High Court confirms Medical Council's decision to cancel doctor's registration and impose three-year ban under Medical Practitioners Act 2007.

[APPROVED]

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 458

Record No. 2026 268 MCA

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 71 OF THE MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS ACT

2007 AND IN THE MATTER OF A REGISTERED MEDICAL PRACTITIONER

AND ON THE APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAL COUNCIL

BETWEEN

MEDICAL COUNCIL

APPLICANT

AND

SYED WAQAS BUKHARI

RESPONDENT

Ex tempore JUDGMENT of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court, delivered on the 22nd day of June 2026

1. Introduction

1. This is my judgment on an application brought by the Medical Council (the “Applicant” or the “Council”) for an order in relation to the Respondent doctor, Syed Waqas Bukhari, under the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 (as amended) (the “2007 Act”) to confirm the

decision of the Council made at its meeting on 22 January 2026 to cancel the Respondent’s registration pursuant to s. 71(1)(f) of the 2007 Act, and that the Respondent be prohibited from applying for restoration to the register for a period of three years from the date of cancellation pursuant to s. 71(1)(g) of the 2007 Act.

2. I previously delivered judgments in July 2022, December 2022 and May 2023 in relation to the Respondent in the context of s. 60 proceedings seeking to suspend the Respondent’s registration and on an application brought by Mediahuis to lift the anonymisation of the Respondent. I give further detail on those judgments later in my judgment.

3. This is a case that was described by the Council’s Fitness to Practise committee (the “Committee”) as being one of the most serious cases to ever come before it, and it is indeed an extremely serious case.

2. Factual Background to the Application

4. The circumstances leading to this application are set out in the grounding affidavit of Dr Maria O’Kane, Chief Executive Officer of the Council. In her affidavit, Dr O’Kane explains that the Respondent doctor, with an address in Pakistan, is registered on the General Division of the register maintained by the Council.

5. A number of complaints have been made by the Council to the Preliminary Proceedings Committee of the Council (the “PPC”). The first of those complaints was made on 7 May 2021. That complaint arose in circumstances where the Respondent, in completing his Annual Retention Application Form (“ARAF”) for the year 2020-21, gave as a response to a question which asked if he had been convicted of any criminal offences in or outside the State or if he was aware of any criminal investigations in being against him, the Respondent stated “careless drink driving without insurance”. The Council sought further information from the Respondent in relation to the response provided by him. Following further engagement between the Council and the Respondent, the Respondent clarified the position on 6 December 2020 as follows:

“I was charged in Cavan court with drunk careless driving with no insurance and possession of marijuana. I have to do 240 hours of community service and banned from driving for at least 5 years. There is no third party involved and the case is closed in court”.

6. While it is unnecessary for me to provide detail here, it is clear that the Respondent has been convicted of at least eight offences, a number of which involved driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, driving at excessive speed, driving without insurance and driving while disqualified. A number of those convictions were unsuccessfully appealed by the Respondent to the Circuit Court, and I have been provided with the details of the charges made and the orders referrable to them.

7. The PPC decided at a meeting held on 26 October 2022 that there was a prima facie case to warrant further action being taken in relation to the complaint on the grounds of alleged professional misconduct, an alleged contravention of a provision of the 2007 Act, and an alleged relevant medical disability arising out of that complaint concerning drink driving and drug driving convictions.

8. In light of the information disclosed to the Council in relation to some of those drink and drug driving offences, the Council made an application to the Court on 25 November 2021 for an order directing that the Respondent’s registration be suspended and that he be prohibited from engaging in the practice of medicine until steps or further steps were taken under Part 7 and, if applicable, Parts 8 and 9 of the 2007 Act, in other words, the fitness to practise provisions. That application was made initially to Irvine P. The Respondent gave an undertaking to the Court on 26 November 2021 not to engage in the practice of medicine until such steps or further steps were taken under the 2007 Act. The matter came before Irvine P on a number of occasions and the undertakings offered by the Respondent on 26 November 2021 were revised and accepted by the Court on various dates in 2021 and 2022. The Council’s application was ultimately dealt with by me in late July 2022.

9. In a judgment I delivered on 29 July 2022 (Medical Council v B [2022] IEHC 503), I decided, on a very finely balanced basis, to accept revised undertakings from the Respondent. Those undertakings, which had been proposed as a fall-back position by the Council, were ultimately accepted by the Council and accepted by me. In the course of those s. 60 proceedings, various other matters emerged which led to an application being made on behalf of Mediahuis to lift the requirement under s. 60 of the 2007 Act that the proceedings be dealt with otherwise than in public. I delivered a judgment on 21 December 2022 in relation to that application lifting the anonymity order which previously applied to the proceedings (Medical Council v B [2022] IEHC 723). Finally, in the course of those proceedings and following further information which came to light in the intervening period, the Medical Council made another s. 60 application in March 2023 to suspend the Respondent’s registration. It alleged that the Respondent had not, in fact, complied with the undertakings accepted by the Court on 29 July 2022. I revisited my earlier judgment of 29 July 2022 and delivered another judgment on that issue on 23 May 2023 (Medical Council v Bukhari [2023] IEHC 429) in which I acceded to the Council’s application, and I made an order suspending the Respondent from practice until steps or further steps were taken under the 2007 Act.

10. A second complaint was made by the Council to the PPC on 21 June 2023. That complaint concerned various alleged breaches by the Respondent of the undertakings given to Irvine P (on various dates in 2021 and 2022) and to me on 29 July 2022. That complaint also included an allegation in relation to the Respondent’s alleged exhibiting of a falsified reference to his affidavit sworn on 10 December 2021 in the context of the s. 60 proceedings before the Court.

11. The PPC held another meeting on 6 March 2024, and it formed the opinion that there was a prima facie case to warrant further action being taken in relation to the complaint made against the Respondent on 21 June 2023 on the grounds of alleged professional misconduct and/or professional performance.

12. The Chief Executive Officer of the Council (the “CEO”) moved an application before the Committee on 26 September 2024 for the complaints made on 7 May 2021 and 21 June 2023 to be heard together at a single inquiry. The Committee acceded to the CEO’s application. A combined Notice of Inquiry (the “Notice”) was sent to the Respondent on 28 March 2025. The allegation made in relation to the alleged exhibiting by the Respondent of a falsified reference to his affidavit sworn on 10 December 2021 in the context of the s. 60 proceedings before the Court at that time did not form part of the inquiry.

13. A number of allegations of professional misconduct and poor professional performance were made against the Respondent in the Notice. They included a series of allegations arising from the Respondent’s extensive convictions of road traffic offences, including offences of driving while intoxicated and driving under the influence of drugs, driving without insurance and driving while disqualified. It was alleged that the allegations amounted to conduct “which doctors of experience, competence and good repute consider disgraceful or dishonourable”.

14. It was also alleged in the Notice that the Respondent had breached the undertakings he had given to the Court on 20 December 2021 to “uphold the law in terms of driving license and insurance legislation and the Misuse of Drugs Act [1977]” and the undertakings given by him on 29 July 2022 in relation to co-operating with the Health Committee and his own medical practitioners.

15. It was further alleged that the Respondent failed to reply, in a timely manner or at all, to multiple emails from a representative of the Health Committee and that he failed to participate in a review session with that committee. It was alleged also that the Respondent drove while disqualified and without insurance on 14 February 2022 and that, on 19 May 2022, he was convicted of driving while disqualified and without insurance on 14 February 2022.

16. Finally, it was alleged that the Respondent suffered from a relevant medical disability in the form of an addiction to alcohol and/or drugs, which might impair his ability to practise medicine or a particular aspect thereof. That allegation was pursued on the ground of an alleged relevant medical disability. The allegations against the Respondent in relation to allegedly breaching undertakings and driving while disqualified and without insurance were pursued on the ground of professional misconduct only.

3. The Inquiry

17. The inquiry took place before the Committee over a number of days on 29-31 July 2025 and on 25 August 2025. The Respondent was not present and was not legally represented on any of those dates. However, the Committee was satisfied that the Respondent had been served with the papers for the inquiry and that he was on notice of the dates on which the inquiry took place. The inquiry was held in public, save for the aspect of the inquiry dealing with the allegation in relation to relevant medical disability, which was held in private.

18. I should say that it appears that the Respondent has left Ireland and that he returned to Pakistan at some point in recent years. It seems that the Respondent has been practising as a doctor in that jurisdiction while these proceedings have been ongoing in Ireland.

4. The Report of the Committee

19. Following the inquiry, the Committee prepared a report of its findings dated 16 September 2025. The Committee found that the allegations against the Respondent in relation to allegedly breaching undertakings and driving while disqualified and without insurance were proven as to fact, and that they amounted to professional misconduct. The Committee found that the allegation against the Respondent in relation to relevant medical disability was not proven as to fact.

20. The Committee then dealt in its report with the question of sanction. In the course of its findings, the Committee noted that the Respondent had demonstrated total disregard for the rule of law and the imposition of previous convictions on him by a court. The Committee was of the opinion that the Respondent’s conduct in those respects was “dangerous, reckless, antisocial and disgraceful when carried out by any person but particularly so when carried out by a professional person such as a medical practitioner”. The Committee also said that the Respondent had demonstrated “a frightening disregard [with his obligation] to comply with road traffic legislation which is in place to ensure everybody’s safety” and for “…the lives and safety of other road users and the laws of this country”. The Committee was of the view that the conduct of the Respondent, on any analysis, was of “an entirely outrageous and disgraceful character”.

21. The Committee also found that the breaches by the Respondent of solemn promises made to the High Court by way of undertakings was a most serious matter, and that it was clear to the Committee that the Respondent had shown a complete disregard for the law of the land and for his obligation to comply with solemn promises made to the High Court, in the context of compliance with those undertakings being essential for the Respondent continuing to practise medicine. These breaches, according to the Committee, fundamentally undermined the values of integrity and honesty which doctors are required to uphold in their practice.

22. In light of those extremely serious findings of professional misconduct, the Committee recommended that the Respondent’s registration be cancelled and that the Respondent be prohibited from applying for restoration to the register for a period of three years.

23. The Committee then explained its rationale for that decision, and noted that it had regard to various mitigating and aggravating factors. Those mitigating factors included the following. The Committee noted that while it made no finding of relevant medical disability, it did make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, it was likely that the Respondent was suffering from Alcohol Misuse Disorder, and that he suffered from that disorder at the time of the events the subject of the complaint. The Committee also noted that the findings of misconduct made against the Respondent were in the context of Road Traffic Acts offences and breaches of undertakings, and that this was not a case in which any patient harm arose. I am not sure that I agree that that is something which could really be said to be a mitigating factor in this case, but the Committee did feel it was worth noting. The Committee had regard to the admissions and apologies made by the Respondent and to his guilty pleas to certain offences the subject matter of the inquiry. I would note here that while the Respondent did plead guilty to some offences, he was convicted of many other offences and some of those convictions were unsuccessfully appealed to the Circuit Court by the Respondent.

24. The Committee also identified a series of aggravating factors. They included the fact that the Respondent was a repeat offender in relation to road traffic matters, that he had breached undertakings given on two different occasions to two different Presidents of the High Court (Irvine P and myself), that he did not display any regard for or compliance with the Road Traffic Acts and his obligations in terms of the undertakings provided to the High Court. The Committee referred to the repeated risk posed to the public as a result of the Respondent’s conduct in terms of his non-compliance with prior court orders of the District Court, the Circuit Court and the High Court. The Committee found that the reputation of the medical profession was damaged by the conduct proven in this case. The Committee noted the non-participation by the Respondent in the process, even though he was offered a remote facility to attend. However, the Committee acknowledged his participation in the s. 60 proceedings.

25. The Committee went on to consider the range of sanctions available to it to impose on the Respondent. It felt that, given the seriousness of the findings of misconduct made in this case, lower grade sanctions would not be sufficient to protect the public. The Committee felt that suspension, even for an extended period, would be too lenient a sanction to properly address the misconduct found in the case. The Committee considered cancellation to be the only appropriate sanction in circumstances where there had been persistent breaches of law and of undertakings given to the Court, driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and driving while disqualified and without insurance.

26. The Committee, as I noted at the outset of my judgment, stated that this was one of the most serious cases to ever come before it. It found that the conduct against the Respondent was fundamentally incompatible with the practice of medicine. It considered that, due the Respondent’s conduct itself, the repeated nature of that conduct, the absence of insight and lack of remorse shown by the Respondent, together with non-participation in the process put the case against the Respondent firmly in the category of the most serious case.

27. The Committee concluded that, in light of all these considerations, it was appropriate not only to cancel the Respondent’s registration, but to prohibit the Respondent from applying for restoration for a period of three years. The Committee considered the conduct of the Respondent as proven to be a “wanton disregard for compliance with the law and wanton non-compliance with solemn promises to the High Court”. It noted that it was of the opinion that the Respondent would benefit from “an extended period of reflection”. The Committee stated that the repeated breaches of court orders in this case was “profoundly damaging for the profession” and that “a clear message [had] to be sent to other practitioners that such conduct will not be tolerated by the Medical Council”.

5. Council Meeting on 22 January 2026

28. The Council considered the Committee’s report at its meeting on 22 January 2026. The Respondent did not attend that meeting. Nonetheless, the Council was satisfied that the Respondent was aware that the meeting was going ahead on that day, and that all relevant material had been sent to him.

29. The Council agreed with the sanctions recommended by the Committee that the Respondent’s registration be cancelled and that he be prohibited from applying for restoration for a period of three years from the date of cancellation. It generally agreed with the reasoning given by the Committee in its report, and it felt that the misconduct at issue in this case was extremely serious and that the Respondent had shown complete disregard for the law and for the disciplinary process itself. The Council agreed with the Committee that the conduct and behaviour of the Respondent was dangerous, reckless, antisocial and disgraceful when carried out by any person, but especially when carried out by a medical practitioner.

30. The Council noted that it had considered the Committee’s report, and it agreed with and adopted the majority of the reasoning of the Committee as set out in its dealing with the question of sanction. The Council noted that the Committee had carefully weighed up the mitigating and aggravating circumstances it had identified, and it agreed with the vast majority of the Committee’s reasoning in that respect, save for the aggravating factor identified by Committee in relation to the Respondent’s non-engagement with the process, to which the Council attached no weight.

31. The Council had regard to and followed the Sanction Guidance published by the Council (May 2024). It considered all of the sanctions available for imposition, and concluded that cancellation was the only appropriate sanction in this case to protect the public interest, to reduce the risk of harm to the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession. It also agreed with the recommendation of the Committee that the Respondent be prohibited for applying for restoration to the register for a period of three years, that that period of time was proportionate and that it was necessary to mark the seriousness of the Respondent’s conduct. The Council noted that it had acted with as much leniency as possible in relation to sanction, but that the seriousness of the case and the need to protect the public warranted applying to the High Court for confirmation of the sanction of cancellation.

32. The Respondent was informed of the Council’s decision on 28 January 2026 by email to his registered email address. The Respondent had a period of 21 days to apply to the High Court to annul the Council’s decision. He did not do so, and that 21-day period has long since elapsed. The Respondent was served with the papers in respect of the Council’s application to the High Court, and was informed of today’s listing in an email sent to the Respondent on 2 June 2026. I ruled at the outset of the hearing that it was in order to proceed in the absence of the Respondent.

6. Relevant Legal Principles

33. The role of the Court on an application such as this is set out in s. 76(3) of the 2007 Act which states that:

“(3) The Court shall, on the hearing of an application under subsection (1), confirm the decision under section 71 the subject of the application unless the Court sees good reason not to do so.”

34. That, or a very similar statutory formulation appears in many of the statutes governing the regulation of professions, including s. 74(3) of the Nurses and Midwives Act 2011 (as amended), s. 70(3) of the Health and Social Care Practitioners Act 2005 (as amended), s. 44(5) of the Teaching Council Act 2001 (as amended), and s. 39(4) the Dental Council Act 1985 (as amended). As I outlined recently in a judgment I delivered in Teaching Council v Clancy [2026] IEHC 265 at para. 26, this statutory formulation has been considered by the High Court in various cases including Medical Council v M.A.G.A [2016] IEHC 779 (Kelly P), in Medical Council v Lohan-Mannion [2017] IEHC 401 (Kelly P), in Teaching Council v S.R [2018] IEHC 582 (Faherty J) and recently by me in Teaching Council v CD [2026] IEHC 244. It is a test that has been regularly applied by me and by other judges in the Professional Disciplinary List. I reviewed the cases of M.A.G.A, Lohan Mannion and S.R and confirmed my agreement with the test as set out and interpreted in those cases in my judgment in Nursing and Midwifery Board v Burke [2025] IEHC 557. Essentially, the test provides that the Court will be required to confirm the relevant decision unless there exists a procedural impropriety or irregularity, a failure to observe the standards of natural and constitutional justice, a serious and significant error (either of fact or of law), or unless the Court is satisfied that the decision is one that no reasonable regulatory body could take on the basis of the evidence before it.

7. Decision on Council’s Application

35. Therefore, I am required in this case to confirm the decision of the Council unless any of those factors which I have mentioned arise. I am not satisfied that any of those factors are present in this case. I am satisfied that there was no procedural impropriety or irregularity in this case, no failure to observe the standards of natural and constitutional justice, and no serious error whatsoever, whether significant or otherwise, in the approach taken by the Council or the Committee or by any other committee involved in the Respondent’s case.

36. I am also not satisfied that the decision made by the Council in this case is one that no reasonable regulatory or professional disciplinary body could take. On the contrary, in my view, this was a decision which was entirely appropriate, proper and proportionate, and one which complied with all of the relevant legal principles applicable to sanctioning in professional disciplinary cases. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that this is not a case in which it could be said that there is “good reason” not to confirm the Council’s decision.

37. I will, therefore, confirm the Council’s decision and make the order sought at para. 1 of the originating notice of motion ex parte to cancel the Respondent’s registration pursuant to s. 71(1)(f) of the 2007 Act, and that the Respondent be prohibited from applying for restoration to the register for a period of three years from the date of cancellation pursuant to s. 71(1)(g) of the 2007 Act.

38. The Council did not apply for the costs of this application, and so I will make no order as to costs.