High Court strikes off solicitor for dishonesty and misconduct following Tribunal recommendations.

[APPROVED]

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 400

Record No. 2026 40 SA

IN THE MATTER OF IAN MCSWEENEY, A SOLICITOR PREVIOUSLY

PRACTISING AS MCSWEENEY SOLICITORS, 25 DUBLIN STREET, CO. DUBLIN

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACTS 1954-2015

BETWEEN

THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND

APPLICANT

AND

IAN MCSWEENEY

RESPONDENT

Ex tempore JUDGMENT of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court, delivered on the 11th day of June 2026

1. Introduction

1. This is my judgment on an application brought by the Law Society (the “Applicant” or the “Society”) for various orders in relation to the Respondent solicitor, Ian McSweeney (the “Respondent”). The application is made pursuant to s. 82(2), s. 85(3) and s. 85(7) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”) and Order 53D of the Rules of the Superior Courts (the “RSC” or the “Rules”).

2. The orders sought by the Society are that the Respondent be struck off the Roll of Solicitors, an order that the Respondent pay the sum of €10,000 to the Law Society’s Compensation Fund, that the Respondent pay a sum of €4,524 as a contribution towards the whole costs of the Society before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (the “LPDT” or the “Tribunal”) and that the Respondent pay the costs of the Society’s application this morning in the measured sum of €3,254, or in the sum as assessed by a Legal Costs Adjudicator in default of agreement.

3. The matter comes before me following two Determinations and Recommendations of the Tribunal following inquiries conducted by it into the Respondent in February 2026.

2. Principles applicable to such applications

4. In a judgment that I gave earlier this morning, in the case of Law Society v Ronan O’Brien [2026] IEHC 380, and in a judgment I delivered on 19 May 2026 in Legal Services Regulatory Authority v Edward O’Brien [2026] IEHC 348, I identified the relevant provisions of the 2015 Act to an application such as this. In doing so, I referred to the definition of “misconduct” in s. 50 of the 2015 Act, and to the provisions of that Act governing inquiries into the conduct of legal practitioners by the Tribunal. I referred also to the circumstances in which the Tribunal decides itself pursuant to s. 81(1) of the 2015 Act to impose sanction following an inquiry, and the circumstances in which the Tribunal makes a recommendation to the High Court for imposition of sanction, pursuant to s. 82(2) of that Act.

5. I set out also in those two judgments the role of the Court under s. 85(3) of the 2015 Act, and the approach which the Court is required to take in dealing with applications such as this. I did so by reference to the judgment of McKechnie J in the Supreme Court in Law Society v Coleman [2018] IESC 80. As I explained in those judgments delivered by me, namely, Edward O’Brien and Ronan O’Brien, the Court is not bound by any recommendation made by the Tribunal as to sanction and that the Court must be satisfied that the Tribunal was entitled as a matter of law to make the findings which it did. The Court must also be satisfied that a recommendation as to sanction made by the Tribunal is consistent with the legal principles governing the imposition of sanctions in the disciplinary regime in this area. In all cases involving recommendations made by the Tribunal as to sanction to the High Court, the caselaw makes clear that the Court is the “ultimate arbiter” in terms of deciding an appropriate sanction to be imposed (see, for example, the dicta of McKechnie J at para. 61 in Coleman). I referred to the Coleman judgment in that respect in the cases of Edward O’Brien and Ronan O’Brien, and I reiterate the point here.

6. In the Edward O’Brien and Ronan O’Brien judgments, I also set out the relevant legal principles applicable to the imposition of sanctions in the disciplinary regime applicable to legal practitioners. Those principles were clearly set out by Kelly P in Law Society v D’Alton [2019] IEHC 177 at para. 33 of his judgment in that case. It is clear that those are the principles which I must apply on this application. I do not propose to reproduce those principles here. I would note here that this judgment is to be read with my judgments in Edward O’Brien and Ronan O’Brien and the discussion of the principles in those two cases.

7. Furthermore, since this case involves allegations and findings of dishonesty, involving the misappropriation of client funds on the part of a solicitor, the approach by the Court to findings of dishonesty and the appropriate sanctions to be imposed in the event of such findings has been set out and discussed in a number of previous cases. I have referred to those cases in my judgment in the Ronan O’Brien delivered earlier this morning. I adopt in this judgment the references I made to the relevant caselaw in Ronan O’Brien.

8. As I observed in Ronan O’Brien, in the event of a finding of dishonesty on the part of a legal practitioner, the sanction to be imposed will be very serious, and will almost invariably be the most serious sanction, namely, in the case of a solicitor, an order that the legal practitioner’s name be struck off the Roll of Solicitors (Kelly P at para. 34 in D’Alton).

9. Honesty is one of the core values of the solicitors profession, with which every solicitor must comply at all times in their practice. That is clear from the Law Society’s Solicitor’s Guide to Professional Conduct (4th Edn) (2022) and from the caselaw which I discussed in the Ronan O’Brien case.

3. Relevant Facts and Background to this Application

10. I now turn to the relevant facts of this application. The factual circumstances in this case are set out in the grounding affidavit of Mary Fenelon, solicitor in the Regulatory Legal Services Section of the Society.

11. As outlined by Ms Fenelon, the Respondent was admitted and enrolled to the Roll of Solicitors on 12 March 2010 and carried on practice as principal solicitor of the firm of McSweeney Solicitors at 25 Dublin Street, Balbriggan, Co. Dublin. The Respondent no longer holds a practising certificate, having been suspended from practice on 11 November 2024 following an order I made that day on the application of the Society. Apart from suspending the solicitor from practice, various other orders were made that day in relation to the Respondent.

12. Following a lengthy process before the Regulation of Practice Committee of the Society in respect of both sets of allegations against the Respondent, the Society made applications to the Tribunal for inquiries in relation to both sets of allegations.

13. The application to the Tribunal for an inquiry in respect of the Respondent in the first matter was grounded on the affidavit of Uche Oparaji, an accountant in the Regulation of Practice Section of the Society, on 9 October 2024. As noted by Mr Oparaji, the allegation of misconduct referred by the Society to the Tribunal for the purposes of an inquiry was that the Respondent was guilty of misconduct in that he:

“failed to ensure that there was furnished to the Society an Accountant’s Report for the year ended 31 December 2023 within six months of that date in breach of Regulation 26(1) of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2014 Statutory Instrument no. 516 of 2014”.

14. Another application was made by the Society to the Tribunal for an inquiry in respect of a second set of allegations against the Respondent. That application was grounded on the affidavit of Rachel Glennon, another accountant in the Regulation of Practice Department of the Society, sworn on 26 June 2025. I will set out in full the allegations proven against the Respondent as to fact and to misconduct later in my judgment.

4. The Inquiry

15. The inquiries into those two sets of allegations were heard together on the 26 February 2026. The Respondent did not attend the inquiry hearing that day. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondent had been served with the relevant papers in respect of the inquiry and that he was aware of the fact that the inquiry was to be heard that day. The Tribunal was, therefore, satisfied that the inquiry hearing could proceed in the Respondent’s absence on

24 February 2026.

(a) Findings on first set of allegations

16. In respect of the first complaint and the first allegation of misconduct arising from that complaint, the Tribunal heard evidence from Mr Oparaji. The Tribunal accepted that evidence and accepted the submissions made by Ms Fenelon on behalf of the Society that the particular allegation in relation to an outstanding Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2023, in breach of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2014, amounted to misconduct. The Tribunal found that that allegation was proven as to fact, and that it amounted to misconduct. I will return later in my judgment to the reasons given by the Tribunal for so finding, and to its subsequent recommendation to the High Court as to sanction in that case.

(b) Findings on second set of allegations

17. The Tribunal also dealt with the second complaint and the second set of allegations of misconduct on 24 February 2026. The Tribunal heard evidence from Ms Glennon and submissions from Ms Fenelon. The Tribunal accepted Ms Glennon’s evidence and Ms Fenelon’s submissions and concluded that certain allegations against the Respondent were proven as to fact and amounted to misconduct (allegations (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j),

(k) and (l)). The allegations proven as to fact and which constituted misconduct were as follows and are set out in Ms Glennon’s affidavit of 26 June 2025, namely;

“…the Solicitor is guilty of professional misconduct in that he:

(a) Allowed a deficit of client funds in the sum of €49,990.89 as of 11 November 2024 in breach of Regulation 7(2)(d) of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.

(b) Withdrew funds from the client account on a piecemeal basis from September 2023 to September 2024 for personal use thereby causing a deficit in client funds of €49,990.89.

(c) Failed to stamp and register nine properties identified notwithstanding that he was in funds to do so.

(e) Failed to reconcile the client bank account since 13 August 2023 and failed to record the majority of the transactions after that date in the client ledgers.

(g) Failed to prepare quarterly client account balancing statements in breach of Regulations 13(8) of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.

(h) Failed to complete a six-monthly office account balancing statement in breach of Regulation 13(9) of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.

(i) Failed to have a Section 150 letter filed on a number of the files reviewed.

(j) Failed to attach a Dispute Resolution Procedure to bills of costs in breach of Section 152(3) of the 2015 Legal Services Regulation Act.

(k) Failed to have statements of account on client files reviewed in breach of Regulation 12(2) of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.

(l) Failed to retain all electronic payment and receipt confirmations on the individual client files or in a separate file dedicated for that purpose in breach of Regulation 25(h) of the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.”

18. In respect of allegations (d) and (f), in relation to the alleged failure by the Respondent to discharge outlay in relation to a litigation matter which settled in January 2023, notwithstanding that he was in funds to do so in the sum of €6,500.80, and in relation to the alleged transfer of fees to the office account in advance of the completion of a conveyance, the Tribunal found that those allegations were not proven as to fact beyond a reasonable doubt and that the Respondent was not guilty of misconduct in respect of both of those allegations.

(c) Tribunal’s reasons for findings

19. The reasons given by the Tribunal for the findings made against the Respondent as to misconduct and its recommendation as to sanction were set out in two separate Determinations and Recommendations both dated 26 March 2026.

20. In relation to the first complaint and the first allegation of misconduct, the Tribunal was satisfied that the allegation was proven as a matter of fact, and that it amounted to misconduct. It accepted that the facts alleged by the Society were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It also accepted that the facts as proven amounted to misconduct under s.

50 of the 2015 Act.

21. In relation to the second complaint and the second set of allegations of misconduct, as I set out earlier in my judgment, the Tribunal found that allegations (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k) and (l) were proven as to fact beyond a reasonable doubt and amounted to misconduct.

22. In respect of allegation (a), which alleged that the Respondent allowed a deficit on client funds in the sum of €49,990.89, the Tribunal stated that any deficit on a client account is a serious matter as “the protection of client [monies] is essential to maintain the public’s confidence in the solicitors profession”.

23. In respect of allegation (b), which alleged that the Respondent had withdrawn funds from the client account on a piecemeal basis for personal use over the course of the year September 2023 to September 2024, the Tribunal noted that the facts proven in relation to that allegation demonstrated a pattern of conduct which was deliberate.

24. In respect of allegation (c), concerning the alleged failure by the Respondent to stamp and register nine properties despite the fact that he was in funds to do so, having received money from his clients for that purpose, the Tribunal noted that the Respondent failed to carry out the instructions of his clients and failed to hold sufficient funds in the client account to meet all liabilities to clients.

25. In respect of allegation (e), which alleged that the Respondent failed to reconcile the client account since 13 August 2023 and failed to record the majority of transactions after that date in the client ledgers, the Tribunal was satisfied from the evidence provided that the Respondent did not maintain proper books of account, as required under the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.

26. In respect of the remaining allegations at (e), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k) and (l), the Tribunal was satisfied that those allegations were proven as to fact, that they amounted to misconduct, and that they breached various provisions of the 2015 Act and the Solicitors Accounts Regulations 2023.

5. Respondent’s prior disciplinary history

27. Before the Tribunal dealt with the issue of sanction, Ms Fenelon drew to its attention the Respondent’s prior disciplinary history. It must be said that the Respondent’s disciplinary history is extensive, and spanned the period April 2019 to May 2024. He has had four orders made against him by the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal (the “SDT”) following inquiries which led to findings of misconduct, one order made against him by the Tribunal in this case following an inquiry and a finding of misconduct, and two orders made against him by this Court (on application by the Law Society). One of those court orders found that the Respondent was guilty of misconduct in that he failed to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2022. The second court order suspended the Respondent from practice on 29 April 2024. In total, the Respondent has had seven previous findings of misconduct made against him.

28. The details of this extensive and appalling disciplinary history were outlined by Ms Fenelon to the Tribunal at the hearing on 24 February 2026, and are summarised below.

29. The orders made included an order by the SDT following an inquiry in January and March 2019 in which the Respondent was found guilty of misconduct in that he failed to respond to numerous letters, and failed to attend a meeting with the Society. He was advised, admonished and ordered to pay a fine of €500 and costs of €1,537. There was a second order made by the SDT following an inquiry in January and March 2019 which found that the Respondent was guilty of misconduct in that he failed to comply with a direction of the Complaints Committee, that he failed to correspond with the complainant in the matter, and that he failed to correspond with the Society. He was censured, ordered to pay a fine of €2,000 and to pay costs of €1,212. A third order was made by the SDT following an inquiry held in March 2020 in respect of the Respondent which found that he was guilty of misconduct in that he failed to comply with an order of the High Court, that he failed to correspond with the Society and to attend meetings, and that he failed to inform his client of a hearing date. The Respondent was censured, ordered to pay a fine of €3,200 and the sum of €1,812 in costs. The fourth order was made by the SDT following an inquiry held in March, June and October 2021 in which the Respondent was found guilty of misconduct in that he failed to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2018. He was censured, ordered to pay a fine of €5,000 and ordered to pay costs of €1,212.

30. In addition, there was a recommendation made by the LPDT following an inquiry held in July 2023, which was ultimately the subject of an order of the High Court on 29 April 2024. In that order, which gave effect to the findings of the LPDT of misconduct on the part of the Respondent for failing to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2021 on time, he was ordered to pay a fine of €5,500 and to pay the costs of the proceedings before the LPDT of €1,537 and the Society’s costs before the High Court of €3,254.

31. There was an order made by the LPDT in July 2023 in which the Respondent was found guilty of misconduct for failing to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2019 on time. The Respondent was censured, ordered to pay a fine of €4,000 and ordered to pay costs of €1,512.

32. Finally, there was a recommendation made by the LPDT following an inquiry held in November and December 2023 and February 2024 in which the Respondent was, again, found guilty of professional misconduct in that he failed to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2022. The matter came before the High Court on 29 May 2024. An order was made that day that the Respondent be censured, pay a fine of €4,000 and pay the sum of €3,012 for the Society’s costs before the LPDT and the Society’s costs of the High Court application of €3,524.

6. Submissions to the Tribunal on sanction

33. As I mentioned, details of the Respondent’s extensive disciplinary history were given by Ms Fenelon to the Tribunal and, in her submissions to the Tribunal on the question of sanction, Ms Fenelon submitted on behalf of the Society that the Tribunal should make a recommendation to the President of the High Court, in light of the Respondent’s previous disciplinary history and the findings of misconduct made in these proceedings, that the Respondent has ceased to be a person fit to remain on the Roll of Solicitors, and that his name should be struck off the Roll. It was submitted that the findings of misconduct made demonstrated that the Respondent was dishonest in his practice, took client monies, and cleared out the client account in circumstances where the Court made an order in April 2024 that all monies held in the Respondent’s client or office account be paid out only on the authority of the Society, and that all monies held in the client and office accounts be paid to the Society.

34. It was pointed out by Ms Fenelon that the Respondent had, by his actions, caused a deficit in client funds of €49,990.89, which resulted in claims being made on the Society’s Compensation Fund. It was noted that where claims are paid out from the Compensation Fund, that has the effect that the members of the solicitors profession, who comply with their professional duties and obligations, effectively end up funding those payments out by their contributions to the Compensation Fund.

35. Ms Fenelon outlined the relevant principles on the imposition of sanctions in this area to the Tribunal, and asked that in addition to an order striking the Respondent’s name off the Roll of Solicitors, an order would also be made that the Respondent pay a contribution to the Compensation Fund of €10,000 and that the Respondent pay the costs of the Society in the Tribunal proceedings of €4,524.

7. Decision and Recommendations of Tribunal on sanction

36. The Tribunal then gave its decision on sanction. In its Determinations and Recommendations in respect of both matters before it, it decided to recommend the sanctions which the Society now seeks to be imposed in its application before me.

37. In respect of the first complaint, and the first finding of misconduct concerning failure by the Respondent to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2023, the Tribunal concluded that the appropriate course to take was to make a recommendation to the High Court pursuant to s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act, that the Court should make one or more of the following orders, namely;

“(a) that the respondent legal practitioner be struck off the Roll of Solicitors, pursuant to section 85(7)(f) of the [2015] Act;

(b) that the respondent legal practitioner pay to the Compensation Fund the sum of €5,000.00 pursuant to section 85(7)(a) of the [2015] Act;

(c) that the respondent legal practitioner pay to the applicant the sum of €3,012.00 in respect of their costs, pursuant to section 85(7)(h)(iii) of the [2015] Act”.

38. In reaching those recommended sanctions, the Tribunal had regard to the significant disciplinary history of the Respondent which included failing to file his Accountant’s Report for the year ending 31 December 2022, and the prior proceedings against him before the SDT, the LPDT, and the High Court. It also pointed to an aggravating factor which was present in the evidence before it, namely, the failure by the Respondent to engage or communicate with the Tribunal, and his failure to attend hearings.

39. In respect of the second complaint, and the very significant findings of misconduct against the Respondent arising from it, the Tribunal again decided that the matter should be dealt with pursuant to s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act, and it made a recommendation to the High Court under that subsection. It recommended that the following orders should be made:

“(a) That the respondent legal practitioner be struck off the Roll of Solicitors, pursuant to section 85(7)(f) of the [2015] Act;

(b) That the respondent legal practitioner pay to the Compensation Fund the sum of €5,000.00 pursuant to section 85(7)(a) of the [2015] Act;

(c) That the Respondent legal practitioner pay to the applicant the sum of €3,012.00 in respect of their costs, pursuant to section 85(7)(h)(iii) of the [2015] Act”.

40. The Tribunal set out its reasons for those recommended sanctions, and it specifically noted that the allegations in this matter related to the misappropriation of client monies, which, it noted, regardless of the amount, is a serious matter that without question undermines the reputation of the profession and puts the public at risk. It noted also that the Respondent had failed to stamp and register nine properties, even though he was in funds to do so. It noted that the Respondent withdrew money from the client account for his personal use. The Tribunal had regard to the significant disciplinary history of the Respondent, and noted that, despite disciplinary sanctions having been imposed on him previously by the SDT, the LPDT and the High Court, the financial penalties imposed on the Respondent in respect of those sanctions had not been discharged. It was pointed out by Ms Fenelon that some partial payments had been made by the Respondent in relation to some of the earlier sanctions, but that the majority of the fines and costs that he was ordered to pay have never been discharged.

41. It was the Tribunal’s conclusion that the conduct of the Respondent rendered him unfit to remain on the Roll of Solicitors. On that basis, and having regard to the seriousness of these issues, the Tribunal made the recommendations as to sanction set out earlier.

8. Decision on the Society’s Application

42. The Society’s application now comes before me to give effect on a composite basis to the two Determinations and Recommendations of the Tribunal in respect of the two complaints. In deciding whether to impose the recommended sanctions of the Tribunal, which the Society now applies for, I have to be satisfied that the Tribunal had regard to the relevant legal principles as set out in the D’Alton case. Having considered the material before the Tribunal, which I have summarised earlier in my judgment, and having considered the relevant legal principles, I am satisfied that the Tribunal did properly apply those principles. The legal principles in D’Alton were outlined in full to the Tribunal by Ms Fenelon, and I am satisfied that the Tribunal took those principles into account and applied them when making its recommendations as to sanction.

43. It is clear from those principles and from the caselaw which I outlined earlier that the Court is not bound by the recommendations of the Tribunal, and that the “ultimate arbiter” as to the appropriate sanctions on an application such as this, is the Court. However, it is of course necessary for the Court to have regard to the recommendations of the Tribunal, to give weight to those recommendations and to respect the views of the Tribunal.

44. In my view, the Tribunal did apply the correct principles, and it did provide in its two Recommendations, sanctions which are appropriate and proportionate to the circumstances of this case. It is clear that this is another case in which very serious findings of dishonesty and misconduct have been made in relation to a solicitor, involving misappropriation of client funds, as well as other very serious incidents of misconduct. Further, these findings were made in the case of a solicitor who has an appalling disciplinary record. Consistent with the caselaw in this area dealing with dishonesty by a solicitor, which confirms that, almost invariably, the appropriate sanction for a solicitor who engages in dishonest conduct is a strike off from the Roll of Solicitors, I am of the view that the sanctions recommended by the Tribunal are entirely appropriate. I agree that the Respondent is not fit to remain on the Roll. I will, therefore, make the orders sought by the Society at paras. (a) - (d) of the Originating Notice of Motion, namely, an order that the name of the Respondent be struck off the Roll of Solicitors, an order that the Respondent pay a sum of €10,000 to the Society’s Compensation Fund, an order that the Respondent pay the sum of €4,524 as a contribution towards the costs of the Society in the Tribunal proceedings, and an order that the Respondent pay the whole of the costs of the Society for this application in the measured sum of €3.254.