High Court refuses permanent anonymity for student in judicial review but grants temporary reporting restrictions to protect appeal rights.

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 54

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

2024 1221 JR

BETWEEN

STUDENT A

APPLICANT

AND

PROVOST, FELLOWS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN,

TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY OF IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 6 February 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. This judgment addresses the question of whether these judicial review proceedings should be subject to reporting restrictions. More specifically, the question is whether a university student is entitled to anonymity in pursuing judicial review proceedings which seek to set aside a decision withdrawing him from a postgraduate course. The resolution of this question requires consideration of the common law power of the court to regulate its own proceedings (as described in Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] IESC 18, [2017] 2 IR 284).

2. It should be emphasised that this judgment is concerned solely with the question of reporting restrictions. It entails no findings whatsoever in respect of the underlying merits of the proceedings. In particular, this judgment does not address the university’s objection that judicial review is not an appropriate remedy in the circumstances of this case. The objection will, instead, be addressed as part of the judgment to be delivered in due course on the underlying merits of the proceedings. In ease of the student, the present procedural judgment has been prepared on the working assumption that judicial review proceedings are appropriate.

THE UNIVERSITY PROCEEDINGS

3. Student A had been enrolled on a pharmacy course at Trinity College Dublin. The course is an integrated NFQ Level 9 course. The course comprises a fouryear undergraduate degree which, if successfully completed, results in the award of a B.Sc. (Pharm) Honours. Thereafter, there is an option to undertake a postgraduate year which, if successfully completed, results in the award of an M.Pharm. This, in turn, entitles the successful postgraduate to apply to register as a pharmacist with the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland.

4. Having regard to the issues which arise in the judicial review proceedings, it may be of assistance to pause here, and to explain the role of a pharmacy school in certifying a master’s degree under the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (Education and Training) (Integrated Course) Rules 2014 (S.I. No. 377 of 2014).

5. Rule 20 stipulates that no master’s degree in pharmacy shall be awarded for the purpose of being recognised as a qualification appropriate for practice unless the head of the school of pharmacy has confirmed, inter alia, his or her overall satisfaction that the person concerned is fit to be a registered pharmacist. One of the findings made against the student in this case is that he is not fit to practise.

6. Student A completed the undergraduate degree. Thereafter, he enrolled on the postgraduate course. The University Council subsequently approved a recommendation by the College Fitness to Practise Committee to “withdraw” the student from the postgraduate course. The approval is dated 14 February 2024.

7. The request for reporting restrictions is premised, primarily, on the fact that one of the findings made against Student A is that he committed an act of plagiarism in the sitting of the penultimate exam of his postgraduate year. It is useful, therefore, to rehearse the procedural history in this regard. Before turning to that task, however, it should be explained that this is not the only factor relied upon by the university’s decision-making tribunals in reaching the decision to withdraw Student A from the postgraduate course. Rather, Student A has been found to have committed what are described as an “agglomeration” of breaches of the code of conduct. These include, for example, arranging for another student to sign him into a mandatory workshop which he did not actually attend.

8. Once the (since admitted) plagiarism was detected, the Director of Teaching and Learning (Postgraduate) consulted the Dean of Graduate Studies, who advised that the incident be referred directly to the Junior Dean. Following a meeting between the Junior Dean, the student, and the Director in September 2023, the Junior Dean determined that: (i) the work was inadmissible; (ii) the mark should be set to zero; (iii) any reassessment (if permitted by course rules) should be capped at the pass mark; and (iv) the incident be recorded as Level 4 plagiarism, i.e. the most serious level.

9. Separately, the plagiarism incident and a number of other alleged breaches of the code of conduct were referred to the School of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences Fitness to Practise Committee. The first-instance decision comprised a finding that Student A was not fit to practise as a pharmacist. Student A brought an appeal against the first-instance decision to the College Fitness to Practise Committee. The appeal takes the form of a de novo hearing. The outcome of the appeal was to affirm the first-instance decision. Thereafter, Student A brought an appeal to the University’s Visitors. The Visitors made a

decision on 24 July 2024 to dismiss the appeal. A detailed statement of reasons was subsequently furnished in December 2024.

10. The 2010 Consolidated Statutes of Trinity College Dublin and of the University of Dublin provide that hearings of the Visitors “shall be open to members of the Community, except in such special and limited circumstances as decided by the Visitors on the application of a party to a hearing before them”. No such application was made on behalf of Student A.

11. The “College Community” is defined under the Consolidated Statutes as consisting of persons associated with the College, comprising (a) students and staff of the College, (b) members of the Board, Council and Senate, (c) the Chaplains, Visitors, Fellows Emeriti and Honorary Fellows, and (d) such other persons as the Board may from time to time include.

12. Student A asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in these judicial review proceedings arising from the fact that there was no reportage of the earlier university proceedings. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the hearing before the Visitors was open to the “College Community” as defined. It cannot sensibly be characterised as a private hearing. Any member of the twenty thousand-strong college community would have been entitled to attend the hearing. Any attendee would have been made aware of the identity of the appellant, i.e. Student A. An attendee would have been at liberty to publish details of the hearing, for example in a college magazine or on social media, or to share those details with a journalist from a mainstream media organisation. The fact, if fact it be, that no member of the college community (other than those directly involved as participants) actually attended the hearing in July 2024 cannot change the character of the hearing from a legal perspective. Student A elected to invoke an appeal procedure to the University’s Visitors which involved, by default, a hearing open to the college community. Student A did not, as he might have done, request that the Visitors conduct the hearing in private.

13. Second, and more fundamentally, the form of procedure before a public body cannot dictate the procedure to be adopted by the High Court in a subsequent legal challenge. The constitutional imperative is that justice be administered in public save in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law. This imperative cannot be cut down by the fact that events prior to the commencement of court proceedings may have been confidential.

THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

14. The within judicial review proceedings were commenced on 30 September 2024. The High Court granted leave to apply for judicial review on 9 December 2024. As part of the ex parte order, reporting restrictions were imposed. The court prohibited the publication of, or broadcast of, any matter relating to the proceedings which would or could identify the student or the university.

15. The university filed a motion on 29 April 2025 seeking to set aside the reporting restrictions. Prior to the hearing of the motion, the reporting restrictions were modified, by consent of the parties, to allow for the identification of the university. This was done on 30 June 2025.

16. The motion was part-heard on 30 June 2025. The hearing was adjourned to allow the parties time to prepare written legal submissions. The hearing resumed on 20 October 2025 and judgment was reserved to today’s date. In the interim, the substantive application for judicial review was heard over three days in late January 2026, and judgment was reserved.

17. It should be explained that one of the grounds advanced in the judicial review proceedings is that, having regard to the earlier decision of the Junior Dean in September 2023, the plagiarism incident should not have been dealt with as a fitness to practise matter at all. It is said that the matter should, instead, have been dealt with by way of disciplinary proceedings. An argument in similar terms was rejected by the University’s Visitors, but this is now under challenge in these judicial review proceedings.

18. For completeness, it should also be explained that whereas Student A has acknowledged that he committed plagiarism in his final year of studies, he contends that the surrounding context significantly mitigates the seriousness of same. Indeed, Student A contends that the existence of mitigating circumstances was accepted by the Junior Dean. Student A also disputes both the fairness and lawfulness of the referral to the Fitness to Practise Committees. Moreover, Student A contends that the Visitors’ decision was disproportionate and made without taking account of relevant material, in particular written character references furnished on his behalf by professional pharmacists.

DISCUSSION

ONUS LIES WITH REQUESTING PARTY

19. Before turning to the detail of the request for reporting restrictions, it is necessary, first, to address the question of which party bears the onus. The matter formally comes before the court in the form of a motion by the university to set aside the ex parte anonymisation order.

20. It is well established that the High Court has an inherent power to set aside any order which has been obtained on an ex parte basis. This principle has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in M.D. v. Board of Management of a Secondary School [2024] IESC 11. Collins J. summarised the position as follows: where an order is made ex parte that immediately and materially affects another party, the affected party is entitled to apply to have the order set aside. Whether the party seeking to set aside bears the onus will depend on the nature and effect of the ex parte order.

21. The case law in relation to reporting restrictions (discussed below) confirms that the onus resides with the party requesting anonymity to demonstrate the existence of a legitimate interest which might justify a departure from the constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public. It follows, therefore, that the onus resides with Student A to justify the reporting restrictions. The earlier ex parte order does not give the student a “head start”, as it were. The university does not bear a burden of having to displace the existing order. Rather, this court is required to consider afresh the question of whether reporting restrictions are justified.

22. Student A has sought to attach some weight to the fact that no member of the media has brought an application to set aside the ex parte order. It is also said that the media have, without difficulty, reported each stage of these proceedings.

23. With respect, no weight can be attached to the absence of an application by the media. The enforcement of the constitutional imperative that justice shall be administered in public, save in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law, is one which the courts themselves are required to enforce. It is not contingent on an application by a party or non-party. Whereas a bona fide member of the media would certainly have standing to challenge reporting restrictions, it is unrealistic to expect that the media would have the resources and the appetite to pursue an application each and every time reporting restrictions are imposed on court proceedings. The enforcement of the constitutional imperative cannot turn on the happenstance of whether the media has knowledge of a case and the impetus to make an application.

24. Here, one of the parties to the proceedings has expressly raised the issue and has brought a motion in that regard. The motion falls to be determined on its own merits and does not require the imprimatur of the media. Indeed, even in the absence of such a motion, the court would be entitled to raise the issue of its own volition.

25. It is inaccurate to suggest that the media have not been inhibited in their reporting of these proceedings. The initial reports could not include the name of the university, nor even the course of study involved. Even the modified form of reporting restrictions fixed on 30 June 2025 preclude the media from reporting on what is an integral element of open justice, namely, the identity of the parties.

OVERVIEW: GROUNDS FOR REQUESTING ANONYMITY

26. The application for an anonymisation order is advanced, principally, by reference to three related propositions as follows. The first proposition is that the identification of Student A as the applicant will adversely affect his constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a livelihood. It is said that academic plagiarism attracts a “visceral” reaction among members of the public generally, and potential employers specifically. This is said to support the making of an anonymisation order pursuant to the court’s common law power, i.e. as opposed to pursuant to a specific legislative provision. It is also said that there is the risk of online abuse.

27. The second proposition is that a student of pharmacy is entitled to be treated, as regards fitness to practise and disciplinary matters, in a manner analogous to a qualified pharmacist under the Pharmacy Act 2007. It is suggested, mistakenly, that the courts “routinely” anonymise the names of professionals. As appears in the discussion of the Pharmacy Act 2007 at paragraphs 68 to 86 below, the default position is that the hearings of the professional conduct committee are in public.

28. The third proposition is that an anonymisation order will be appropriate where the identification of an individual as a party to legal proceedings might adversely affect their mental health.

29. These arguments are addressed, in turn, in the discussion which follows.

COMMON LAW POWER / GILCHRIST PRINCIPLES

30. Article 34.1 of the Constitution of Ireland provides that justice shall be administered in public save in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law. The qualifying words “prescribed by law” have been interpreted as encompassing not only statute law but also the courts’ common law power to regulate their own proceedings.

31. The Supreme Court in Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd (cited above) confirmed that the common law power includes a continuing power to depart from the standard of a full hearing in public. The judgment further held that such a course could be particularly justified when constitutional values are engaged.

32. The principles governing the exercise of the court’s common law power were summarised as follows (at paragraph 46 of the reported judgment): “(i) The Article 34.1 requirement of administration of justice in public is a fundamental constitutional value of great importance.

(ii) Article 34.1 itself recognises however that there may be

exceptions to that fundamental rule.

(iii) Any such exception to the general rule must be strictly

construed, both as to the subject matter, and the manner in

which the procedures depart from the standard of a full

hearing in public.

(iv) Any such exception may be provided for by statute but also

falls under the common law power of the court to regulate its

own proceedings.

(v) Where an exception from the principle of hearing in public

is sought to be justified by reference only to the common law

power and in the absence of legislation, then the interests

involved must be very clear, and the circumstances pressing.

[…]

(vi) If it can be shown that justice cannot be done unless a hearing is conducted other than in public, that will plainly justify the exception from the rule established by Article 34.1, but that is not the only criterion. Where constitutional interests and values of considerable weight may be damaged or destroyed by a hearing in public, it may be appropriate for the legislature to provide for the possibility of the hearing other than in public, (as it has done) and for the court to exercise that power in a particular case if satisfied that it is a case which presents those features which justify a hearing other than in public.

(vii) The requirement of strict construction of any exception to the principle of trial in public means that a court must be satisfied that each departure from that general rule is no more than is required to protect the countervailing interest. It also means that the court must be resolutely sceptical of any claim to depart from any aspect of a full hearing in public.

Litigation is a robust business. The presence of the public is

not just unavoidable, but is necessary and welcome. In

particular this will mean that even after concluding that the

case warrants a departure from that constitutional standard,

the court must consider if any lesser steps are possible such

as providing for witnesses not to be identified by name, or

otherwise identified or for the provision of a redacted

transcript for any portion of the hearing conducted in

camera.”

33. The judgment in Gilchrist explained, at paragraph 41, that a court should be cautious in departing from a full hearing in public where the Oireachtas has not legislated for the particular contingency:

“The absence of a statutory provision is not however

irrelevant. Where the Oireachtas has considered it

appropriate to permit the possibility of a trial in private in

respect of certain subject matters, that is an important

legislative judgement on the importance of the subject

matter. Where the Oireachtas has not seen fit to legislate for

the possibility of a hearing in camera, then the court should

only exercise an inherent jurisdiction to depart from a full

hearing in public where it is shown that the interests involved

are particularly important, and the necessity is truly

compelling. […].”

34. Finally, it is instructive to refer to the following passage from the judgment of O’Donnell J. (as he then was) in Zalewski v. Workplace Relations Commission [2021] IESC 24, [2022] 1 IR 421 (at paragraph 143 of the report): “[…] Article 34.1 makes clear that public hearings are of the essence of the administration of justice. In some cases, this may be practically important because the publicity may bring forward further relevant evidence and witnesses, or because it will allow a party (whether an employee or employer) to achieve public vindication. It may, furthermore, have the general public benefit that it allows the public to see justice administered, which might, for example, make it easier for a judgement to be made on the fairness, competence, and efficiency of the decision-maker. However, the requirement for a public hearing does not require any functional justification: from time immemorial, it has been regarded as fundamental to the administration of justice, and as establishing a principle from which any exception must be justified. […]”

35. This passage is relevant to an argument made on behalf of Student A to the effect that there is no “necessity” to identify him as the applicant in these proceedings. It is said that such identification is not required to protect members of the public, as he cannot practise as a pharmacist. It is also said that he is not a public figure, even in the extended sense that the term is used in the context of freedom of expression.

36. The difficulty with these arguments is that they invert the proper sequence of the analysis. The correct starting position is that court proceedings will generally be heard in public. This will include identification of the parties. There is no requirement to establish a “need” to identify the parties. As explained in the passage from Zalewski v. Workplace Relations Commission, a public hearing does not require any functional justification.

A “MINOR ADJUSTMENT” ONLY?

37. It has been submitted on behalf of Student A that the reporting restrictions that he seeks entail no more than a “minor adjustment” to a full hearing in public. If and insofar as this submission is intended to reflect the point that the court must always consider if any lesser steps, short of an in camera hearing, would meet the contingency, then it is broadly correct. The making of an anonymisation order simpliciter entails a less dramatic departure from the constitutional imperative than does an in camera hearing from which even bona fide members of the media are excluded. However, if the submission is intended to suggest that a different legal test applies to an anonymisation order, this would be incorrect. The legal test remains the same: where an exception from the principle of a hearing in public is sought to be justified by reference to the common law power alone, i.e. in the absence of legislation, then the interests involved must be very clear and the circumstances pressing. The judgment in Gilchrist expressly states that a court must be resolutely sceptical of any claim to depart from any aspect of a full hearing in public. It follows, therefore, that the party seeking any exception—such as an anonymisation order—must satisfy the threshold of very clear interests and pressing circumstances. Put otherwise, it is always necessary, first, to establish the existence of interests and circumstances which are potentially capable of justifying a departure from the constitutional standard of a full hearing in public. It is only where such interests and circumstances have been established that the court moves on to a consideration of the degree, if any, to which any departure from a full hearing in public might be justified. (See, in particular, paragraph 46(vii) of the reported judgment in Gilchrist).

38. Student A’s reliance on D.F. v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2015] IESC 44, [2015] 2 IR 487 is misplaced. That judgment concerned section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008. A policy

decision to allow an exception to the open justice principle, in the limited circumstances defined under the Act, has been made by the Oireachtas. The judgment emphasises that the role of the court is very different in cases where it is exercising its exceptional common law power in the absence of legislation. The position is stated as follows at paragraph 28 of the reported judgment:

“[…] All of these decisions, in the absence of the express

legislative exception prescribed in Article 34.1 of the

Constitution, and in the particular circumstances of those

cases in that context, held that anonymity could not be

ordered for the litigants in those cases. Here it is different.

There is legislation providing for a limited departure from a

full open hearing as contemplated by Article 34.1, provided

particular terms are judicially adjudicated to have been met.

The Oireachtas has fulfilled its function of determining

whether it is appropriate that, and in what circumstances, a

party to proceedings, plaintiff or defendant, applicant or

respondent, or a witness or prospective witness, is entitled to

be seen by the public in court, observed by and reported on

by the press but, exceptionally, is to be kept unidentified in

any written judgment of the court or in media reports. This

minor and exceptional departure from open reporting is

possible once a series of statutory tests has been met. That

is different to the exercise of a jurisdiction dependent solely

on Article 34.1 which is not informed by the legislation

contemplated by the Constitution.”

39. The judgment in D.F. is not authority for the proposition that the necessity to establish the existence of interests and circumstances, which are potentially capable of justifying any departure from a full hearing in public, can be dispensed with where an anonymisation order is sought pursuant to the common law power.

40. The identity of the parties is a crucial component of the administration of justice in public. It cannot be said that the administration of justice is a process which exists in a vacuum, removed from the realities and nuances of personhood. This would represent an undervaluation of the scope of open justice and public scrutiny.

41. The following examples, from the criminal sphere, may assist in illustrating the principle. It is essential to public confidence in the fairness of the system for the prosecution of criminal offences that the identity of those being prosecuted be disclosed. It is not enough that only the names of those ultimately convicted of a criminal offence be published. This is necessary to ensure that in the— hopefully unlikely—event that prosecutors were to target a particular group on discriminatory grounds, this would be exposed to public scrutiny.

42. To posit an even more extreme hypothesis: suppose an accused was acquitted by a non-jury court in circumstances where the evidence against them appeared to be overwhelming. Next suppose the accused is a powerful politician. It cannot sensibly be said that the values underlying the open justice principle would be well served were this fact to be withheld from the public in consequence of an anonymity order. Equally, were a public prosecutor, at the urging of the government, to pursue trumped-up charges against an opposition politician, the open justice principle would not be served if this fact were to be withheld.

PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

43. The factual circumstances in Gilchrist were extreme: the case concerned the need for confidentiality in the context of a witness protection programme. A full public hearing had the potential to put lives at risk. The Gilchrist principles have since been applied in less dramatic circumstances, including, relevantly, in the context of professional or academic disciplinary proceedings.

44. The parties have very helpfully researched the case law and have brought to my attention a series of judgments wherein the High Court has held that, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to make anonymisation orders in the context of professional or academic disciplinary proceedings.

45. In the first category of cases, the purpose of the anonymisation order was to protect the privacy of a person other than the professional accused of misconduct. For example, in A Social Worker v. CORU [2021] IEHC 756, the identity being protected was that of a non-party. It seems that, as part of her response to the disciplinary proceedings, the professional had made a counterallegation against one of the witnesses, to the effect that the witness had sexually assaulted her. An anonymisation order was made to protect that witness’s identity.

46. In Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582, the identity being protected was that of the primary school children whose treatment by the professional had been the subject of the disciplinary proceedings.

47. In Medical Council v. Anonymous [2019] IEHC 109, the identity being protected was that of the patients said to have been mistreated by the medical practitioner.

48. In M.M. v. A University [2024] IEHC 664, [2026] IEHC 57, the concern was to protect the identity of a fellow student against whom the plaintiff had made an allegation of assault. The fellow student was not a party to the court proceedings and, indeed, appears to have been entirely unaware that the allegation had been made against him.

49. In the second category of cases, an anonymisation order was made in circumstances where there was cogent evidence that publication would cause damage to the health or rehabilitation of the professional. An example of this approach is provided by Medical Council v. Anonymous [2019] IEHC 109. On the facts, the medical practitioner had suffered from an opioid addiction and had been prescribing unnecessary opioids to patients, administering partial doses to them, and administering the remainder to himself thereafter. The medical practitioner subsequently took steps to address his opioid addiction. The High Court was satisfied that the medical practitioner’s identity should be protected, by reporting restrictions, lest a full public hearing would adversely affect his rehabilitation and recovery. In Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582, the High Court held that, in the absence of evidence, there was no basis upon which the court could restrict publication of the professional’s name on medical grounds.

50. The third category is where a public hearing would undermine or prejudice the outcome of disciplinary proceedings. The judgment in C. v. Panel of the Disciplinary Committee of the Teaching Council [2024] IEHC 54 is an example of such an approach. The court proceedings involved a challenge to the admissibility of evidence at a disciplinary hearing. One of the concerns had been that unrestricted reportage of the court proceedings might alert the disciplinary panel to the existence of the disputed evidence and render moot any subsequent

decision by the court to exclude the evidence as inadmissible.

51. There was some suggestion that there might be a fourth category of cases where reporting restrictions were imposed in respect of court proceedings, which related to the very early stage of a disciplinary process, on the basis that as of yet unsubstantiated allegations of sexual assault had been made against a professional.

52. As appears, the case law indicates that reporting restrictions will only be imposed in very limited circumstances. In most instances, the rationale is to protect the rights of parties other than the professional who is the subject of the disciplinary proceedings. The case law certainly does not support an argument that reporting restrictions will be routinely imposed to protect the good name or professional reputation of the person who is the subject of the disciplinary proceedings.

RIGHT TO A GOOD NAME AND RIGHT TO EARN A LIVELIHOOD

53. The gravamen of Student A’s complaint is that if these judicial review proceedings are heard and determined in public, without any reporting restrictions, there is a significant risk that he will be publicly identified as a person who has not only admitted to academic plagiarism but who has also been found—following what he says is an unlawful process—to be unfit to practise as a pharmacist. It is argued that such public identification would represent an interference with his constitutional right to a good name and his constitutional right to earn a livelihood. The implication being that a prospective employer might be reluctant to employ a person against whom such a finding has been made.

54. The logic of Student A’s argument is that any reputational or professional damage which may be caused to him by reportage of the judicial review proceedings will not be remedied by a successful outcome of those proceedings. More specifically, Student A’s argument does not countenance that a public determination by the High Court to the effect that the university’s proceedings were invalid will vindicate his reputation.

55. With respect, this argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the interaction between the constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a livelihood, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public, on the other. The general position is that the reputational rights of a party to litigation are vindicated by a public hearing and determination of the court proceedings. Neither common law nor constitutional law has ever insisted, as a general proposition, that the identity of parties, against whom allegations of wrongdoing have been made, must be withheld until the conclusion of the court proceedings. That this is so is illustrated by the approach taken in criminal proceedings. Save in certain limited circumstances where it is necessary to do so to protect vulnerable victims, or the integrity of related criminal proceedings, an adult accused of a criminal offence may, generally, be publicly identified from the outset of the criminal proceedings.

56. This principle applies with equal force to judicial review proceedings. The High Court exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over certain acts or decisions of public bodies, including, relevantly, universities in receipt of significant public funding. The only potential remedy for a person who contends that they have been unlawfully expelled from a university course, and who has exhausted all internal rights of appeal, is to seek vindication by way of a public hearing and determination by the High Court. This approach has been applied in the specific context of allegations of academic plagiarism: Flanagan v. University College Dublin [1988] IR 724, [1989] ILRM 469.

57. Student A appears to contend that a different approach should be applied to the members of a regulated profession and to aspiring students seeking to enter that profession. I will return to address (at paragraphs 68 to 86 below) the specific arguments which he makes by reference to the Pharmacy Act 2007. For present purposes, it is sufficient to make the following general observation. It is incorrect to suggest that judicial review proceedings in relation to regulated professions are routinely subject to reporting restrictions in order to protect the identities of the professionals. One need only consider the titles of the published judgments on the courts.ie website to appreciate that the default position is that the parties to legal challenges to disciplinary proceedings are almost always identified. To take an example of a single category of cases: there are numerous published judgments wherein members of An Garda Síochána, who are challenging the legality of disciplinary decisions, are named. This is so notwithstanding that, in some instances, the disputed breach of discipline involves allegations of conduct—such as sexual assault—which if substantiated would attract public opprobrium. The applicant’s right to a good name is vindicated by a public hearing and determination of the judicial review proceedings.

58. Similarly, a snapshot of judgments over the past twelve months reveals that student-applicants are normally named in judicial review proceedings. See, for example, Igweze v. Dundalk Institute of Technology [2025] IEHC 232 and Khimji v. University College Dublin [2026] IEHC 55. The fact that an applicant is in pursuit of further education or a professional qualification is insufficient, in and of itself, to justify reporting restrictions.

59. It is correct to say that—under specific legislation—an interim application to suspend a professional from practice, pending the completion of a disciplinary process, is presumptively heard in private. The rationale for such an approach is, in part, to protect the reputation of a professional in circumstances where allegations against them have not been assessed by a preliminary proceedings committee. (See paragraphs 77 to 79 below).

60. This rationale does not apply to Student A. This is not a case where an application has been made to the court at the initial stages of the university’s process, prior even to a prima facie assessment of the case. Rather, the university’s process has been completed and the allegations have been considered in detail and adjudicated upon. The student has exhausted his rights of appeal to the College Fitness to Practise Committee and to the University’s Visitors. The prescribed process is at an end, and the findings are final subject only to the potential intervention of the High Court by way of judicial review.

61. There was also some suggestion that even absent an express statutory power to hold a hearing in private, the older case law contains examples where reporting restrictions were imposed where the allegation against the professional was one of sexual assault. The circumstances of the present case are entirely removed from that. This is because the risk of the temporary reputational damage apprehended by Student A is of a lesser order. Whereas academic plagiarism is, undoubtedly, a serious matter under the University Calendar, it is not a criminal offence and the fitness to practise proceedings were not a criminal trial. Academic plagiarism falls well short of the type of alleged misconduct the subject of those older cases where temporary reporting restrictions were allowed. Moreover, the fact of the plagiarism is not disputed; rather, the gravamen of the student’s complaint relates to the characterisation of the severity of the plagiarism. It is said that the consequences imposed, i.e. his expulsion from the postgraduate course and the negative “fitness to practise” finding, were disproportionate to the misconduct.

62. Student A has challenged the findings made against him. If these judicial review proceedings are successful, then those findings will be set aside by the High Court. The decision of the High Court will be embodied in a written judgment which will be posted on the courts.ie website. Members of the media will be entitled to publish or broadcast a fair and accurate report of the proceedings and the written judgment. All of this will represent a public vindication of Student A.

63. Student A’s argument for reporting restrictions is predicated on a bleak assessment of the effectiveness of the administration of justice, implying that success in the judicial review proceedings would be of no benefit if publicly reported. This assessment is incorrect both as a matter of constitutional principle and of practice. The principle has already been discussed above. As to practice, reasonable members of society can be credited with understanding the significance of a court order setting aside the impugned findings of the College Fitness to Practise Committee and the University’s Visitors. A reasonable member of society would understand that the earlier finding that Student A is not a fit person to be a pharmacist no longer stands. This is not an arcane concept that only a trained lawyer might be expected to comprehend. Rather, the vindication will be clear to all.

64. As an aside, it should be noted that—even in advance of any decision on the judicial review proceedings setting aside the findings—a number of potential employers have provided favourable character references in respect of Student A. These references have been exhibited as part of the judicial review proceedings. The existence of such references tends to undermine any suggestion that any future employer would not understand the significance of a court order setting aside the impugned findings.

65. Perhaps at least part of the explanation for Student A’s pessimism lies in the distinguishing feature of the present case, namely that he has admitted academic plagiarism. This is not a case where temporary reporting restrictions are sought to prevent a party being identified with misconduct which is denied.

66. It seems that the ambition of these proceedings is not simply to set aside the subjective findings as to the characterisation of the severity of his admitted misconduct and its implications for his fitness to practise as a pharmacist, but also to conceal the objective fact that he had committed academic plagiarism.

67. Even if he is successful in setting aside the findings made by the College Fitness to Practise Committee and upheld by the University’s Visitors, it will remain a fact that Student A did commit academic plagiarism. The object of the constitutional right to a good name is to protect the reputation which somebody actually possesses. It is not intended to prevent disclosure of facts which are not disputed. A litigant cannot rely on the risk of embarrassment caused by their own admitted misconduct to justify a derogation from the constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public.

PHARMACY ACT 2007

Overview

68. It is submitted that Student A is entitled to be “treated as if he were a practising pharmacist” and to the benefit of the protections afforded to such persons. It is further submitted that—in circumstances where his stated objective is to practise as a pharmacist—any publication of his identity would engage the same constitutional interests, i.e. the right to a good name and the right to earn a livelihood, as would be engaged for registered pharmacists subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Pharmacy Act 2007.

69. This submission runs to the effect that although he is not yet on the statutory register of pharmacists, the standard actually applied to him throughout the university’s process was that of a professional pharmacist. The core finding under challenge is the finding that Student A is “not fit to practise as a pharmacist”. It is submitted that his conduct has been assessed by reference to professional norms rather than ordinary student discipline. Counsel draws attention to the fact that the University’s Code of Conduct for Pharmacy Students is expressed to be “guided” by the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland’s Code of Conduct for Pharmacists and by the Medical Council’s guidance.

Part 6, Pharmacy Act 2007

70. Part 6 of the Pharmacy Act 2007 (“PA 2007”) establishes a comprehensive disciplinary regime for registered pharmacists and registered retail pharmacy businesses. The disciplinary regime is administered through the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland’s various committees of inquiry. These consist of a preliminary proceedings committee, a professional conduct committee, and a health committee.

71. The first formal step in the disciplinary regime is the reference of a complaint to the preliminary proceedings committee. The function of the preliminary proceedings committee is to advise on whether there is “sufficient cause” to warrant further action being taken. The Act does not envisage that the preliminary proceedings committee will convene a hearing.

72. In the event that a decision is made to take further action, other than mediation, the complaint is referred to either (i) the professional conduct committee, or

(ii) the health committee.

73. Section 42 of the PA 2007 draws a sharp distinction, in terms of default public or private hearings, as between the two committees. The default is that hearings before the professional conduct committee “shall be held in public”, but may be held in private on request where the committee considers it appropriate.

Conversely, the default is that hearings before the health committee “shall be held in private”, but may be held in public on request where appropriate.

74. This distinction is indicative of a legislative intention to protect the privacy of a registered pharmacist in respect of matters relating to their personal health. In all other instances, the default is a public hearing.

75. In the event that a committee of inquiry finds that the complaint is substantiated, the council is obliged to impose a disciplinary sanction. If the proposed disciplinary sanction goes beyond an admonishment or a censure—for example, if it is proposed to suspend or cancel the pharmacist’s registration—then it is necessary to apply to the High Court for confirmation.

76. The Pharmacy Act 2007 does not make provision for a confirmation application to be heard in private. It follows that the default position is that a confirmation application is to be heard fully in public, subject to the common law power described in Gilchrist.

77. For completeness, it should be explained that provision is made for the interim suspension of a registered pharmacist (PA 2007, section 45). An interim suspension may only be ordered if the court considers that there is a risk to the health and safety of the public which is of such magnitude that the pharmacist’s registration should be suspended pending further procedure under Part 6 of the Act. An application for interim suspension shall be heard in private, unless the court, on a request by the registered pharmacist that it be heard in public, considers that it should be so heard. The presumption in favour of a private hearing reflects the fact that the complaint procedure is incomplete. Indeed, there may not even have been an initial assessment as to whether there is “sufficient cause” to warrant further action being taken.

78. The nature of the hearing—and the role of the court—at this early stage is very different from an application to confirm disciplinary sanctions. At the stage of an application for an interim suspension, the allegations comprising the complaint have not yet been assessed and the pharmacist has not yet been afforded a full hearing before the professional conduct committee. The relief sought, i.e. an interim suspension, is precautionary in nature and will only arise where the protection of the public requires that a pharmacist’s entitlement to practise be suspended pending the outcome of the statutory process. An interim suspension application does not involve the court adjudicating upon the truth of the allegations comprised in the complaint.

79. The presumption in favour of a private hearing is intended to allow the court to address the exigency of the protection of the public without the risk of undermining the, as of yet, incomplete disciplinary process. The High Court (Barniville P.) has described the rationale underlying the equivalent provision under the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 as follows in Medical Council v. Bukhari [2022] IEHC 723 (at paragraph 49). The first objective is to protect the reputation of the medical doctor the subject of the complaint. The judgment observes that it will be necessary in most cases for the hearing of a suspension application to be in private because of the serious damage which could be caused to a medical doctor by a public ventilation of allegations against them at a very early stage in the professional disciplinary process and before there has been any sifting of the complaint by the preliminary proceedings committee to determine whether there is a prima facie case. The second objective is to protect the rights of patients or other third parties who would be adversely affected by a public hearing.

Discussion

80. If one were to assume, for the purpose of argument only, that a disciplinary process applicable to a postgraduate student should be broadly analogous to that applicable to a registered pharmacist, this would not advance Student A’s argument. This is because the argument is predicated on the mistaken premise that the default position is that disciplinary proceedings applicable to a registered pharmacist are heard in private. In fact, the position is the obverse. The default position is that hearings before the professional conduct committee “shall be held in public”. This is subject to a discretion to hold all or part of the hearing in private. The type of factors which inform the exercise of this discretion would include, for example, the need to protect the privacy of patients, especially those who are vulnerable.

81. Student A’s argument, however, requires reading the discretion as mandating a private hearing in any case where an allegation is made against a registered pharmacist of a type which, if upheld, would reflect badly on their reputation. This is contrary to the architecture of the legislation and would result in most cases being heard in private.

82. In the event that a committee of inquiry finds that the complaint is substantiated, and it is proposed to, say, cancel the pharmacist’s registration, the default position is that the court application to confirm the proposed disciplinary sanctions would similarly be held in public.

83. The only contingency in which the PA 2007 leans in favour of court proceedings being heard in private is where an interim suspension application is made at an earlier stage of the disciplinary process. As discussed at paragraphs 77 to 79 above, the presumption in favour of a private hearing is intended, primarily, to allow the court to address the exigency of the protection of the public without the risk of undermining the, as of yet, incomplete disciplinary process.

84. Student A has travelled well beyond this point in the university’s process. The university’s process has been completed and the allegations have been considered in detail and adjudicated upon. The student has exhausted his rights of appeal to the College Fitness to Practise Committee and to the University’s Visitors. The prescribed process is at an end, and the findings are final subject only to the potential intervention of the High Court by way of judicial review.

85. If and insofar as it might be legitimate to draw an analogy between the university’s process and the statutory process, the student’s position approximates more closely to that of a registered pharmacist resisting a confirmation application before the court. This is because in each instance the non-judicial stage of the process has been completed and an adverse finding made. The potential that the finding by the non-judicial decision-makers might not be accepted by the High Court does not mandate a private hearing. As explained earlier, the default position is that the court application to confirm proposed disciplinary sanctions is held in public. Indeed, the earlier hearing before the professional conduct committee is presumptively in public too.

86. In summary, the contended-for analogy with a registered pharmacist actually undermines Student A’s argument for reporting restrictions.

SOCIAL MEDIA

87. Student A has averred on affidavit that he has a concern that, were he to be publicly identified as the applicant in these judicial review proceedings, he and his family members would be subject to abuse and vilification on social media.

This risk is said to be heightened by the fact that his is an unusual surname and the fact that [details redacted]. It is argued that if the anonymisation order were to be lifted, there is a potential for further articles to be published online and shared on social media, with potentially serious consequences for the student and his family. See, in particular, the supplemental affidavit filed on

10 November 2025.

88. In assessing this argument, it is salutary to recall that the rationale underlying Article 34.1 of the Constitution of Ireland is to allow for the judicial process to be scrutinised. The Supreme Court, in Irish Times Ltd v. Ireland [1998] 1 IR 359, recognised that justice is best served in an open court where the judicial process can be scrutinised and that in a democratic society, justice must not only be done but be seen to be done.

89. The courts have consistently acknowledged the crucial role that the traditional print and broadcast media play in giving practical effect to the constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public. The position was summarised as follows by Keane J. (as he then was) at page 409 of the reported judgment in Irish Times Ltd v. Ireland:

“[…] However, the very fact that physical and other

constraints prevent more than a minuscule section of the

entire population from being present in court while justice is

being administered makes it all the more imperative that the

media should have the widest possible freedom to report

what happens in court which is consistent with the proper

administration of justice. It is manifest that the right of the

public to know what is happening in our courts, a right which

is clearly recognised and guaranteed by Article 34, would be

eroded almost to vanishing point if the public had to depend

on the account that might be transmitted to them by such

people as happened to gain admission to the court room for

the trial in question. In modern conditions, the media are the

eyes and ears of the public and the ordinary citizen is almost

entirely dependent on them for his knowledge of what goes

on in court.

Justice must be administered in public, not in order to satisfy

the merely prurient or mindlessly inquisitive, but because, if

it were not, an essential feature of a truly democratic society

would be missing. Such a society could not tolerate the huge

void that would be left if the public had to rely on what might

be seen or heard by casual observers, rather than on a detailed

daily commentary by press, radio and television. The most

benign climate for the growth of corruption and abuse of

powers, whether by the judiciary or members of the legal

profession, is one of secrecy.”

90. The Supreme Court (per Donnelly J.) emphasised in Smith v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] IESC 42 that openness and transparency enhance, rather than detract from, the rule of law because the public are put in the position where they can see justice in action, a process in which press access facilitates wider dissemination of information about hearings where ordinary members of the public are not permitted.

91. These judgments recognise the reality that most members of the public, owing to work and personal commitments, could not attend court in person as observers even if they wished to do so. Instead, they rely on media reports as their principal source of information. The courts cannot be blind to the fact that, in more recent times, online platforms and social media also have a role to play. Many mainstream media outlets now have a significant online presence. Indeed, there are more articles published in the online version of a newspaper than in the print version. The articles which are published online are often shared or reposted by ordinary members of the public on their own social media accounts. It is possible for others to post “comments” in relation to an article, whether underneath the original publication on the mainstream media’s own account or on a third-party’s user account. Regrettably, the comments, in some instances, engage in vulgar abuse of the parties or the judges involved. The fact that such commentary is often ill-informed and wrong does not render it, in and of itself, unlawful.

92. Of course, a point may be reached where online commentary goes beyond the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and, instead, entails criminality. There is ample legislation on the statute book which addresses the contingency of unacceptable online abuse. For example, the offence of “harassment” is defined, under the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997 (as amended), as including the act of communicating with or about a person in circumstances where such communication seriously interferes with that person’s peace and privacy, or causes alarm, distress or harm to that person. It is also open to apply for a civil restraining order under Part 5 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023.

93. Save in exceptional cases, where the evidence before the court indicates that there is a real risk to the health and safety of the parties involved, it will rarely be appropriate to impose reporting restrictions, in advance, on an anticipatory basis. Were it otherwise, the open justice principle would be undermined. The precise purpose of the principle is to allow for public scrutiny of, and discussion of, the administration of justice. It would defeat this purpose were the courts to retreat behind a veil of reporting restrictions for fear that someone, somewhere, might engage in criminal behaviour by harassing the parties online. This is especially so where no specific evidence has been adduced on affidavit as to the likelihood of criminal behaviour, beyond a generalised and vague fear of harassment.

94. I turn now to apply the foregoing principles to the facts of the present case. As of today’s date, the substantive application for judicial review has been heard and judgment reserved. Were the reporting restrictions to be lifted prior to the delivery of the reserved judgment, then Student A would be identifiable as the applicant in these judicial review proceedings. The mainstream media—which has already reported, on an anonymised basis, on the existence of these proceedings—would be entitled to publish Student A’s name as part of a fair and accurate report of the proceedings. Once the reserved judgment is delivered, any fair and accurate report would have to refer to the outcome of the proceedings.

95. If Student A succeeds in his judicial review proceedings, then he will have the benefit of a favourable decision of the High Court which will be embodied in a written judgment posted on the courts.ie website. Members of the media will be entitled to publish or broadcast a fair and accurate report of the proceedings and the written judgment. All of this will represent a public vindication of Student A.

96. The nature of the online abuse, which Student A apprehends will be directed towards him and his family, has not been elaborated upon in either evidence or submission. Presumably, the concern is in respect of events prior to the delivery of the reserved judgment, the concern being that ill-informed individuals will publish abusive comments in respect of the proceedings. No evidence has been put before the court to suggest that the proceedings have excited any hostile reaction online to date. This is so notwithstanding that details in relation to the proceedings have been published in the mainstream media and have been available online since June and July 2025.

97. The constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public cannot be departed from on the basis of speculation or conjecture. It would be inappropriate to impose reporting restrictions in relation to proceedings simply because one of the parties apprehends that any online discussion of the case might descend into personal abuse. As already explained, there is ample legislation on the statute book which addresses the contingency of unacceptable online abuse.

98. For completeness, it should be acknowledged that there may be extreme cases where the public identification of the parties to proceedings might give rise to a real risk to their health and safety. In such a case, it may be appropriate to impose reporting restrictions at least on a temporary basis. For example, there have been recent instances where community tensions have been high in the immediate aftermath of allegations of child sexual abuse. A court might consider that there is justification to impose temporary restrictions on the public identification of those suspected of criminal involvement until tensions have subsided.

99. The circumstances of the present case are at a different remove. There is simply no evidence before the court which suggests that the public identification of Student A as the applicant in these proceedings will give rise to a real risk to his health and safety or to that of his family members. This is because academic plagiarism, although a serious matter in the University Calendar, is unlikely to attract the type of public opprobrium or vigilantism which might spill over from the online world into the real world. It is only in cases where an individual has been identified as having been accused of a heinous crime, such as child sexual abuse, that such a risk might arise. Even then, the risk is likely to be temporary only.

CIVIL LAW (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT 2008

100. For completeness, it is necessary to refer briefly to the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008. Section 27 of the Act empowers a court, in limited circumstances, to prohibit the publication or broadcast of any matter which would, or would be likely to, identify a party to the proceedings as a person having a medical condition.

101. The cumulative criteria to be satisfied are prescribed as follows at subsection 27(3): “The court shall grant an order under this section only if it is satisfied that—

(a) the relevant person concerned has a medical

condition,

(b) his or her identification as a person with that

condition would be likely to cause undue stress to

him or her, and

(c) the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of

justice.”

102. Student A, in an affidavit dated 20 May 2025, has raised concerns as to the impact of the judicial review proceedings upon his mental health. It is said, in particular, that the judicial review proceedings are taking a “toll” on his mental health. No further detail is provided and no independent medical evidence has been put before the court.

103. I have carefully considered whether any of this might potentially engage the statutory power to impose reporting restrictions under the Act. I have concluded that none of the statutory pre‑conditions have been met. The section permits only a narrow curtailment of reporting, namely a prohibition on publication that would identify a relevant person as a person having a medical condition, and it obliges the court to grant an order only where it is satisfied, cumulatively, that the person has a medical condition, that identification as a person with that condition would be likely to cause undue stress, and that the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice. The language of the provision is precise and confined to the fact of the medical condition; it does not contemplate a wider anonymisation of the proceedings.

104. No independent medical evidence has been adduced to suggest that Student A might have a qualifying medical condition, still less that identification as a person with that condition would be likely to cause undue stress within the meaning of the section. All that has been asserted are generalised concerns about the ordinary strains of litigation and reputational worry, which do not satisfy the section’s cumulative and condition‑specific requirements. As explained in Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582, in the absence of evidence, there is no basis upon which a court could restrict publication of an individual’s name on medical grounds.

105. For completeness, even if the statutory requirements were met, any order under the section would be confined to prohibiting publication that would identify Student A as a person having the medical condition; it would not operate as a blanket anonymisation order and it would not prevent fair and accurate reporting of the proceedings generally, including publication of the findings. To construe the section otherwise would be to expand it beyond its text and purpose.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER

106. The identity of the parties is a crucial component of the administration of justice in public. It cannot be said that the administration of justice is a process which exists in a vacuum, removed from the realities and nuances of personhood. This would represent an undervaluation of the scope of open justice and public scrutiny.

107. The request for reporting restrictions is premised on a misunderstanding of the interaction between the constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a livelihood, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public, on the other. The general position is that the reputational rights of a party to litigation are vindicated by a public hearing and determination of the court proceedings. Neither common law nor constitutional law has ever insisted, as a general proposition, that the identity of parties, against whom allegations of wrongdoing have been made, must be withheld until the

conclusion of the court proceedings.

108. The same principles apply to the members of a regulated profession and to aspiring students seeking to enter that profession. The case law indicates that reporting restrictions will only be imposed in very limited circumstances. In most instances, the rationale is to protect the rights of parties other than the professional the subject of the disciplinary proceedings. The case law certainly does not support an argument that reporting restrictions will be routinely imposed to protect the good name or professional reputation of the person the subject of the disciplinary proceedings. (Paragraphs 43 to 67 above).

109. If one were to assume, for the purpose of argument only, that a disciplinary process applicable to a postgraduate student should be broadly analogous to that applicable to a registered pharmacist, this would not advance Student A’s argument. This is because the argument is predicated on the mistaken premise that the default position is that disciplinary proceedings applicable to a registered pharmacist are heard in private. In fact, the position is the obverse. (Paragraphs 68 to 86 above).

110. The constitutional imperative that justice be administered in public cannot be departed from on the basis of speculation or conjecture. It would be inappropriate to impose reporting restrictions in relation to proceedings simply because one of the parties apprehends that any discussion of the case on social media might descend into online abuse. There is ample legislation on the statute book which addresses the contingency of unacceptable online abuse. (Paragraphs 87 to 99 above).

111. In the circumstances, the request for reporting restrictions in the form of an anonymisation order is refused. The reporting restrictions imposed under the order of 30 June 2025 will be vacated, subject to what is said under the next heading below.

112. As to costs, my provisional view is that the university, having been entirely successful in having the reporting restrictions set aside, should be entitled to recover its costs against the student in accordance with the default position under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 as applied, by analogy, to interlocutory applications under Order 99, rule 3 RSC. The proceedings will be listed before me on Thursday 19 February 2026, for oral submissions on costs and on the final form of order.

REPORTING RESTRICTIONS

113. Notwithstanding that the court has held that there is no proper basis for making a permanent anonymisation order, it is nevertheless necessary to impose temporary reporting restrictions to safeguard the applicant’s right of appeal. To elaborate: it would render any appeal to the Court of Appeal, or any application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, nugatory were the applicant’s name to be published immediately. The very thing that the applicant seeks to prevent would have occurred prior to the determination of any appeal or application for leave to appeal.

114. Accordingly, the reporting restrictions described below are to apply for a period of twenty-eight days from the date of the perfection of the order pursuant to this judgment. In the event that an appeal or an application for leave to appeal is filed, then reporting restrictions will continue thereafter until such time as the appeal proceedings are finally determined or until further order.

115. The reporting restrictions are as follows. The publication of, or broadcast of, any matter relating to the proceedings which would or could identify the student as applicant in these judicial review proceedings is prohibited. This prohibition is directed to matters such as the student’s name, address, age, family circumstances, and secondary schooling. There is no restriction on the publication of the names and details of the respondents to the proceedings, the course of study undertaken by the student, the years during which the student attended Dublin University, nor of the allegations and findings made against him. This judgment will be published on the courts.ie website and there is no prohibition on the fair and accurate reportage of any matter referred to herein.

116. Any media organisation or bona fide member of the media may apply, on seven days’ notice, to have these reporting restrictions lifted, varied or clarified. The parties to the proceedings also have liberty to apply.

Appearances

Rosario Boyle, SC and Conor Duff for the applicant instructed by Sonia McEntee Solicitors Patrick Leonard, SC and Liam O’Connell for the first respondent instructed by Byrne Wallace Shields LLP