High Court quashes planning decision for unduly restrictive interpretation of rural enterprise objective.

[2026] IEHC 408

THE HIGH COURT

PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT

[H.JR.2025.0001387]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 50, 50A AND 50B OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

ACT 2000, AS AMENDED

BETWEEN

ROCKET PYROTECHNICS (IRELAND) LIMITED

APPLICANT

AND

AN COIMISIÚN PLEANÁLA

RESPONDENT

Date of impugned decision: 24 July 2025

Date proceedings commenced: 17 September 2025

Date of main hearing: 22 June 2026

JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Friday 26 June 2026

1. The project in this case was held not to satisfy a development plan objective relating to

“rural enterprises” that are “dependent” on a rural location. The question here is the interpretation

of those concepts in the context of the particular plan concerned.

Geographical context

2. The project (https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/320786) is installation of a 40-feet metal

shipping container underground with 3.2 m high earth mounding to all sides for the safe and secure

storage of pyrotechnics (Class 1 hazardous goods) along with four square metres timber fence for

packing and unpacking of pyrotechnics, green mesh security fencing, shock-proof fencing to site

perimeter and all associated ancillary site works at Rathoma, Killala, Co. Mayo.

Parties

3. The applicant, Rocket Pyrotechnics (Ireland) Limited, is an Irish company that provides

professional fireworks and special effects services. The respondent is An Coimisiún Pleanála, the

decision-taker.

Facts

4. It may be helpful to begin with the applicant’s contextual submission:

“(B) RELEVANT BACKGROUND

5. The Applicant, Rocket Pyrotechnics (Ireland) Limited, is an indigenous, family-owned

Irish company which has provided professional fireworks and special effects services in

Ireland for over 25 years. The proposed development site is located on the lands of the

historical Breen family home of one of the principals of the business at Rathoma, Killala,

County Mayo. Mr Patrick Gerard (Gary) Breen is a director of the Applicant and Mr John

Breen is its senior pyrotechnician.

6. The Applicant employs 3 full-time staff and 15 freelance, highly trained and

specialised technicians (18 personnel in total). Its team includes creative designers and

display managers who deploy state-of-the-art wireless firing technology and special effects

equipment, choreographing performances synchronised with firings programmable to within

one hundredth of a second. The Applicant provides pyrotechnics for multiple events on a

weekly basis at locations nationwide, including large-scale arts, music and sporting events

(such as the Rose of Tralee, Taylor Swift concerts, Aiken Promotions events and Leinster

Rugby fixtures), corporate events, weddings and displays at historic landmarks, castles,

stately homes and hotels. Past engagements include Riverfest Limerick, Electric Picnic (10th

Anniversary), Spraoi Festival, the Ballina Salmon Festival, Bray Summer Fest, Ardmore

Pattern Festival, St. Patrick’s Festival Dungarvan, Lismore Castle, Tramore Fun Fair,

Ballymun Otherworld Festival, Finglas Halloween Festival, Swords Castle Halloween Festival

and Brian Boru Festival, Puck Fair, Drogheda Christmas Bonanza and Carrick Carnival.

Fireworks displays are a hallmark of major events such as the St. Patrick’s Festival, feature

prominently in promotional materials of Fáilte Ireland, and play a pivotal role in arts festivals,

national sporting events and Ireland’s growing TV and film industries. The Applicant is one

of only two remaining indigenous pyrotechnics companies operating in the State.

7. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (‘Brexit’) has

fundamentally disrupted the supply chain for the Applicant, making it substantially more

difficult to secure combustibles and explosives in a timely manner. Two other indigenous

Irish pyrotechnics companies have closed since Brexit. The Applicant currently has no

storage or sorting facility of its own; each event must be specifically and separately ordered

for collection in person from Northern Ireland. The Applicant is wholly exposed to a volatile

supply chain and bears the economic burden of increased costs, being prevented from bulk

purchasing and storing supplies to achieve economies of scale, reduced transport overheads

and shorter lead-in times for events. The business is, in consequence, under serious threat.

The Applicant has engaged extensively with the Government’s Inspector of Explosives, who

has approved, in principle, five different potential locations for storage. The proposed

volume of storage at the site (subject to licence) is up to 2,000kg of Hazard Type 1

explosives, and the site will be used solely for storage only and not for the manufacture or

sale of supplies; access is anticipated on average four times per week and the development

will not require full-time on-site employees nor generate traffic volumes significant enough

to impact the local road network.

8. The Applicant has previously sought permission for storage facilities at alternative

locations without success. On 22 June 2020, the Applicant applied for permission for a

storage facility in County Wicklow (ref. 20/578); permission was refused on 12 August 2020,

principally on the basis that the development was contrary to an objective to permit

commercial development in rural areas only where there is a proven need to locate therein.

A second application at the same Wicklow location (ref. 21/154) was refused by the planning

authority on 29 July 2021 and on appeal by the Commission on 9 February 2022 (ref. ABP-

311171-21) for the same principal reason. During 2022, the Applicant identified an

industrial-zoned site in County Wexford and again obtained the Government Inspector of

Explosives’ approval in principle, but a section 5 declaration (ref. EXD00983) determined

that the proposed storage facility was not exempted development, and the planning

feedback indicated that an application would be refused. A prior application at the Mayo site

the subject of these proceedings (ref. 23/60447) was refused on 22 March 2024 for the

same principal reason.”

5. On 25 June 2024, Rocket Pyrotechnics (Ireland) Limited applied to Mayo County Council for

permission for a proposed development at Rathoma, Killala, Co. Mayo, comprising the installation of

a shipping container underground for the storage of pyrotechnics and to carry out all associated

ancillary site works.

6. A planning report dated 15 August 2024, signed by an executive planner and a senior

executive planner, recommended the refusal of permission for one reason.

7. On 15 August 2024, the council issued a notification of decision to refuse permission for the

said development for one reason.

8. On 11 September 2024, the applicant appealed to the commission against the council’s

decision. The appeal included a submission entitled “First Party Grounds of Appeal” prepared by

MKO, Planning and Environmental Consultants and included, as appendices, the council’s notification

to refuse permission and a technical letter provided by Ryan and Associates Fire Consultants.

9. The commission received no third party observations on the appeal.

10. In line with its usual practice, the commission appointed an inspector, to prepare a report

and make a recommendation on the appeal. The inspector carried out a site inspection on 20

February 2025, and prepared a report dated 2 July 2025, in which he recommended refusal of

permission.

11. The commission considered the appeal at a meeting held on 22 July 2025. As recorded in

the direction of 22 July 2025, the commission decided to refuse permission generally in accordance

with the inspector’s recommendation, for specified reasons and considerations.

12. A formal order dated 24 July 2025 was then prepared to reflect the direction of 22 July 2025.

The “reasons and considerations” were as follows:

“Having regard to the rural location and the nature of the proposed development, the

Commission was not satisfied that the applicant had demonstrated that the proposed

pyrotechnics storage facility at this location was justified and the proposed development

would be contrary to the objectives of the current County Development Plan, specifically

Objective EDO 54, to facilitate rural enterprises, and resource development that are

dependent on their locality in rural locations. The proposed development would, therefore,

be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

Procedural history

13. On 17 September 2025, the proceedings were issued.

14. On 29 September 2025, I granted leave (order perfected on 30 September 2025).

15. On 2 October 2025, a notice of motion was filed.

16. On 12 January 2026, a hearing date of 22 June 2026 was fixed.

17. On 13 March 2026, the respondent's opposition papers were filed.

18. On 18 May 2026, the applicant’s legal submissions were filed.

19. On 9 June 2026, the respondent’s legal submissions were filed.

20. I might be allowed to commend both sides for the really excellent written submissions in

this case, and while inevitably there are elements in submissions that are not being upheld, all

submissions were helpful, and their measured and reasonable approach was particularly appreciated.

21. The procedural approach taken in this case was somewhat experimental in the sense that

the parties agreed that innovative options could be taken to cut down on costs. One option which

the court has is under O. 84 r. 22(8) RSC, to dispense with an oral hearing altogether (emphasis

added):

“(8) The Court may on the return date of the notice of motion, or any adjournment thereof,

give directions as to whether it shall require at the hearing of the application for

judicial review oral submissions in respect of any of the written submissions of the

parties on points or issues of law.”

22. I did not go that far. Oral submissions are of course the norm but in this instance the parties

agreed that the initial case would be by written submissions, the court could then prepare a draft

judgment with provisional findings, and the parties could make contrary oral submissions contesting

the merits of any provisional conclusions in a brief hearing of the order of 30-60 minutes. Prior to

the hearing, the parties were sent a draft judgment on 16 June 2026.

23. This is of course unfamiliar but not a completely unprecedented procedure in the common

law world. The Supreme Court of California prepares a document equivalent to a draft judgment

prior to the hearing but does not share it with the parties (Goodwin Liu, “How the California Supreme

Court Actually Works: A Reply to Professor Bussel”, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1246 (2014)

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Goodwin-Liu-How-the-Supreme-

Court-actually-works-2014.pdf). Compared to that, the procedure the parties agreed to adopt here

was far superior and in some ways the parties were able to obtain somewhat more influence over

the shape of the judgment than a conventional approach where they are just informed of the court’s

views after the chance for persuasion is over. This is not something I would want to impose but if

parties in a given case are prepared to consent to such an approach there is something to be said

for it. Also a certain degree of innovation may be beneficial in a context where judicial resources

are limited given a near-doubling of the planning caseload since existing resources were allocated.

24. As with any draft judgment, parties are required to keep the draft confidential. Draft

judgments are not public domain materials and, while they can be shared between the lawyers

concerned and their clients, subject to the following, it is inappropriate for any person to refer to

them for any purpose other than to assist the court in relation to the finalisation of the formal

judgment. Therefore anyone with information as to the text, content or proposed outcome of any

draft is required not to publish or transmit such information to others save solely by way of private

transmission for the legitimate purposes of assisting in the finalisation of the judgment and subject

to a similar restriction on any recipient. Trial participants should take reasonable steps to keep

drafts confidential. On this topic, see Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58, [2022]

1 W.L.R. 367, [24/01/2022] T.L.R. 1 (Briggs, Kitchin, Burrows, Rose, Arden SCJJ) which discusses

why restriction on publication of draft judgments is in the interests of the administration of justice;

see also Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 (Ch), [2006] 5 WLUK 45, (2006)

150 S.J.L.B. 603 (Smith J.); R. (Counsel General for Wales) v. Secretary of State for Business,

Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 181, [2022] 1 W.L.R. 1915, [2022] 4 All E.R. 599

(Sir Geoffrey Vos MR; Davies and Dingemans LJJ. concurring); Public Institution for Social Security

v. Banque Pictet & Cie SA and others [2022] EWCA Civ 368, [2022] 3 WLUK 291, [2022] B.L.R. 349

(Carr LJ; Jackson and Simler LJJ. concurring); Itkin v. Wood [2023] JRC 101 (Unreported, Royal

Court of Jersey, 22 June 2023).

25. The foregoing constitutes an immediately effective direction of the court to the parties and

anyone having notice of the draft judgment with effect from the date of circulation of the draft.

26. Contrary submissions could be made at the hearing. In particular, parties should draw the

court’s attention to any apparent error or ambiguity whether they have been provisionally successful

on the point or not.

27. The rules of engagement in such a situation are that the draft is without prejudice to the

right of the court ultimately to issue a judgment in whatever form or with whatever content it

considers appropriate. It is then entirely a matter for the court as to whether to give judgment with

or without amendment including any amendment that appears appropriate to the court whether

arising from submissions or not.

28. While the proceedings predate Practice Direction HC 137, para. 58(a) of that practice

direction would require the council to be put on notice. I proposed that the parties might furnish a

copy of the draft judgment to the council forthwith with a view to having any contrary views

communicated to the court before the judgment is finalised.

29. The matter was listed for mention on 17 June 2026. The commission sent a copy of the

draft to the council who replied indicating that they would not be making comments.

30. The matter was to be heard on 22 June 2026, and brief submissions were made on foot of

which the draft was amended.

31. Judgment was reserved at the end of that hearing. I would like to record my thanks to all

of the lawyers involved for their unfailingly courteous, professional and helpful assistance. As I have

previously sought to make clear, insofar as any points advanced are not being accepted in this or

any other given judgment, that is solely to do with the inherent merits of such points and is no

reflection on those instructed to convey such points, a distinction that most certainly should be, and

I believe generally is in fact, self-evident to all concerned. As no submissions were made about the

draft order on costs I am assuming that there was no issue with what was proposed. In that regard

one major advantage of the procedure the parties agreed here was that the costs have been kept

to well below the industry norm in the context of High Court planning litigation.

Relief sought

32. The reliefs sought are as follows:

“1. An Order of Certiorari by way of application for judicial review quashing the decision

of the Respondent, An Coimisiún Pleanála, made on 24 July 2025 (reference no. ABP-

320786-22) to refuse the Applicant’s application for permission to install a shipping container

underground for the storage of pyrotechnics and to carry out all associated ancillary site

works on lands at Rathoma, Killala, County Mayo.

2. An Order remitting the matter to the Respondent to be considered and determined

in accordance with law and in accordance with such directions as this Honourable Court may

deem meet.

3. Such declaration(s) of the legal rights and/or legal position of the Applicant and/or

persons similarly situated and/or of the legal duties of Respondent as the Court considers

appropriate.

4. A declaration that s.50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended,

(the ‘2000 Act’) and/or that s.3, s.4, and s.7 of the Environmental (Miscellaneous Provisions)

Act 2011 and/or Order 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts applies in respect of the costs

of this application.

5. Such further or other order as this Honourable Court may deem fit.

6. The costs of these proceedings.”

Grounds of challenge

33. The core grounds of challenge are as follows:

“(1) Domestic Law Grounds

1. The decision of the Respondent, An Coimisiún Pleanála (the ‘Commission’), made on

24 July 2025 (reference no. ABP-320786-24) (the ‘Impugned Decision’) to refuse the

Applicant’s application for permission to install a shipping container underground for the

storage of pyrotechnics and to carry out all associated ancillary site works on lands at

Rathoma, Killala, County Mayo is invalid in that the Commission erred in its interpretation

of the Mayo County Development Plan 2022 to 2028, specifically Objective EDO 54, further

particulars of which are set out in Part 2 below.

2. The Impugned Decision is invalid in that the Commission made a material error of

fact in the characterisation of the proposed development as other than rural enterprise

and/or other than dependent on its locality in a rural location, further particulars of which

are set out in Part 2 below.”

The council’s decision

34. The council refused the application for reasons expressed more widely than being contrary

to EDO 54:

“The Planning Authority issued a Notification of Decision to REFUSE permission on the 15th

of August 2024 for 1 no. reason as follows -

Having regard to the rural location and the nature and scale of the proposed development

and the objectives of the Mayo County Development Plan 2022-2028, in particular Objective

EDO 54 regarding commercial development in a rural area, the lack of sufficient justification

for the provision of a pyrotechnics storage facility at this location, and the surrounding

pattern of development in the area, it is considered that the proposed development would

represent haphazard sporadic development in a rural area, would be contrary to the

objectives of the Mayo County Development Plan 2022-2028 to only permit commercial

development in a rural area where there is a proven need to locate therein and would

seriously injure the amenities, or depreciate the value, of property in the vicinity. The

proposed development therefore would be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable

development of the area.”

35. The council did not, for whatever reason, comment on the appeal.

The inspector’s rationale

36. The inspector reasoned as follows on this issue (emphasis added):

“Principle of Development

6.2.1. The crux of the decision of the Planning Authority, as set out in its single reason

for refusal, is that there is no justification for the proposed development in a rural

location, and that the proposal would be haphazard, injurious to the amenity of the

area and would devalue property in the vicinity.

6.2.2. In response, the appellant contends that the proposed development requires a

rural location in order to achieve separation distances required under regulations

governing the storage of explosives, and cites examples of other types of development

which, whilst not rural in nature, are optimally located in rural locations due to practical

constraints which would arise in urban areas, should they be sited there. The appellant also

states that the proposal would not adversely affect the amenity or value of property given

its location relative to the closest dwelling, and that no adverse impacts on Natura 2000

Sites would arise as a result of the proposed development.

6.2.3. Policy in relation to rural enterprise is set out in Objective EDO54 of the Mayo County

Development Plan 2022 - 2028. Objective EDO54 provides for the facilitation of rural

enterprises and resource development that are dependent on being located in the rural area.

Compliance with Objective EDO54 firstly requires that the development under

consideration is a ‘rural enterprise’ and/or ‘a resource development’, and then

subject to meeting these criteria, requires the proposed development to be

dependent on a rural location.

6.2.4. The basis of the appellant’s case is that a rural location would allow the proposed

development to meet specific regulatory requirements in relation to the storage of

explosives, specifically the achievement of separation distances from houses and roads.

While I acknowledge that the achievement of these separation distances would be

more easily met within a rural area the fact remains that the proposed

development is neither a rural enterprise or a resource development, and therefore

the proposed development does not meet the formative requirement(s) of

Objective EDO54. In my opinion the auxiliary requirement of Objective EDO54,

that being the requirement for the proposed development to be dependent on a

rural location, is moot given that former element(s) have not been met. The

appellant makes reference to examples of uses which it states are not rural in nature but

yet are referred to in Objective EDO54 as being acceptable in rural areas, i.e. extractive

industries, solar and wind developments, due to the fact they benefit from a rural location

and the appellant contends that the proposed development should similarly be considered

on this basis. Aside from the need to be located a specific distance from certain receptors,

the proposed development does not have a need to be located in a rural area, and is not

reliant on any specific rural based resource. In my opinion extractive industries, solar and

wind developments are not comparable with the storage of pyrotechnics. For example,

extractive industries only operate where aggregates arise. Solar developments are

compatible with agricultural practices and allow for grazing beneath arrays. Wind

developments often require upland locations to avail of wind speeds which are more typically

higher in rural upland areas. It is reasonable in my opinion for a development plan objective

to facilitate these uses in a rural area and whilst the appellant does not contest this, to draw

comparisons to a storage facility for pyrotechnics as needing to be located within

a rural area on the basis of meeting licencing requirements cannot be sustained in

my view.

6.2.5. In summation, it has not been demonstrated that the proposed development is a

rural enterprises and/or a resource development, or that it is dependent a rural location.

The proposed development would therefore not accord with the requirements of Objective

EDO 54 of the Mayo County Development Plan 2022 – 2028. I recommend that permission

is refused on this basis.”

The impugned decision

37. The impugned decision provides as follows:

“Decision

REFUSE permission for the above proposed development in accordance with the reasons and

considerations set out below.

Reasons and Considerations

Having regard to the rural location and the nature of the proposed development, the

Commission was not satisfied that the applicant had demonstrated that the proposed

pyrotechnics storage facility at this location was justified and the proposed development

would be contrary to the objectives of the current County Development Plan, specifically

Objective EDO 54, to facilitate rural enterprises, and resource development that are

dependent on their locality in rural locations. The proposed development would, therefore,

be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

38. This is not hugely explanatory in itself and must be construed as essentially following the

inspector’s logic.

Preliminary issues

39. The parties’ positions on preliminary issues as recorded in the statement of case are

summarised as follows:

“Respondent’s Position

20. The Commission contends (at §4 of its Statement of Opposition and §3 of its

submissions) that the matters raised by the Applicant in these proceedings, in both core

grounds, while pleaded in other terms, involve the Applicant’s disagreement with the

decision by the Commission in concluding that the Proposed Development is not a rural

enterprise and/or is not dependent on being located in a rural area and/or does not come

within Policy EDO 54 of the Mayo County Council Development Plan 2022-28 (‘CDP’). This

is a disagreement on the merits, dressed up in legal language, which is not a basis for relief

in judicial review.

21. The Commission also relies (at §3 of its Statement of Opposition, §3 of its

submissions) on the presumption of validity and contends the Applicant has not discharged

the onus of proof.

Applicant’s Position

22. The Applicant rejects the contention that the matters raised involve no more than

disagreement with the application of the CDP. The Applicant’s case is that the Commission

misinterpreted the CDP, specifically Objective EDO 54, and made material errors of fact.

The interpretation of a development plan is a question of law and is not an exercise of

planning judgement reviewable only on rationality grounds. The presumption of validity

does not insulate the Impugned Decision from scrutiny where it is shown to rest on a

misinterpretation of the CDP and material errors of fact.”

40. As regards the preliminary issues raised, the commission’s attempt to rebuff the challenge

as a merits disagreement is a misunderstanding. The key issue is interpretation of the plan. Given

the proposed order below, the commission can apply the plan as so interpreted to the facts on

remittal.

Domestic law issues

Core ground 1 – misinterpretation of CDP

41. Core ground 1 is:

“1. The decision of the Respondent, An Coimisiún Pleanála (the ‘Commission’), made on

24 July 2025 (reference no. ABP-320786-24) (the ‘Impugned Decision’) to refuse the

Applicant’s application for permission to install a shipping container underground for the

storage of pyrotechnics and to carry out all associated ancillary site works on lands at

Rathoma, Killala, County Mayo is invalid in that the Commission erred in its interpretation

of the Mayo County Development Plan 2022 to 2028, specifically Objective EDO 54, further

particulars of which are set out in Part 2 below.”

42. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:

“Core Ground 1

Applicant’s Position

24. The Applicant’s position is that the Impugned Decision is invalid in that the

Commission erred in its interpretation of the CDP, specifically Objective EDO 54. The

Inspector and the Commission parsed Objective EDO 54 to comprise separate conjunctive

requirements: a ‘formative’ or primary requirement that the development constitute ‘rural

enterprise’ or ‘resource development’, and an ‘auxiliary’ or secondary requirement of

dependency on a rural location. The Inspector concluded that the dependency requirement

was ‘moot’ and so was not considered.

25. The Applicant contends that, construed properly, Objective EDO 54 commits to

facilitate enterprise that is dependent on locality in rural locations, of which rural enterprises,

resource development and renewable energy are the principal kinds. The phrase ‘that are

dependent on their locality in rural locations’ is a central element of the Objective and cannot

be treated as secondary or dismissed as ‘moot’.

26. The Applicant further contends that the CDP must be read as a whole, including

paragraph 4.4.8 (which recognises that the rural economy ‘extends beyond’ traditional

sectors to include ‘all aspects of the economy’), Policy EDP 19 (supporting indigenous

industry and business start-ups), and Objectives EDO 55 and EDO 56 (supporting rural

entrepreneurship and micro-businesses). The Applicant also contends that Objective EDO

54 does not contain any prohibition on kinds of development that are not listed, and that

the Inspector and Commission were wrong to conclude that the proposed development

would be contrary to Objective EDO 54, or that it was necessary for the Applicant to justify

the location by reference to rural enterprise or resource development separately from

dependency on rural location.

Respondent’s Position

27. The Commission’s interpretation of Policy EDO 54 – i.e. that it comprises separate

requirements, (a) that the development in question comprises a rural enterprise, resource

development or renewable energy resource and (b) that the development in question is

dependent on its location in a rural area– is correct. The Commission accepts that EDO 54

is not to be interpreted as if it is a provision of statute, and that points (a) and (b) are

related, and that for example, in considering whether a particular development involves a

rural enterprise, it is relevant to consider whether it is dependent on its location in a rural

area. The Inspector’s analysis is consistent with this interpretation and accordingly no error

of interpretation arises.

28. With reference to the Applicant’s claim that ‘construed properly, Objective EDO 54

commits to facilitate enterprise that is dependent on locality in rural locations, of which rural

enterprises, resource development and renewable energy are the principal kinds’, this is an

incorrect interpretation of the Objective. This interpretation flies in the face of the ordinary

meaning of the wording of the objective, which commits to facilitate ‘rural enterprises, and

resource development… and renewable energy resources’ that are dependent on their

locality in rural locations (emphasis added). Further, the underlined use of the word ‘rural’

must be given meaning, and the Applicant’s interpretation would be to empty that word of

meaning. Further, contrary to the Applicant’s claims, a holistic reading of the CDP does not

require the underlined use of the word ‘rural’ to be emptied of meaning; any broadening of

the meaning of the underlined use of ‘rural’ should include e.g. home working, digital hubs

per §4.4.8 of the CDP, but not a pyrotechnics storage facility.

29. Further, the Applicant’s claim that EDO 54 does not contain any prohibition on kinds

of development that are not listed is not consistent with a correct interpretation of this

objective: correctly interpreted, the objective means that only proposed development of

enterprises/resource development/renewable energy resources that come within the types

of developments identified in the Objective will be facilitated.

30. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if the Inspector did err in his interpretation in

the manner alleged by the Applicant (which is denied), this is a harmless error in

circumstances where inter alia the Inspector, as well as considering the question of whether

the Proposed Development was a rural enterprise, also considered the question of whether

it was dependent on its location in a rural area, and concluded that it was not (and the

Applicant has not challenged this conclusion other than by way of the claim of material error

of fact which is without merit on the basis set out below).”

43. Section 4.4.8 of the CDP 2022-2028 (https://www.mayo.ie/getmedia/db6f18d0-73c2-463f-

a6cc-5b1186762a48/Vol-1-Written-Variation-No-1.pdf) is as follows (emphasis added):

“4.4.8 Rural Economy

Mayo is a rural county, with much of its population rural-based and the majority of the land

in the county is in agricultural / forestry use. Construction, engineering, manufacturing,

quarrying, tourism related services, transport, energy production, forestry, agriculture, food,

education, waste disposal and health are all significant areas of employment in the rural

areas of County Mayo. The Council recognises, however, that rural-based employment

extends beyond these traditional rural sectors to include all aspects of the

economy. A national strategic outcome of the NPF is ‘Strengthened Rural Economies and

Communities’. Rural areas play a key role in defining our identity, in driving our economy

and our high quality environment and are part of the county’s strategic development during

the plan period.

In addition to the natural resources and food sector as traditional pillars of the rural

economy, improved connectivity facilitating home working and digital hubs, broadband and

rural economic development opportunities offer the potential to ensure our rural area

remains and strengthens as a living and working community. Local Development Companies

are important collaborators with Mayo County Council on rural economic development

through their work with the LEADER Rural Development Programme and other rural based

programmes.

Rural Economy Policies

EDP 19 To support, in conjunction with Mayo LEO and other agencies, the development of

indigenous industry and business start-ups in rural employment centres (villages and

settlements) in the county, subject to compliance with siting, design and environmental

considerations.

EDP 20 To support the implementation of the new LEADER Rural Development Programme

2014-2020, and any subsequent amended/updated programme for the county.

Rural Economy Policies [this appears to be a misprint for objectives]

EDO 54 To facilitate rural enterprises, and resource development (such as agriculture,

agrifood sector, agri-tourism, commercial fishing, aquaculture, rural tourism, forestry, bio-

energy, the extractive industry, recreation, cultural heritage, marine enterprise sector,

research and analysis) and renewable energy resources (such as wind/solar/ocean energy)

that are dependent on their locality in rural locations, where it can be demonstrated

that the development will not have significant adverse effects on the environment,

including the integrity of the Natura 2000 network, residential amenity or visual amenity.

Where proposals demonstrate measures to promote environmental enhancement through

improved ecological connectivity, such as measures in the Pollinator Plan, additional native

species planting or blue and green infrastructure measures, these will be favourably

considered.

EDO 55 To support rural entrepreneurship and the development of micro businesses

(generally less than 10 no. employees) in rural areas, where environmental and landscape

impact is minimal and such developments do not generate significant or undue traffic. This

objective shall not apply to sites accessed from the National Road Network.

EDO 56 To support remote working in the rural area, at an appropriate scale, for

enterprise/businesses that do not require visiting members of the public, subject

to normal planning considerations.”

44. Sometimes people quibble that public bodies have no function in statutory interpretation but

that is misconceived and unworkable. All public law entities of necessity must interpret the

legislation they are required to apply, and make any legal or factual findings required to carry out

their functions.

45. Insofar as Browne says at 12-883 of Simons on Planning Law that “An Bord Pleanála does

not have jurisdiction to decide other than simple questions of law”, I am afraid that I can’t agree.

There is no logical or legal basis for that. Any decision-taker has to decide any questions of fact or

law necessary for their decision subject only to procedural exclusivity (for example, the commission

doesn’t have jurisdiction to declare government policy documents or legislation invalid although if

rigorous criteria are met they may need to disapply such matters in favour of EU law).

46. Furthermore, the suggestion in Simons is unfortunately not workable anyway because there

is no special bespoke theory of law for the commission alone – a version of the restricted railroad

ticket good for this journey only. The “simple points only” theory would have to apply throughout

the public sector. Decision-making would quickly grind to a halt on that basis.

47. Even more fundamentally, the notion of what is a “simple question of law” is hopelessly

subjective. Lawyers (I include judges) are conditioned to regard the questions of law they deal with

as highly complex. You don’t need to be Sigmund Freud to appreciate some of the reasons for that.

In the case of practitioners, the incentive to characterise questions as complex also has an economic

overlay – something that has now been institutionalised in the Planning and Development (Costs of

Part 9 Judicial Review Proceedings) Regulations 2026 (S.I. No. 200 of 2026) – no doubt a topic for

interesting debates to come. And yet very few cases are that complex in the end – most boil down

to the application to particular facts of well-established legal principles. Innovative theories are

normally stillborn but every once in a while the law does develop in some tangible way. However

let’s not fool ourselves – this is not the norm.

48. The fact that the commission has power to refer questions to the High Court does not mean

that it is obliged to do so or even that it is a good idea to do so. My own view for what it is worth is

that generally that procedure is highly inefficient. A far preferable approach is what is apparently

referred to in military terms as “completed staff work” – namely that in any hierarchical system,

when one tier is presenting something for potential review by the next tier, it should be a complete

piece of work. Edwin C. Bliss describes it thus in his classic work on time management, Getting

Things Done (Revised ed., London, Warner Books, 1991), p. 110:

“It is believed that the idea originated with Napoleon, and it is a standard operating

procedure in just about every modern army, navy, and air force in the world.

In a military context, the idea is that under no circumstances does the chief of staff go into

the commanding general and say ‘General, here is the problem we face. What would you

like us to do about it?’”

49. The commission are familiar with the principle because that’s what they get from the

inspectorate – a complete draft decision including proposed conditions – but the notion applies to

trial courts just as much to administrative bodies. So the most helpful thing the commission or any

administrative body can do is to address all issues that are necessary for the decision and come up

with a completed piece of work. Stopping half way to ask questions just unleashes another lengthy

process (for good measure, one not subject to any procedural streamlining such as applies to

planning decisions under s. 50) which, at its conclusion, leaves the original process incomplete and

needing to be picked up again from a standing start. The fundamental point for present purposes

is the existence of this procedure does not mean that the administrative body cannot decide complex

questions of fact or law. The exception is where asking the question will have the effect of speeding

matters up. This arises in particular with a reference to the CJEU. If that is likely at some point, it

is often quicker to do it straight away rather than force everybody through two or three tiers of the

domestic legal system first.

50. While acknowledging that planning decision-takers can and must decide questions of law,

including complex ones, the interpretation of the plan – like any legal point – is ultimately a matter

for the court, and such decisions by public bodies are in a sense working interpretations rather than

settled answers, until the courts are called upon to get involved.

51. We can now turn to the commission’s reasons for rejection:

(i) “Having regard to the rural location and the nature of the proposed development” –

that does not tell us very much about the reason for refusal in this particular context

– the rural location was the reason proposed by the applicant why permission should

be granted, and presumably the location and nature of the development are relevant

in every case.

(ii) “the Commission was not satisfied that the applicant had demonstrated that the

proposed pyrotechnics storage facility at this location was justified”. Any proposal

could be rejected on the basis that the applicant for permission has not

demonstrated that the application was justified.

(iii) “and the proposed development would be contrary to the objectives of the current

County Development Plan, specifically Objective EDO 54, to facilitate rural

enterprises, and resource development that are dependent on their locality in rural

locations” – this is where the problem of interpretation erupts.

(iv) “The proposed development would, therefore, be contrary to the proper planning

and sustainable development of the area.” – if words mean anything this is not a

further reason, it is a consequence of the foregoing.

52. In Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Woulfe J., 11

April 2024) (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court decided that

a planning decision-taker is required, where it relevantly arises, to address the text of development

plans and interpret them where required, and enjoys a zone of evaluative judgement in relation to

development plan provisions that involve flexibility. Here we don’t get beyond the first step because

the commission’s interpretation was incorrect. Any valid evaluation can only arise on a correct

interpretation, so if and insofar as the correct application of the plan involves some (not excessively

wide) margin of evaluation, that can be addressed by the commission on remittal.

53. The core problem is the conceptualisation of the application as contrary to objective EDO

54. This unfortunately is a complete misinterpretation of the plan – albeit one shared by all of the

statutory actors here.

54. The simple reason this is fundamentally flawed is that EDO 54 does not prohibit anything.

It simply gives policy support to a particular type of development. Other types of development are

given policy support by other plan objectives. If a development falls outside EDO 54 all that means

is that it does not get support from that particular objective, but it may do so from other plan

provisions. The whole notion of being “contrary to” EDO 54 is fundamentally misconceived.

55. For example, objectives EDO 1 to 28 support economic development in the county generally:

“EDO 1 To facilitate and support the continued growth of the economy in the county in a

sustainable manner and in accordance with the National Planning Framework (NPF) and the

Regional Spatial and Economic Strategy.

EDO 2 To support and facilitate the economic development of the county in a manner which

is consistent with the economic pillars identified in the Enterprise and Investment Units

Economic Strategy.

EDO 3 To continue to promote the county to attract enterprise and investment into Mayo

through the Enterprise & Investment Unit and/or Local Enterprise Office, with a focus on a

number of established and emerging sectors including tourism, manufacturing, marine,

renewable energy, ICT, food and agri-food.

EDO 4 To continue to support new and existing enterprises in the county through the

provision of training, mentoring, financial supports, advice and networking events.

EDO 5 To encourage enterprise and employment development to locate in brownfield sites

or unoccupied buildings in town centres or where appropriate in existing industrial/retail

parks or other brownfield industrial sites in preference to undeveloped zoned or unzoned

lands.

EDO 6 To facilitate the economic development of Mayo to create a viable and favourable

economic environment for business and enterprise, whilst delivering sustainable jobs,

employment opportunities and an enriched standard of living for all.

EDO 7 To identify and promote a range of locations within the County for different types of

enterprise activity including international business and technology parks, small and medium

enterprises (SME) and micro enterprise centre.

EDO 8 To co-operate with local and national development agencies and engage with existing

and future employers in order to maximise job opportunities in the County.

EDO 9 To encourage and facilitate home-based start up enterprises of appropriate type,

size and scale, subject to compliance with the criteria outlined in 5.10 of Volume 2

(Development Management Standards) of the Plan, and where it can be demonstrated that

the development will not have significant adverse effects on the environment, including the

integrity of the Natura 2000 network, residential amenity or visual amenity.

EDO 10 To work in partnership with relevant stakeholders, to ensure that a sustainable

approach is taken to enterprise development and employment creation across all sectors of

the Mayo economy, in accordance with the Green Economy national frameworks relevant to

each sector.

EDO 11 To engage with all relevant government stakeholders, enterprise agencies and

sectoral representatives in pursuing ‘green’ approaches to economic development and

actively collaborate with key industry and educational bodies to promote Mayo based

initiatives across the economic sectors.

EDO 12 To promote quality employment and residential developments in proximity to each

other in order to reduce the need to travel.

EDO 13 To encourage the provision of ‘live work’ communities, in which employment,

residency and sustainable transport facilities are located in close proximity to each other, to

reduce long distance commuter trends and congestion, as well as reducing outward

migration from the county.

EDO 14 To ensure that people intensive developments are located close to the strategic

public transport network.

EDO 15 To address the rate of out bound commuting, with the provision of ‘live work’

communities in strategic settlements served by sustainable transport, thereby improving

quality of life, encouraging volunteerism and community engagement.

EDO 16 To encourage mixed use settlement forms and sustainable centres, in which

employment, residency, education and local services / amenities are located in close

proximity to each other.

EDO 17 To work with Irish Water and other infrastructure providers, to support the provision

of services and facilities to accommodate the future economic growth of the County and to

seek to reserve infrastructure capacity for employment generating uses.

EDO 18 To ensure that there is sufficient quantum of zoned lands to facilitate a range of

enterprise across the county in line with the settlement hierarchy.

EDO 19 To support start-up businesses and small-scale industrial enterprise at appropriate

locations throughout the County, subject to the principles of proper planning and sustainable

development.

EDO 20 To further linkages and partnerships with GMIT including the branding of the area

as a centre of excellence in the knowledge-based economy.

EDO 21 To encourage and facilitate indigenous industries, at appropriate locations with good

communication infrastructure, in recognition of their increasing importance in providing local

employment and helping to stimulate economic activity within small communities.

EDO 22 To support the use of town centre and other suitable locations for new service

focused enterprises.

EDO 23 To support the continued development of Galway Mayo Institute of Technology

(GMIT), Castlebar Campus including the development of a shared approach to enterprise

development with the Local Enterprise Office.

EDO 24 To acquire suitable land (subject to the availability of funding), including, where

appropriate, disused sites in State ownership, for creative and innovative entrepreneurial

initiatives and the provision of clustered incubator units.

EDO 25 To promote the development of the key strategic employment sites identified in the

Economic Development Strategy for County Mayo.

EDO 26 To support and promote the equine industry in the County as an economic and

employment provider.

EDO 27 To work with Eirgrid, as far as practicable, to ensure power infrastructure is available

for the development of zoned employment lands within the N5 corridor.

EDO 28 To review the Development Contribution Scheme.”

56. The commission is correct (submissions para. 30) that EDO 54 does not operate “to facilitate

the types of development identified within the Objective, but also to facilitate any other type of

development, as long as this does not prevent or prejudice the Council from facilitating rural

enterprise”. It is not EDO 54 that facilitates other development but other objectives, plan text, and

national and regional policy. EDO 54 applies to what it applies to, but it does not exhaust the

economic policies of County Mayo. That does not “empty the Objective of all meaning and render it

futile” as submitted, any more than would arise in any other policy area where there are multiple

instruments, none of which are totally exhaustive.

57. In fairness to the commission and the inspector, this confusion originated with the council’s

wording. The council came up with the following:

“it is considered that the proposed development ... would be contrary to the objectives of

the Mayo County Development Plan 2022-2028 to only permit commercial development in

a rural area where there is a proven need to locate therein ...”

58. This is a textual hallucination. The plan does not “only permit commercial development in

a rural area where there is a proven need to locate therein”. No clause of the plan is quoted because

none exists.

59. If the commission’s use of “in particular” were to be suggested as covering the plan overall,

that would be an untenable interpretation given that EDO 54 is the only text engaged with, and its

language is used by both the inspector and the commission in this context.

60. With the background of that fundamental confusion in mind, we can now turn to why the

commission’s engagement with that particular objective was flawed, although not entirely so

because the inspector’s basic interpretation is quite correct. Contrary to the applicant’s submission,

objective EDO 54 does involve a cumulative test:

(i) the objective applies to projects that are either (a) rural enterprises or (b) resource

development or (c) renewable energy resource;

(ii) projects must be dependent on their locality in rural locations; and

(iii) in addition it should be demonstrated that the development will not have significant

adverse effects on the environment.

61. The inspector’s application of this test was:

(i) this is not a rural enterprise; and

(ii) locality-dependency was “moot” but the inference is that it did not appear to be

satisfied.

62. Opposing parties tend to see everything as evaluation, but evaluation presupposes a correct

interpretation. The analysis here is not the application of a correct test to particular facts because

it involves further more detailed questions of interpretation. Those are in essence:

(i) does the concept of “rural enterprise” mean (a) enterprises that serve the rural

community or are suitable for a rural location or (b) enterprises that in effect “have

a need to be located in a rural area, [or are] reliant on any specific rural based

resource”; and

(ii) does the concept of “dependent” on locality in rural locations include (a) cases where

the conditions for the development are more easily met in rural locations as opposed

to (b) only cases where they “have a need to be located in a rural area, [or are]

reliant on any specific rural based resource”?

63. In broad terms:

(i) as to (i) the inspector did not define “rural enterprise” but seemed to conflate the

test with the concept of dependency on being located in a rural area (option (b));

and

(ii) as to (ii) the inspector goes for interpretation (b).

64. Contrary to Sherwin, the inspector and commission did not actually interpret the plan

provision. One can infer from the discussion what interpretation they appear to have taken but it is

certainly not clearly articulated. The commission’s submissions here obliquely acknowledge the lack

of an actual interpretation (emphasis added):

“11. The Commission accepts that this Development Plan provision is not to be

interpreted as if it is a provision of statute, and that points (a) and (b) (described in the sub-

heading above paragraph 6, above) are related, and that for example, in considering

whether a particular development involves a rural enterprise, it is relevant to consider

whether it is dependent on its location in a rural area, i.e. that this is a factor (but not the

only factor) that is relevant in considering whether a particular enterprise constitutes a

‘rural enterprise’. The Inspector’s analysis is consistent with this.”

65. “Consistent with this” seems to mean that the commission have thought about it after the

event and come up with a wording into which the decision can be fitted. “Not the only factor” also

seems to mean that they have re-interpreted the decision, but without specifying what the other

factors are.

66. Unfortunately, applying the test in Re XJS Investments Ltd. 1986 WJSC-SC 1935, [1986]

I.R. 750, [1987] I.L.R.M. 659 (McCarthy J., nem. diss.)), I consider that interpretation (a) is the

appropriate one in both cases for the following reasons.

67. On the first question, the development plan itself does not define rural enterprises but states

that “The Council recognises, however, that rural-based employment extends beyond these

traditional rural sectors to include all aspects of the economy.” With such a statement immediately

preceding the policies and objectives at issue, the only reasonable interpretation of “rural enterprise”

has to be reasonably consistent with this (“all aspects of the economy”). To interpret “rural

enterprises” as requiring necessarily inherent rurality renders the qualification about locality-

dependency otiose and duplicative.

68. Rural enterprise can’t mean owned by rural dwellers, as that contradicts the objective nature

of planning law (for example, such a firm could be sold immediately following the grant of

permission).

69. It clearly does include enterprises that serve the needs of the rural community, but the

overall text of the plan has the implication that it is not limited to that.

70. The numerous references in the plan to home working for example must constitute rural

enterprise if the plan is to be read as a coherent whole.

71. So the best interpretation is that rural enterprise is enterprise serving a rural area or

otherwise appropriate for such an area. That does involve a degree of evaluative judgment.

72. As the applicant points out, EDO 54 should be viewed as part of a coherent whole with EDO

55 and EDO 56 which situate the concept of rural entrepreneurship in the overall economy (micro-

businesses, remote working, etc.) rather than being completely conditioned by rurality. Likewise

EDP 19 is relevant insofar as it refers to supporting indigenous industry and business start-ups.

73. Development plans are not statutes, and this is a particularly loosely drafted provision. Any

interpretation of such a clause runs the risk of creating some duplication. But the meaning that best

accords with the text, context and purpose is to give “rural enterprise” and “dependent” different

meanings – the former relating to contribution to the rural economy in some way. We will turn to

the latter shortly.

74. If rural enterprise means (as the inspector in effect held) enterprise that needs to be located

in a rural area, that renders the second limb of the test totally duplicative and otiose. A broad

reading of “rural enterprise” keeps the duplication to the minimum and also accords better with the

context and purpose of the objective.

75. The commission’s reading would also exclude many rural economic activities that have plan

support from EDO 54 and from the notion of rural enterprise generally.

76. The fact that EDO 54 gives examples does not have the implication that other matters are

not included. The wide variety and mix of the examples precludes any rigid interpretation based on

noscitur a sociis.

77. Insofar as the commission submits that “only proposed development of enterprises/resource

development/renewable energy resources that come within the types of developments identified in

the Objective will be facilitated”, this is ambiguous. If it means that only enterprises meeting the

cumulative criteria above are covered by the objective, then that is correct. If it means that only

enterprises coming within the named examples are covered, then that is incorrect. That reading

would contradict the term “such as” which is used twice in the objective.

78. As a final footnote on this topic, the Irish statute book does not furnish much material in

terms of a definition of rural enterprise, but my thinking on this issue was assisted by a look at

international material, particularly one New South Wales instrument, the Bellingen Local

Environmental Plan 1990 (https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/1999-12-24/epi-1990-

0080) that includes the following definition:

“rural enterprise means an industry or other business which, by virtue of its nature, the

service provided or the products produced, distributed or sold, is in the opinion of the council

appropriately located in a rural zone.”

79. This is helpful by analogy, taking it for what it is (to state the obvious).

80. So we can now turn to the issue of dependency which the inspector held meant that the

enterprise needs to be located in a rural area.

81. Nietzsche proposed that „Alles ist Nothwendigkeit“/ “everything is necessity” (Menschliches,

Allzumenschliches/ Human, All Too Human (Chemnitz, Ernst Schmeitzner, 1878), §107), but literal

readings are at one’s own risk at the best of times, and are supremely perilous in his case. I interpret

his statement as meaning that things are more necessary than we like to admit – which is in this

context a reasonable riposte to the inspector’s comments.

82. The most striking thing about the inspector’s notion is that the concept of “need to be located

in a rural area” makes the test for the application of the objective extremely restrictive – far more

so than anything arising from the wording, context or purpose. Very little can be said to need to be

located in a rural area. Taking some examples:

(i) there can be agriculture in the city – e.g. market gardening, or city farms;

(ii) there can be wind turbines in urban or industrial areas, e.g. there are many on the

Thames east of London (anecdotally and for transparency, in my own encounters

with them they seemed to make no discernible noise at all above the ambient urban

baseline); and

(iii) there can be solar farms in cities on rooftops or otherwise – Spain’s largest urban

solar farm is across a group of cemeteries

(https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/requiem-power-project-valencia-2024-

2024-08-26_en).

83. Forestry and outdoor rural recreation maybe meets the “need to be located in a rural area”

test but such a test would render EDO 54 very vestigial in its application. This would also contradict

the wide introductory context about all aspects of the economy.

84. In that context and bearing in mind that the purpose of the provision would be rendered

largely nugatory by a “need” test, the term “dependent” should be read in a sense of drawing support

from or being facilitated by a rural location as opposed to some form of sine qua non.

85. This is the vernacular use of the term “dependent”, which does not normally connote an

absolute need but some relationship whereby that which is depended on assists and facilitates that

on which it is dependent. An employer might depend on a particular worker but that doesn’t imply

absolute necessity – she can make do without the worker if that arises.

86. Having regard to the foregoing, a project that is significantly more suited to a rural as

opposed to an urban area is capable of being regarded as dependent on a rural location even if that

falls short of some absolute need. Such a project is also capable of meeting the test for being a

rural enterprise by virtue of being an enterprise suitable for a rural area.

87. Contrary to the respondent’s submission, the core of the challenge is not merits-based, it is

plainly one of legal interpretation of the plan. That interpretation does leave some room for

evaluation but not unlimited room.

88. Insofar as the commission say any error of interpretation is harmless because the locality-

dependency issue is not challenged, that reads the challenge too narrowly. It is acceptably clear

that the finding on this issue is challenged, albeit perhaps largely phrased as an error of fact. I

would accept that there is an error but would characterise it as one of interpretation. Relief should

not be refused on the basis of such a somewhat debateable characterisation on the pleadings if the

point is acceptably clear, as it is here.

89. The application of the plan, correctly interpreted, to the facts, will be a matter for remittal.

That said, I am far from clear as to what the planning objection to this proposal is other than what

the council said was “haphazard” development – which presumably implies it should be somewhere

else. But where? I appreciate the commission may say that’s not their problem. But the planning

policy point remains that if this site is deemed unsuitable, it must be on the basis of a theory that

involves either a conclusion that this is not a suitable development full stop for some as yet

unidentified reason, or that it could be suitable in some other type of location on a logic that is also

unidentified. In a more normal case one might suggest engagement with the council’s planning

department, but it is not clear that this would achieve anything given the kitchen-sink nature of their

rejection, including the dreaded spectre of property price depreciation, happily not something that

spooked the commission on appeal. No doubt the commission can address all matters that require

to be addressed on remittal. The problem with the property-price argument is that it compares the

particular project not with the practical alternative but with some fictional perfect solution which

doesn’t exist. Assuming for the sake of argument that this project will depress property prices on

adjacent lands (which is denied), the alternative to storing fireworks here is storing them somewhere

else which will presumably depress property prices there instead. All that is significant is the

marginal increase in adverse effect of choosing this location – but in fact a rural location is much

more likely to reduce any such effects than increase them, which is presumably why the commission

were not having any of that particular argument.

90. Ultimately the problem is that if our society wants fireworks, they have to be stored

somewhere. In general, the best place to keep dangerous materials is the middle of nowhere – that

applies to anthrax on Gruinard Island in Scotland, underground nuclear storage (something we may

need to get used to eventually if the underlying problem of runaway demand for energy cannot be

curbed), or infectious disease specimens – as in the underground lab in Michael Crichton’s The

Andromeda Strain (New York, Knopf, 1969). The council classified this development as “commercial”

with the implied suggestion that it could be in an industrial estate or the like. That unfortunately

misses the point that storage of dangerous matter is not just any old commercial development. If

this was in an industrial estate, and an explosion occurred, other structures could be damaged

causing severe economic loss not to speak of personal injury. If it was in an isolated area that would

be much less likely to be the case. One doesn’t need to be Michael Crichton to conceive a planning

and development-themed science fiction plot whereby, say, an infectious disease lab was refused

permission for location in a rural area due to not being a rural enterprise, and relocated to an

urbanised area near a wet market. The real inflection point of such a genre of Planning Noir will

arise if a project involving storage of dangerous materials relocates to a more urbanised area, and

if there is an accident causing collateral damage, at which stage we will find out if planning decision-

takers come forward to take ownership. The rejection of this application by the council on grounds

of being “commercial” could give rise to the potential for anxiety that the real problem with the

proposal is its unfamiliarity, rather than anything that arises from deeper engagement with the

particular trade-offs arising in this type of context.

Core ground 2 – alleged error of fact

91. Core ground 2 is:

“2. The Impugned Decision is invalid in that the Commission made a material error of

fact in the characterisation of the proposed development as other than rural enterprise

and/or other than dependent on its locality in a rural location, further particulars of which

are set out in Part 2 below.”

92. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:

“Core Ground 2

Applicant’s Position

31. The Applicant’s position is that the Impugned Decision is invalid in that the

Commission made a material error of fact in the characterisation of the proposed

development as other than rural enterprise and/or as other than dependent on its locality in

a rural location. The Inspector concluded the proposed development was not rural enterprise

and that dependency was ‘moot’; the Commission does not demur from those conclusions.

32. These are material errors of fact: the Applicant is a mobile pyrotechnics business

providing specialised services for multiple weekly events nationwide, including large-scale

arts, music, sporting and corporate events, and its business supports rural tourism,

recreation and cultural heritage. The proposed storage facility is necessary for the long-

term sustainability of the business. The business supports rural tourism, recreation and

cultural heritage, all matters listed within Objective EDO 54 among the examples of rural

enterprise the CDP commits to facilitate.

33. Further, the supplies required for the business are Hazard Type 1 explosives which

must be licensed for storage under Section 7 of S.I. No. 804 ‘Stores for Explosives Order

2007’. Table 3 of Schedule 4 requires a separation distance of 229 metres to the nearest

road or other building. These regulatory constraints mean that the proposed development

could not meet licensing requirements in an urban location and, as a practical matter, must

be located in a rural area. The Inspector and Commission were wrong to conclude that the

proposed development is not dependent on its locality in a rural location.

Respondent’s Position

34. The Applicant’s claims that the Commission’s findings that (a) the Proposed

Development is not a rural enterprise and (b) the Proposed Development is not dependent

on being located in a rural area constitute material errors of fact are without merit:

35. Firstly, these alleged facts are not questions of fact but questions of evaluative

judgement and therefore not amenable to a finding of material error of fact.

36. Secondly, these alleged facts are not objectively verifiable. There is no method of

objectively or definitively determining whether the Proposed Development (a) is a rural

enterprise, or (b) is dependent on being located in a rural area.

37. Thirdly, these alleged facts are not uncontentious. aRegarding [sic] the question of

whether the Proposed Development is a rural enterprise, the Applicant and the Commission

disagree on this point and therefore it is contentious. In the case of the question of whether

the Proposed Development is dependent on being located in a rural location, the Applicant

(on the one hand) and the Commission and the Council (on the other hand) disagree on this

point, and therefore it is contentious.

38. Fourthly, there is no mistake by the Commission on either of these points, and the

Commission relies in this regard on §6.2.4 of the Inspector’s Report. Further, with specific

reference to the claim that the Commission materially erred in fact by finding that the

Proposed Development is not dependent on being located in a rural area, the Commission

notes that the planning authority concluded, in the Planning Report, that ‘[t]here is

insufficient justification for the proposed development to be at this rural location’. Further,

it is not even clear that the Applicant is now definitively stating that the Proposed

Development is definitively dependent on location in a rural area: ‘[t]he prospect of

acceptance in a residential or industrial area must be low’ (§30 of Applicant’s submissions).

Further, with reference to the matters set out at §34 above, these are classic arguments

against the merits of the Inspector’s findings on the issue of dependency on rural location,

which cannot give rise to relief.”

93. This does not add a whole lot to the previous point and does not call for further discussion,

other than to emphasise that contrary to what the commission might be taken to be suggesting, not

everything can be collapsed into evaluation. There has to be a correct interpretation of the plan

first, and evaluation only gets going within whatever scope is afforded by that correct interpretation.

We don’t get to that point in this case. The real issue is not error of fact but unduly restrictive

interpretation of the plan.

Summary

94. For the avoidance of doubt, preambular matters prior to the first heading of this judgment,

and the following summary, do not take from the operative parts of the judgment and must be read

in a sense consistent with those. In outline summary, therefore:

(i) it is settled law that planning decision-takers should engage with the plan and

correctly interpret it;

(ii) applying such law to the facts here, the commission did not in fact clearly interpret

the plan, but insofar as its decision involved interpretation, it incorrectly viewed EDO

54 as precluding developments not within its terms and/or it incorrectly adopted a

test of necessity for both limbs of the objective (“rural enterprise” and dependency

on a rural location);

(iii) it is settled law that evaluative judgement in the application of an instrument only

arises on the basis of the relevant instrument as properly interpreted; and

(iv) applying such law to the facts here, we do not get to the point of evaluative

judgement due to the unduly restrictive approach taken to the interpretation of the

plan.

Order

95. For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:

(i) there be an order based on relief 1 claimed in the statement of grounds by way of

an order of certiorari by way of application for judicial review quashing the decision

of the respondent, An Coimisiún Pleanála, made on 24 July 2025 (reference no. ABP-

320786-22) to refuse the applicant’s application for permission to install a shipping

container underground for the storage of pyrotechnics and to carry out all associated

ancillary site works on lands at Rathoma, Killala, County Mayo;

(ii) in accordance with O. 103 r. 36(1)(a) RSC, the matter be remitted to the commission

at a point prior to the inspector’s report to reconsider the appeal in accordance with

this judgment;

(iii) there be an order for costs (including reserved costs and the costs of written

submissions) to the applicant against the respondent;

(iv) any issue as to the extent of such costs be determined, in default of agreement, by

way of legal costs adjudication; and

(v) for the avoidance of doubt, the order for costs shall include an order for the costs of

legal costs adjudication.