High Court dismisses judicial review claims that 40-41 month citizenship delays constitute wrongful refusal or mandate for decision.

APPROVED

REDACTED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 51

Record No. 2024/1293JR

BETWEEN/

MJ

APPLICANT

-AND-

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENT

-and-

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 2025/493JR

BETWEEN/

AA

APPLICANT

-AND-

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 30th day of January 2026

INTRODUCTION

Overview

1. These two applications for judicial review have been listed together for hearing as being representative of several cases where, inter alia, the relief of mandamus is sought directing that a ministerial decision issue on the Applicants’ application for citizenship or naturalisation pursuant to the provisions of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (“the 1956 Act”).

2. The central issues in each case concern whether the period of time which has elapsed since the initial applications were made and the engagement thereafter by the Respondent (“the Minister” or “the Department”) with the Applicants and their legal advisers (i) is such as to amount to a wrongful refusal to make a decision by the Minister, and, (ii) whether the delay in each case (40 months in Ms. MJ’s case and 41 months in Mr. AA’s case from the date of their respective applications for naturalisation to the hearing) is unjustified, or so egregious, as to be tantamount to a refusal in its effect.

3. The Applicants do not seek, and nor could they, an order of mandamus directing the Minister to give a positive decision granting their applications for citizenship. Delay in the processing of their applications does not confer any substantive rights: see Iatan v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2006] IEHC 30; [2007] 4 I.R. 47 per Clarke J. (as he then was) at para. 6.11; A.N. v. Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 354.

4. The Applicants contend, rather, that the delay of 41 months in Mr. AA’s case and 40 months in Ms. MJ’s case, entitles them to an order of mandamus directing (or a declaration that they are entitled to) a decision per se.

5. In summary, taking the example of Ms. MJ’s case, the issue which arises in these applications for judicial review was captured at the level of generality at paragraph 9 in the Affidavit of Darragh Brennan (a departmental official) as follows:

“While a decision on the Naturalisation Application is currently outstanding, this is as a direct result of the fact that the Respondent continues to await the outcome of background checks in respect of the Applicant prior to finalising his assessment as to whether the Applicant is of good character pursuant to section 15(1)(b) [of the] Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended)”.

6. For the reasons set out in this judgment (and summarised in the Conclusion), I am of the view that the Applicants are not entitled to the relief of mandamus or the declaratory reliefs sought in their respective judicial review challenges.

THE STATUTORY PROVISONS

7. Section 15(1)(a) to (e) of the 1956 Act sets out conditions which the Minister is required to consider on an application for a certificate of naturalisation:

“15 (1) Upon receipt of an application for a certificate of naturalisation, the Minister may, in his absolute discretion, grant the application, if satisfied that the applicant—

(a) is of full age;

(b) is of good character;

(c) has had a period of one year's continuous residence in the State immediately before the date of the application and, during the eight years immediately preceding that period, has had a total residence in the State amounting to four years;

(d) intends in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation; and

(e) has, in accordance with subsection (1A) or, as the case may be, subsection (1B), and in the prescribed manner—

(i) made a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State, and

(ii) undertaken to faithfully observe the laws of the State and respect its democratic values.”

8. Much of the focus of these applications for judicial review centred on s. 15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act and the condition in relation to an applicant being “of good character”.

9. Section 15A(1)(a) to (h) of the 1956 Act provides inter alia for the naturalisation of spouses of Irish citizens as follows:

“15A. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 15, the Minister may, in his or her absolute discretion, grant an application for a certificate of naturalisation to the nonnational spouse or civil partner of an Irish citizen if satisfied that the applicant—

(a) is of full age,

(b) is of good character,

(c) and that citizen—

(i) are married to each other, have been married to each other for a period of not less than 3 years, and are living together, as attested to by affidavit submitted by the citizen to the Minister in the prescribed form, or

(ii) are civil partners of each other, have been civil partners of each other for a period of not less than 3 years, and are living together, as attested to by affidavit submitted by the citizen to the Minister in the prescribed form,

(d) is, in the case of a spouse, in a marriage recognised under the laws of the State as subsisting,

(e) had, immediately before the date of the application, a period of one year’s continuous residence in the island of Ireland,

(f) had, during the 4 years immediately preceding that period, a total residence in the island of Ireland amounting to 2 years,

(g) intends in good faith to continue to reside in the island of Ireland after naturalisation, and

(h) has, in accordance with subsection (1A) or, as the case may be, subsection (1B), and in the prescribed manner—

(i) made a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State, and

(ii) undertaken to faithfully observe the laws of the State and respect its democratic values.”

10. Section 16 of the 1956 Act provides inter alia for a ministerial power to dispense with, or waive, conditions of naturalisation in certain cases as follows:

“(1) The Minister may, in his absolute discretion, grant an application for a certificate of naturalisation in the following cases, although the conditions for naturalisation (or any of them) are not complied with:

(a) where the applicant is of Irish descent or Irish associations;

(b) where the applicant is a parent or guardian acting on behalf of a minor of Irish descent or Irish associations;

(c) where the applicant is a naturalised Irish citizen acting on behalf of a minor child of the applicant;

(d)[…]

(e)[…]

(f) where the applicant is or has been resident abroad in the public service;

(g) where the applicant is a person who is a refugee within the meaning of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of the 28th day of July, 1951, and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of the 31st day of January, 1967, or is a Stateless person within the meaning of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of the 28th day of September, 1954.

(2) For the purposes of this section a person is of Irish associations if—

(a) he or she is related by blood, affinity or adoption to, or is the civil partner of, a person who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen, or

(b) he or she was related by blood, affinity or adoption to, or was the civil partner of, a person who is deceased and who, at the time of his or her death, was an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen.”

11. Generally, where s. 16(1)(g) of the 1956 Act applies, the residency requirement is reduced to three years (and the Minister has a discretion to reduce it further). In Mr. AA’s case, it is submitted that s. 16(1)(g) of the 1956 Act applies and in Ms. MJ’s case, it is submitted that s. 16(2) of the 1956 Act applies.

THE CASE OF MJ

12. The Applicant in the proceedings (Record No. 2024 1293 JR) (“Ms. MJ”) was born on 5th January 1989 in Pakistan and has been living in Ireland since 31st January 2019 with her husband, who holds dual Pakistani and Irish citizenship. She is the mother of an Irish citizen child who was born in Dublin on 16th January 2022.

Proceedings

13. On 18th October 2024 the within proceedings were filed and comprised a Statement of Grounds dated and filed on 18th October 2024, a Grounding Affidavit of the Applicant and verifying Affidavit of Sajjad Hader, Solicitor, both dated 18th October 2024. Following an ex parte application on 13th December 2024, the High Court (O’Higgins J.) granted leave to apply for judicial review.

14. The Minister filed a Statement of Opposition on 3rd March 2025 which was verified in the Affidavit of a departmental official, Darragh Brennan, sworn on 4th March 2025. Ms. MJ swore a second Affidavit on 24th March 2025, and the affidavit was filed on 25th March 2025.

15. As part of the specific pleas on behalf of the Minister regarding the Applicant’s naturalisation application, the Statement of Opposition inter alia states as follows at paras 23 and 24:

“23. As regards Ground e(1) of the Legal Grounds set forth at Section E of the Statement of Grounds, it is denied that any delay in processing the naturalisation application is inordinate, unreasonable and/or inexcusable.

24. While it is not denied that the Applicant has an interest in seeing the naturalisation application determined within a reasonable time, what is reasonable is dependent on inter alia the factual context and the nature of the decision-making being conducted, and the Respondent relies on the General and Specific Pleas set out above for the purpose of contending that no unreasonable or inordinate or inexcusable delay has arisen in the Applicant’s case.”

Application for naturalisation

16. On 13th June 2022, Ms. MJ’s solicitors applied for her to be naturalised as an Irish citizen pursuant to s. 16 (or in the alternative, s. 15) of the 1956 Act and stated that s. 16 authorised the exercise of ministerial discretion to waive all or any statutory conditions in favour of any applicant to enable him/her to be naturalised as an Irish Citizen. The letter enclosed approximately 41 items of documentation in support of the application. The completed application form, at s. 12, confirms that Ms. MJ’s application was based on Irish associations (defined as follows; being related by blood; affinity or adoption to or being the civil partner of an Irish citizen) and she also claimed Irish association through blood as being the biological mother of an Irish Citizen child who was born on 16th January 2020.

17. At section 13 of the application form, Ms. MJ confirmed that her application was based on her marriage to an Irish citizen, thereby also engaging s. 15A of the 1956 Act.

18. At the time of Ms. MJ’s application for citizenship on 13th June 2022 the processing time for straightforward applications was in or around 23 months.

19. It appears that, previously, the processing time for a straightforward application had been around 12 months but this increased due inter alia to operational implications arising from the public health restrictions imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic and arising from the judgment and decision on appeal in Roderick Jones v Minister for Justice [2019] IECA 285.

Response

20. On 30th October 2022, the Minister advised Ms. MJ that her naturalisation application was being processed with a view to establishing whether Ms. MJ met the statutory conditions for the granting of naturalisation. The letter stated that it would be submitted to the Minister for

decision as expeditiously as possible as soon as their enquiries were complete and all required documentation had been compiled. Ms. MJ was further informed that in general it took approximately 23 months for a straightforward naturalisation application to be processed; however, for a broad range of reasons, some naturalisation applications would take longer than others to process; it was a statutory requirement that applicants for naturalisation be of good character; while, in some cases, that could be established relatively quickly, in others completing the necessary checks could take a considerable period of time and as a result there would always be a proportion of cases that took longer than the norm to process. The letter of 30th October 2022, for example, stated as follows:

“In general, it takes approximately 23 months for a straightforward application to be processed from the date it is received to the date a decision is made. However, the nature of the naturalisation process is such that for a broad range of reasons some cases will take longer than others to process. It is a statutory requirement that, inter alia, applicants for naturalisation be of good character. In some instances that can be established relatively quickly and in other cases completing the necessary checks can take a considerable period of time. As a result, there will always be a proportion of cases that take longer than the norm to process. If further documentation and/or clarification of any matter related to your application is required from you, we will write to you requesting it. Otherwise, you will receive a letter in due course to inform you of the Minister’s decision on your application.”

21. The expiry of 23 months in Ms. MS’ case would bring matters up to on or about May 2024.

Request for background checks

22. On 20th March 2023, the Minister requested background checks from An Garda Síochána in respect of Ms. MJ.

23. On 9th October 2023, the Garda National Vetting Bureau informed Ms. MJ that her vetting process was completed and that a disclosure in this respect had been made to the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS). This email also stated that applicants should note that a vetting disclosure issues in respect of every vetting application and that the reference to “disclosure” did not indicate the outcome of the applicant’s vetting application, but rather only that the vetting process has been completed.

24. In both applications involving Ms. MJ and Mr. AA, it was submitted on their behalf that the background checks which were causing the delay in the processing of their applications must be something other than ‘garda vetting’, having regard to the completion and outcome of the garda vetting process confirmed in information received in Subject Access Requests.

Further correspondence

25. On 26th October 2023, the Minister requested further documentation be provided in connection with Ms. MJ’s naturalisation application, namely: (i) a copy of divorce papers in respect of her spouse’s previous marriage to a Lithuanian national; (ii) copies of three different proofs of residence on the part of her spouse on the island of Ireland dated within three months prior to the naturalisation application.

26. On 1st November 2023 solicitors on behalf of Ms. MJ provided the requested documentation in response to the Minister’s request dated 26th October 2023.

27. On 25th January 2024 the Minister acknowledged receipt of this response and of the documentation which had been submitted.

Mandamus letter

28. By email dated 16th May 2024, the Applicant’s solicitors sent what was submitted to be the mandamus letter which subtended this application for judicial review.

29. This letter stated as follows:

“Dear Sirs,

We are writing to follow up on our client’s instruction to formally serve a 14-day notice to your office regarding her naturalisation application, which was submitted in or about June 2022. Regrettably, OVER TWENTY THREE MONTHS have elapsed without any

decision or valid reasons for the significant delays.

We kindly request your understanding that the most recent correspondence received from your esteemed office was on 25th January 2024. However, NEARLY FOUR MONTHS have since passed without any further communication or decision provided. Additionally, [it is] important to note that the applicant’s Garda vetting was successfully completed and viewed on 9th October 2023. As a result, we have been instructed to formally notify you that unless a decision is issued or a response is received within 14 days of the date of this email, indicating an estimated timeline for the determination of the application for a certificate of naturalisation, we may proceed with judicial review proceedings seeking an order of mandamus without further notice. Please be aware that this email would be relied upon to hold you accountable for any costs associated with such legal actions. We sincerely hope that resorting to legal measures will not be necessary and that a prompt response will be forthcoming. Thank you for your attention to this matter, and we eagerly await your earliest response.”

30. This email inter alia requested “a decision being issued or a response received within 14 days of the date of this email indicating an estimated timeline for the determination of the application for a certificate of naturalisation”.

31. This was responded to by correspondence dated 22nd May 2024 from the Citizenship section of the Department of Justice, which stated that the Applicant’s application was actively being reviewed to ascertain the status of same and a response providing a ‘status update’ of Ms. MJ’s application would be given within 28 days from 22nd May 2024.

32. The letter stated that:

“In light of the foregoing, we would request that you refrain from issuing legal proceedings. It is the view of this office that legal proceedings are inappropriate at this time in circumstances where your client’s application is actively being reviewed and a response will issue within 28 days with a status update report of your client’s application. In the event that legal proceedings are instituted against the Minister, this letter will be used in an application to the courts to have your client fixed with costs, including any reserved costs, arising from such proceedings”.

33. On 18th June 2024, the Minister wrote to the solicitors for Ms. MJ referring to the correspondence dated 16th May 2024. This letter is an important letter having regard to the reliefs sought in these proceedings. A letter in the same terms and dated 21st January 2025 was sent in Mr. AA’s case. Reference was made to the letter of 22nd May 2024 and the undertaking to review Ms. MJ’s application to ascertain the status of same and revert within 28 days with an update on her application. The letter dated 18th June 2024 stated further as follows:

“We have conducted a review of the status of your client’s application and we confirm that your client’s application is currently being processed in the normal course as expeditiously as possible. Final background checks are awaited. On receipt of this required information and assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks, we anticipate that a

decision will be made within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the required information. The decision will be notified to your client in writing. In the event that a

decision cannot be made within the aforementioned timeframe, we will advise your office accordingly. In light of the foregoing, we request that you refrain from issuing legal proceedings against the Minister. As per our earlier letter, it is the view of this office that legal proceedings are inappropriate at this time, particularly in circumstances where your client's application is actively under consideration and a timeframe for a decision issue has been advised.”

34. On 6th December 2024, an update was requested by the Minister from An Garda Síochána regarding the outstanding background checks.

35. In correspondence dated 19th February 2025, which is addressed later in this judgment, the Minster wrote to Ms. MJ’s solicitors explaining inter alia that the naturalisation application was being processed in the normal course as expeditiously as possible and set out reasons for the delay and the steps which the Minister had taken to have the application processed as expeditiously as possible. This explanation was set out under two sub-headings: the first was under the sub-heading “General requirements in decision-making under [s.15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act]” and referred, in generic terms, to the issues which arose in relation to all applications. In summary, it referred to the inquiry into the statutory requirement of “good character” pursuant to s. 15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act which necessitated the Minister asking An Garda Síochána to make enquiries into any applicant’s background (the detail and extent of which were a matter for An Garda Síochána) and that the time taken to do this may vary, depending on a number of factors, including security issues, all of which was outside the control of the Minister. Other variables, which may require a considerable period of time, included the country of origin of an applicant which may necessitate the engagement with external agencies and it was stated that “Neither the Minister nor An Garda Síochána are in a position to give these external agencies direction as to their response time”. Reference was also made to the importance of maintaining strong links with other national security services and the disclosure of information in the context of an application and a refusal.

36. The second heading in the letter dated 19th February 2025, on behalf of the Minister, was specific to the Applicant’s application and was under the sub-heading “The present Application”. Whilst this is addressed later in this judgment, the letter inter alia referred to the fact that background checks in respect of the Applicant had not yet been fully completed, emphasised that the ongoing processing of the application was not a reflection on the Applicant’s character, set out that the application was received on 15th June 2022 (acknowledged on 30th October 2022), a Garda vetting disclosure was received dated 7th October 2023, background checks were requested on 20th March 2023 from An Garda Síochána, an update was requested on 6th December 2024 and a response was awaited. The letter also stated that upon receipt of the required final background checks and assuming there were no concerns, the Minister would accord priority to the processing of the application and issue a written decision within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the required information, or advise the Applicant’s solicitors of an updated timeframe, if for any reason a decision could not be made within this timeframe. Additional aspects of the letter are referred to later in this judgment.

Letter dated 18th June 2024 from the Department (Citizenship-CMU5)

37. In reviewing the above correspondence, it can be observed that the letter of 22nd May 2024 was followed up by a more comprehensive letter dated 18th June 2024 by the Minister which arguably focuses on the central issue in these proceedings.

38. As mentioned, this letter is in the same terms as the letter dated 21st January 2025 in Mr. AA’s case and the assessment in this judgment of the letter dated 18th June 2024 in relation to Ms. MJ applies mutatis mutandis to the letter dated 21st January 2025 in Mr. AA’s case.

39. To recap, the letter dated 18th June 2024 inter alia stated as follows:

“We have conducted a review of the status of your client’s application and we confirm that your client’s application is currently being processed in the normal course as expeditiously as possible. Final background checks are awaited. On receipt of this required information and assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks, we anticipate that a

decision will be made within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the required information. The decision will be notified to your client in writing. In the event that a decision cannot be made within the aforementioned timeframe, we will advise your office accordingly.”

40. The letter contained a similar paragraph to that contained in previous correspondence which requested that the Applicant refrain from issuing legal proceedings as this would be inappropriate in circumstances where the Applicant’s application was actively under consideration and a timeframe for a decision to issue had been advised to Ms. MJ and her solicitors.

41. At the hearing before me, the parties’ oral submissions addressed this correspondence. Given the indicative time period of 23 months, this letter (dated 18th June 2024) was received 24 months after Ms. MJ’s initial application, so therefore it was received approximately one month longer than the average period at that time though it had been indicated that the average time period for making a decision on a routine application had been reduced from 23 months to 19 months. A period of 23 or 19 months was, of course, an indicative period and it was accepted on behalf of the Applicant that applications could vary within and beyond this period, depending on the circumstances.

42. The main focus in the letter of 18th June 2024 was in relation to the paragraph which stated as follows:

“Final background checks are awaited. On receipt of this required information and assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks, we anticipate that a decision will be made within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the required information. The

decision will be notified to your client in writing. In the event that a decision cannot be made within the aforementioned timeframe, we will advise your office accordingly.”

43. Mr. Power SC (for both Applicants) submitted that this was the point in time (i.e., on 18th June 2024), or shortly thereafter, when the Minister should have explained whether or not the Applicant’s application was a “straightforward” application and explain the delay. He referred inter alia to s. 15A and s. 16 of the 1956 Act, and submitted that the Applicant had never been sufficiently informed that her application was otherwise than a straightforward one. He also submitted that this paragraph did not inform the Applicant as to when she will receive a

decision and was open-ended, because she was not informed when the 12-week period would commence. An issue which arises, therefore, was whether the ‘conditionality’ built into this response, i.e., the reference to “On receipt of this required information and assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks”, and which informs when the 12-week period will commence, is reasonable.

44. Mr. Power SC submits that in a hypothetical case (or at the level of generality) if an issue arose and was put to an applicant to address, he accepts that the 12-week period, in a general case (but not in the circumstances which apply to Ms. MJ or Mr. AA) may have to be extended, but his overriding difficulty in the case of Ms. MJ, for example, is that as of 18th June 2024, Ms. MJ has been given no indication or information about the nature of the final background checks in her case in the context of what, he submits, she understood to be a routine or straightforward application.

45. Therefore, as stated, it was contended on behalf of Ms. MJ that this was in fact an open-ended letter and that there was no certainty as to when the 12-week period would begin and the reference to “assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks” was a further element of uncertainty as to when the Applicant would receive a decision on her application for naturalisation.

46. On behalf of the Minister, it was contended by Mr. Murphy SC, that Ms. MJ and her solicitors were informed of an indicative time period and in the circumstances the letter could not give a precise date as to when the 12-week period would commence and this conditionality was factored in by the reference to “assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks”. He also pointed to the Applicant being informed that “in the event that a decision cannot be made within the aforementioned timeframe we will advise your office accordingly.” It is submitted that this was entirely reasonable in circumstances where the Minister is obliged to comply with the statutory requirement of assessing inter alia good character and required the information from the final background checks requested of An Garda Síochána to complete this process of assessment but had no control over precisely when that information would be forthcoming. He submitted that background checks are always ultimately completed (and in this regard referred to paragraph (11) in Mr. Cremins’ Affidavit dated 18th September 2025 in Mr. AA’s case).

47. These are the two perspectives which form the gravamen of the issue in these two applications for judicial review. The question arises as to whether this framework for a decision was sufficient, reasonable and, therefore, acceptable or, alternatively, was open-ended, uncertain and not acceptable.

48. As set out later in this judgment, I consider, adopting the terminology employed by the High Court (Cooke J.) in Nearing v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 4 I.R. 211 (“Nearing”) that the position in both the cases of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA is that there has been no wrongful refusal to make a decision by the Minister and the delay in each case has not been unjustified or so egregious such as to be tantamount to a refusal in its effect.

49. A central aspect of the Applicants’ complaints is that they have not received sufficient information as to why they have been the subject of what was described on their behalf as ‘extra’ or ‘enhanced’ background checks in the sense of checks or inquiries being requested by An Garda Síochána of external or extra-territorial agencies in relation to the assessment of the ‘good character’ of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA.

50. The position of the Minister (and the departmental officials) is that until that information in relation to external background checks is received the Minister cannot carry out a final assessment of the question of ‘good character’.

51. In relation to the effect and/or consequences of seeking mandamus, in the outline submissions on behalf of the Minister, at paragraph 5.4, it is submitted that the Applicant “demands that the Court force the Minister to determine the Application now on the basis of the length of time taken to date, regardless of the current unavailability of relevant information in the form of background checks. That cannot be in any party’s interests: where the Minister is not currently satisfied as [to] [sic.] the Applicant’s good character and is awaiting the results of background checks, any decision made now would be being made without access to full facts, and would have to be negative. In reality, the Applicant is asking the Court to mandate a negative decision on the Application. There is a certain lack of practicality to the Applicant’s position, which the Court is entitled to weigh in its discretion on judicial review.”

Letter dated 19th February 2025

52. After the proceedings issued, the Applicant’s solicitors received a letter from the Citizenship- CMU5 section of the Department of Justice dated 19th February 2025. The contents of this letter and the format is the same in both Applicants’ cases. In Mr. AA’s case the letter is dated 31st January 2025. Therefore, the following assessment in Ms. MJ’s case applies to the circumstances of both Applicants.

53. As stated, the letter of 19th February 2025 was issued after the Applicant had obtained leave to apply for judicial review (and referred to the judicial review record number – 2024/1293JR).

54. The letter stated that the Department had conducted a review of the status of the application and confirmed that the Applicant’s application was currently being processed in the normal course as expeditiously as possible. It set out the reasons for the delay in the case and the steps that had been taken by the Minister to have the application processed as expeditiously as possible.

55. As referred to earlier in this judgment, the delay was explained under two subheadings; the first referred to “General requirements in decision-making under section 15(1)(b) Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956”, and the second one was under subheading “The present application”.

56. Further, this letter is important as it also formed a central tenet of the Minister’s Statement of Opposition and the Affidavit of Mr. Brennan.

57. At paragraphs 6(s)(i) – (vii) of the Statement of Opposition, for example, it is stated that on 19th February 2025, the Minister wrote to the Applicant’s solicitors explaining inter alia that:

(i) the Naturalisation Application was being processed as expeditiously as possible, but that the discharge of the Respondent’s statutory obligation under s. 15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act necessitated the making of enquiries into the Applicant’s background;

(ii) the delay in the determination of the Naturalisation Application had arisen due to the fact that the results of background checks of the Applicant continued to be awaited;

(iii) these checks had been requested from An Garda Síochána on 20th March 2023;

(iv) an update had been requested from An Garda Síochána on 6th December 2024, and a response remained outstanding;

(v) the State is reliant on the maintenance of good relationships between national security services in intelligence-gathering and information-gathering;

(vi) it is not possible for the Minister or An Garda Síochána to give direction to external agencies as to their response time for the carrying out of background checks;

(vii) upon receipt of the required final background checks and assuming no concerns arise therefrom, the Respondent would accord priority to the Naturalisation Application and issue a decision within 12 weeks from the date of receipt (or advise of an updated timeframe, in the event a decision cannot be made within 12 weeks).

58. It is posited on behalf of the Minister that the aforesaid position is reasonable and lawful.

59. Mr. Power SC submits, however, that the Applicant is entitled to know why this is contributing to the delay, and for example, what type of agencies have been approached in general terms, when a response is likely, and what has been done to follow up with those agencies to ensure that a response will issue, but he accepts that the Applicant is not entitled to information which may, for example, compromise an issue such as state security, i.e., it is submitted that the Applicant is entitled to know what has been generally done to progress matters.

60. The letter is also referred to in Mr. Brennan’s Affidavit of 4th March 2025 at paras 36 to 38 as follows:

“36. By letter dated 19th February 2025, the Respondent informed the Applicant that the background checks being carried out remained ongoing, and explained why a delay had arisen in the determination of the Naturalisation.

…

37. As appears therefrom, the Respondent explained inter alia that the request to An Garda Síochána to conduct enquiries into the Applicant’s background was in discharge of his statutory obligations under section 15(1)(b) INCA 1956 [i.e., the 1956 Act]. The Respondent explained that the period for completion of the said background checks was outside the control of the Respondent and also outside the control of An Garda Síochána, where requests were made of agencies outside the State. The Respondent explained that it was not possible, for reasons of national security, to disclose information related to intelligence-gathering shared on a trust basis between national security services. The Respondent explained that a request had been made of An Garda Síochána on 6 December 2024, for an update as to the status of the background checks, and a response remained outstanding.

38. In this letter, the Respondent confirmed that, on receipt of the required final background checks, and assuming no concerns arising from those final checks, the Respondent intended to accord priority to the processing of the Naturalisation Application and to issue a decision thereupon within 12 weeks from the date of the receipt of the required information.”

61. Returning to the letter of 19th February 2025, under the subheading “General requirements in

decision-making under section 15(1)(b) Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956”, it stated as follows:

“As part of the Minister’s assessment into the good character of any applicant under section 15(1)(b) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, the Minister requests An Garda Síochána to make enquiries into that applicant’s background. The detail and extent of these enquiries are matters for An Garda Síochána. In some cases, the assessment of character takes longer to complete. This may be for a number of reasons, including whether potential security issues arise necessitating the carrying out of rigorous and wide-ranging background checks, the period for the completion of which is outside the control of the Minister.

The country of origin of the applicant question is also a variable which can affect the time within which the checks can be completed. This is due to the fact that, where necessary, An Garda Síochána may make requests of agencies outside the State in order to be able to complete their enquiries. It can sometimes take a considerable period of time for these external agencies to carry out their work. Neither the Minister nor An Garda Síochána are in a position to give external agencies directions as to their response time. By way of general background, An Garda Síochána, in its role as a security service, has developed strong links with other security services, particularly those with whom the State shares common threats to national security.

Intelligence gathering is shared on a trust basis between services (with various caveats preventing or restricting its further disclosure), and with a view to preventing serious security threats from materialising. This is an essential relationship given the State’s vulnerabilities at national level and its isolated location. If An Garda Síochána was now to embark on a policy of disclosure of sensitive and secretive intelligence shared with it on a trust relationship, then An Garda Síochána risks losing access to that intelligence and losing the relationships which are so important to protect the security of the State and its citizens.

Where national security issues arise in the context of naturalisation applications, as much detail as possible will be disclosed to applicants at that point. In addition, if the Minister issues an intention to refuse a certificate of naturalisation based on confidential information, applicants can avail of the Single Person Committee (“SPC”) process, established following the judgment of the Supreme Court in AP v. Minister for Justice [2019] IESC 74. This process may result in a recommendation by the SPC to disclose more information relating to the reasons for the intended refusal, in an appropriate case.”

62. The central complaint made by the Applicant is not in relation to these matters per se. It is accepted on behalf of the Applicant that the security and other matters referred to under the sub-heading “General requirements and decision-making under section 15(1)(b) of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956” are necessary and that “these checks help to ensure the maintenance of national security, the integrity of the process for determining applications for a certificate naturalisation and, ultimately, the integrity of the Irish passport.”

63. The complaint made by the Applicant is that she says she simply does not know whether these matters apply to her situation especially when it is submitted on her behalf that she has always understood that her application was routine and straightforward, a point which the Applicant makes at paragraph (5) of her Affidavit sworn on 24th March 2025.

64. Whilst these matters are set out in a generalised way in this correspondence and are not, for example, expressly adopted or incorporated to the specific circumstances of the Applicant or expressly adopted as a particularisation of her circumstances, I do not think any issue can be taken with the fact that they are matters which generally inform the exercise of the Minister’s overall discretion under section 15(1)(b) of the 2015 Act.

65. The letter then deals with the Applicant’s application its next section. Under the subheading “The present Application”, the letter states as follows:

“In respect of your client’s Application in particular, background checks are being carried out which have not yet been fully completed. It must be emphasised that the ongoing processing of the application is not a reflection on your client’s character. As explained above, these checks help to ensure the maintenance of national security, the integrity of the process for determining applications for certificate of naturalisation and, ultimately, the integrity of the Irish passport. The Minister received the application form in the present case on 15/06/2022 and acknowledged receipt on 30/10/2022. A Garda vetting disclosure was received dated 7/10/23. On 20/03/2023 background checks [were] requested from An Garda Síochána. An update was requested on 06/12/2024, a response remained outstanding. The Minister appreciates that your client is entitled to a decision within a reasonable timeframe. However, what is a reasonable timeframe [necessarily] depends on the nature and context of the decision-making being undertaken and the circumstances of the application for that decision. As set out above, the Minister has a statutory duty to satisfy herself that an applicant is of good character before granting a certificate of naturalisation under section 15 of the 1956 Act. Until such time as the background checks are completed, it is not possible for the Minister to complete an assessment of good character, and this precludes the Minister from making a

decision on the application.

On receipt of the required final background checks and assuming there are no concerns arising from those final checks, the Minister will accord priority to the processing of the application and issue a decision on the application within 12 weeks from the date of the receipt of the required information. The decision will be notified to your client in writing. If, for any reason, a decision cannot be made within the aforementioned timeframe, we will advise your office accordingly and provide an updated timeframe for the making of the decision based on current information.”

66. Taking the letter of 19th February 2025 together with the letter of 18th June 2024, whilst the Minister has stated an acceptance that the Applicant is entitled to a decision within a reasonable timeframe, it is submitted on behalf of the Minister that having regard to the statutory criteria, this necessarily precludes the furnishing of a precise date in which it would be possible to advise the Applicant that a decision would be made. It is submitted that it was impossible for the Minister, when final background checks are awaited from An Garda Síochána, to give a precise date as to when a decision will be made on the Applicant’s application. It is stated that the most which could be said was that once the final background checks were received and assuming there were no concerns arising from those checks, the Minister would issue a decision on the application within 12 weeks from the date of the receipt of the required information. This, it is submitted, is what is being referred when it is stated in the letter dated 19th February 2025 that “The Minister appreciates that your client is entitled to a decision within a reasonable time frame”. As just referred to, the letter states that what is a reasonable timeframe is necessarily dependent on the nature and context of the decision-making being undertaken and the circumstances of the application for that decision. Here the Minister has a statutory obligation to be satisfied that the Applicants are of good character, and until background checks, which were requested as part of this statutory process, are finalised and the results communicated, that assessment cannot be completed and a decision made. The alternative, if directed to make a decision without the full assessment being completed, would necessarily result, it is submitted on behalf of the Minister, in a negative decision for each of the Applicants.

67. Nonetheless, the Applicant submits that this is simply insufficient in terms of information. It is contended that she has only been informed that final background checks are awaited with no further information other than when information is received, and assuming there are no further concerns, a decision will be made within 12 weeks from the date of the receipt of the required information. It is argued that this is completely deficient in terms of reasonableness of an indicative timeframe.

THE CASE OF AA

Preliminary

68. This application for judicial review (Record No. 2025 493 JR) is anonymised as the Applicant is a refugee and was declared as such by a ministerial declaration communicated to him by the Ministerial Decisions Unit of the Department of Justice on 9th September 2020.

Proceedings

69. On 12th May 2025, Mr. AA was granted leave to apply for judicial review. The Applicant’s Statement of Grounds was filed on 11th April 2025 and was grounded upon the verifying Affidavit of Mr. AA, also filed on 11th April 2025 and in the Affidavits of Eimear Nugent, Solicitor, filed on 11th April 2025 and 16th April 2025.

70. The Respondent’s Statement of Opposition was filed on 25th September 2025 and verified by the Affidavit of John Cremins, Assistant Principal, Citizenship Division, Immigration Service Delivery, Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration sworn on 18th September 2025 and filed on 25th September 2025.

Chronology

71. Mr. AA’s application for naturalisation was acknowledged by the Citizenship-CMU4 section of the Department of Justice on 23rd October 2022, and as with the correspondence sent to Ms. MJ, it was stated that in general it took 23 months for a straightforward application to be processed from the date it was received, to the date on which a decision was made.

72. On 26th January 2023, he enquired about the progress of his application and referred to (and apologised for) receiving a fixed penalty notice (for being on his mobile phone whilst driving).

73. On 22nd May 2023, he was informed that a review of his application for naturalisation had been completed and that it had been accepted for processing, and that an up-to-date Garda report was required and he was requested to complete an online e-vetting form.

74. On 8th June 2023 the Applicant was sent, by way of a general information letter, an update on changes to the processing of citizenship applications, which informed him that the backlog was an unfortunate legacy of the Covid-19 pandemic and that applications took around 19 months to complete and an assurance was given to seek to reduce waiting times, whilst addressing the backlogs. This was a general correspondence sent to applicants which acknowledged, and apologised for, the delay in processing applications and referred generally to holding additional citizenship ceremonies in 2023. A similar general letter was sent on 14th August 2023 and this also expressed the general aim of speeding up the process.

75. On his request for an update, the Applicant was informed by e-mail on 2nd May 2024 that his application for naturalisation continued to be processed and a similar request and response occurred on 21st May 2024, 12th June 2024 and 2nd July 2024.

76. On foot of a further request on 16th July 2024, the Citizenship section of the Department of Justice informed the Applicant that his “application for naturalisation is currently being processed in the normal way with a view to establishing whether you meet the statutory conditions for the granting of naturalisation and will be submitted to the Minister for decision when processing is complete”.

77. The garda vetting searches were completed on 15th October 2023 and confirmed that the Applicant had no criminal record.

78. On 18th December 2024, Mr. AA’s solicitors sent the first of a number of pre-litigation letters which inter alia stated that his application for naturalisation had been submitted on 31st May 2022 and, at that time, his application had been pending for a period of two years and six months and requested that a decision issue within the next 21-day period. This letter also referred to each of the elements of ss. 15(1)(a)(b)(c) and (d) of the 1956 Act, including inter alia Mr. AA’s age, good character, his reckonable residence as a refugee under s. 16 of the 1956 Act, and the policy of the Minister to require that applicants for naturalisation, who are declared refugees, have three years of reckonable residence at the time of their application. The letter referred to the unfairness caused by the delay and the failure to be provided with an explanation for it and stated that if no decision was received after 21 days from the date of the letter, the Applicant would apply for an order of mandamus.

79. The Department of Justice replied on 2nd January 2025 confirming that the Applicant’s application would be reviewed to ascertain its status and stated that they would revert within

28 days with an update. The letter requested the Applicant’s solicitors refrain from issuing legal proceedings and stated that this would be inappropriate in circumstances where the Applicant’s application was being reviewed and a status update report would issue in 28 days.

80. The letter from the Department to Mr. AA dated 21st January 2025 is in the same terms and format as the letter dated 18th June 2024 sent in Ms. MJ’s case and the same observations arise, as set out earlier in this judgment.

81. Mr. AA’s solicitors sent a further pre-litigation letter to the Citizenship Division, Immigration Service Delivery section of the Department of Justice on 28th January 2025 inter alia pointing out that his application had been pending for a period of two years and 8 months and stating that if a decision was not received by close of business after 14 days, an application by way of judicial review seeking mandamus would issue.

82. The letter from the Department to Mr. AA’s solicitors dated 31st January 2025 is in the same terms and format as the letter dated 19th February 2025 sent in Ms. MJ’s case and the same observations arise as set out earlier in this judgment.

83. Mr. AA’s solicitors sent a further pre-litigation letter to the Citizenship Division, Immigration Service Delivery section of the Department of Justice on 10th February 2025 and this letter took issue with the departmental response dated 31st January 2025 which had sought to explain the delay on the basis of potential security/national security issues, and pointed out that it has never been suggested that such issues arose in relation to Mr. AA and that given that a similar response has issued in relation to other applicants, it was described as “a generic response of the Minister issued to many applicants to justify lengthy delays on the processing of naturalisation applications”.

84. This letter (dated 10th February 2025) on behalf of the Applicant requested that if there were concerns held in relation to Mr. AA, they should either be put to him or withdrawn.

85. It also highlighted that the Applicant was the holder of a refugee declaration issued by the Minister and requested clarification on whether background checks were made in relation to his country of nationality, queried why the background checks had commenced one year and five months after his application for naturalisation and why they were necessary when the Garda vetting process was completed in November 2023 and the Applicant had no criminal record.

86. The letter took issue with the statement in the letter from the Department on 31st January 2025 that assuming there were no concerns arising from the receipt of final information on the background checks, priority would be given to the application and that a decision would be issued “within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the required information”. The solicitors for Mr. AA responded that “[t]his statement does not provide us with any assurance that the Minister will be determining [Mr. AA’s] application in the near future, given that the background checks appear to be pending for over one year to date without progress. In fact, the concern now arises that [Mr. AA] may never have an opportunity to have his application determined should your office fail to receive a response to these pending background checks”. The letter stated that an application for mandamus would be made if a decision is not received

7 days after the date of this letter.

87. The response from the Department of Justice dated 13th February 2025 stated that background checks were still awaited and that the Minister did not have the power under s. 15 of the 1956 Act to exercise their discretion to grant a certificate of naturalisation before being satisfied that the applicant was of good character and, therefore, the Minister was unable to accede to the request to issue a decision in the absence of the receipt of background checks.

88. No reference is made in this letter to s. 16 of the 1956 Act and the ministerial power to dispense with, or waive, conditions of naturalisation in certain cases including where an applicant was in receipt of a refugee declaration. That part of Mr. AA’s challenge which refers to s. 16 of the 1956 Act is addressed later in this judgment.

89. On 5th March 2025, Mr. AA’s solicitors, in correspondence sent to the Citizenship Division, Immigration Service Delivery section of the Department of Justice, referred in detail to the circumstances in which Mr. AA received a fixed penalty notice and would be receiving 3 penalty points and a fine of €120 for being on his mobile phone whilst driving, after having recently moved to Galway. It was explained that Mr. AA had been using his phone to check exits on roads which he was not familiar with in Galway. It was submitted on his behalf that this was a minor incident and a genuine mistake and referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Talla v Minister for Justice and Equality [2020] IECA 135 and the decision of the High Court in Hussain v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 171 in support of the submission that Mr. AA should be held to be a person of good character within the meaning of the 1956 Act and further that he was a refugee who had lived in Ireland for many years and was working as a paramedic. The letter requested that a decision be issued after 14 days from the date of this letter otherwise an application for mandamus would issue.

90. On 7th March 2025, by e-mail from the Citizenship E-Vetting Team, in relation to Mr. AA’s application for a certificate of naturalisation, Mr. AA was informed that an up-to-date Garda report was required and he was asked to complete an e-vetting online form.

91. The information about the fixed penalty points received by Mr. AA was referred to in the letter dated 10th March 2025, in which the Citizenship-CMU5 section of the Department of Justice responded to the Applicant’s solicitors’ letter dated 5th March 2025 and referred to the e-mail sent from the Citizenship E-Vetting Team dated 7th March 2025. This correspondence dated 10th March 2025 stated that an up-to-date Garda report was now required and that the Applicant was required to use the link in the email to the online E-vetting form (as it happens, the Applicant’s first attempt was ineligible as he entered an Eircode into the wrong section). The results of a Subject Access Request in a letter from the Data Protection Unit in An Garda Síochána to the Applicant’s solicitors on 12th March 2025 stated that there was no personal data held by An Garda Síochána relating to the Applicant and pertaining to criminal convictions. The results of a Subject Access Request dated 27th March 2025 dealt with the period from 1st January 2022 to 27th March 2025 and referred to various incidents reported by Mr. AA, or where he was a witness, whilst he was working as a security guard. The letter of 10th March 2025 stated that the position in relation to Mr. AA’s application remained the same as per the earlier correspondence and that background checks were awaited. Mr. AA was requested to refrain from issuing legal proceedings and it was stated that to do so would be inappropriate “at this time, particularly in circumstances where your client’s application is actively under consideration and a timeframe for a decision to issue has been advised”.

92. Mr. AA’s solicitors sent a further pre-litigation letter to the Minister on 4th April 2025 stating

(i) that e-vetting was completed on 14th March 2025 and had been viewed by the Immigration Service Delivery (“ISD”) on 27th March 2025, (ii) that Mr. AA had paid the fixed penalty notice fine of €120 on 3rd April 2025 and (iii) notwithstanding that Mr. AA had been informed on 31st January 2025 that background checks had been requested by the Department of Justice from An Garda Síochána on 1st November 2023, and that an update was further requested from An Garda Síochána on 6th December 2024, no reference to any form of ongoing checks was contained in the disclosures contained in a Subject Access Request. The letter of 4th April 2025 noted that 2 years and 10 months had passed at that time since his application and stated that a mandamus application would issue if a decision was not received after 7 days from the date of that letter.

93. This letter was replied to by letter from the Citizenship section of the Department of Justice dated 10th April 2025 which stated that the situation remained the same and background checks were awaited. The letter added that “An Garda Síochána may make requests of agencies outside the State in order to be able to complete their enquiries. It can sometimes take a considerable period of time for these external agencies to carry out their work. However, once background checks have been completed such information will be attached to your client’s application. Please be assured we are making every effort to process and complete your client’s application. We will revert immediately once a decision has been reached on the application. Your patience in this matter is appreciated”. In the same terms as the previous correspondence which had been sent, Mr. AA’s solicitor was requested to refrain from issuing legal proceedings.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

94. It is contended on behalf of each of the Applicants that they remain unaware of the nature of any background checks which have been carried out and, therefore, remain uninformed of the basis for the delay in the processing of their respective applications. The Applicants argue, insofar the exchange of correspondence (at least up until or shortly after their proceedings issued) is concerned, they had understood that their applications for naturalisation or citizenship, were routine or straightforward, but despite this, an unacceptable delay has ensued. It is also contended on behalf the Applicants that the Minister in correspondence (and in opposition papers) has failed to ‘contextualise’ matters of policy, in terms of the matters which are required to be addressed in an application for citizenship, to the specific circumstances which apply to each of the Applicants. Specifically, the Applicants argue that they have not been informed when the timeline of 12 weeks referred to inter alia in the letter of 18th June 2024 in Ms. MJ’s case and 21st January 2025 in Mr. AA’s case, will commence.

95. To recap, in both cases, this states as follows: “Final background checks are awaited. On receipt of this required information and assuming there are no concerns arising from the final checks, we anticipate that a decision will be made within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the required information. The decision will be notified to your client in writing. In the event that a decision cannot be made within the aforementioned timeframe, we will advise your office accordingly.”

96. The differences between the parties in this regard can be seen in paragraph 20 of the Affidavit of Darragh Brennan sworn on 4th March 2025 (in Ms. MJ’s case, for example) where by specific reference to this particular extract from the letter dated 18th June 2024, he states that “In this way, [the Minister] explained to the Applicant that the reason for the delay in her case was that background checks remain outstanding, and an estimated timeline for determination post-completion of outstanding background checks was given”.

97. The Applicants’ complaint is that they do not know precisely when the 12-week period will commence and that the ‘start’ period, and the 12-week period itself, are open-ended in what they understood were routine or straightforward applications.

98. The question which arises in these cases is whether that stated position is such that would entitle Ms. MJ and Mr. AA to the remedy of mandamus (and/or declaration) by way of judicial review in the context of their citizenship applications.

99. I do not consider, for the following reasons, that there has been, in the cases of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA, to paraphrase Henchy J., “a breach of an explicit and unambiguous duty imposed by the relevant statute and which called for an order of mandamus” (The State (Sheehan) v Government of Ireland [1987] I.R. 550 at p. 562) and nor is there, in the circumstances which arise in their applications, an entitlement to declaratory relief.

100. Whilst understandably, the focus in many mandamus applications centres on the efflux of time in the making of a statutory decision which amounts to an ‘unlawful delay’, I consider that the ministerial response in the circumstances which apply to Ms. MJ and Mr. AA articulated a timeframe which, whilst containing an aspect of conditionality, i.e., 12 weeks upon receipt of the required information in relation to final background checks which admit of no concerns and where this cannot be done the Applicant’s solicitors would be advised accordingly, was a ‘reasonable time’, having regard inter alia to the particular circumstances of Ms. MJ and Mr.

AA, the nature of the decision sought, the impact that any delay may have and the manner in which each of their applications was processed by the Department of Justice and the explanations given to the Applicants and their solicitors for the time taken to process their applications.

Bifurcated process

101. The actual grant of naturalisation is a privilege which attracts an absolute ministerial discretion and is not a right.

102. In addressing this reason for refusing the Applicants the reliefs sought in their respective challenges, the process has two stages. These applications for judicial review focus on the first part of this process.

103. The bifurcated nature of the process under the 1956 Act distinguishes, for example, between (i) the ministerial evaluation of the conditions for naturalisation and (ii) the conferral of the grant of citizenship which is in the absolute discretion of the Minister. This difference was captured in the following observations of the Supreme Court in A.P. v. Minister of Justice [2019] 3 I.R.

317 ([2019] IESC 47) where O’Donnell J. (as he then was) inter alia stated at paragraph [85], p. 345, that “The satisfaction of the statutory conditions (or satisfaction subject to waiver of some or all of the conditions) does not give rise to an obligation on the Minister to grant any application. Rather, satisfaction of the conditions or permitted waiver allows the Minister to exercise the absolute discretion conferred by statute as to whether or not to grant the certificate of naturalisation”. O’Donnell J. also stated at paragraph [86] that “[a] decision in relation to the conferral of citizenship not only confers the entire range of constitutional rights upon such a person, but also imposes obligations on the State, both internally in relation to the citizen, and externally in its relations with other states”.

104. Further, the Court of Appeal in M v The Minister for Justice [2024] IECA 1 (Whelan J., Binchy

J. and Hyland J.) where Hyland J. also observed, after citing the extract at paragraph [85] from O’Donnell J. in A.P., stated at para. 47 of their judgment, that “naturalisation is a two-step process. The first step is the question of whether the Minister is satisfied that the applicant has met the conditions for naturalisation. The second is the grant of the application – a decision in respect of which the Minister has absolute discretion.”

105. As mentioned, the challenges brought by Ms. MJ and Mr. AA are concerned with the first part of this process which requires the Minister to assess, and be satisfied, in relation to prescribed statutory conditions for the issue of a certificate or for naturalisation set out in s. 15 of the 1956 Act, including the assessment of good character, full age, continuous residence in the State amounting to 1 year (and 3 or 4 years in total of the previous 8), intention in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation, and the making of a declaration of fidelity and observing the laws of the State.

106. Leaving aside for one moment the argument advanced by Mr. Power SC (for both Applicants) about the correlation of the residency requirement (especially in the case of Mr. AA who is a declared refugee) with the time taken to make a decision on their applications for naturalisation (addressed later in this judgment), in the main, these challenges focused on the delay in the processing of the applications for citizenship made by Ms. MJ and Mr. AA arising from the requirement to receive information on background checks from An Garda Síochána in assessing the statutory requirement in s. 15 of the 1956 Act of “good character”. This is a matter which the Oireachtas has left to the Minister to process and it does not contain a prescribed time limit.

107. In Mr. AA’s case, a declaration is sought that by delegating the function of conducting background checks – which the Minister has deemed to be an essential part of the assessment of the Applicant’s “good character” for the purposes of s. 15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act – to third parties with the result that the Minister has no control over the assessment process, the Minister has unlawfully delegated her statutory function and/or has acted ultra vires. It is, therefore, argued that in accordance with s. 15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act, the Minister is required to make the determination as to whether Mr. AA is “of good character”. It is further submitted that the Minister erred in law in concluding in his letter of 13th February 2025 that he does not have the power to grant a certificate of naturalisation before being satisfied that an applicant is of “good character” and, therefore, could not accede to Mr. AA’s request that the certificate of naturalisation issue in the absence of receipt of background checks. It is submitted that s. 16(1)(g) of the 1956 Act provides that the Minister may grant an application for a certificate of naturalisation notwithstanding that any of the conditions for naturalisation are not complied with, if the applicant is a refugee. Therefore, it is submitted that in determining that he cannot issue a certificate of naturalisation in the absence of receipt of unspecified background checks, the Minister has unlawfully fettered his discretion pursuant to section 16(1)(g) of the 1956 Act and thus a declaration is sought that the Minister does have the power to grant a certificate of naturalisation in the absence of receipt of background checks.

108. However, insofar as this argument is made particularly in the grounds of challenge in the case of Mr. AA (as per paragraphs (5) to (8) in his Statement of Grounds dated 11th April 2025, and subsequent legal arguments made on his behalf), the power of the Minister to dispense with or waive conditions of naturalisation, such as that set out in s. 16 of the 1956 Act, (and in the case of Mr. AA who is a declared refugee, s. 16(1)(g) of the 1956), must await receipt of the information pending from An Garda Síochána and external agencies, as recognised in the observations of O’Donnell J. in A.P. v. Minister of Justice [2019] 3 I.R. 317, cited above.

Indicative time frame and required information in relation to external checks

109. In both cases involving Ms. MJ and Mr. AA, the Minister had indicated that he or she anticipated a decision would be made within 12 weeks from receipt of the required information from final background checks, assuming no concerns arose from that information.

110. Although the facts in Mansouri v The Minister for Justice [2013] IEHC 527 related to the question of costs, by analogy, a similar issue to that which arises in the case of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA was described by McDermott J., at para. 37 of his judgment, as follows:

“In this case there was an external element which the respondent regarded as a prerequisite to the making of his decision. On the evidence the respondent sought, as is proper, to investigate the applicant’s good character by making inquiries with external agencies. The stasis that ensued in the processing of the application is entirely due to this inquiry. The respondent made the making of his decision dependent upon the conclusion of that investigation. That was a factor over which he had no control. Following the initiation of proceedings, the information became available from the external agencies and was then furnished to the respondent by An Garda Síochána. This enabled the respondent to take a decision thereby rendering the proceedings moot. The court is satisfied that though this was a factor external to the proceedings, nevertheless this is not a case in which it can be said that the proceedings had become moot due solely to external events.”

111. In the cases of Mr. AA and Ms. MJ, adopting the language used by McDermott J. in Mansouri, I consider, having regard to the evidence in each of these cases, that “the respondent sought, as is proper, to investigate the applicant’s good character by making inquiries with external agencies” and that “the stasis that ensued in the processing of the application is entirely due to this inquiry. The respondent made the making of his decision dependent upon the conclusion of that investigation. That was a factor over which he had no control.”

112. Earlier at paragraph (16) of his judgment, McDermott J. in Mansouri had inter alia observed that “[t]he Minister is, of course, entitled to carry out appropriate investigations as to the character of an applicant and to direct the extent of the inquiries to be made. Inquiries with external agencies manifestly took a very long time. The court notes that the delay in this case is not one that is peculiar to the applicant alone. It is similar to many cases now pending before the court in which the same issue as to costs arising out of mootness following the grant of certificates of naturalisation delayed by investigations of character through external agencies falls to be considered”.

113. Further, in the composite judgments titled Singh v The Minister for Justice and Equality; Zydek v The Minister for Justice and Equality; Shahid Arshad v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 437 (hereinafter referred to as “Singh”), Hyland J., at paras 75 and 79 of her judgment, drew a distinction between (i) an investigation being carried out solely by the Minister/Department, where the Minister can control both the investigation itself and its timeframe and was in a position to inform the court about the progress of the investigation, as was the case in Arshad (and where mandamus was granted compelling the Minister to make a

decision because the delay was held to be egregious), and (ii) where the investigation was being carried out by An Garda Síochána and over which the Minister had no control, as in the cases of Singh and Zydek (Ms. Zydek, for example, was under investigation by An Garda Síochána, as part of a wider inquiry described as Operation Vantage, in relation to an alleged marriage of convenience to Mr. Singh). In Singh and Zydek the relief of mandamus was refused.

114. In refusing relief to Mr. Singh and Ms. Zydek, Hyland J. found that there was no prejudice in Ms. Zydek’s case and observed, at para. 62 that “[good] character is a statutory requirement that must be established to the satisfaction of the Minister before a certificate of naturalisation may be granted. It is difficult to see how the Minister could be satisfied in this respect while there is an ongoing Garda investigation”.

115. At para. 63 of her judgment, Hyland J. also observed that “Mr. Singh and Ms. Zydek are stated to be the subject of an active investigation by An Garda Síochána in relation to immigration offences. As I note above, because good character is a statutory requirement that must be established before a certificate of naturalisation may be granted to any applicant, the active investigation by An Garda Síochána is highly relevant”.

116. Hyland J. found (at para. 64) that although the delay was greater in respect of Mr. Singh and the question of prejudice was much more real in his case given the benefits that Irish citizenship would afford to Mr. Singh, she did not find that the delay was unconscionable given that there was an ongoing investigation into immigration offences and the requirement of good character.

117. There are, I consider, similarities with the circumstances in the Singh and Zydek cases with those which apply in the case of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA. I do not consider that the delay at the point of the hearing of the cases involving Ms. MJ and Mr. AA in late October 2025 amounts to an egregious and unjustified delay in dealing with their applications so as to be tantamount to a refusal (para. 69 of Singh) or that the Minister was not making any effort to ascertain the current state of the investigation being carried out by An Garda Síochána (para. 70 of Singh) but rather, whilst the delay in each case is substantial, the investigation is ongoing and at the time of the hearing of these matters, and it is not unreasonable or egregious for the Minister to continue to await the outcome of the An Garda Síochána investigation in order to permit him to form a view on the statutory criteria of good character (para. 71 of Singh).

External inquiries involving Ms. MJ and Mr. AA

118. In routine or straightforward applications for naturalisation, it was stated on behalf of the Minister that the average time period for making a decision on a naturalisation application was

19 months (reduced from 23 months).

119. In contrast, and a further reason subtending my decision to refuse the Applicants’ application for judicial review, this period may be longer when background checks are awaited from An Garda Síochána who may in turn be awaiting for external checks from agencies outside of the jurisdiction, including, for example, from the authorities of an applicant’s place of origin. (In this regard, the ‘e-vetting’ process is a process of inquiry which is separate to the background checks which are being carried out in these cases).

120. In the case of Ms. MJ, at para. 7 of the Statement of Opposition dated 3rd March 2025, reference is made to the Minister (via the Department of Justice) keeping the Applicant informed at all times of the reasons why the naturalisation application remained outstanding and specifically that the outcome of background checks was awaited and that the Minister/Department had “committed to making a decision on the naturalisation application once the necessary information from external sources is available” to the Minister (underlining added in this judgment).

121. In a similar vein, under the sub-heading ‘General Plea’ the Statement of Opposition in Ms. MJ’s case stated inter alia at paragraph (12) that “A background check can have obvious relevance to the assessment of the character of applicants for naturalisation, in particular so far as concerns their conduct outside this State” (underlining added in this judgment).

122. Further, under the sub-heading ‘Specific Pleas regarding (the Applicant’s) Naturalisation Application’, the Statement of Opposition (in Ms. MJ’s case) (verified by the Affidavit of Darragh Brennan, Principal Officer in the Citizenship Division of the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration sworn on 4th March 2025), at paragraphs 20, 28 and 31, refers inter alia to the engagement by An Garda Síochána with external agencies as follows:

“20. Given the sensitive and complex nature of such national security checks, it is not possible to predict when the investigation in respect of the Applicant will conclude and, as pleaded above, it is not possible for An Garda Síochána to give direction to external agencies to conclude their background checks within a particular timeframe. An update was requested by the Respondent of An Garda Síochána on 6th December 2024 …

28. At all material times the Respondent has sought to provide the Applicant with as much information as reasonably possible consistent with the fulfilment of his role and function in determining the Naturalisation Application. In correspondence dated 18th June 2024 and 19th February 2025, the Respondent indicated that a decision would issue within 12 weeks of receipt of final background checks, which is as expeditious a timeframe as is reasonable to expect by reference to the facts as pleaded above and, in particular, the fact that neither the Respondent nor An Garda Síochána is in a position to give external agencies direction as to their response time and accordingly no absolute ‘back-stop’ date for determination of the Naturalisation Application can be provided.

…

31. It is denied that the degree of delay which has arisen to date in the determination of the Naturalisation Application is egregious or unjustifiable or tantamount to a refusal in its effect. The Respondent has repeatedly committed to determining the Naturalisation Application upon receipt of the outcome of external background checks which are necessary to be conducted as part of the discharge of the Respondent’s statutory function under s. 15 [of the 1956 Act]”.

123. As mentioned, the Statement of Opposition (and paragraphs 20, 28 and 31) as set out above, is verified in the Affidavit of Darragh Brennan, Principal Officer in the Citizenship Division of the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration sworn on 4th March 2025, and in addition, under the subheading “Request for background checks by the Respondent” he inter alia avers at paragraphs 34, 36, 37 and 38 of his Affidavit as follows:

“34. The Respondent accepts that it is frequently difficult for An Garda Síochána to predict when an investigation might conclude and that it can sometimes take a considerable period of time for external agencies to carry out their work.

…

36. By letter dated 19 February 2025, the Respondent informed the Applicant that the background checks being carried out remained ongoing, and explained why a delay had arisen in the determination of the Naturalisation Application.

…

37. As appears therefrom, the Respondent explained inter alia that the request to An Garda Síochána to conduct enquiries into the Applicant’s background was in discharge of his statutory obligations under section 15(1)(b) [of the 1956 Act]. The Respondent explained that the period for completion of the said background checks was outside the control of the Respondent and also outside the control of An Garda Síochána, where requests were made of agencies outside the State. The Respondent explained that it was not possible, for reasons of national security, to disclose information related to intelligence-gathering shared on a trust basis between national security services. The Respondent explained that a request had been made of An Garda Síochána on 6th December 2024, for an update as to the status of the background checks, and a response remained outstanding.

…

38. In this letter, the Respondent confirmed that, on receipt of the required final background checks, and assuming no concerns arising from those final checks, the Respondent intended to accord priority to the processing of the Naturalisation Application and to issue a decision thereupon within 12 weeks from the date of the receipt of the required information”

124. Whilst there was some debate during the hearing about when the respective Applicants were informed about the involvement of external agencies in the background checks being carried out by An Garda Síochána, as referred to above, in Ms. MJ’s case, for example, the position is set out in more express terms in the Statement of Opposition and verifying Affidavit of Mr. Brennan and less so in the earlier correspondence between the parties up until the issuing of the applications for judicial review.

125. A similar, though less detailed approach, is adopted in Mr. AA’s case in the Statement of Opposition filed on 25th September 2025, which is verified by the Affidavit of Mr. Cremins, an official in the Department of Justice.

126. Paragraph 2(vii) of the Statement of Opposition inter alia states that “[t]he Respondent is not in a position to dictate to or oblige that external third parties undertake such checks within any specified period in circumstances where the Respondent has no control over these processes”, and at paragraph 3(iii) of the Statement of Opposition, it is stated that “[w]ith regard to the Applicant’s application for a certificate of naturalisation: As part of the determination as to whether the conditions of naturalisation have been met, the outcome of background checks in relation to the Applicant from external third parties is awaited, over which the Respondent has no control”.

127. As stated, the Statement of Opposition is verified by the Affidavit of John Cremins, Assistant Principal, Citizenship Division, Immigration Service Delivery, Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration on 18th September 2025. Mr. Cremins, in this Affidavit, exhibits a letter dated 10th April 2025 from the Citizenship section of the Department of Justice (which was sent in response to the letter sent by the solicitors for Mr. AA dated 4th April 2025) which states that:

“The position in relation to your client’s application remains the same as per our earlier correspondence. We are still awaiting background checks in relation to your client’s application. An Garda Síochána may make requests of agencies outside the State in order to be able to complete their enquiries. It can sometimes take a considerable period of time for these external agencies to carry out their work. However, once background checks have been completed such information will be attached to your client’s application. Please be assured we are making every effort to process and complete your client’s application. We will revert immediately once a

decision has been reached on the application. Your patience in this matter is appreciated.”

128. In the same terms as the previous correspondence sent, the Applicant’s solicitor was requested to refrain from issuing legal proceedings.

129. Mr. Cremins in his Affidavit dated 18th September 2025 also avers at paragraph 11 that “[t]he time taken for the completion of these checks varies depending on the circumstances, but are always ultimately completed. In some instances, the checks required to be undertaken can be completed relatively quickly, whereas in others it can take more time, which may be outside of the control of the Department where it requires information from external agencies, departments and bodies. Where information arises in the course of processing, including from external bodies, this may require correspondence with an applicant in order for particular matters to be addressed or information provided” (underlining added in this judgment).

130. The letter from the Department to Mr. AA’s solicitors dated 31st January 2025 is in the same terms and format as the letter dated 19th February 2025 sent in Ms. MJ’s case. In both cases, these letters contain a sub-heading “General requirements in decision-making under section 15(1)(b) Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956” which inter alia states “[t]he country of origin of the applicant in question is also a variable which can affect the time within which the checks can be completed. This is due to the fact that, where necessary, An Garda Síochána may make requests of agencies outside the State in order to be able to complete their enquiries. It can sometimes take a considerable period of time for these external agencies to carry out their work. Neither the Minister nor An Garda Síochána are in a position to give these external agencies direction as to their response time”.

131. Mr. Cremins’ averment that “[t]he time taken for the completion of these checks varies depending on the circumstances, but are always ultimately completed” is important particularly because at the time of the hearing of these applications in late October 2025, no decision had been made in either case, after 40 and 41 months. It was submitted on behalf of the Applicants that the Minister’s response was open-ended and should be read as synonymous with ‘never’. (In Mansouri, for example, following the initiation of proceedings, the information became available from the external agencies and was then furnished to the respondent by An Garda Síochána, which enabled the Minister to take a decision which rendered the proceedings moot and, as referred to earlier in this judgment, that case was in fact a costs application).

132. In relation to the period of delay, by comparison in Singh, in Ms. Zydek’s case the delay was 3 years and 4 months (para. 57 of the judgment in Singh) and in Mr. Singh’s case, the delay at the time of the hearing was 4 years and 2 months.

133. In Ms. MJ’s case, the elapse of time or delay at the time of the hearing in late October 2025 was

40 months (3 years and 4 months); the elapse of time or delay in Mr. AA’s case was 41 months (3 years and 5 months) to the hearing in late October 2025 (and 35 months from the date that the proceedings were filed).

134. In Singh, Hyland J. considered that because the remedy of mandamus was a forward-looking relief, the period of delay should include the time period from the application was made until “the present day”, i.e., the day of the hearing of the judicial review application.

135. Thus, notwithstanding the issue between the parties as to timing and, on the Applicants’ argument, the lack of any contextualisation to the particular circumstances of each of the Applicants, of any reference to An Garda Síochána’s engagement with external agencies in the earlier correspondence between the parties or the generic nature of any such references, before and after proceedings commenced, I must consider the information which was before me in late October 2025.

136. As just outlined, that information confirms that the Minister, in assessing the statutory criteria of “good character” in respect of the applications for naturalisation made by Ms. MJ and Mr. AA pursuant to the 1956 Act, had sought background checks from An Garda Síochána and that he had no control over the timing in which such inquiries (which may include the gardaí contacting external agencies outside of the State in relation to both Applicants) are carried out or when the information received consequent upon any such inquires would be furnished to the Minister.

Periods of time for residency requirements

137. The reference on behalf of the Applicants to periods of time for residency requirements, for example 3 or 4 years, or such other reduced period as the Minister may direct, was a further matter raised on behalf of the Applicants. I do not consider, however, that this is a correlative factor which either informs or guides the indicative time frame for the making of a decision on a naturalisation application. The Oireachtas has not prescribed an overall time period for the making of a decision on an application for citizenship whereas in one of the conditions to be considered in assessing the application of a certificate for naturalisation – at s. 15(1)(c) of the 1956 Act – requires the Minister to be satisfied that an applicant has had a period of one year’s continuous residence in the State immediately before the date of the application and, during the eight years immediately preceding that period, has had a total residence in the State amounting to three or four years.

Reasonable period

138. In these challenges, the Applicants seek the making of a decision simpliciter. They do not argue that they are entitled to a positive decision.

139. Taking Ms. MJ’s application, for example, (although the underlying point arises in both cases), on behalf of the Minister, it is submitted and stated on Affidavit (beginning at para. 22 of Darragh Brennan’s Grounding Affidavit sworn on 4th March 2025) that it is fully accepted the Applicant is entitled to a decision on her naturalisation application within a reasonable period and that what is reasonable is dependent on a number of factors.

140. In considering what constitutes a reasonable period, it is submitted on behalf of the Applicants that the ministerial response (set out in the letters dated 18th June 2024, in the case of Ms. MJ, and 21st January 2025, in the case of Mr. AA), was too open-ended, in the sense that if reliance is ultimately placed on the outcome of inquiries by a third party, the timing of which is unascertainable, this, it was argued, could not be deemed to be a reasonable period and that there has to be a tipping-point beyond which the delay is unreasonable. On behalf of the Applicants, inter alia three points in this regard were emphasised:

(a) first, many of the matters referred to by the Minister were generic and applied to all applications and comprised general propositions which were not sufficiently contextualised to the factual position which applied to each of the Applicants’ circumstances;

(b) in the correspondence which had been issued, the Applicants understood that their cases were straightforward and routine; and

(c) it was submitted on behalf of the Applicants that the reasonableness of the period had to be viewed against the residency requirement in section 15 and 16 of the 1956 Act (i.e., three years in the cases of the Applicants in these cases) which, it was submitted, was an appropriate yardstick and when the delay went over this period, there was an onus on the Minister to explain the position.

141. The point made on behalf of the Applicants is that there is an onus on the Minister to explain whether or not any applicant’s case is or is not a straightforward case and if so, why the period of inquiry may be longer than the average time for delivery of a decision on an application for naturalisation.

142. In his Affidavit, Mr. Brennan further states that in the course of carrying out his examination, the Minister requests and receives information from external sources, including An Garda Síochána and is aware that An Garda Síochána may, where necessary, request and receive this material from agencies operating outside the State. At para. 28 of his Affidavit, Mr. Brennan avers that “[i]t must be emphasised that this process helps to ensure the maintenance of national security, the integrity of the process for determining applications for certificates of naturalisation and, ultimately, the integrity of the Irish passport. Until such time as these checks are completed, it is not possible for the Respondent to complete an assessment of “good character”, which is a statutory prerequisite laid down by the Oireachtas as essential prior to a final decision being made on a naturalisation application”.

143. In the decision of KM & GD v Minister for Justice [2007] IEHC 234, the High Court (Edwards J.) in considering the question of delay identified the following factors: (1) the period in question;

(2) the complexity of the issues to be considered; (3) the amount of information to be gathered and the extent of enquiries to be made; (4) the reasons advanced for the time taken; and (5) the likely prejudice to the applicant on account of delay. The decision in KM was considered in a number of subsequent decisions, including, for example, in Nearing and in Singh.

144. In Nearing at p. 217, the High Court (Cooke J.) considered that what constituted a ‘reasonable time’ depended on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the decision sought, the particularities of the applicant’s position, and the impact that any delay may have and also on the conduct of the administrative decision maker in dealing with such applications, together with any explanation given for the time taken. Cooke J. held at p. 217, para. 20 of Nearing, that mandamus should not issue against an administrative decision-maker, simply because there was a duty to make a decision. He observed that the remedy lay only in order to make good an illegal default in the discharge of a public duty. Consequently, he held, there must have been an express or implied wrongful refusal to make a decision on the part of the Minister, or, perhaps, such egregious and unjustified delay in dealing with the application as to be tantamount to a refusal in its effect. In Nearing, Cooke J. referred at p. 220, para. 29, to the “transparent manner in which the management of the scheme and the progress in reaching the application was explained from time to time, the court could not find that the time taken was culpably unreasonable. In view of the explanation and the indications given as to progress made towards reaching the batch of applications from August, 2007 it could not be said, in the court’s judgment, that there was any point at which the applicant became entitled to treat the time taken as a refusal in the sense outlined in Point Exhibition Co. Ltd. v. The Revenue Commissioners [1993] 2 I.R. 551.”

145. In considering what constitutes a ‘reasonable time’, therefore, and having regard to the fact that the ultimate conferral of citizenship is a privilege involving the application of absolute ministerial discretion, I consider that the Minister is entitled to carry out inquiries, including asking An Garda Síochána to carry out background checks (which in turn may involve an engagement with external agencies) which he deems to be rationally and reasonably necessary particularly where the Oireachtas in section s.15 of the 1956 Act require the Minister to be satisfied that an applicant is of good character before considering further to grant a certificate of naturalisation. In addition, the Minister has no control over the substance or timing of such inquiries carried out by An Garda Síochána (which may include further inquiries by An Garda Síochána with external agencies outside of the jurisdiction).

146. In applying the factors in KM, for example, the delay or efflux of time has to be seen in the overall context of the making of an application for citizenship or naturalisation. The delay in Ms. MJ’s case was approximately 40 months (3 years and 4 months), whereas the delay in Mr. AA’s case is 41 months (3 years and 5 months) from the time of their respective applications to the hearing of these cases in late October 2025. The second, third and fourth factors in KM (i.e., complexity, the information required and extent of enquiries to be made and the reasons given for the time taken) correlate with a ministerial request asking An Garda Síochána to carry out background checks (which may involve an engagement with external agencies) as part of the Minister’s assessment of the statutory criteria of ‘good character’ pursuant to the provisions of the 1956 Act and the Minister has no control over when the required information will be furnished to the Department. The Minister has, and is, engaged with the Applicants and their solicitors and, idiomatically, ‘has not sat on his hands’ or remained passive. The Minister has regularly sought updates. There is not a refusal and nor is the delay deemed to be a refusal. There is a required piece of information, over which the Minister has no control in relation to when it will be furnished, and this requires to be considered as part of the ministerial decision-making pursuant to the 1956 Act. On the question of any prejudice, whilst there is an understandable frustration at the time taken to process the respective applications, the Applicants are not without rights in terms of employment, social welfare, certain travel rights and conditional residence rights and both Applicants have security of status and benefits notwithstanding that a decision has not been furnished on their citizenship applications. Ultimately, the Minister is required to await an essential piece of information as part of his assessment of statutory criteria, in this case, ‘good character’. If, for example, an order of mandamus was directed to the Minister to issue a

decision without receipt of the full picture in relation to information pertaining to each Applicants’ character (or a declaration was to issue to the same effect), it is submitted, and I accept, that the Minister would be required at this juncture to issue a negative decision, which would not be in the Applicants’ interests and may be the subject of a further challenge.

147. Taking, for example, Mr. AA’s case, I accept the evidence of Mr. Cremins at paragraphs (10) and (11) of his Affidavit sworn on 18th September 2025 that the time taken for completion of the criteria in s. 15(1) of the 1956 Act, which in this case was focused on the criteria of “good character” involves examination of the application by the Department internally, as well as engagement with other departments and external agencies if necessary, including the Garda National Immigration Bureau and the Garda National Vetting Bureau and in certain circumstances, additional checks may become necessary which may involve engagement with agencies outside the State.

148. Mr. Cremins stated that any background checks undertaken, including by An Garda Síochána, form an important part of informing the Minister’s assessment of an Applicant’s character for the purposes of s. 15(1)(b) of the 1956 Act but this determination was not limited to those background checks alone. He further stated that the time taken for the completion of these checks varied depending on the circumstances “but are always ultimately completed.” In this regard, Mr. Cremins stated that “[i]n some instances, the checks required to be undertaken can be completed relatively quickly, whereas in others it can take more time, which may be outside of the control of the Department where it requires information from external agencies, departments, and bodies. Where information arises in the course of processing, including from external bodies, this may require correspondence with an applicant in order for particular matters to be addressed or information provided”.

CONCLUSION

149. The conferral of citizenship is a privilege. The decision-making process in assessing an application involves a ministerial evaluation of prescribed statutory criteria, including in these two applications the assessment of “good character” and depending on the outcome of that process, the ultimate conferral of the grant of citizenship lies in the absolute discretion of the Minister. These judicial review applications are concerned in the main with the first part of that assessment and the evaluation of the prescribed statutory criteria such as “good character”.

150. Mandamus does not issue against an administrative decision maker simply because there is a duty to make a decision. Mandamus lies to make good an illegal default in the discharge of a public duty. There must have been, either expressly or by implication, a wrongful refusal to make a decision or such an egregious and unjustified delay in dealing with the application as to be tantamount to a refusal in its effect: see Nearing at p. 217.

151. In circumstances where the Minister accepts that a decision must be made within a reasonable period, it is submitted on behalf of the Applicants that period cannot be indeterminate and the question arises, whether the stated position on behalf of the Minister is in fact indeterminate or open-ended such as that it is unreasonable.

152. Whilst maintaining the argument that the delay in the processing of the applications for the naturalisation of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA amount to a delays which are unreasonable and unlawful to the extent that they are entitled to an order of mandamus (or declaratory relief), it appears to be accepted on behalf of the Applicants that the greater the explanation given by the Minister for the delay in the processing of these applications by, for example, the furnishing of a sufficient level of information in relation to the background checks that were being carried out, then the greater leeway the Minister has in terms of the time taken to make a decision on the applications. It is submitted on behalf of the Applicants that they are entitled to a broad recitation, beyond what is argued is the minimalist information with which they have been furnished, for inter alia two reasons: first, it is argued that there is an obligation on the Minister (and his officials) to explain the delay; second, it is contended that the furnishing of such information allows an applicant to engage in the process and address any issues which may arise.

153. The general position of the Minister is encapsulated, by way of example, at para. 35 of Mr. Brennan’s Affidavit where he states that “[t]he Respondent appreciates that an applicant may feel aggrieved at having to wait a lengthy period of time for a decision on an application. However, the grant of a certificate of naturalisation is a privilege, not a right, and I believe that the Respondent must have regard to the interests of the State as outlined above. Until such time as the background checks in respect of the Applicant are completed, it is not possible for the Respondent to complete an assessment of good character, and this precludes the Respondent from making a decision on the present application”.

154. In addition to the matters raised in the correspondence between the parties and set out in this judgment, the Applicants, through their legal advisers were informed of the following: (i) final background checks were awaited (which may involve an engagement with external agencies outside of the State); (ii) on receipt of this required information from the background checks, and assuming there were no concerns arising from these final checks, it was anticipated that a

decision would be made within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of this required information;

(iii) the Applicants would receive a written notification of the decision; and (iv) in the event that a decision could not be made within this indicative timeframe, the Applicants’ solicitors would be advised of the situation.

155. Whilst during the hearing of these judicial review applications, views were canvassed on behalf of each of the parties about the nature of the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief, I am of the view that the Applicants are not entitled to any relief by way of judicial review in these cases. Therefore, the classic statement that such remedies are a discretionary remedy (as in Brady v Cavan County Council [1999] IESC 49; [1999] 4 I.R. 99, in the context of mandamus) does not arise on the facts of these applications for judicial review. What is often referred to, for example, as the exercise of judicial discretion is in fact a reference to where a court is required to explain why it is considered that in a particular case it is justified in withholding relief which would otherwise be ordered. That does not arise in these cases as I have determined that the Applicants are not entitled to the reliefs of mandamus or any declaratory relief: see Kelly v Minister for Agriculture & Ors [2021] IESC 62 (O’Donnell J., as he then was), Sister Mary Christian & Ors. v Dublin City Council (No. 1) [2012] IEHC 163; [2012] 2 I.R. 506 (Clarke J., as he then was).

156. In O’Donoghue v Keyes [2016] IEHC 262, the High Court (Barrett J.) carried out a review of the case law on mandamus and in his overview at para. 18, he referred to the key elements of mandamus as follows: “(1) the public dimension of the remedy, (2) the requirement that before seeking performance of a legal duty by mandamus, performance of same must have been sought and refused, albeit not necessarily the subject of an express refusal, (3) the general reluctance on the part of the courts to order mandamus where an equally effective and convenient remedy is available, (4) the requirement that where mandamus of a statutorily imposed duty is sought, that the duty has been clearly and unambiguously expressed in the applicable statute, and (5) the related requirement that for an order of mandamus to issue for the enforcement of a statutory right it must appear that the statute in question imposes a duty, the performance or nonperformance of which is not a matter of discretion”.

157. In this judgment, I have sought to weigh the impact on both the Applicants and the Minister of granting or refusing an order of mandamus in these cases (and, in the alternative, declaratory relief) in the context of what the Oireachtas has prescribed in the 1956 Act.

158. The nature of the ministerial duty under the 1956 Act, the fact that the ultimate conferral of citizenship is a privilege and not a vested right in the Applicants, the impact of the delay and elapse of time and the reason given for it and the consequences if mandamus was directed at this juncture are factors which are common to all applications for mandamus and have been considered in the cases of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA: see by analogy Re McD (A Child) [2024] IESC 6; [2024] 2 ILRM 153 per Murray J. at para. 13; Nearing v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 4 I.R. 211 at p. 217 (as discussed by Charleton J. in H v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IESC 32).

159. Ultimately, having regard to the context provided for in the 1956 Act, I do not consider that it is just and convenient to make an order of mandamus or declaratory relief: see the observations of Hogan J. in Re McD (A Child) [2024] IESC 6; [2024] 2 ILRM 153 per Hogan J. at para. 93.

160. I do not consider, in the circumstances of these two applications for judicial review, that either

(i) there has been an actual refusal to make a decision on each of the Applicant’s application for citizenship which amounts to a wrongful refusal or (ii) that the delays in making a decision in each of the cases of Ms. MJ and Mr. AA are “such an egregious and unjustified delay” in dealing with the their applications “so as to be tantamount to a refusal in its effect”: see Singh at para. 69; Point Exhibition Co. Ltd v The Revenue Commissioners [1993] 2 I.R. 551 at p. 555. The Minister has responded to each of the letters of inquiry sent on behalf of the Applicants and explained that the delay arose because of outstanding information over which the Minister has no control. Each of Applicants have been informed and made aware of the position.

161. In the circumstances, I refuse the reliefs sought by the Applicants in their respective judicial review applications.

PROPOSED ORDER

162. I propose to make an order refusing the reliefs sought by the Applicants in each of these judicial review applications.

163. I shall put the matter in before me on Tuesday 10th February 2026 at 10:30am to deal with the question of costs.

CONLETH BRADLEY

30th January 2026