High Court refuses stay of deportation order due to lack of practical consequences and safe country designation.

APPROVED

REDACTED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 50

Record No: 2025/1795 JR

BETWEEN/

A.M.A.

APPLICANT

-AND-

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION

RESPONDENT

(No.3)

RULING of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 30th day of January 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. This ruling arises from an interlocutory application made on Monday 19th January 2026 for a stay on the execution of a deportation order pending an application to the Supreme Court seeking to appeal an ex tempore ruling delivered on Tuesday 16th December 2025 where I refused an application made the previous evening (Monday 15th December 2025) for leave to apply for judicial review and an injunction.

2. The Applicant had applied for leave to apply for judicial review, on notice to the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (“the Minister”), to challenge a deportation order dated 3rd October 2025 which had been served on him by letter dated 9th October 2025 and an injunction restraining the implementation of the deportation order.

3. During the week beginning Monday 15th December to Saturday 20th December 2025, I refused the following applications made by the Applicant: (i) the application for leave to apply for judicial review challenging a deportation order together with an application for an injunction restraining the Applicant’s deportation (the “principal ruling” delivered on Tuesday 16th December 2025); and (ii) an application for a certificate for leave to appeal the aforesaid refusals to the Court of Appeal (the “second ruling” delivered on Saturday 20th December 2025).

4. After refusing the application for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the point of law proposed pursuant to s. 5(6)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), having regard to the fact that this ruling was given on Saturday 20th December 2025, when the Courts were closed for the Christmas vacation, and that its effect meant that if the Applicant wanted to pursue the matter any further, an application would have to be made for admission to the Supreme Court, I placed a temporary stay on the deportation order (the subject of the judicial review challenge) until 19th January 2026, the week after the commencement of the new term. After delivering that ruling on Saturday 20th December 2025, Senior Counsel for the Applicant indicated that the matter was concluded insofar as the High Court was concerned and that the only avenue available to the Applicant would be an application to the Supreme Court.

5. For what were essentially practical reasons, without any interlocutory hearing of the matter, and having regard to the particular time of year, the fact that the courts were closed and that the new term would not commence until Monday 12th January 2026, and in circumstances where a certificate application to appeal to the Court of Appeal had been refused, I considered that a temporary and time-limited stay on the deportation order to 19th January 2026 was warranted to allow the Applicant make an application to the Supreme Court, as indicated. By analogy, that approach was in keeping, in general terms, with the observations of the Supreme Court (Hogan J.) in MD v The Board of Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 (para.42) that if granting interim relief in judicial review proceedings, “that relief should be time limited, and it should also provide that the onus lies with the moving party to apply for interlocutory relief on notice to the respondent.”

6. In this interlocutory application, the Applicant accepts that he is not in any sense entitled, because of the exceptional circumstances in which the temporary and time-limited stay was granted, that it be renewed simpliciter. Each of the parties accept that it is appropriate that this application for a stay be now made.

7. A letter dated 15th January 2026 from the Applicant’s solicitor together with the Application for Leave to Appeal (to the Supreme Court) dated 15th January 2026 describes what occurred after the High Court ruling on Saturday 20th December 2025.

8. In summary, it appears that the appeal or application to the Supreme Court was not in fact filed in the Supreme Court until 15th January 2026, rather than 7th January 2026, and is, therefore, also the subject of an extension of time application to the Supreme Court. It is explained that this arose due to a misunderstanding both in relation to the expiry of the time limit for filing the Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court and also as to when time would run from the order made on 16th December 2025 (and perfected on 18th December 2025).

THE APPLICABLE TEST

9. The parties agree that the test to be applied in this application is that set out by the Supreme Court in its decisions in CC & Ors v The Minister for Justice & Ors [2016] 2 I.R. 680 (“CC”) referring to Okunade v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 49, [2012] 3 I.R. 152 (“Okunade”) and in MD v The Board of Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 (“MD”).

10. In CC, the Supreme Court held that in considering whether to grant a stay or an interlocutory injunction pending the hearing of an appeal, the court should apply the test applicable to applications for interlocutory orders pending a trial at first instance as set out in Okunade. The first question was as to whether there was any stateable or arguable basis for the appeal itself. If there was, then the court had to assess the potential injustice that might result from, on the one hand, intervening in favour of the appellant only to find that the appellant lost, as opposed to not intervening in favour of the appellant only to find that the appeal was successful.

APPLICATION OF THE TEST

11. Whilst there is scope for potential confusion as to the standards to be applied when the standard for the leave application in a challenge to a deportation order is ‘substantial grounds’, the test for an injunction is that set out in Okunade, the first limb of which, at para. 104(a) of Clarke J.’s judgment, provides that the court should first determine whether the applicant has established an arguable case and if not, the application must be refused, and the standard for the certificate application is whether the principal ruling involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken, the authorities cited make clear that my overarching approach in considering the parties’ arguments in this interlocutory application is to minimise the risk of injustice and to apply the test set out in Okunade, CC and MD.

12. The weight to be attached to the considerations will vary depending on the type of case and the individual facts and whilst the precise application of the underlying principle, which requires the court to act in a manner which gives rise to the least risk of injustice, may also vary in the context of an order sought pending appeal in contrast to an order sought pending trial, Clarke

J. stated in both Okunade and CC, that the broad principle and approach must remain the same whether it is an injunction/stay application pending an appeal application or an injunction/stay application pending trial.

13. In CC at paragraph 27, Clarke J. (as he then was) referred to the approach set out at paras 110 and 111 at pp. 195 and 196 in Okunade, as follows:

“[110] The default position is, therefore, that an applicant will not be entitled to a stay or an injunction. However, it may be that, on the facts of any individual case, there are further factors that can properly be taken into account on either side. If, for example, (and it should be made clear that no such consideration arises on the facts of this case) there was a serious risk of criminality or other activity contrary to the public interest then that would be a factor to which significant additional weight would lie on the side of refusing an injunction. Perhaps more likely an applicant must, of course, be entitled to put before the court the practical consequences of being deported pending the

conclusion of the judicial review process, such as the relevant conditions in any country to which the applicant is likely to be deported. There may, as already noted and as the trial judge recognised, be some cases where the presence of the applicant for the hearing of the judicial review proceedings is necessary. If that is so then all due weight needs to be attached to that factor. In a case where an applicant would suffer material prejudice in the presentation of the case at trial very great weight would need to be attached to that fact. [111] Furthermore, if an applicant can demonstrate that deportation, even on a temporary basis, would cause more than what one might describe as the ordinary disruption in being removed from a country in which the relevant applicant wished to live, such as a particular risk to the individual or a specific risk of irremediable damage then such factors, if sufficiently weighty, could readily tilt the balance in favour of the grant of an injunction or a stay.”

14. In terms of the arguments made on behalf of the Applicant in this application, and bearing in mind the developments outlined above which have occurred after the initial ‘leave’ application was made on 15th December 2025 including the Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court dated 15th January 2026, in making an assumption that the Applicant has established a stateable or arguable basis for the appeal, I must then assess the potential injustice that might result from, on the one hand, intervening in favour of the Applicant only to find that he has lost, as opposed to not intervening in his favour only to find that the appeal was successful, on the other hand. What this means practically for the Applicant is that if I do not grant a stay, in all likelihood he will be deported and if he succeeds in his application to extend and his admission to appeal before the Supreme Court, the question arises as to whether this would amount to an injustice to the Applicant and, alternatively, if I do grant a stay and the Supreme Court refuses his applications, the question arises as to whether this would amount to an injustice to the Minister.

15. Taking each of the arguments made on behalf of the Applicant in this application in turn, firstly, insofar as it is argued that the Applicant remains in custody (since December 2025) pending his deportation, I do not consider that this is a factor which weighs in favour of a stay being granted. Section 5 of the Immigration Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) expressly provides for the arrest, detention and removal of non-nationals and persons in the position of the Applicant.

16. Then, in the covering letter from the Applicant’s solicitor dated 15th January 2026, and in submissions made on behalf of the Applicant, reference was also made inter alia to s. 5(8) of the 1999 Act. At the hearing of the interlocutory application, it was submitted that s. 5(8) meant that the Applicant could only be detained for a maximum of 56 days in aggregate which, I was informed, is due to expire on 14th February 2026. However, the fact that the Applicant is in custody and may be due to be deported prior to 14th February 2026 represents the orderly implementation of the deportation order in a process prescribed by the Oireachtas in the 1999 Act. I do not consider that this is a factor which weighs in favour of a stay being granted.

17. Next, it was submitted that the Applicant’s solicitor had requested that the application for an extension of time to appeal, and the application made to the Supreme Court in relation to the appeal itself, be dealt with by the Supreme Court on an urgent basis and reference was made again to (i) the fact that the Applicant is in custody and (ii) that the 56-day period expires on 14th February 2026. As just set out, I consider that the Applicant being in custody and the expiry of the 56-day period on 14th February 2026 is a consequence of the orderly operation of the 1999 Act. Further, whether the Supreme Court accedes to the Applicant’s request as to how his application is dealt with is a matter for the Supreme Court alone and I have not had regard to what the Applicant has described as the misunderstandings by counsel on his behalf during the making of the application/appeal to the Supreme Court. I, therefore, do not consider that this argument weighs in favour of granting a stay on the deportation order.

18. In considering the arguments made by the parties in this application for a stay on the deportation order, and in carrying out that balancing exercise, the orderly implementation of the deportation order has a significant value (see Collins J. in MD applying Okunade).

19. In this interlocutory application, the Applicant further submits that he relies on the arguments which he previously made on the certificate application seeking to appeal on a point of law to the Court of Appeal.

20. In MD, Collins J. explained that the Supreme Court had held in Okunade that the entitlement of those conferred with statutory or other power or authority to make legally binding decisions

– in this case, the Minister – was an important part of the structure of any legal order based on the rule of law.

21. It followed that significant weight must be given to permitting measures which are prima facie valid to be “carried out in a regular and orderly way” and that all due weight needed to be accorded to “allowing the systems and processes by which lawful power [was] to be exercised to operate in an orderly fashion.” Collins J. also observed that whilst deportation orders applied to individuals, in every such case, the potential suspension of a presumptively valid public law measure engaged considerations of the public interest. This is essentially a summary of the factors referred to by Clarke J. at paras 104(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) in Okunade.

22. At paragraph 28 of his judgment in CC, Clarke J. referred to paras. 98 and 99, pp. 190 and 191 of his judgment in Okunade and the appropriate weight that can be given to the strength or weakness of the case insofar as the challenge does not involve contested issues of fact or complex questions of law (a similar factor is outlined by Clarke J. in Okunade at para. 104(d) to the effect in considering where the greatest risk of injustice would lie, a court can, in addition, and subject to the issues arising on the judicial review not involving detailed investigations of fact or complex questions of law, consider the strength or weakness of an applicant’s case).

23. In the principal ruling, I addressed the leave application and not the substantive application. I applied the threshold standard of ‘substantial grounds’ and also pointed out that as this application was on notice, the court’s inquiry at the leave stage could be more detailed as I had the benefit of the Applicant’s Affidavit and exhibits and the Affidavit and exhibit of Elaine Houlihan (12th December 2025), Assistant Principal Officer in the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration, on behalf of the Minister. I referred in this regard to the observations of the Supreme Court (Charleton J.) in Esmé v The Minister for Justice and Law Reform [2015] IESC 26 and in Burke & Anor. v Minister for Education & Ors [2022] IESC 1 where in dealing with the lower threshold of ‘arguability’, Charleton J., at para. 15 of Esmé, stated inter alia that “a point of law is only arguable within the meaning of the relevant decisions if it could, by the standards of a rational preliminary analysis, ultimately have a prospect of success” and excluded reliance of what he referred to as the ‘barely arguable’ or ‘mere arguability’.

24. Mindful that due weight requires to be accorded to “allowing the systems and processes by which lawful power [was] to be exercised to operate in an orderly fashion” (per Collins J. in MD), the Affidavit of Ms. Houlihan, on behalf of the Minister, at paras 13, 14 and 15 summarised the Applicant’s engagement in this process prescribed pursuant to the 2015 Act including that under cover of letter dated 9th October 2025, the Minister had served a deportation order dated 3rd October 2025 and the Section 50 Report dated 1st October 2025 on the Applicant and his solicitors.

25. Ms. Houlihan stated that the letter dated 9th October 2025 informed the Applicant of the headline reasons for the making of the Order by reference “to the relevant provisions of [the 2015 Act]. Broadly, these might be summarised as the fact of the Applicant’s unsuccessful applications for international protection; the fact of the Applicant’s unsuccessful application for permission to remain in the State; the fact that the Applicant had not availed of the opportunity to voluntary return; and the negative conclusion regarding the possibility of refoulement … (15) … these adjudications had all been previously notified to the Applicant, in English, together with a narrative discussing and explaining the detailed reasons for the

decision in each case. Accordingly, insofar as the Applicant might imply otherwise, it is clear from the foregoing that the Applicant has been informed of the reasons which resulted in permission to remain in the State being refused and upon which ultimately the Deportation Order is based. In addition, the Applicant did not request any of the decisions or notifications in a language other than in English.”

26. In addressing these matters, the applicable legislative architecture and manner of the Applicant’s challenge require to be considered.

27. At the hearing on 15th December 2025, the parties agreed that the issue came down to the net issue of statutory interpretation: the interpretation of s. 51(3) of the 2015 Act. The principal ruling subsequently delivered the next morning applied the principles of statutory interpretation which have been restated in a number of judgments of the Superior Courts such as in Heather Hill Management Company v An Bord Pleanála [2022] 2 ILRM 313, A, B & C v The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade [2023] 1 ILRM 335, TRI v The Minister for Foreign Affairs and The Minister for Justice [2025] IESC 7 and People (DPP) v Crawford [2024] IESC 44 to the effect, in summary, that the words in a statutory provision cannot be viewed in the abstract or in isolation and rather must be viewed in context, having regard to the subject matter and the objective of those provisions.

28. To recap, s. 51 of the 2015 Act provides for the making and notification of deportation orders.

29. Section 51(1) of the 2015 Act provides that, subject to section 50 and subsection (1A), the Minister shall make an order under this section (“deportation order”) in relation to a person where the Minister:

(a) has refused under section 47 both to give a refugee declaration and to give a subsidiary protection to the person, and

(b) is satisfied that section 48(5) does not apply in respect of the person, and

(c) has refused under section 49(4) to give the person a permission under that section.

30. Section 51(2) of the 2015 Act provides that “a deportation order shall require the person specified in the order to leave the State within such period as may be specified in the order and thereafter to remain out of the State.”

31. Section 51(3) of the 2015 Act provides that “where the Minister makes a deportation order, he or she shall notify the person specified in the order of the making of the order and of the reasons for it and, where necessary and possible, the person shall be given a copy of the notification in a language that the person understands.”

32. Section 5(1)(oj) of the 2000 Act inter alia provides that a person shall not question the validity of a deportation order under s. 51 of the 2015 Act otherwise than by way of an application for judicial review under O. 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.

33. Section 5(2) of the 2000 Act provides that leave to apply for judicial review shall not be granted unless the High Court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the deportation order is invalid or ought to be quashed.

34. The seeking of an appeal in the circumstances of this case is governed by s. 5(6)(a) of the 2000 Act which provides as follows:

“The determination of the High Court of an application for leave to apply for judicial review to which this section applies, or of an application for such judicial review, shall be final and no appeal shall lie from the decision of the High Court to the [Court of Appeal] in either case except with the leave of the High Court which leave shall only be granted where the High Court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the [Court of Appeal].” (The previous reference to the Supreme Court was replaced by the Court of Appeal arising from s. 74(1) of the Court of Appeal Act 2014).

35. In the principal ruling I held, based on the facts before me, that whilst the Applicant had availed of the services of an interpreter in his questionnaire and interview under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, insofar as the matters referred to in s. 51(1) of the 2015 Act are concerned, the Applicant, who was legally represented, had been informed directly in relation to these matters in English, without translation, and without objection.

36. This included notification on 12th February 2025 of his refusal of refugee status and subsidiary protection (section 39) and refusal of permission/leave to remain (section 49). The Applicant had appealed to the IPAT and was notified that his appeal had been refused by decision of the IPAT dated 19th August 2025. On 25th August 2025, the Applicant sought a review of the refusal seeking for permission to remain and the principal ruling referred to a number of documents which included references in support of the Applicant. All of these matters were conducted through English and without objection by or on behalf of the Applicant, who was legally represented.

37. By letter dated 19th September 2025, which was exhibited to the Affidavit of Ms. Houlihan dated 12th December 2025, the Applicant was informed of the following, through English, that: under s. 47(5) of the 2015 Act, the Minister was refusing him a refugee or subsidiary protection declaration; that the Minister had decided pursuant to s. 49(4)(b) of the 2015 Act (with reasons attached in a Notice issued under s. 48(3) of the 2015 Act) to refuse him permission to remain in the State.

38. The letter then addressed the Applicant’s current status, his Temporary Residence Certificate (TRC), permission to access the labour market, set out the next steps which included the statement that “[y]ou no longer have permission to remain in the State and you must now return voluntarily to your country of origin or be deported” and set out details in relation to ‘Voluntary Return’ and ‘Deportation’. Again, the facts are that neither the Applicant, nor his legal advisers, raised any issue that these matters were communicated to the Applicant in English.

39. The principal ruling then referred to the letter of notification dated 9th October 2025 which contained the Deportation Order dated 3rd October 2025, both of which were notified to the Applicant in English. It set out the Applicant’s case, as made at the hearing before me, the approach to statutory interpretation as set out above, the case law relied upon by the Applicant and the Minister, the provisions of s. 47(5) and s. 51 of the 2015 Act and referred inter alia to the decision of the High Court (Humphreys J.) in MZA (Pakistan) v The Minister for Justice [2018] IEHC 784.

40. The principal ruling also referred to authorities relied upon by the Applicant, including K.A v The Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 556, the decision of Humphreys J. in I.I. (Nigeria) v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IEHC 392 and, as stated, the decision of Humphreys

J. in M.Z.A, the decision of Barrett J. of 26th May 2016 in McEvoy v Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2016] IEHC 269 and reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in S.E. v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] 3 I.R. 317, and the particular reliance placed on paragraphs 7 to 9 at p. 321 of that judgment, which dealt with a deportation order in relation to an Egyptian national. The principal ruling set out that in S.E. the Supreme Court held, in allowing the appeal, that s. 6 of the Immigration Act 1999 permitted two methods of service, either personal service or by prepaid registered post, and there was nothing intrinsically absurd or creating impossibility in an interpretation of the section that found that placing a letter on the departmental file was not service by registered post at the last known address, and secondly, that to construct an entirely new provision governing a situation where no address was provided at which service of a notice could have been effected, went further than s. 5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 permitted.

41. In the principal ruling I held that, with the possible exception of MZA (Pakistan) v The Minister for Justice [2018] IEHC 784 and its reference to s. 51(3) of the 2015 Act, the authorities relied upon by the Applicant did not deal directly with the particular point at issue in this application, which was one of statutory interpretation, contextually set out, arising from the decisions in Heather Hill, and I referred to the fact that I had set out in some detail the immediate factual background, and the processes that lead to the deportation order which was sought to be challenged.

42. The approach adopted in the principal ruling, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and that the words in section 51 of the 2015 Act cannot be viewed in the abstract or in isolation and rather must be viewed in the context, having regard to the Applicant’s case which included the communication and notification to him in English of the refusal pursuant to section 47 of the 2015 Act both to give a refugee declaration and to give a subsidiary protection to the Applicant, the communication in English that the Minister was satisfied that s. 48(5) did not apply in respect of the Applicant, and the communication that the Applicant had been refused leave to remain under s. 49(4) of the 2015 Act, I did not consider, in the interpretation of s. 51(3), in the Applicant’s case, that there had been a breach of section 51 of the 2015 Act and that it was not necessary for the notification of the Deportation Order to be in Arabic, which was the gravamen of the Applicant’s case. I refused the Applicant leave to apply for judicial review.

43. Notwithstanding the consequences of that refusal on the injunction application, I nonetheless referred to the respective arguments made by each of the parties and their respective reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Okunade v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] 3 I.R. 152 and arguments made, and refused the injunction sought, and stated I did so for the same reasons as I had refused the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

44. Turning to the statutory provisions which provide for an appeal, the certificate application was heard on Friday 19th December 2025 (which was the last day of Michaelmas term).

45. I delivered a second ruling on that application on Saturday 20th December 2025 and I refused the Applicant’s application for a certificate to appeal the ruling delivered on Tuesday 16th December 2025 to the Court of Appeal.

46. The second ruling found that the proposed question – in providing that a copy of the notification of a deportation order and the reasons for it shall be “where necessary and possible” given to the subject of the deportation order “in a language that the person understands”, does s.51(3) of the International Protection Act 2015 require that the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration assess in each case whether it is necessary to translate the notification, or is the Minister only obliged to carry out this assessment when requested to do so by the person in question? – did not meet the cumulative requirements that (a) the point of law sought to be certified must be of exceptional public importance and (b) it must be in the public interest that an appeal be brought pursuant to s.5(6)(a) of the 2000 Act.

47. In summary, I refused the certificate application for the following reasons:

(i) the caselaw applicable to the equivalent section in the planning code has also emphasised the exceptionality of the appellate jurisdiction (i.e., to be invoked sparingly) and the objective of the Oireachtas in seeking finality, certainty and expedition in challenges brought by way of judicial review (CHASE v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 231 per Barniville J. (as he then was)) at paragraph 32;

(ii) the proposed question was not a point of law which arose from the decision in the principal ruling in this case and a point which was not decided cannot amount to a such a point of law;

(iii) a point of law was required to be formulated in a manner which indicated how it was determinative of the proceedings and should not invite a discursive exercise from the appellate court (see Monkstown Road Residents’ Association v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 9 per Holland J. at paragraph 8). The closer a point of law was to the application of clear and well-established legal principles, the more difficult it is to satisfy the requirement that the point of law is one of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that there be an appeal on the point;

(iv) in this certificate application, both parties had agreed that the central matter was one of statutory interpretation. As the application was on notice, and the Minister had filed an Affidavit with an exhibit, I had the benefit of evidence on affidavit from both the Applicant and an official on behalf of the Minister. I was, therefore, in a position to carry out an inquiry at a greater level of detail than would be the case if the matter had been made ex parte;

(v) the point of law of exceptional public importance in respect of which it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken, must (a) emanate from the decision in the principal ruling (rather than the merits of the parties’ arguments made during the course of the hearing which led to that decision) and (b) transcend the facts that arise in the fact-specific context of a particular case;

(vi) in the Applicant’s case, the principal ruling, and the decision therein, addressed the matter from the perspective of the interpretation of s. 51(3) of the 2015 Act and considered the provisions in context having regard to the subject matter of the Applicant’s application and the objective of these provisions i.e., by reference to the language, place, function and context;

(vii) as mentioned, the initial leave application was made on notice and therefore the inquiry as to whether substantial grounds had been met was in the context of the facts set out by both parties which allowed for a greater detail of inquiry compared to an ex parte application. The proposed question of law in this case was not a transcendent factor which arose from the decision in the principal ruling but rather was framed in a way that sought to present what is in essence a fresh fact-finding inquiry in relation to all deportations rather than emanating from the decision in the principal ruling;

(viii) the fact that s. 51(1) and (3) of the 2015 Act may have application to all deportation orders did not, in and of itself, mean that it was of exceptional public importance. As stated, the requirements that (a) the point of law sought to be certified must be of exceptional public importance and (b) it must be in the public interest that an appeal be brought, are cumulative;

(ix) as to whether it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal be brought, there was no uncertainty or lack of clarity in the law. In the approach adopted to the interpretation of s. 51 in the principal ruling, the provisions of s. 51 were viewed in context having regard to the Applicant’s case, which included the communication and notification to him in English of the refusal pursuant to s. 47 of the 2015 Act both to give a refugee declaration and subsidiary protection to the Applicant, the communication in English that the Minister was satisfied that s. 48(5) did not apply in respect of the Applicant, and the communication that the Applicant had been refused leave to remain under s. 49(4) of the 2015 Act. All of this had been communicated in English without objection.

(x) Accordingly, in the principal judgment, I did not consider that there had been a breach of s. 51, including s. 51(3) of the 2015 Act. I held that it was not necessary for the notification of the deportation order to be in Arabic, which had formed the central basis of the Applicant’s case. There was no uncertainty, therefore, arising from the decision in the principal ruling which would warrant it desirable in the public interest that an appeal be brought.

(xi) Reference had been made in a very general manner (with no specific details) as to what was said to be a case where another High Court judge had granted leave but it appears, without any detail being available about that case, it was not on notice and the equivalent issue was not the main aspect of the case. The raising of an argument on a proposed point of law did not mean that the law was uncertain. The uncertainty must arise over and above the mere fact that an argument can be made on the point. In the judgment of the High Court in Glancré Teoranta v An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 250 at paragraph 9, MacMenamin J. stated that “‘uncertainty’ cannot be ‘imputed’ to the law by an applicant simply by raising a question as to the point of law. Rather, the authorities appear to indicate that the uncertainty must arise over and above this, for example in the daily operation of the law in question.”

48. I, therefore, do not consider that the arguments made by the Applicant and determined in the principal ruling and the second ruling weigh in favour of granting a stay of the deportation order.

49. In this application for a stay on the deportation order served on the Applicant, and having regard to the matters set out by Clarke J. at para. 104(b)(iv) of Okunade (that the court give all due weight to the consequences for the Applicant of being required to comply with the measure under challenge in circumstances where that measure may be found to be unlawful), I do not consider that the Applicant has established that there are adverse practical consequences of being deported pending his application to the Supreme Court or prior to 14th February 2026 such as, for example, the relevant conditions in Egypt, which is designated as a safe country under s. 72 of the 2015 Act and is the country to which the Applicant is likely to be deported or that the presence of the Applicant is necessary insofar as the determination of the Supreme Court of his applications to that Court or that anything more than ordinary disruption in being removed would apply to his circumstances.

50. Accordingly, I refuse this application for a stay or injunction on the deportation order dated 3rd October 2025 which had been served on the Applicant by letter dated 9th October 2025.

PROPOSED ORDER

51. I propose to make an order refusing the Applicant’s application for a stay or injunction on the deportation order.

52. My provisional view is that as the Respondent has been entirely successful in opposing this application for a stay, the default position under sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, together with Order 99 of the (recast) Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (as amended), applies, and the Respondent would be presumptively entitled to recover such measured legal costs against the Applicant which may be agreed, or adjudicated upon in default of agreement, by the Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicator.

53. If a different costs order is sought by either party in relation to this application, the parties’ respective solicitors can arrange a date for the matter to be further mentioned by contacting the Registrar.

CONLETH BRADLEY

30th January 2026