High Court orders surrender to Poland for drug trafficking and organized crime under EAW.

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 401

[2025 No. 98 EXT]

BETWEEN

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

AND

ROBERT KRZYSZTOF KRASKA

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of the Hon. Mr. Justice Patrick McGrath delivered on the 8 June 2026

1. The applicant seeks an order for the surrender of the respondent to Poland pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant dated the 26 February 2025 (“the EAW”), issued by Arkadiusz Cocjoki, a Circuit Court Judge in Gliwice, Poland.

2. The EAW seeks the surrender of the respondent in order that he might be prosecuted for three offences contrary to Polish Law as follows:- a. He is alleged, between May 2021 and April 2022, within the territory of Poland, to have participated in a criminal group or gang which trafficked in Cannabis and laundered the proceeds of its sale;

b. Between May 2021 and April 2022, the Respondent is alleged, together with others, to have been involved in the transnational trafficking of amphetamine, ketamine and cannabis herb and it is alleged this criminal conduct took place in Poland, Ireland and Spain; and c. It is alleged that, between May 2021 and April 2022, in Poland, Spain and Ireland, the Respondent impeded the detection of the proceeds of crime

3. A detailed description of the circumstances which form the basis of these allegations is set out paragraph (e) of the EAW and the offences for which surrender is sought are certified by the IJA to be ‘ticked box’ offences, that is offences of a kind which fall within the list of offences for which it is not necessary to demonstrate correspondence and which are set out in Article 2.2 of the Framework Decision. The following boxes in that list are ticked:- ‘illicit manufacture, processing, trade or trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances’ and ‘participation in an organised criminal group or organisation in concert with the aim of committing crimes’ and ‘laundering of the proceeds of crime’

4. I am satisfied that the person before the court, the respondent, is the person in respect of whom the EAW was issued. No issue was raised in that regard.

5. I am satisfied that none of the matters referred to in sections 22, 23 and 24 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended (“the 2003 Act”), arise for consideration in this application and surrender of the respondent is not precluded for any of the reasons set forth in any of those sections.

6. The offences set out in the EAW carry maximum prison sentences of 5 years, 10 years and 12 years. I am therefore satisfied that the minimum gravity requirements of the Act of 2003 have been met.

7. The offences set out in the Warrant are ‘ticked box offences’, that is offences to which it is certified Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision applies. There is no manifest error in certifying the offences as being covered by the said Article 2(2) of the Framework

Decision and I am therefore satisfied that it is not necessary for this Court to determine whether of not the offences for which surrender is sought would correspond with offences under Irish Law.

8. In any event, having considered the description of the circumstances of the alleged offending as set out in detail at paragraph (e) of the EAW, I am satisfied that the said offences would correspond with the following offences under Irish Law:- a. The allegations which constitute the first offence would, if proven, correspond with an offence contrary to s. 72 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006;

b. The allegations which constitute the second offence would, if proven, establish correspondence with an offence contrary to sections 15, 15A or 15C of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (as amended);

c. The allegations underlying the third offence would establish correspondence with an offence in Irish law contrary to sections 7 or 8 of the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act, 2010.

9. At the hearing of the application the Respondent pursued the following two grounds of objection:-

(i) There is a lack of clarity and / or error on the face of the Warrant as, although he is clearly sought for the purposes of prosecution, Part D has seemingly erroneously been completed by the issuing judicial authority;

(ii) His surrender ought to be refused, or at the very least the decision as to whether he ought to be surrendered ought to be deferred, owing to his mental condition.

10. A s. 20 request was sent to the IJA seeking further information in relation to these issues. In the body of that request the following was stated:

‘The requested person, Robert Kraska, has adduced evidence on affidavit before the High Court that he is diagnosed with bipolar personality disorder and sever depression. It has been indicated that he is prescribed with the following necessary medications:_

- Sertaline 200mg mane,

- Sodium Valproate 900mg,

- Aripiprasole 10mg mane,

- Olanzapine 10mg nocte The executing judicial authority, the High Court, thus respectfully requests the following clarifying information pursuant to Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584:

1. Please state the detention institution(s) or prison(s) including the precise part of the institution(s) in which it is actually intended that the requested person, if surrendered, be detained, including on a quarantine or temporary or transitional basis. In this regard please see paragraphs {77} – [87] of the Judgment of the CJEU in ML (C-220/18 PPU, 25th June 2018). If it is not possible to state the actual detention institution or prison at this stage, then please state those in which it is most likely the requested person will be detained.

2. Please note the diagnoses of the requested person who asserts that he suffers from bipolar personality disorder and severe depression. With reference to paragraphs [56] and [59] of the Council of Europe’s CPT report on Poland.

Dated 22nd February 2024, please provide the following assurances;

(a) Please clarify whether, in the event of surrender, the requested person will be medically screened without delay upon his arrival to a remand detention facility and / or a prison;

(b) Please clarify whether the requested person will be provided with the necessary, prescribed medications whilst he is on remand in custody or otherwise detained in the event of surrender.

3. Please clarify whether the requested person is sought for the purpose of trial?

If so, please clarify why Part D of the European arrest warrant is completed pursuant to Article 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584 by reference to a trial resulting in the decision in absentia’

11. In the reply of the 23 February 2026, the IJA inter alia stated as follows:-

‘1. Following his surrender to the Republic of Poland, Robert Kraska will most likely be placed in custody at the remand centre in Gliwice, where he will remain at the disposal of the Circuit Prosecutor’s office in Gliwice…… Pursuant to Article 260 s1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ‘if health condition of the accused so requires, pre-detention may be executed solely in the form of placement in an appropriate medical institution, including a psychiatric institution’. After being surrendered, the suspect will be promptly interviewed. During this activity, he will be able to provide explanations regarding his state of health and medications taken. The suspect and his defence counsel will also be able to submit complete information and documentation, the Court will decide whether the suspect should remain in the Remand Centre in Gliwice or in an appropriate medical institution.

2. Pursuant to Article 202 s1 of the Code of Criminal Procedue ‘for the purpose of issuing an opinion on the mental health of he accused, the court, and at the preparatory hearing stage the prosecution, shall appoint at least two psychiatrists’. Where necessary a psychologist shall also participate.

Accordingly, Robert Krask will, immediately after surrender, be subjected to examination by two court appointed psychiatrists. In such a case the suspect will also have the possibility of being assisted by court appointed defence counsel throughout the proceedings. In the event of mental health issues, such defence is mandatory. The suspect will therefore be represented by defence counsel throughout the entire proceedings, during his stay at the remand centre in Gliwice or in an appropriate medical institution, Robert Krask will remain under constant medical supervision. The suspect will have access to professional psychiatric care. During the period of pre-trial detention, Robert Kraska will be provided with the prescribed medication’

12. Insofar as the third question is concerned, it was stated in the letter of reply from the IJA that the Respondent is a suspect and will be promptly brought before the Court if surrendered and will then be served with the decision on pre-trial detention. The court will also take into account his personal circumstances in determining whether pre-trial detention should be discontinued. The IJA also state that he was at all times in the course of the proceedings concerning the imposition of pre-trial detention, represented by a lawyer of his own choice.

First Ground of Objection

13. Having considered the Warrant and the reply received to the s. 20 request, there is no doubt that the Polish authorities seek his surrender for the purposes of prosecution and that he may upon return be initially temporarily detained for a period of up to 90 days.

14. The provisions of Section 45 of the 2003 Act are not engaged as this is not a case where the Respondent was tried in absentia. There is therefore no need for this Court to inquire as to the various matters provided for in that section as there was no trial in absentia

15. There is no merit in the first ground of objection. There is no dispute but that the Respondent is sought by the Polish authorities for the purposes of prosecution for the three offences outlined in the EAW. Any reference in the EAW to his non-attendance at a hearing is clearly referable to the decision to issue a warrant for his arrest and to order pre-trial detention for a period of up to 90 days.

Second Ground of Objection

16. The Respondent refers to ongoing issues in relation to his mental capacity and mental health and makes two separate but related objections in this regard:-

(a) Owing to his current mental health condition he does not have capacity to participate in these extradition proceedings and the matter ought therefore be adjourned until a time when he has such capacity; and / or

(b) Owing to deficiencies in the care provided to inmates or detainees in the Polish prison system there is a real risk of a breach of his personal rights under the European Convention of Human Rights and his surrender ought therefore be refused under s. 37 of the 2003 Act.

Capacity

17. This case was in the EAW list for a considerable period of time and was adjourned on several occasions, between the 19 May 2025 and the 1 October 2025, at the request of the Respondent as he claimed to have been suffering from mental health issues. Sick notes were produced to the Court, and it was said on various occasions that he could not attend court for one month. On the 24 July 2025, by way of example, the Respondents GP had indicated that he could not attend court due to depression.

18. The court had indicated that the matter could not be adjourned indefinitely and had previously said that the Respondent needed to put in place a plan for treatment for his mental health issues.

19. The Respondent has submitted a report from a Mr Kasha Skoczen, a wellbeing psychologist, which extensively deals with his difficulties with depression, bi-polar disorder and anxiety. There is however no indication therein of any capacity issues or of an inability on the part of Mr Kraska to comprehend proceedings or instruct his lawyers.

20. He also has submitted a report from a Dr Ching in which it was stated that at that time (being October 2025):

‘his capacity to participate in the legal proceeding is contingent upon his understanding of the nature and the purpose of the legal proceedings, his ability to retain information, his ability to weigh the pros and cons of the information, and his capacity to communicate his decision and relevant information ….. Mr Kraska did not demonstrate a sufficient understanding of his extradition proceeding. He stated there was a police investigation against his friend in Poland in relation to a drug-related crime, and the Polish police wanted to interview him. He was unable to articulate the role of the Irish Court in his extradition proceeding. He demonstrated a reasonable level of ability to retain information throughout the assessment’

21. It was further stated therein that:

‘his current capacity to participate in his extradition proceeding is temporarily impaired by current cognitive defences and mental state in the context of his acute severe depressive episode of his Bipolar Affective Disorder’

22. Dr Ching’s report was handed into court to explain the Respondent’s absence at an earlier point in the proceedings. On the 24 November 2025, this report having been provided to the Court, Burns J agreed that a Respondent is not expected to understand the intricacies of extradition proceedings but the issue in relation to capacity is whether a Respondent can give informed instructions to his legal team. Having noted an absence of evidence in this regard at that time, Burns J directed that the Respondents solicitor swear an affidavit outlining the attempts to engage with Mr Kraska. In his affidavit of the 5 December 2025, the Respondents then lawyer, Mr Bernard Stobie, stated at paragraph 2 thereof:-

‘I say that I had consultations with the Respondent on a number of occasions, including with Counsel. The relevant papers were gone through in the normal way. Extradition was to be contested’

23. The report of Dr Ching was based on an assessment in October 2025 and refers to a temporary impairment of his capacity to participate in extradition proceedings due to a severe depressive episode. Even at that time, however, Dr Ching noted that he was able to give an extensive and detailed history of his past and he spoke to the doctor about the subject of the crime alleged in the warrant and told his that there was in investigation in Poland into drug related crime and he was to be interviewed. Dr Ching at that time also noted that ‘he demonstrated a reasonable level of ability to retain information through out the assessment’.

24. As pointed out by the Minister the report did not state whether the Respondent was unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings, whether he could or could not give instructions or whether he could or could not understand the nature, effect and consequences of decisions made by him in the course of proceedings. There has been no updated report from any doctor or other expert on this issue of capacity.

25. Since that date and on the directions of Mr Justice Burns an affidavit was filed by his solicitor and it demonstrates that his lawyers seemed to have no difficulties in obtaining instructions from their client in relation to the extradition proceedings.

26. I agree with the comments of Judge Burns to the effect that, given the complexity of extradition proceedings, it could not be expected that a respondent would have an indepth knowledge of legal issues that arise in an EAW matter.

27. The appropriate test to be applied when considering issues of capacity in EAW proceedings is the civil test set out in Nolan v Carrick [2013] IEHC 523, where the test was described as follows at paragraph 117 of the judgment:

‘Was the defendant’s cognitive ability impaired to the extent that he did not sufficiently understand with the assistance of such proper explanation for legal advisors and such experts as the nature of the case may require, the issues upon which the decision was likely to be necessary, the nature and effect of the decisions made in the course of the litigation and the consequences of the

decision made by him for the litigation at that time?’

28. Having considered all of the evidence submitted by the Respondent, including the various medical reports provided, I am satisfied that he has failed to demonstrate a lack of capacity to the required legal standard as set out in Carrick v Nolan.

Article 3 of Convention and Medical Treatment in Polish Prisons

29. The Respondent submits that, owing to deficiencies in the care and treatments provided to persons with mental health conditions in Polish prisons, there is a risk of a breach of his rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In support of this claim the Respondent cited a number of paragraphs from the Council of Europe CPT Report on Poland, dated the 22 February 2024, which he states documented inadequate healthcare and an ‘extremely impoverished’ regime for remand prisoners. It should be noted that this was a targeted visit to two particular penitentiary establishments (Bialystok Remand Prison and Prison No 1 if Grudziadz) and focused largely on recently remanded prisoners.

30. The Respondent previously submitted that, at a minimum, it was necessary to seek an assurance from the Polish authorities as to the availability of appropriate medical treatment and medication if surrendered. A s. 20 request was issued by this Court, and a reply was received thereto, both of which are set out above.

31. In the course of his submissions the Respondent refers to the decision of Edwards J in Minister for Justice v Machaczka [2012] IEHC 523, a case where surrender was refused where specific medication was not available at that time in Poland. The respondent in that case had an extensive well documented history of severe mental illness which had included his admission to a psychiatric unit in this state and Poland as an inpatient. He had been diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder and was prescribed with Clozapine.

Evidence was received from a psychiatrist which outlined that this medication was the only treatment which had been effective for him up to that point. In refusing surrender Edwards J held that given:-

‘the evidence that Clozapine represents the only affective treatment for the respondent, the evidence that Clozapine is not licensed for treatment of schizoaffective disorder in Poland, substantial grounds exist for believing that the respondent would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment with the meaning of article 3 ECHR in the event of being surrendered to the issuing state.’

32. In Minister for Justice v Rettinger [2010] IESC 45, the Supreme Court accepted that prison conditions in the requesting state could give rise to a refusal to surrender under section 37 of the 2003 Act but stressed that where such an objection is raised:

‘the burden rests upon the [respondent] to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that if he (or she) were returned to the requesting country he, or she, would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention’

33. A summary of the principles which have emerged from the case law in this regard was provided by Burns J in Minister for Justice v Angel [2020] IEHC 699 where the court said as follows:

‘(a) the cornerstone of the Framework Decision is that member states, save in exceptional circumstances, are required to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principles of mutual recognition and trust;

(b) a refusal to execute a European arrest warrant is intended to be an exception;

(c) one of the exceptions arises when there is a real or substantial risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR or Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’);

(d) the prohibition on surrender where there is a real or substantial risk of inhuman or degrading treatment is mandatory. The objectives of the Framework Decision cannot defeat an established risk of ill-treatment;

(e) the burden rests upon a respondent to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial / reasonable grounds for believing that if he or she were returned to the requesting country, he or she will be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR;

(f) the threshold which a respondent must meet in order to prevent extradition is not a low one. There is a default presumption that the requesting country will act in good faith and will respect the requested person’s fundamental rights;

(g) in examining whether there is a real risk, the Court should consider all of the material before it and if necessary, material obtained of its own motion;

(h) the Court may attach importance to reports of independent international human rights organisations or reports from government sources;

(i) the relevant time to consider the conditions in the requesting state is at the time of the hearing;

(j) …

(k) a finding that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of general conditions of confinement in the issuing member state cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal to execute a European arrest warrant. Whenever the existence of such a risk is identified, it is then necessary for the executing judicial authority to make a further assessment, specific and precise, of whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk;

(l) an assurance provided by the competent authorities of the issuing state that, irrespective or where he is detained, the person will not suffer inhumane degrading treatment is something which the executing state cannot disregard and the executing judicial authority, in view of the mutual trust which must exist between the members states on which the European arrest warrant is based, must rely on that assurance, at least in the absence of any specific indications that the detention conditions in a particular detention centre are in breach of article 3 ECHR or article 4 of the Charter; and

(m) It is only in exceptional circumstances, and on the basis of precise information, that the executing judicial authority can find that, notwithstanding such an assurance, there is a real risk of the person concerned being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment because of the conditions of that person’s detention in the issuing member state’

34. The Respondent raised certain concerns as to the provision of appropriate treatment, including medication, for his mental health illnesses if surrendered to Poland and detained in one of its prisons or detention centres. He referred to Country of Origin information in support of his concern and as to the provision of adequate healthcare to those detained in Polish prisons.

35. A request was made by this Court seeking further information from the IJA as to where he might be detained if surrendered, what medical facilities would be available and whether he would be able to access necessary medications. A reply was received from the Polish authorities setting out where he would likely be detained (which was not one of the prisons the subject of criticism in the section of the CPT Report cited by the Respondent), the treatments and facilities available and confirming that any necessary medications would be accessible.

36. No reason has been advanced to query or call into question the detailed and specific information and assurances provided by the IJA. Consistent with well settled case law and cognisant of the principles of mutual trust and confidence, there is no basis for this court to call into question the bona fides and reliability of the information and assurances provided.

37. There is therefore no evidential basis to conclude that, if surrendered to Poland, there is a real risk that the Respondent will not receive appropriate medical and / or psychiatric care whilst detained in a prison or other institution

38. Having considered the evidence in this matter, I am of the view that this is not a case where there are grounds to consider that there is a risk of a breach of his rights under Article 3 of the ECHR if surrendered to Poland and detained in one of its prisons.

39. This ground of objection is therefore not made out.

40. The Court will therefore, pursuant to s. 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) make an order for his surrender to Poland on foot of the EAW before the Court.