dr M in a long email she sent to the plaintiff later that evening which ended with an expression of commitment to the plaintiff’s academic success and well-being, which Dr M described as the intention behind the academic plan. The plaintiff replied to that email seeking more time to consider the three options. She was given a week up to 6 November. On 6 November, the plaintiff sought an additional 24 hours to “think things through” and make sure she was making the right choice.

61. The plaintiff said she was, at that stage, no longer comfortable speaking directly to Dr M. She criticised Dr M for conducting the Zoom meeting of 26 October from her car and criticised Dr G for having the meeting in his office with people coming in and out. Both criticisms are groundless and, in relation to Dr G, simply untrue. The meeting was conducted in an appropriately confidential and supportive way and did not seem to cause any concern for the plaintiff’s student adviser or give rise to any expression of concern by the plaintiff at the time. Dr M gave the plaintiff a lot more than the 15 minutes allocated for the meeting, an approach entirely consistent with the significant amount of time, effort and work Dr M and her colleagues had put into trying to support the plaintiff in her difficult circumstances, but at the same time to provide her with clarity around what was required of her and what was or was not achievable in terms of the plaintiff’s preferred outcomes. The plaintiff's response to Dr M’s clear and reasoned refusal of the plaintiff’s request to reject the academic plan and to progress to stage 3, was met with groundless and unfair criticism of Dr G and Dr M.

62. The plaintiff then sent a doctor's letter to the governing board in which the nature of the alleged assault was set out, and the doctor stated their view that it was in the plaintiff's best interest to graduate in 2027. The board confirmed that the decision of 12 October 2023 stood and directed that the plaintiff was to select one of the three options set out in the academic plan. The plaintiff criticised this correspondence, firstly, for having been sent outside of normal working hours and, secondly, for not mentioning support or any route for appeal or discussion. The plaintiff describes her situation at para. 131 of her witness statement; "Receiving such a communication so late at night, in the aftermath of disclosing (assault) to a board of unknown individuals, made me feel overwhelmed, isolated and entirely unsupported. The pressure to choose between academic plans without any flexibility or meaningful engagement with my circumstances compounded my distress. It felt as though the trauma I had disclosed was being administratively acknowledged but substantively disregarded." Once again, the plaintiff misunderstood or chose to misunderstand that the academic plan and options thereunder had been devised to support her, albeit she did not agree with it and believed it would have been better for her to progress to stage 3 carrying her six unremediated stage 2 modules with her. In truth, it was not that the board’s response failed to support her, but rather that it did not give her the support she wanted, i.e. to progress to stage 3 carrying her six unremediated stage

2 modules. The plaintiff’s criticism of the absence of any route for appeal or discussion was equally groundless as no further appeal was available or necessary. How the plaintiff’s special grades were to be remediated was a matter for the school in the exercise of the academic judgment of the academics involved. This was not an issue on which the plaintiff was entitled either to agreement or recourse to an appeal.

63. The plaintiff’s alleged assault was clearly very distressing for her. It was a significant part of what led to the granting of the special grades and all the benefits special grades confer such as non-capping of grades, no financial penalties, etc. However, being awarded special grades does not and could not affect how the plaintiff was required to remediate her outstanding modules. Regardless of how sympathetic the school was to the plaintiff’s circumstances, they still owed it to her to manage her workload and to ensure that her degree, if she successfully progresses through the programme, is a mark of her academic excellence and not an expression of sympathy about her difficult personal circumstances.

64. I do not consider that the university could, or should, have addressed the plaintiff’s situation in any way other than as they did. They have obligations about the plaintiff’s workload and the quality and integrity of her degree. Their decision to award special grades to the plaintiff did not require them to afford special or inappropriate treatment to the plaintiff by allowing her to proceed to stage 3 carrying six unremediated stage 2 modules because she had suffered traumatic events. The trauma she had disclosed entitled her to consideration of those circumstances in her application for special grades, but did not entitle her to input into how she would be required to remediate her six outstanding stage 2 modules or to progress to stage 3 with six unremediated stage 2 modules.

Disclosures made in April 2024

65. The plaintiff ceased contact with Dr M from November 2023 until she recommenced email correspondence with her in February 2024. Over the next two months the plaintiff made repeated requests for a meeting with Prof K, the head of the school and eventually got to meet with him on

10 April 2024. Prof K said he had only ever met two of the school’s 3,700 students about academic progress in his time as head of the school. Prof K’s agreement to meet is further evidence of the extensive support the plaintiff has received from the school.

66. Prior to the 10 April meeting, the plaintiff had disclosed confidentially to two other nonacademic members of the University staff that her alleged assault had been perpetrated by an unidentified student in the year below her in her school. At the meeting of 10 April, the plaintiff made the same disclosure to Prof K, which was the first time that this information was furnished to a member of the academic staff and outside of a confidential relationship of student/disability support. The plaintiff said she made this disclosure to explain why she could not agree to the terms of the academic plan.

Prof K, despite having had no advance notice of the nature of the discussion, responded sympathetically. He said the school would accommodate the plaintiff in whatever way might be possible by rearranging classes/tutorials/placements, even though there were challenges in doing this when the plaintiff did not wish to identify the student in question. Prof K also offered the plaintiff the option of a leave of absence. The plaintiff expressed her concern about the possibility that the other student might take a leave of absence or fail and end up in her year group.

Prof K’s response was to say, "what if the sun falls from the sky". This comment was clearly made to reflect Prof K’s view that such an event was highly unlikely, and that the plaintiff should focus on what was likely to happen rather than what might or could happen. The plaintiff alleges that Prof K laughed as he made this statement, which was emphatically denied both by Prof K and by Ms K, the plaintiff’s student adviser, who also attended the meeting and who had been supporting the plaintiff as student adviser and whom the plaintiff had previously frequently thanked in emails for her support and assistance.

Having seen Ms K and Prof K give their evidence and the careful and reflective way they spoke of the plaintiff and of the very difficult and traumatic experiences she had encountered in 2023, I prefer their evidence on this allegation to that of the plaintiff. There was nothing insulting, derogatory or disrespectful in how Prof K spoke to the plaintiff. Rather, it seems that the plaintiff, yet again, interpreted a respectful disagreement with her position and view of what should happen as unfair treatment of her rather than what it was, i.e. a consideration of her concerns and an explanation of what could realistically be done, albeit without accepting the validity of concerns that the plaintiff may genuinely have held.

A new academic plan; April 2024

67. Prof K contacted Dr M after the meeting and, with the plaintiff’s permission, disclosed the plaintiff’s personal circumstances that had been disclosed to Prof K. Dr M re-engaged with the plaintiff by email about the remediation of her stage 2 exams. The plaintiff emailed Dr M on 11 April seeking to arrange a meeting to discuss her academic plan. Dr M responded the following day and advised the plaintiff that a new academic plan would have to be configured for her as the academic year was almost over. The plaintiff requested remediation over the summer period which Dr M explained would not be facilitated because a bespoke professional degree could not be created for her. Dr M reminded the plaintiff that the special grades were being held for her but could not remain in place indefinitely as they must be remediated within two trimesters. The plaintiff responded by email dated 15 April in which she told Dr M she had been attending stage 3 modules even though she acknowledged that Dr M had directed her to stop attending them. The plaintiff explained her defiance of Dr M’s direction by firstly referring to having been advised in the past that independent learning might be more beneficial than attending labs (in circumstances where she had fainted in labs during her 2022/2023 academic year) and secondly because of advice she received from the Student Health Centre “that getting out and having some sort of engagement with professors and my peers was a better alternative than withdrawing socially and spending my time isolated at home”. The plaintiff concluded her email by saying that she very much appreciated the governing board holding the special grades for her for such a significant amount of time and understood that she had handled the entire situation very badly but that she was “incredibly appreciative” of the ongoing support.

68. Dr M said in her evidence that she had serious concerns about that email, in particular the advice that the plaintiff claimed to have been given that independent learning might be more beneficial than in person attendance at class. Dr M said this advice would never have been given to the plaintiff by the governing board as it was not an option for any student to opt out of attending mandatory parts of the curriculum and to engage in "independent learning". Dr M was also very concerned at the plaintiff's defiance of the direction given to her not to attend stage 3 modules. Dr M said that, from that email alone, she had “the most serious concerns I have ever had about a [professional] student” (para. 229 of the witness statement). Dr M described the plaintiff's view about the remediation of her stage 2 modules and her desire to progress to stages 3 and 4 as “untenable” and that it was evident to her that the plaintiff had no real grasp of what her academic situation was. She described the plaintiff as being wedded to the idea of whatever plan the plaintiff “had devised” and was not going to heed any advice or accept any plan that the governing board could provide to her (para. 234 of her witness statement).

69. By email dated 18 April 2024, Dr M furnished the plaintiff with a new academic plan which she said had been formulated following contact with her academic colleagues. By email dated 18 April 2024, the plaintiff expressed her concerns with the plan and said that she wished to take her remediation exams in May, for which she said she was well prepared. The plaintiff requested a meeting with Dr M and, on the same date, 19 April 2004, she emailed Ms K indicating her intention to file formal complaints about her treatment by a number of the university’s academic staff and alleging discrimination and bad faith against them and damage to her.

70. On 22 April 2024, the plaintiff emailed Prof K saying that it was essential that he attend the meeting between the plaintiff and Dr M. Prof K explained it was not necessary for him to attend, and the plaintiff needed to go ahead with meeting Dr M on the following day and agree her academic plan with her. The meeting was scheduled to take place on 25 April with Ms K in attendance as the plaintiff’s support person. Prior to the meeting, the plaintiff asked if she could bring the President of the Students’ Union, Ms N, with her. Dr M declined and said the meeting would proceed in Dr M’s office with the plaintiff and Ms K as arranged. The plaintiff replied stating that she was happy to meet Dr M and Ms K that day. The plaintiff brought Ms N to the meeting with her, despite Dr M’s clear direction to her not to do so. The meeting did not proceed, unsurprisingly, given the basis on which the meeting had been arranged and how the plaintiff had conducted herself. The plaintiff alleges that Dr M shouted at her before leaving the meeting. Dr M disputes this. Ms K, who brought the plaintiff and Ms N into her office to try to de-escalate the situation, said that Ms N was shouting and was very upset.

71. Once again, the plaintiff chose not to abide by the directions of her academic superiors and seemed to view the meeting with Dr M as another opportunity to renegotiate an academic plan that she had repeatedly been told was non-negotiable.

72. The plaintiff emailed Ms K the following day setting out that she wanted to discuss her academic options rather than have an academic plan randomly emailed to her. She said she was happy to contact the module coordinators individually and “have some form of local/alternative assessments strategy arranged as they see fit but I would like to be given the opportunity to be a part of my academic planning as to avoid a repeat of events of the past year” (email of 26 April 2024). This was despite what she had been told repeatedly, i.e. that the academic plan had been drawn up in consultation with Dr M’s academic colleagues and was non-negotiable. Ms K told the plaintiff that her correspondence should be with Dr M. The plaintiff seemed to think it should go to Prof K, the head of School. Unsurprisingly, Ms K disagreed and encouraged the plaintiff to reach out to Dr M. The plaintiff responded by email dated 29 April 2024 setting out her view that two other academics, Prof D and Dr R might offer a “fresh perspective on this matter” and asked Ms K to contact those individuals regarding her situation and "ensure my voice is heard". Ms K replied to say that the plaintiff was free to contact anyone she felt was appropriate, but that Ms K’s role was not to be an in between person. Thereafter, the plaintiff’s correspondence with Ms K came to an end.

73. Once again, the plaintiff refused to engage with what she had been directed to do and instead tried to secure an outcome that she had been repeatedly told was not an option for her.

74. On 13 May, Dr M emailed the plaintiff offering a meeting with herself and Ms K to discuss the academic plan. The plaintiff responded, requesting to be accompanied by Ms N and a representative of the University's disability support service. Dr M explained that the meeting was in relation to her academic plan and would only require herself and Ms K, but that Dr M could meet with representatives of the University's disability support services in relation to the plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation at a later stage. The meeting did not take place. Dr M emailed again on

20 May and asked the plaintiff to outline her specific requests regarding the academic plan that she had furnished the plaintiff with on 18 April and reminded the plaintiff that two of her module coordinators had confirmed she was to reattend those stage 2 modules. The plaintiff said she was confused by a requirement to attend modules and stated her view that as she had been awarded special grades in those modules “the module coordinators did not have the authority to compel me to re-attend” (at para. 188 of her witness statement). Once again, I find the plaintiff's views about the consequences of being granted grades to be incorrect, groundless and contrary to what her academic supervisors had directed her to do.

75. The plaintiff did not reply to Dr M’s email and their communication came to an end.

The plaintiff’s dealings with the disability support service

76. In June 2024, the plaintiff commenced corresponding with the University’s disability support service. She claimed she had not received the disability supports to which she was entitled. At this stage, the plaintiff was not registered for stage 3 and had been instructed not to attend stage 3 modules. Therefore, the basis for requiring classroom disability support for stage 3 modules was unclear.

77. Ms F, the director of the service, gave evidence about her dealings with the plaintiff from June to September 2024 which she described in her witness statement as “challenging”. She described the plaintiff as requesting a range of requests and gave the example of the plaintiff having sought access to an ISL (Irish Sign Language) interpreter but that once there was a response to her request, the plaintiff’s request changed to something else. Ms F said the plaintiff’s request for an ISL interpreter was not denied (as suggested by the plaintiff) but that once ISL was offered to the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not respond and there were no further requests. Ms F described the plaintiff’s emails as “long and detailed but somewhat combative or challenging in tone.” She said she found the staff of the school “to be responsive and supportive in their attempt to address the many requests made to support the student”.

The plaintiff’s ‘right’ to remediation

78. The University say that the plaintiff’s academic plan of October 2023 was formulated in the discharge of the School's obligations pursuant to Regulation 3.8 of the Academic Regulations to monitor the plaintiff’s workload. The plaintiff fundamentally disagrees and maintains that the Regulations, the exceptional circumstances policy and various other documents issued by the University, including documents akin to guidelines or FAQ, prohibit any such academic plan. She says that a student granted special grades is entitled to an immediate and unconditional opportunity to remediate and, entirely at the election of the student, to simultaneously progress to the next stage of their programme i.e. to the same stage or at the same pace as if the modules for which special grades were granted had been passed, including the right to carry all of their unremediated modules with them to the next stage of their degree programme. The plaintiff agreed with the University’s counsel’s description of her view that a student granted special grades is rendered "immune" from any academic plan or any requirement of the school to remediate or repeat modules over a specified period of time or to delay progress to the next stage until at least some remediation had been achieved. The plaintiff said that the programme board or governing board had no entitlement to chart her academic progression towards a professional degree, having regard to her circumstances (transcript, day 2, page 56).

79. The plaintiff’s view of her right to remediate immediately upon being granted special grades without any consideration of her workload is, at the least, misguided and, at worst, naive. The plaintiff, in her correspondence with the school’s academics, repeatedly referred to the need to reach a “resolution” and spoke of how "we" might have achieved that, suggesting her view of the relationship as more akin to professional colleagues than an academic dealing with a student in the second year of a professional degree programme. The academic/student relationship is one of superior and subordinate in which the academic can and, on occasion should, direct a student on how they are required to engage with their learning. Whilst the academic may try to bring the student with them and reach a consensus as to the best way to progress the student’s learning, such a consensus is a bonus rather than a requirement. This is in sharp contrast with a collegiate relationship as may exist between qualified professional colleagues or between employees where there may be an expectation, and possibly even a right, to engage with a view to reaching a solution acceptable to all parties involved, i.e. an agreement.

80. The plaintiff based her asserted right to immediate remediation and to simultaneous progression to stage 3 on various documents attached to policies and procedures that had been issued by the University over a number of years, at least one of which was stated by University’s witness to have been withdrawn in 2017. Other documents relied on were described as guidelines and/or the equivalent to frequently asked questions (FAQ), designed to give guidance to a student as to what to expect upon being granted special grades. The plaintiff relied heavily on an infographic that was included in a guide to the Exceptional Circumstances Policy, which said it was to explain how to remediate a special grade. It stated that a student granted a special grade was required to contact their module coordinator directly to discuss how to remediate the special grade.

81. Regardless of what a guide or an infographic might say or suggest, none of the documents relied on by the plaintiff could possibly override the clear wording of the Academic Regulations and the obligation they place on the University, and in particular para. 3.8 thereof. In applying the Academic Regulations to the plaintiff's relationship with the University, the plaintiff decided that she, as a second-year student progressing through a professional degree programme, was entitled to consult with the academic staff of her University School about how the six modules she has not yet passed should be remediated, with a view to reaching an agreement that was acceptable to her. Whatever consultation she may have been entitled to (which I consider further at para. 125- 130), it falls well short of any entitlement to reach agreement on remediation, as contended by the plaintiff in her correspondence with the University and in these proceedings.

82. It is extraordinary for the plaintiff to contend an entitlement to move into stage 3 of her professional and externally accredited degree programme, that is regulated by national and European law, against the wishes, advice and academic judgment of all the academic staff who were tasked with educating and supporting her learning. There was nothing in the evidence put before this court over an 8 day hearing to suggest that the University’s refusal to allow the plaintiff to remediate her six outstanding stage 2 modules immediately and to simultaneously progress to the next stage of her degree programme, was motivated by anything other than a concern for the reputation and integrity of the School's degree programme, the quality of the plaintiff’s education and the achievement of the learning outcomes necessary for the plaintiff to progress to the next stage of her degree programme. There was no evidence whatsoever of the bad faith which the plaintiff attributed to the University and to the academic staff who had put weeks and months of work into trying to assist a student who had struggled both academically and emotionally since the autumn of 2022 and who had experienced very traumatic events in her personal life between February and May 2023. Rather, it seems that any outcome other than the one the plaintiff wanted, i.e. to proceed to stage 3 carrying half of her stage 2 modules, was not just rejected by her but condemned as unfair and/or unlawful treatment motivated by bad faith. Ms K, the plaintiff’s student adviser, said in her evidence: “There was a lot of care and attention to her personal situation. It seemed like she didn’t want to hear any of that, she just wanted this plan put in place that wasn’t actually something the School could do” (transcript, day 6, page 105).

Ms K went on to say,

“It just seemed that every option that was being given, if it wasn’t what [the plaintiff] wanted it wasn’t going to work. I just wanted her just to pass, just do the exams, pass them, focus on them than trying to get a bespoke programme that wasn’t really possible” (Transcript, day 6, page 106).

83. The plaintiff seeks what I can only describe as unique reliefs from this court relating not only to stage 3 of her degree programme (as per Declaration (h) set out above that she is entitled to special grades for the stage 3 modules she was not permitted to undertake) but also to stage 4 (as per Declaration (l) set out above, that the refusal to permit her to undertake and/or register for stage 4 modules was a breach of duty and of agreement by the University) In effect, the plaintiff asks this court to take over the regulation of her professional degree.

84. The plaintiff’s unrealistic expectations, both of this court and of herself, as well as of the university’s role in regulating a degree subject to statutory requirements for international recognition, were further illustrated by her own account of how she envisaged completing the remaining half of her unremediated stage 2 modules and all of her stage 3 modules. She claims to have studied freely available online material for her stage 3 modules, despite not having registered or attended classes or labs for any of those modules. Nevertheless, she relies on having been advised she could instead engage in “independent learning” as set out at para. 64 above. She said that whilst she had not attended her stage 4A modules, she had; “all the kind of reading done… and just kind of tie up the loose ends, kind of get my up to eight hours of tutoring, just talk to module coordinators or their appointed tutor, tie up those loose ends, and then, yeah, get assessed” (transcript, day 3, page 17/18). She suggested that having been assessed for those stage 4 modules, she would then proceed through the remaining stages over an expedited timeframe so that she would be able to graduate in 2027 with the students with which she had commenced her course in 2021. There is absolutely no reality nor any legal basis to the plaintiff’s stated aspirations for her desire to graduate with a professional, externally regulated, degree in 2027.

85. In summary, the plaintiff’s view of her right to progress to stage 3 while simultaneously remediating six stage 2 modules is;

- not in accordance with the Academic Regulations and the University’s relevant policies and procedures;

- misunderstands the nature of the academic/student relationship;

- ignores the University’s obligation to monitor its students’ workload, pursuant to the Academic Regulations and the wider duty of care owed within any academic/student education relationship;

- gnores the University’s obligation and entitlement to determine a student’s progress through the degree programme.

- unrealistic and unworkable. The treatment of the plaintiff in relation to the remediation of her special grades in the six stage 2 modules that she had not yet passed was entirely lawful and proper.

A pragmatic solution proposed by Prof K

86. The plaintiff lodged complaints under the University’s Dignity and Respect Policy in June 2024 and August 2024 against Dr M, Prof K and Prof S. The plaintiff’s complaints pursuant to the Student’s Complaints Policy were dismissed by a Prof K in a report dated 15 July 2024. The plaintiff was advised she could submit a complaint to the Student Complaints Office which the plaintiff did, but because the plaintiff had instituted the within proceedings by then, that process was paused. The plaintiff disagrees with that approach.

87. Prof G was then appointed as a liaison person between the plaintiff and the school at the end of July 2024. The plaintiff consented to Prof G being sent a list of the plaintiff's classroom and examination reasonable accommodations. Prof G decided that the plaintiff’s six remediation exams should be scheduled, in consultation with the module coordinator, for September 2024. This was part of what the plaintiff had been seeking previously, but the fundamental difference was that Prof G's plan did not involve the plaintiff progressing to stage 3 whilst carrying her unremediated stage

2 modules. On 19 August 2024, Prof G emailed the plaintiff inviting her to a meeting about her academic plan. The plaintiff replied saying that a meeting in relation to the academic plan was not required and that the basis and scope for the academic plan was at issue in the within High Court proceedings.

88. Prof G arranged for the plaintiff’s special grades to be uploaded to the plaintiff’s record and emailed the plaintiff on 20 August requesting her to meet in relation to the remediation of outstanding modules and the academic plan. Again, the plaintiff declined because of the within proceedings. Prof G emailed again about meeting and the plaintiff responded saying she would rearrange the meeting as soon as the governing authority representative clarified their position.

89. The plaintiff suggests that because the school did eventually make the remediation exams in respect of the six outstanding modules available to her in September 2024 and again in May 2025 without compliance with all of the requirements of the academic plan or October 2023, that the legality of that academic plan was questionable. However, those exams were made available to the plaintiff as a pragmatic approach to the serious problems that presented to the school in July 2024 when a number of complaints made by the plaintiff against various senior academics with whom she had dealings, were dismissed in their entirety. The decision-maker suggested that a pragmatic solution be formulated to enable the plaintiff to progress in her degree. This was at a point in time that had the plaintiff simply followed the academic plan and successfully remediated, she would have been moving into the next stage of her degree. Instead, she was involved in various internal complaints procedures, at least some of which had been determined against her, her solicitors were engaged in extensive correspondence with the University and High Court proceedings had been issued on 30 July 2024. This was simply the University adopting a pragmatic approach in allowing her to sit the exams she had repeatedly said she was ready, willing and able to sit and pass. That does not render the decision of the University in October 2023 to require the plaintiff to agree to one of three options contained in the academic plan created for her at that time unlawful. The law should be used to determine and enforce people's rights and not to challenge or condemn pragmatic attempts to resolve difficult problems that have been going on for some time.

Remediation exams; September 2024

90. Arising from the injunction proceedings instituted by the plaintiff in July 2024, a detailed letter was sent by the University’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors on 13 August. The letter incorrectly said that Prof K had taken the view that the special grades should have been awarded to the plaintiff immediately upon being granted. For the within discussion, I focus on the issue of the University’s invitation to the plaintiff, on a without prejudice basis, to remediate her six stage 2 modules. The University’s advice was that the plaintiff should do this over the academic year 2024/2025 and reattend the relevant stage 2 modules which the University said was also the view of the module coordinators but alternatively, the plaintiff was permitted to take on the workload of remediating the six exams in September 2024 and subsequently register for stage 3 and do that year in full. If she decided on that option, she could sit the six exams in September 2024, even though the strong academic advice was that she should reattend the modules. The University was not in agreement with the plaintiff's wish to register for stage 4 but pointed out that any dispute about that would not come before the court until after the remediation exams were over. Therefore, they suggested that the plaintiff could take the remediation exams in September without conceding any of the arguments on either side. The plaintiff’s solicitors reverted with detailed comments on other aspects of that letter, but did not comment on that central proposal about sitting the exams in September.

91. The University’s solicitors wrote again on 30 August noting the plaintiff had cancelled both meetings that Prof G attempted to arrange on short notice, basing the reasons for cancelling on legal advice she had received. Nevertheless, the letter confirmed that Prof G remained available to meet with the plaintiff to assist her in progressing her degree. The plaintiff was once again invited to sit the exams scheduled between 16 and 25 September 2024 but was told that to do so, she needed to engage with Prof G. The plaintiff’s solicitor sent a 10-page response on 5 September 2024 setting out what they required the University to do, including registering the plaintiff for stage 3 and backdating that to the academic year 2023/24, provide classroom and exam reasonable accommodations and allow the plaintiff to register for stage 4 academic year 2024/25. In relation to the proposals about sitting the exams in September 2024, the plaintiff’s solicitors confirmed that the plaintiff remained anxious to complete the assessments in the coming weeks and would engage with her module coordinators and Prof G to make the necessary arrangements. They stated that the plaintiff should be provided with learning materials for all six unremediated modules and requested access to those module offerings in the University's online learning environment. The letter also stated that, until the plaintiff had received confirmation that the materials in relation to her assessments would be based upon access to any new material, she had to reserve her position as to whether she would be able to undertake those assessments in September.

92. An issue then arose with the plaintiff’s access to the University's online learning environment. The plaintiff said that she did not have access to the materials for the academic year 2023/2024 and was unaware of the content of the modules for that time as she had not attended the stage 2 module lectures. However that issue about the plaintiff having or not having access to the materials for 2023/2024 was clearly irrelevant as Prof G had emailed the plaintiff directly on 12 September advising her that the learning outcomes for the modules in question "are the same for both academic years (‘22/’23 and ‘23/’24) and the module coordinators assure me that material to be re-examined reflects this". Prof G confirmed that access to the online learning environment for the plaintiff had been arranged, the plaintiff’s special remediation exams had been put in place and the prescribed reasonable accommodations had been arranged for her. Ms F of the Disability Support service also confirmed in her evidence that she had met with the plaintiff and was satisfied that she had access to the materials she needed (transcript, day 5, page 131) and that the plaintiff had told she was “absolutely ready” to sit the exams and simply needed the School to arrange them for her (transcript, day 5, page 141).

93. The plaintiff solicitors wrote on 5 September 2024 taking detailed issue with the plaintiff’s access to the University’s online learning environment and her classroom reasonable accommodation (including issues such as tuition, notetaker and recording devices) despite the fact that the plaintiff did not require classroom reasonable accommodations in order to sit her exams. The plaintiff’s solicitors also took issue with Prof G’s statement in relation to the learning outcomes being the same for both years and the module coordinators having assured her that the material to be examined reflected this. The plaintiff’s solicitors said their concern was whether there had been changes to lecture or tutorial slides, notes or recording. The letter concluded by saying the plaintiff would contact her module coordinators directly to arrange completion of her special assessments. A letter in similar terms was sent to the defendant’s solicitors on 2 October 2024 raising similar issues, except for confirming that access to the University's online learning environment had been given on

25 September 2025. The University’s solicitors responded by letter dated 13 September 2025 and set out, inter alia, the following:- "1. No student is entitled to prescribe what goes into an exam paper in advance or to seek assurances about it.

2. Your assertion that remediation must be fixed to the iteration of the module studied remains wrong.

3. The content of a remediation exam is a matter for the academic judgment of module coordinators.

4. The module coordinators setting the exams are aware that your client studied the material in 2022/23 and have confirmed that your client can do the exams based on that material and that they will be corrected in the knowledge of and having cognisance of what your client studied.

5. The learning outcomes of the modules have not changed.

6. Any issue about the content of an exam can be dealt with by a way of assessment appeal in accordance with the relevant policy."

94. The plaintiff’s solicitor’s lengthy reply of 16 September took issue with the response from the University's solicitors and continued to maintain the plaintiff’s requirements for reasonable classroom and exam accommodations. They sent another lengthy eight-page letter dated 24 September 2024 which discussed the appointment of an academic mentor, the suitability of Prof G as a liaison person and the plaintiff’s right to organise her own special assessments by direct contact with the module coordinators.

95. Despite the lengthy and frequently unnecessarily complex nature of the plaintiff’s solicitor’s correspondence, the position set out by Prof G was always very clear and was confirmed by her and the module coordinators in their evidence. Prof G engaged with the module coordinators, some directly and some via Prof S, and thereafter clearly and unequivocally assured the plaintiff that the remediation exams for each of the six modules would be on the material from the academic year 2022/2023 and not from the academic year 2023/2024 which the plaintiff had missed and for which she said she did not have access to the University’s online learning environment.

96. The plaintiff confirmed in her evidence that she had access to the 2022/2023 material. She explained that the basis for her stated reluctance to sit the September 2024 exams without access to the 2023/2024 material was because she had been advised by Dr N, a non-academic member of the academic affairs staff who provides pastoral support for students and who had no direct association with this school (stated by her at transcript, day 2, page 184), that it was not advisable to sit a repeat or remediation exam without access to that year’s teaching material. Dr N also said in her evidence that she had advised the plaintiff to make sure, in preparing for her remediation assessments, "that she had access to the content that she needed to study" (transcript day 2, page 170). Dr N was asked about the assurance to the plaintiff that the examinations were appropriate for her to take by reference to the 2022/2023 materials, to which she replied:- “Yes, that’s, that's absolutely fine. So, I think that that is saying to the student that you have these materials and therefore the exam will be based, I mean it’s not saying the exams will be based on these materials but pretty much that's what I would read from it.” (transcript, day 2, page 180). She went on to say that she, as a student adviser, would feel concerned for the student about the reference to any issue with the content of an exam being dealt with by way of an assessment appeal. She described this as not very student-centred.

97. Dr N’s advice to the plaintiff was given to the plaintiff as part of the pastoral support Dr N was tasked to provide. It was not and never purported to be academic advice. Dr N said that she never saw the reassurance given to the plaintiff by Prof G. by email on 13 September 2024 that the module coordinators had confirmed that the exams would be by reference to the 2022/2023 materials (transcript, day 2, page 178-179). She accepted that she was not aware of the details of these exams, when they were being set and how they were being dealt with but pointed out that she did not need to be aware of those facts to do her job properly (transcript, day 2, page 186).

98. Dr N was not aware of all of the highly unusual circumstances of this student who was by then, embroiled in a series of internal complaints, had instituted High Court proceedings and was dealing with the granular detail of her preparation for her September remediation exams via lengthy correspondence between her solicitors and solicitors for the University. The evidence is very clear that Prof G had ensured, in consultation with the plaintiff’s module coordinators, that the plaintiff’s remediation exam scheduled for September 2024 would only examine the plaintiff on materials that she would have covered in the academic year 2022/2023. Prof G explained this to the plaintiff in her email of 13 September. Nevertheless, the plaintiff claimed to prefer the pastoral advice from her student advisor which was given to her without the plaintiff having informed Dr N of the reassurance she had been given in writing by Prof G about the materials on which she was to be examined. This was a serious error of judgment on the plaintiff’s part. It is also inconsistent with the plaintiff’s repeated emphasis on her being ready, willing and able to sit the remediation exams, a theme that she regularly communicated from September 2023 in her meetings with and emails to the university's academic staff, in each of her exceptional circumstances application, in her Affidavit sworn on 30 July 2024 throughout her witness statement and in her oral testimony to this court.

Expert evidence

99. Expert evidence was given about the plaintiff’s access, or lack of access, to the University’s online learning environment from a witness presented by the defendant as a forensic IT expert and a witness presented by the plaintiff as an expert to reply to the defendant's expert witness’ report. The plaintiff’s witness told the court that this was the first time he had acted as an expert witness (transcript, day 7, page 48), that he did not know the obligations of an expert witness (transcript, day 7, page 51) and that he had been time constrained to write the report (transcript, day 7, page 70). It became clear from his evidence and approach to his task that he did not fully understand or appreciate the provisions of Order 39, rule 56-61 of the Rules of the Superior Courts on his overriding duty as an expert witness to assist the court rather than the party who is discharging his fees. He clearly viewed his conclusions through the prism of what the plaintiff had told him when he met her over Zoom in advance of finalising his report, that she could not access the University's online learning environment at the relevant time for the 2024 materials. He agreed, under cross examination, that he had accepted the plaintiff’s statement that she could not access the online environment for five of the unremediated modules as the starting point for his analysis of the defendant’s forensic report, which he said he then went on to prove (transcript, day 7, pages 100-101). The plaintiff’s claim about not having access was not accepted by the defendant whose expert said she was given access, identified a reason why the plaintiff may have been prevented from having such access on her device, along with evidence of the plaintiff having had access since

6 February 2024 to the 2024 material for one of the modules to be remediated, that she had accessed the 2024 materials on 12 September for another of the modules and on 21 September for another, from which the defendant’s expert concluded she could have accessed the materials for all six modules. Under cross examination, the plaintiff’s expert accepted that the plaintiff did have access to the 2024 materials for one of the modules since 6 February 2024.

100. The plaintiff’s expert confirmed that he had not sought access to the plaintiff’s device which she had said she had used to try to access the online learning environment. The defendant’s expert did not have access to that device and only had a pdf of a screenshot which the plaintiff said showed her being denied access. The plaintiff’s expert did not ask the plaintiff for access to her device, which he said was because he was only asked to review the defendant’s forensic report (transcript, day 7, page 80) and not to do a forensic analysis of the device (transcript, day 7, page 84). Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s expert had asked for the original screenshots of the pdf’s that were provided by the plaintiff. He said he was told they were not available and only the pdf version was available, but did not enquire why this was and accepted the answer the plaintiff had given him (transcript, day 7, page 84).

101. I do not consider it necessary for this court to determine the technical issues in relation to access to the University's online learning environment in September 2024, in circumstances where the plaintiff was clearly and unambiguously informed by Prof G in writing that she would only be examined on the material she had covered in 2022/2023. The plaintiff confirmed in her evidence that she had access to that material in the online learning environment well in advance of the September 2024 exams. If I am incorrect in that and if the technical evidence is relevant to the plaintiff’s case that she was denied access to the necessary study materials required to remediate (as pleaded at para. 13(ii) and (iii) and 14(c) of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim), then I prefer the evidence of the defendant’s forensic expert and I find the approach, methodology and conclusions of the plaintiff’s expert to be lacking the appropriate balance, rigour and focus on assisting the court that is required of an expert witness. Other reasons identified for not sitting the September 2024 exams

102. The plaintiff also explained her decision not to sit the September remediation exams by reference to her being denied access to the tutoring that was part of her classroom reasonable accommodations. That tutoring was in respect of the modules she had already attended (insofar as she had attended them) and the University said it was not an accommodation to which she was automatically entitled, in preparing for her remediation exams. Nevertheless, the University’s disability support office was willing to consider funding tutoring but required the plaintiff’s consent for them to liaise with Prof G. The plaintiff refused to consent to that and in her evidence this was: “Because that’s not grounded in policy. I was hoping for a strict adherence to policy and it is that the [disability services office] liaises with, from my understanding, the module coordinator and module staff and then the module staff can kind of – how do you put it – recommend a tutor and that find of it”. (Transcript, day 3, page 42).

103. The plaintiff rejected the university’s efforts to provide her with tutoring in advance of the September 2024 remediation exams. Prof G, a senior academic, had been appointed as her liaison person in relation to her preparation for those exams and had been centrally involved in making the arrangements for these exams to be scheduled for the plaintiff, based only on the materials from 2022/2023. The plaintiff refused to allow Prof G to liaise with the disability support office in relation to the provision of tutoring for her. The consequence of that was that the disability support office could not progress their attempts to provide her with the tutoring she had said she wanted. The plaintiff cannot seek to blame the university for that by reference to some sort of asserted right to have the disability support office liaise with each of her module coordinators rather than with the senior academic who had been put in place by the University to oversee a process of exam remediation that was arranged specifically for the plaintiff in the very unusual circumstances that then applied to her.

104. The plaintiff’s stated excuses for not availing of the opportunity afforded to her to sit six remediation exams in September 2024 on the 2022/2023 materials, are entirely unconvincing and groundless in fact. It is a great pity that the plaintiff did not focus more of her energy on the remediation exams arranged for her in September 2024, based solely on the 2022/2023 material to which she had access, having repeatedly claimed over many months that she wanted to and was ready, willing and able to sit her remediation exams and having told this court that she had said “multiple times I really really wanted to sit those exams, they were incredibly important” (Transcript, day 3, page 46).

May 2025 exams

105. By letter dated 9 April 2025, the defendant’s solicitors addressed some of the issues that the plaintiff’s solicitors had raised about classroom accommodations but also made further proposals for the plaintiff to do the six remediation exams between 3-17 May 2025 without prejudice to the within proceedings. The plaintiff was assured that the exam papers would reflect what she had covered during the academic year 2022/23, she would have access to the University’s online learning environment for the modules and would be provided with examination reasonable accommodations. Those proposals required the school to seek and obtain derogations from the University programme board to permit resit examinations in a trimester when the modules were still running. The letter from the University’s solicitors of 9 April pointed out that this required further commitments of time and effort from the already busy staff at the stressful time of year in order to yet again facilitate the plaintiff and that it was therefore imperative that the plaintiff confirm as soon as possible if she was willing to do the exams. The plaintiff’s solicitors responded with a holding letter dated 11 April.

106. A further letter dated 15 April 2025 was sent in relation to an investigation into offensive text messages that had been sent to the plaintiff. The background to this was that in late 2024, the plaintiff says she became aware of disturbing messages about her on a class online group, including references to her alleged assault in February 2023. In February 2025, she received a highly offensive email with images attached. In April 2025, she was informed by university personnel that they had been appointed to investigate messages she had received and which she had provided to university staff. During the week of 21 April 2025, the plaintiff said that a photograph from the night of her alleged assault was circulated by email. The plaintiff was contacted by An Garda Síochána about these messages. The plaintiff said in her evidence that, after that, she did not think about the remediation exams that were scheduled for her between 3 and 17 May and described that time as “a horrific month” (transcript, day 3, page 54).

107. On 7 May, the plaintiff’s solicitors sent a substantive reply to the University’s solicitors’ letter of 9 April, which was four days after the plaintiff had been told the exams would be specially scheduled for her. The letter is lengthy and purports to set out various reasons why the plaintiff could not take up the proposal to sit the remediation exams in May and reiterating what was asserted as the plaintiff’s right to engage directly with the module coordinators in relation to remediation of the modules for which she had been granted special grades. As well as setting out lengthy quotes from previous correspondence and repeating concerns in relation to reasonable accommodation and access to the University's online learning environment, the plaintiff’s solicitors seemed to challenge the university’s proposals as predicated on certain awards being granted in respect of the September 2024 remediation exams which the plaintiff did not attend. The plaintiff’s solicitors said they were very concerned by the University’s “apparent suggestion that it should pre-empt determination, in the defendant’s favour, of matters pleaded in the amended statement of claim”. This was despite the university’s proposal having been clearly made without prejudice to the issues in the within proceedings. The plaintiff’s solicitor’s letter refers to the plaintiff’s wish to engage directly with module coordinators, which was stated to be in reliance on the university’s policies.

108. Nowhere in that long and detailed letter is there any mention of the plaintiff being unable to do the exams because she was so upset about the emails of 21 April which she identified in her evidence as the reason why she was unable to sit the exams specially arranged for her in May. The letter does refer, in the final paragraph, to the plaintiff been currently unwell (as of 9 May 2025) but only to explain a possible delay by her in replying to any email the academic staff might send her.

109. At no time did the plaintiff furnish or indicate an intention to obtain or furnish medical certification of her unfitness to sit the May 2025 remediation exams, despite the detailed familiarity she had with the University’s policies for dealing with such unexpected situations arising during scheduled exam times.

110. The plaintiff’s solicitors have been attentive in addressing the plaintiff’s detailed concerns in their detailed correspondence. I can only conclude that the absence of any reference in their letter of 9 May to the plaintiff being medically unfit to sit her exams or being too upset by the emails and other messages to do so, was because this did not reflect their instructions at the time. The other issues raised in that letter were not relied on by the plaintiff in her evidence to explain her nonattendance at the exams. In her evidence the plaintiff praised that letter as she said it:- "lays out, in my opinion, incredibly well the issues with everything, it addresses them, which module contact, which [University online learning environment] access, that a student does in fact have an entitlement to contact module coordinators and such it lays it out incredibly well, in my opinion, and, yeah, at the end it does… again, it was an incredibly distressing time, I don't think there was a need to lay out exactly what happened." (Transcript, day 3, page 56). The plaintiff is wrong in claiming that there was no need to lay out exactly what happened. The opportunity to sit the remediation exams that the plaintiff had been seeking was offered to her without prejudice to the within proceedings. She had repeatedly said she was ready, willing and able to sit the exams. The academic staff were going to considerable lengths to arrange these exams for her. In those circumstances there was every need to ensure that her solicitors were instructed to lay out what happened such that (as she told this court) she was unable to attend the exams that had been scheduled for her in May 2025.

111. Having regard to the plaintiff’s explanation to this court for not sitting the May exams, the lack of any attempts to avail of the process for identifying medical reasons for not attending an exam and significantly having regard to the contents of the plaintiff’s solicitors’ detailed and carefully drafted letter of 9 May 2025, I do not find the plaintiff’s reasons for not sitting the remediation exams made available to her between 3 and 17 May 2025 to be convincing or acceptable.

Application of the Regulations and Policies

112. There is no basis in the Academic Regulations or in any of the policies and documents on which the plaintiff sought to rely, to support the plaintiff’s case that special grades cannot be considered in any monitoring of the plaintiff's workload or that granting a special grade renders a student immune from a workload review. Neither is there anything to support the plaintiff’s claim that she was entitled to exclusively deal directly with her module coordinators in relation to how her special grades were to be remediated (a claim which does not seem to be expressly pleaded but on which the plaintiff placed a lot of emphasis in her evidence).

113. Regulation 3.7 states; “A student may not register to more than 40 credits in any trimester. In determining workload, credits from resits and repeats shall be counted by a Governing Board.” Regulation 3.8 states: “Governing Boards shall monitor student workloads and where, in the opinion of a Governing Board, a student’s workload is unsustainable, it may, following appropriate consultation with the student, require that the student’s workload be reduced to sustainable levels.” The ‘Progression Explained’ document prepared by the school and on which the plaintiff relied, simply confirms what a reading of Academic Regulation 3.7 makes clear, i.e. that special grades are not specified as counting in terms of academic workload as per Regulation 3.7. The fact that special grades do not count in determining the student’s workload as per 3.7 is separate to how a student workload is to be monitored as per 3.8. Neither Regulation 3.7 nor the explanations set out by the university in their various guidance documents could render a student with special grades immune from the overriding responsibility afforded to the Governing Board by Regulation 3.8 to monitor a student’s workload and their responsibility for students’ academic welfare and progression set out at Regulation 1.6.

114. Regulation 3.8 does not mention many things, including special grades, that could be part of a student’s workload. The omission of any reference to special grades does not mean that Regulation 3.8 does not apply to a student who has been granted special grades. That plaintiff’s case that special grades grants her an immunity from a workload review flies in the face of the clear and unambiguous obligations that the Regulations impose on the governing board in relation to the welfare of students alongside the basic duty of care that any University owes to its students to ensure their academic obligations are not managed or imposed on them in a way that could be unduly onerous for them.

115. The plaintiff also contends that the imposition of an academic plan was a breach of the Academic Regulations and the exceptional circumstances policy, relying largely on what she says is the exclusive role for module coordinators in deciding on remediation of special grades. The plaintiff referred to an infograph included in a guide to the policy which says that a student is required “to contact your module coordinator directly to discuss how to remediate the [special] grade”. That does not give rise to the entitlement for which the plaintiff seemed to contend in her evidence ie that only she and her module coordinators could determine how she was to remediate her six unremediated modules.

116. The evidence confirmed that the plaintiff could have approached her module coordinators at any time to discuss her preparation for her remediation exams. The plaintiff seemed to believe that she was entitled to a different type of communication with them i.e. that they would determine how her modules were to be remediated in direct communication with her, rather than simply discuss her preparation for the method of remediation that had been decided on by the school following on discussion with all of the module coordinators. Academic Regulation 4.31 on special grades provides for the remediation assessment to be set “by the School”. Clearly, the module coordinators will be a significant part of the remediation process but they do not operate independently of the school in the manner contended for by the plaintiff, either as a matter of practical reality or from the evidence given by the university’s witnesses (which included a number of the plaintiff’s module coordinators) of the engagement between the module coordinators and initially Dr G and later Dr M and finally Prof G in relation to drawing up the plaintiff’s various academic plans and proposals for sitting her remediation exams.

117. One of the aspects of the academic plans drawn up for the plaintiff that was most repugnant to her was the University's refusal to allow her to progress immediately to stage 3 whilst carrying her unremediated stage 2 modules alongside having to have to re-attend some of those stage 2 modules. That requirement for re-attendance was required by some of her module coordinators, identified by Dr M in her evidence, who had expressed concern about the plaintiff’s poor attendance at class in Autumn 2022 (a fact to which the plaintiff admitted) and the poor quality of some of her assessments at the time. The first Academic Plan after the grant of special grades of 20 October 2023 stated that two of the plaintiff’s module coordinators had indicated that their modules had proved difficult for the plaintiff in 2022. The plaintiff seemed to consider those concerns to have been vaporised by the grant of special grades. That is incorrect and groundless. The fact that the university determined, in the exercise of academic judgment, that there were exceptional circumstances that impacted on the plaintiff’s performance/attendance for the May exams, did not remove the understandable concerns of the plaintiff’s module coordinators about the impact of her poor attendance at class on her ability to demonstrate that she had achieved the required learning outcomes. The programme board were satisfied that the plaintiff’s traumatic personal circumstances had impacted her performance/absence during the May exams. However, that could not neutralise the plaintiff’s module coordinators’ concerns or dilute their obligations to assess the plaintiff’s achievement of the learning outcomes necessary for her progress into the next stage of her regulated degree programme.

118. The plaintiff said the University could advise her but could not mandate her to follow an academic plan (transcript, day 2, page 43). It is also clear from her email correspondence, which she attached to her witness statement, that she believed she was entitled to have the academic plan of October 2023 replaced with something that was acceptable to her. The plaintiff argued that an academic plan can only be mandated within the University’s fitness to practice procedure or its continuation policy where express provision is made for academic plans. That is not so. The process of educating a student, including monitoring their workload as required by Regulation 3.8, is an ongoing process that does not require every step taken to be referenced or cross-referenced in a policy or procedure. The plaintiff was being supported by the University in enabling her to remediate half of her stage 2 modules. The academic plan was entirely within the rights, and arguably even obligations, of the University. The plaintiff’s opposition to the support that was afforded to her is groundless both in law and on the facts of this case.

119. There was nothing unlawful in the University’s imposition of an academic plan on the plaintiff. On the contrary, if the University had ignored the concerns it had about the plaintiff's struggles with her academic work, including those caused at least in May 2023 by exceptional personal circumstances, it could have been accused of acting in breach of its duty of care to the plaintiff and its obligation to ensure the integrity of her degree programme for which it is responsible for regulating and validating.

120. For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that academic judgment must apply to a

decision about how a special grade should be remediated. A student has no right to input into how a special grade is to be remediated, whether by reference to the infograph included in the guide to the Exceptional Circumstances policy or any other policy or document produced by the university. Were it to be otherwise, a student who fails or is absent for an exam and is awarded a special grade for it, could claim a right to input into how they are to pass that module even though they had no such right to input into the original assessment (that they either failed or did not attend) nor did any of their fellow students who passed the exam first time round have any right to input into how their learning outcomes and their right to progress to the next stage of their degree, was to be assessed. That makes no sense and, again, misunderstands the inherent nature of the academic/student relationship. A student has the right to be directed in their degree programme in order to learn from their academic superiors. Having established that they have achieved the required learning outcomes, a student will be awarded a degree as a mark of the academic excellence they have achieved. The validation of the student having achieved the required level of academic excellence could hardly include any entitlement for that student to determine how their learning is to be assessed. The Academic Plan precluded further applications ‘relating to earlier events’

121. The plaintiff also criticised the 20 October 2023 academic plan for requiring her to agree that no further exceptional circumstances applications would be accepted “relating to earlier events” or if she failed modules due to workload. The letter attached to the academic plan of 20 October 2023 says; “if you choose to proceed with the Plan, the Board will require that you agree to it in writing on the understanding that no further exceptional circumstances applications will be accepted in relation to what occurred earlier this year and/or if you are not able to pass any modules where workload is cited as a reason”. She states (at para. 107 of her witness statement) that there is no policy in the university which makes the award of special grades contingent upon not submitting further special grade applications and said that this “felt unfair and unsupported by any policy or regulation”. She pleaded at para. 124(a)(ii) that this requirement was “outwith any authority lawfully conferred on the [board] or otherwise or at all and when it was, in all of the circumstances then prevailing, unreasonable to do so”.

122. This condition meant that the plaintiff could not rely on what had happened previously in making any further exceptional circumstances application. That, in itself, makes sense albeit it may have felt harsh to the plaintiff. No student could keep applying for special grades arising from the same circumstances as to do so could leave them trapped in a cyclical process of failing or not attending an exam and then making repeated further applications for special grades. That is not to say that such a student, and the plaintiff in particular, could not address ongoing consequences of a previous situation in another way, such as by applying for a leave of absence, something that had been offered to the plaintiff on more than one occasion. Neither did the condition imposed on the plaintiff preclude her from seeking to rely on events that had not yet occurred, such as the development of a medical condition arising from (as versus being based on) what had happened previously.

123. The plaintiff was from precluded from relying on what had already happened, and which had grounded the award of special grades, in a further application for special grades in the future if she failed or did not attend another exam. That, in itself, is not unlawful.

124. The plaintiff pleads that it was outwith the board’s authority and seemed, in her evidence, to rely on the absence of any express provision for such an approach in the Regulations or policies. I do not think that it itself renders the condition unlawful, in the absence of the requirement itself being unlawful. Many circumstances may arise that are not specifically provided for in the Regulations but will still come within the power and obligations of the board to determine how a student should be treated. The treatment of a student by their university should not be a rigid and strict process whereby nothing is permitted unless it is expressly provided for in a regulation or policy.

125. In any event, as I determine (at para. 134 below) that the formulation of the academic plan arose from the exercise of the school’s academic judgment, I consider the impugned requirement imposed on the plaintiff by the plan not to be a matter amenable to review by this court and not falling within the exceptional breach of fair procedures that might permit such a review, as occurred in Zhang v Athlone Institute of Technology [2013] IEHC 390 where Dunne J stated; “As a general proposition, the Courts should not be the place in which to deal with questions of discipline arising in academic institutions but there may be cases in which the nature of a breach of the right to fair procedures is such that recourse to the Courts is unavoidable. This, in my view, is one such case.”

Consultation

126. The plaintiff in her submissions to this court sought to rely on what she claimed was a lack of consultation. This is not pleaded. Nevertheless, for completeness and without conceding that this court has jurisdiction to determine the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff during the hearing, I address the point here.

127. Regulation 3.8 states: “Governing Boards shall monitor student workloads and where, in the opinion of a Governing Board, a student’s workload is unsustainable, it may, following appropriate consultation with the student, require that the student’s workload be reduced to sustainable levels.” The reference to consultation in Regulation 3.8 is qualified firstly by it taking place after the Governing Body has determined that a student’s workload is unsustainable and secondly by it being “appropriate”. The plaintiff incorrectly ascribes a requirement of agreement to the concept of consultation as set out in Regulation 3.8 that has no basis in the plain English meaning of ‘consultation’, in how it is set out in Regulation 3.8 or in law. Consultation can be required with an identified aspiration, such as “with a view to reaching agreement” as is provided for by section 9(1) of the Protection of Employment Act 1977 in advance of a collective redundancy. That does not equate consultation with reaching agreement but rather it qualifies the type of consultation that is required by the statutory provision. No aspiration or requirement to reach agreement with a student is provided for in Regulation 3.8.

128. I was furnished with two UK authorities on consultation. R v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment (2000) WL 976099 was a challenge to the sequencing of the consultation and the length of time between the statutory requirement to consult and the impugned decision. The judgments contain nothing helpful to understanding what is required by consultation. In R v. North and East Devon Health Authority [2000] 2 WLR 622, the Court of Appeal was concerned with the timing of a statutory consultation process and found that it should have been undertaken when proposals were still at a formative stage. The court set out, at para. 112, one of the obligations imposed by the consultation required in that case as follows; “Its obligation is to let those who have a potential interest in the subject matter know in clear terms what the proposal is and exactly why it is under positive consideration, telling them enough (which may be a good deal) to enable them to make an intelligent response. The obligation, although it may be quite onerous, goes no further than this." The Court of Appeal concluded, at paragraph 117; “We conclude therefore that although there are criticisms to be levelled at the consultation process, and although it ran certain risks, it was not flawed by any significant noncompliance with the Gunning criteria”.

129. Perhaps a more useful source to an understanding of what is meant and required by ‘consultation’ outside of specific statutory qualifications, might be the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of consultation which are; ”The action of consulting or taking counsel together; deliberation, conference”, “A conference in which the parties consult and deliberate; a meeting for deliberation or discussion.” Those definitions make it clear that consultation on its own and without an identified end goal, is not akin to reaching agreement. The plaintiff seems to have interpreted consultation in Regulation 3.8 as consultation with a view to reaching agreement. No such qualification is provided for in Regulation

3.8 or elsewhere. There is no basis for the plaintiff’s contention that she was entitled to input and/or reach agreement about the content of an academic plan that had been formulated as part of the university’s monitoring of her workload, as per Regulation 3.8.

130. Dr M sought to engage with the plaintiff in relation to choosing one of three options put forward in the academic plan that had been drawn up for her because of the Governing Body’s

decision that the plaintiff’s workload (of remediating 6 of her stage 2 modules alongside progressing to stage 3) was unsustainable. This satisfied “appropriate consultation with the student” contained in Regulation 3.8. The rights to a different sort of engagement and/or a right to be heard or to a resolution acceptable to her for which the plaintiff has contended, do not exist within the relationship between a student such as the plaintiff and this university.

131. Neither is there any basis for the plaintiff’s contention that she was entitled to reach agreement with her module coordinators, or anyone else, about how she was required to remediate her special grade modules, for the reasons set out above at ---.

Academic Judgment

132. The plaintiff accepts that some of the decisions made about her did require academic judgement, including the decision to grant special grades. She highlights two possible outcomes arising from the grant of special grades, that are set out in the Student Guide on the exceptional circumstances policy as follows;

"Outcome 1

If you asked that your special circumstances be taken into account by the Governing Board in determining your final grade for the module (s), the School(s) involved will have taken this into account when submitting a final grade for your module. You will not be given details of the decisions made and the grade changes made (if any).

Outcome 2

If you are granted the opportunity to have specific components of a module assessed on a further occasion without academic penalty, you will be awarded a special grade for that module. You must contact the School for details on how to complete the assessment for the module. Your result will not be capped. You must complete the component (or components) of assessment, or complete some equivalent assessment(s), set by the School within a period prescribed by the School, but no later than two trimesters of the initial module attempt."

133. Outcome 1 relates to the assessment of a final grade for the module and outcome 2 applies to the remediation of the module. The plaintiff contends that academic judgement only applies to outcome 1 and not to outcome 2. Precisely why a decision on how a student is to ameliorate a module which they had not yet passed does not give rise to academic judgement is unclear from the plaintiff's submissions, although the plaintiff's counsel did accept that academic judgement applied to the module coordinator's decision on how to remediate which he said was solely a matter for the individual module coordinator. He described the school's role in those circumstances as being limited to regulation and administration.

134. A decision on how a student is to demonstrate achievement of learning outcomes, whether the student should progress to stage 3 carrying half the stage 2, whether progression conflicts with the ability to do the current stage and to therefore be permitted to progress to the next stage of their degree, could never be a simple application of rules or an isolated decision to be made by each module coordinator for each of the unpassed modules.

135. The case law (Rajah v. The Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 IR 384, Fassi v. DCU [2015] IEHC 38 and Galbraith v. DCU [2022] IEHC 520) all confirm that decisions involving solely questions of academic judgement are not amenable to judicial review. Those decisions also confirmed that the basis of the relationship between a student and their college are the college’s regulations, to which the student agrees to be bound when they became a student of the college. Whether or not a breach of those regulations is amenable to judicial review does not necessarily preclude such a breach from forming a claim in breach of contract and/or breach of duty arguments such as have been formulated by this plaintiff. If the plaintiff could establish that the University failed to follow its own rules, it is possible that she could not be deprived of access to a remedy merely because academic judgment is not amenable to judicial review. However, where a student alleges such a breach of contract, the university would be permitted to dispute any such breach by, inter alia, relying on the decision being made as having been informed by questions of academic judgement.

136. Here I am satisfied that the decision that the school was required to make about how the plaintiff was to remediate half of her stage 2 modules for which she had been awarded special grades, clearly involved the application of academic judgement. In exercising their academic judgement, the academics of the school were both entitled and obliged to consider the plaintiff's workload, along with other relevant considerations in assessing whether she could or should progress to stage 3. For the reasons I set out further above, I am satisfied that the School’s consideration of the plaintiff's workload and the formulation of an academic plan for her was proper, proportionate, lawful and in accordance with the terms of the contract between the plaintiff and University, including by reference to the University's Academic Regulations.

137. The situation is similar to that which arose in Galbraith v. DCU where the university refused to allow a third-year student progress to fourth year where a period of ill-health had prevented her from completing a placement component of her third year, which the student contended could have been done during her fourth year. Barrett J held at para. 26 of his judgement as follows; "I should perhaps add that there is no bad faith or malice at play in how DCU has conducted itself. Nor has it engaged in any improper considerations. And the impugned decisions are exclusively concerned with academic matters, being the nature of the results to issue to Ms Galbraith and, more generally, whether and when a student should be deemed sufficiently qualified proceed from Year 3 to Year 4 (a matter governed by the rules described above, which rules have correctly been applied by DCU).

Conclusions

138. I summarise the following as the findings of fact I have made on the evidence put before the court;

i) The plaintiff encountered difficulties in university from the beginning of her first year in 2021.

ii) Prof S did not demonstrate bias against the plaintiff as a disabled person. iii) The plaintiff experienced negative emotional well-being and struggled with her education before February 2023.

iv) The six stage 2 modules that the plaintiff had not yet passed in May 2023 was an unusually high number of unremediated modules.

v) The plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that the exceptional circumstances application included all the information that was required.

vi) Prof S was entitled to arrange a level 1 Fitness to Practice meeting with the plaintiff in September 2023. vii) Whether special grades were granted or not, there was always an issue with the immediate remediation of the plaintiff’s stage 2 failed modules and her desire to progress to stage 3 in September 2023. viii) The plaintiff’s wish and/or expectation to progress to stage 3 with six unremediated stage 2 modules was never viewed by the University as a realistic, viable or appropriate option for the plaintiff.

ix) There is no basis for criticising the plaintiff’s treatment by the University in relation to her applications for special grades prior to October 2023 when she disclosed the nature of her medical treatment at the time of the May exams.

x) Almost immediately on the plaintiff advising the school and the committee of the nature of her medical treatment, her application was granted.

xi) The requirement of the plaintiff’s academic plan not to make further applications relating to earlier events was not unlawful and was part of the University’s exercise of academic judgment. xii) Remediation of outstanding modules is a separate and different process to the grant of special grades, but both require the exercise of academic judgment. xiii) Dr M negotiated with the plaintiff’s module coordinators in drawing up the academic plan of 20 October 2023. xiv) The academic plan was drawn up to support the plaintiff.

xv) It is a matter for the school to determine how a student is to remediate a module, regardless of whether a special grade has been granted or not. The student does not have any right to input into that decision. xvi) The university delayed in posting the plaintiff’s special grades legitimately to ensure the plaintiff did not fall foul of the requirement to remediate within two semesters. xvii) The plaintiff’s view that the grant of special grades rendered her immune from a workload review is groundless. xviii) The plaintiff’s view that the grant of special grades prevented the university from imposing an academic plan on her is groundless. xix) The plaintiff’s view that the grant of special grades meant that the university could not prevent her from progressing to stage 3 with six unremediated stage 2 modules is groundless.

xx) The plaintiff’s view that the academic plan had no academic or regulatory basis is groundless. xxi) A workload review and the grant of special grades are two separate processes. xxii) A workload review is an obligation of the Governing Board as per Regulation 3.8 and is not qualified or limited by any grant of special grades. xxiii) The plaintiff was appropriately and fairly treated by Dr M and Dr B in their meeting of 26 October 2023. xxiv) Remediation assessments are set by the school, as per Academic Regulation 4.31. xxv) Academic judgment must apply to a decision about how a special grade should be remediated. xxvi) A student has no right to input into how a special grade is to be remediated. xxvii) The plaintiff had no right to reach agreement on her academic plan. xxviii) The plaintiff had no right to negotiate an alternative version of her academic plan. xxix) The plaintiff had no right to progress to stage 3 whilst carrying six unremediated stage 2 modules. xxx) The award of special grades to the plaintiff did not affect how she was or could be required to mediate her six unremediated stage 2 modules. xxxi) The award of special grades to the plaintiff did not entitle her to have those grades posted immediately. xxxii) The award of special grades to the plaintiff did not entitle her to progress to stage 3. xxxiii) The plaintiff was treated fairly and sympathetically by Professor K on 10April 2024. Professor K did not laugh at the plaintiff. xxxiv) By April 2024, Dr M had serious concerns about the plaintiff and had a legitimate basis for those concerns. xxxv) The plaintiff’s expectations that she should progress to the remaining stages are unrealistic and devoid of any legal basis. xxxvi) The plaintiff’s treatment in relation to how she was required to mediate was lawful and proper. xxxvii) The plaintiff was told by Professor G that the exams arranged for her in September 2024 would only be on the material she had covered in 2022/23. xxxviii) The plaintiff’s stated excuses for not sitting the September 2024 exams are unconvincing and groundless in fact. xxxix) The plaintiff’s stated excuses for not sitting the May 2025 exams are unconvincing and unacceptable.

xl) The plaintiff is incorrect that only she and her module coordinators could determine the remediation of her unremediated modules. xli) The reference to ‘appropriate consultation’ in Academic Regulation 3.8 does not give rise to a requirement to reach agreement and was complied with by Dr M’s attempts to engage with the plaintiff on the three options presented to her in her academic plan of 20 October 2023. xlii) The school’s consideration of the plaintiff's workload and the formulation of an academic plan for her was proper, proportionate, lawful and in accordance with the terms of the contract between the plaintiff and University, including by reference to the University's academic regulations.

139. I find against the plaintiff on all of the grounds on which she relies and refuse all of the reliefs that she has sought. There is no basis in the Academic Regulations or policies or any aspect of the relationship between the plaintiff and the University for the rights for which the plaintiff contends. There is no evidence of any breach of the plaintiff’s rights in how she has been treated in relation to how and when her special grades were granted, the imposition of an academic plan, her treatment by the academic staff of her school, including in relation to the remediation exams arranged for her in September 2024 and May 2025 or in the school’s refusal to allow her to register for stage 3 before at least partially remediating her outstanding stage 2 modules. There is no basis to any claim for relief arising from the University’s refusal to allow the plaintiff to undertake and/or register for stage 3 or stage 4 modules.

140. What happened to the plaintiff between February and May 2023 was deeply traumatic for her and, in her own words, her life fell apart. Once the University was told in October 2023, they responded fairly and sympathetically and immediately recognised the impact that those events had on her ability to attend or pass her May 2023 exams. The plaintiff was awarded special grades. Thereafter, the plaintiff formed the erroneous view that this rendered her immune from any monitoring of her workload and from the imposition of an academic plan and gave her rights to input into how she was to remediate and to do so by way of direct communication with each of her module coordinators. Those rights were never part of her agreement with the University. An immunity from a workload review would have directly contradicted the University’s obligations to her to monitor her workload and ensure it was sustainable for her. The University was entitled to impose the academic plan that it did, having liaised with her module coordinators, and to seek to consult with the plaintiff around which of the three options formulated for her she wished to choose.

141. It was the plaintiff’s decision not to engage with that plan, as it was her decision not to sit the remediation exams arranged for her in September 2024 and May 2025. Those decisions had and continue to have consequences for the plaintiff and her progress through her degree programme, which are of her making and are not the fault of the University or its academic staff. The school’s academics have tried to support the plaintiff and assist her in remediating her outstanding modules in a way that would enable them to stand over her progress, as is necessary in a student/academic relationship that is, of its nature, hierarchical and focused on the validation of a student’s achievement of the academic excellence that their degree represents. The plaintiff has had very traumatic experiences but that does not and cannot dilute either the academic standards required of her or the school’s obligation to determine the achievement of learning outcomes necessary to allow progress to the next stage of the degree programme for which they are responsible.

142. It will be a matter for the University to decide how or if the plaintiff will be allowed a further opportunity to remediate her outstanding modules and/or progress to the next stage of her degree programme. The plaintiff is a talented young woman with her life ahead of her and it is to be hoped that she will avail of whatever opportunities are given to her, if any.

Costs

143. The defendant wisely did not seek the costs insofar as they relate to the Gilchrist order, which will, for the avoidance of doubt, include half of the costs of the proceedings before the court on 23rd January 2026.

144. The defendant has succeeded in defeating all of the reliefs that the plaintiff sought. In those circumstances and in accordance with Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 the defendant is entitled to their costs, to include all reserved costs and the costs of the injunction, to be adjudicated upon in default of agreement.

Counsel for the plaintiff: Ciaran Craven SC, Michael Davitt BL

Counsel for the defendant: Feichin McDonagh SC, Barra Faughnan BL.