High Court grants adoption order after finding statutory proofs satisfied and child's best interests served.

APPROVED

REDACTED

FOR PUBLICATION

THE HIGH COURT

FAMILY LAW

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 54(2) OF THE ADOPTION ACT 2010 (AS AMENDED)

AND IN THE MATTER OF M, A MINOR BORN ON THE [REDACTED] 2012

Record No. HM 2025.168 [2026] IEHC 399

Between:

CHILD AND FAMILY AGENCY

AND

L.N.

AND

O.N.

Applicants

AND

THE ADOPTION AUTHORITY OF IRELAND

AND

R.A.

AND

P.M.

Respondents

Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 19th May 2026.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. The application under consideration is for an Order permitting an adoption order to be made by the Adoption Authority of Ireland (‘AAI’) in respect of M, the child the subject of these proceedings. The jurisdiction to make such an order derives from section 54 of the Adoption Act 2010 (as amended) (‘the 2010 Act’) in circumstances in which the parents and/or guardians of the child do not consent to such adoption. The jurisdiction vested in this Court under section 54 of the 2010 Act is complex in terms of the multiplicity of proofs required and is far reaching in that the granting of the relief being sought will result in the complete severance of the legal relationship between the child and its birth family, the now prospective adopters becoming in legal parents of M and his legal family.

PROOFS REQUIRED IN THIS APPLICATION

2. As clearly indicated in the judgment of Hogan J. in Child and Family Agency and Anr v. The Adoption Authority of Ireland and Others [2023] IESC 12 (‘the B Case’) at paragraph 57:

“The question of law for this Court is, as I have already indicated, whether each of the relevant statutory conditions have been fulfilled. As MacGrath J.

stated in Child and Family Agency v. Adoption Authority of Ireland (HR and FR) [2018] IEHC 515 (at [101]) before any adoption of this nature can be authorised by the High Court there must be “satisfactory proof” that each of these statutory conditions have been satisfied. In this respect, therefore, these conditions are each cumulative.”

3. Section 54(2A) of the 2010 Act requires:

(a) A failure of duty towards the child by its parents for a continuous period of 36 months prior to the application to such extent that the safety or welfare of the child is likely to be prejudicially affected;

(b) That there is no reasonable prospect that the parents will be able to care for the child in a manner that will not prejudicially affect the safety or welfare of the child;

(c) A failure such as constitutes an abandonment of parental rights relating to the child;

(d) Such failure justifying the State supplying the place of parents, as guardian of the common good;

(e) That the child has been in the custody of the prospective adopters continuously for a period of not less than 18 months prior to the application;

(f) That adoption is the proportionate way to supply the place of parents.

4. Section 54(3) of the Adoption Act, 2010 (as amended) requires:

(a) That regard be had to the Constitutional and other rights of all persons concerned, including the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child;

(b) That regard be had to the views of the child, such being given “due weight” in the context of the age and maturity of the child;

(c) That the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration;1

(d) That regard be had to all of the circumstances being “any other matter which the High Court considers relevant to the application.

5. Only if and when these proofs are satisfied does the 2010 Act provide that I may make an Order pursuant to section 54(2) of the 2010 Act authorising the AAI to make an adoption order in respect of the child and to dispense with the consent of any person whose consent is necessary for the making of such adoption order.

6. There are two essential pre-requisites which precede an application such as the present:

(i) The AAI must have made a declaration pursuant to section 53 of the 2010 Act that it would be proper to make an adoption order in respect of the child. Such declaration has been made in the present case as deposed to and exhibited by Mark Kirwan in his Affidavit sworn herein on behalf of the AAI on the 28th November 2025. This declaration is dated the 8th October 2024.

(ii) The CFA must be satisfied, as provided for by section 54(1) of the 2010 Act, that every reasonable effort has been made to support the parents of the child to whom the declaration under section 53(1) of the 2010 Act relates. In

As defined in section 19 of the 2010 Act.

relation to (ii) above, MacGrath J. in CFA and Others v AAI and Others [2018] IEHC 515 has confirmed that the statutory requirement in this regard rests with the CFA and not with the Court.2 That the CFA is satisfied that this requirement has been complied with is pleaded and is averred to by Andrea McNamara, Social Worker with the CFA, in an Affidavit sworn on the 17th November 2025.

7. The issue of the possible adoption of M by his foster carers has been in train over a long number of years, first being raised in the summer of 2020. It was delayed for a period in circumstances in which the Third Named Respondent, the birth father, was seeking guardianship of M which guardianship was conferred in or about 2024 by statutory declaration executed by the Second Named Respondent, the birth mother.

EVIDENCE

8. The substantive evidence before me comprised a number of Affidavits and the case was heard on affidavit evidence together with a report in respect of the voice of the child prepared by an independent guardian ad litem (‘GAL’) appointed by the Court.

No cross-examination on any of these affidavits or report was sought by any of the parties.

The substantive Affidavits before me are:

• Affidavit of A McN sworn on the 17th November 2025 (this affidavit relates to the history of the child and the care circumstances since birth);

• Affidavit of D McG sworn on the 12th November 2025 (this affidavit relates to interactions between the CFA and the birth parents as regards their attitude to the adoption of M);

• Affidavit of Mark Kirwan sworn on the 28th November 2025 (for the AAI);

“This obligation arises by virtue of s. 54(1)(a) of the Act of 2010 as amended by the Act of 2017. On my interpretation of that section, it appears that this is a matter upon which the Child and Family Agency must satisfy itself before it makes the application which is now before the Court. Section 54(1) addresses issues and requirements which must be fulfilled before the application is made; section 54(2) concerns the jurisdiction of the court on the hearing of such application. Section 54(1)(a) therefore appears to stipulate that this is a matter within the competency of the Agency. It is not specified in section 54(2) that this Court must also satisfy itself that the Child and Family Agency has complied with the provisions of section 54(1) before it may consider the making of an authorisation order or an order dispensing with the consent of a person whose consent is required, or that the application under section 54(2) should act as an appeal from a decision, declaration or determination of the Child and Family Agency in that regard. On the face of it, therefore, it seems to me that any remedy or challenge to compliance with the provisions of s. 54(1)(a) may lie in a different forum.”

• Affidavit of P.M. (the birth father) sworn on the 15th January 2026;

• Replying Affidavit of A McN sworn on the 19th February 2026 (this affidavit is in reply to the Affidavit of the birth father referenced above).

9. The evidential background to this case is largely uncontested. To the extent that it is, I will reference this below. The child (‘M’) in this matter is aged almost 14 years and has been in the care of the Second and Third Named Applicants since shortly (5 weeks) after his birth. M was born a number of weeks prematurely and was admitted into care pursuant to a voluntary care agreement entered into between the CFA and the birth parents. The birth mother was suffering from addiction issues and M was born with neonatal abstinence syndrome and was suffering from opiate withdrawal in the context of his pre-birth circumstances. A Full Care Order was made in June 2018.

The birth parents were not married to each other at any time. The Third Named Respondent (‘the birth father’) was appointed a guardian of the child in February 2024. M has never been cared for by his birth father or birth mother.

10. In her first affidavit, Ms McN, social worker, for the CFA, avers to the complex care needs of the child at birth and to his continuing additional physical and psychological care needs. There is ample and clear evidence that the Second and Third Named Applicants have assiduously and comprehensively addressed and catered for these needs and that the child has thrived in their care. It is averred (and not contested) that the Third Named Respondent has only had access in the presence of the Second Named Applicant, the foster mother. This is averred to be justified based upon the additional needs of the child. The overall picture is one of the birth father requesting additional and more extensive access on occasion, while being satisfied with arrangements on other occasions, without any proactive steps being taken by him to action achieving such increases. The averments indicate that he was kept informed of educational and medical assessments but that there was little reaction or response to this information when provided.

POSITION OF THE BIRTH MOTHER

11. The birth mother, the Second Named Respondent, was represented at the hearing by Counsel who informed me that she was consenting to the application and that she did not wish to make submissions. It was indicated that the birth mother wished to acknowledge the very high standard of care afforded to the child by the Second and

Third Named Applicants and to thank them for this. No Affidavit was sworn by the birth mother.

POSITION OF THE BIRTH FATHER

12. The birth father is opposing this application.

Chronology:

• July 2011 – relationship with birth mother commenced;

• There was cohabitation by the birth parents during the pregnancy;

• [REDACTED] 2012: child born;

• Relationship of the birth parents ended proximate to the birth of the child;

• Subsequent to his birth, the birth mother attended the hospital to care and feed M but his complex care needs were such as caused concern as to her ability to care for him independently. At the age of five months, he was voluntarily placed in foster care with the current prospective adopters. M moved to foster care from hospital;

• At no time after his birth did M reside with his birth parents. It is not disputed that the living circumstances of the birth father would have made this challenging;

• The birth father has had regular access with M since birth. These are visits of limited duration and regularity. It would appear to be common case that the birth father availed of all access proposed by the CFA, made requests for extension of such access which the CFA believed not to be appropriate in the context of the child’s needs but he did not proactively seek to progress additional access;

• June 2018 – Full Care Order made. This would not appear to have been opposed.

An enhanced rights order was subsequently made in favour of the Second and Third Named Applicants which would also not appear to have been opposed;

• The birth father has maintained access with the CFA and has fully participated in meetings to address and review care arrangements and progress;

• He has consistently opposed the adoption application since it was suggested in the summer of 2020 at Child in Care Review meetings.

13. He has filed an Affidavit in reply to these proceedings and was represented at the hearing. There are some inconsistencies between the averments of the father and those of the CFA. Additionally, there are some inconsistencies between the averments of the father and his position at hearing by way of submission. The CFA social worker confirms that the birth father always enjoyed at positive and respectful relationship with the foster carers and direct contact between him and M has been arranged directly with the foster carers. This access happens once per month. The birth father has acknowledged that he is satisfied with the level of care which the child receives from the foster parents and confirms that his family relationship with M is acknowledged. When adoption was discussed with him in 2020, he indicated that he would not seek the return of the child from the present placement but that he was not in favour of adoption. The Affidavit of D McG indicates that there is somewhat of a change in this regard in recent times with the birth father having expressed the wish to have M returned to his care.

14. An Affidavit was sworn by the birth father in which he references the fact that he has been a guardian of M since February 2024. An Affidavit in reply to this was sworn by Ms McN, social worker. He confirms that he has consistently objected to the adoption of his child by the Second and Third Named Applicants. He also avers that he disagrees with the contention that he does not want M returned to his care. At hearing, the submission made on his behalf was that he was satisfied with the care that M is receiving, that he is not seeking to remove M from the care of the Second and Third Named Applicants and that he does not wish to upset this arrangement. It was submitted on his behalf that his objection is to the termination of his parental rights.

His precise position in this regard remains unclear due to these inconsistencies.

15. He avers to having lived in Ireland since 2010 and that he has been an Irish citizen since 2023. He avers to his stable, progressive and successful employment circumstances and educational achievements. He avers to being in a long-term relationship and to his successful and active parenting role in respect of two other children. He avers to the close relationship between M and these half siblings and their activities together are detailed. He states that access with his siblings is enjoyed by M. There is a lack of consistency between the nature and extent of the relationship between M and his siblings as deposed to by the Third Named Respondent and as averred to by the social workers involved and also when compared with the nature of such relationship referenced by the GAL in the Voice of the Child report. He denies that he consented to M being taken into care. Again, this was not entirely consistent with submissions made on his behalf which indicated that he recognised himself when M was born that he simply was not in a position to assert his parental rights as he was not in a position to care for such a young infant and he could not provide a stable environment for the child. Submissions also referenced the fact that seeking care of M at the time of his birth “would not have been realistic” having regard to the child’s “complex medical needs.”

16. He further avers that he was not made aware prior to the Emergency Care Order applications brought by the CFA on the 25th September 2013 that an application would be made for M to be taken into care. He refers to an inconsistency between the assertions of the CFA that the child entered care voluntarily in circumstances in which there was an Emergency Care Order application. He states that he was never served with any proceedings and that, if the placement in care was based upon a voluntary agreement, he was not a party to this agreement. The records of the CFA in relation to the child indicate that he was admitted to care “under a voluntary care agreement with his parents”. This is consistent with the submissions made on behalf of the birth father but is at odds with his Affidavit. The replying Affidavit of Ms McN indicates that an Emergency Care Order was sought and, indeed, granted. This would appear to have pre-dated the voluntary placement. It would appear that PM was involved to some degree in the interim and final care order proceedings in or about 2017/2018.

There would not appear to have been opposition by him to such orders being made.

17. In relation to the initial Interim Care Order hearing, he states that he did not attend such hearing as he was not served with the papers regarding such application. He asserts to an understanding that a different person was served. The replying Affidavit avers to there being no record of a third party having been served in error. He states that when he became aware of the court applications, he did attend them. He avers that his uncertain immigration status “at this time” led to him not understanding his legal position regarding custody of the child. There is a lack of specificity in relation to the dates and occasions referenced by the birth father in his affidavit. He avers that “consideration was never given for M to live with him and he was not given the opportunity to look after [him]”. He states that he has a deep bond with the child which has grown since birth. In relation to his role and participation in M’s life, he states, in agreement with the CFA, that he:

“… attends access, engages consistently and consistently attends the child in care review meetings.”

18. He references that the child’s name for him is reflective of a parental role (although this contradicts the averments of social workers involved). The Affidavit does not state how the child addresses the Second and Third Applicants. He references a consistency of access which he has attended, initially fortnightly and now monthly. It would appear that this has been organised directly with the Second and Third Applicants in circumstances of “a difficulty with having no allocated social worker for approximately most of the time M has been in care.” The records of the CFA list M’s allocated social workers over a number of years but the Affidavit of Ms McNamara acknowledges that there have been “periods in recent years where [he] has not had an allocated social worker”. He avers to having been anxious to have more involvement in his child’s care but that he “has found it difficult to increase his involvement in particular when social workers have not been allocated.” It would appear from this Affidavit that access is facilitated by the Second and Third Named Applicants and that they are very active in so doing (the child, it appears, is brought to access by them, a journey of some distance, and that they attend the access visits). He says that access has been at the discretion of the CFA and that the insufficiency of such contact is due to the exercise of this discretion. He avers that he “cannot accept that there is no prospect of fulfilling parental responsibilities and/or of exercising parental rights now or into the future”. The birth father expresses frustration at the suggestion that there is “coaxing” in the contest of access attendance. He denies that this is the case and states that such suggestion has only been made in the context of the adoption application. He describes this as “a narrative” to advance the adoption of M.

19. It is accepted that the birth father consented to an enhanced rights application in favour of the prospective adopters but he says that he did so in ease of the protection of the welfare of the child in case of emergency, this being the explanation given to him by the CFA. He states that he has throughout the years remained hopeful of reuniting with the child “given the opportunity” and that he wants the child to reside with him and his family (again, this is inconsistent with his position at hearing). He requests an assessment to this end. It was accepted at hearing that the birth father has never taken any active steps to advance such a hope. He avers to concerns relating to the child’s understanding of the implications of adoption and its impact upon his relationship with his family of origin. He avers to being “highly committed” to M since birth and denies abandonment of M. He avers to his consistent engagement with the CFA and the Second and Third Named Applicants to “ensure the care” of M and to his successful parenting of the children currently in his care. His Affidavit would appear to accept that he has never cared for M as he states that he has never been put in a position where he can care for the child. He expresses the view that the parenting concerns of the CFA related to the birth mother and not to him. The contention that the parenting deficit rested and rests with the birth mother and not with him is a consistent position both in the Affidavit of P.M. and in his submissions.

It is denied that there has been a failure of parental duty and asserts that the history of the case does not support such failure. He says that his caring for M was never explored by the CFA. He avers to an understanding of the nature of adoption and of its legal implications. He avers to being “conscious of the impact of an adoption order on the wider paternal family, including [M’s] half siblings, …”. There are no specifics or particulars expressed in this regard. The Affidavit further acknowledges “the considerable level of care that [M] has received from the Second and Third Named Applicants.”. The concluding substantive paragraph of the Affidavit of the birth father succinctly and compellingly states his position:

“I say that I love my [child] unreservedly and I want him to be happy. I further say that I fully accept the care that he has received and continues to receive from the Second and Third Named Applicants. I say however, that I cannot consent to [M] no longer being legally, my son.”

20. The birth father was legally represented by solicitor and Counsel at the hearing. As previously identified, there would appear to be some degree of disparity between the position of the birth father as expressed at the hearing and the averments contained in his Affidavit sworn in the proceedings. In particular in this regard:

(i) As to the involvement of the birth father in the placement into voluntary care;

(ii) As to the intention of the birth father in relation to reunification.

The submissions emphasised the parental deficiencies of the birth mother and sought to distinguish the position of the birth father in this regard. He references societal challenges which he faced at the time of M’s birth. He says that his difficulties were not of his own making. However, clearly, many of these challenges have disappeared or diminished over the subsequent years and yet there would not appear to have been any proactivity on the part of the birth father in seeking to retrieve the care of the child. He argues that there cannot be said to be an abandonment when he has sought to have contact with the child since birth and has sought to augment such contact by request which requests were refused. His failure to progress such requests was, in submission, attributed to a lack of legal knowledge and advice. It is accepted that the steps taken in 2024 related to guardianship only and did not involve any applications pertaining to the care or day to day nurture of the child. Adoption, it is further submitted, is not proportionate as it will not alter the day-to-day circumstances of the child in any way where the birth father now acknowledges that he does not seek to resume care and is satisfied that the current fosterage arrangement would continue. It is submitted that refusal of the reliefs sought will result in the maintenance of the status quo and will constitute no prejudice to M. It is submitted that this satisfies the best interests of the child.

21. The submissions made on his behalf were that the legal proofs were not satisfied as regards:

(i) Failure of duty

(ii) Abandonment

(iii) Proportionality.

THE VOICE OF THE CHILD

22. An independent GAL, Ms D, was appointed to ascertain the wishes of the child and to assess maturity and authenticity. Ms D had previously been involved with M as his GAL in the context of care proceedings so her relationship with him is of longstanding. The positivity of the relationship with the Second and Third Named Applicants is referenced and it is indicated that the Second Named Applicant is the child’s primary attachment figure. He is expressed to be “very dependent” on her in the provision of “ongoing structure and support in his day to day functioning.” The child’s ongoing medical and psychological issues are detailed. In this context and having regard to the extent of these issues, he appears to be doing extremely well within his current living situation, assisted greatly by the management and monitoring of his carers. No capacity issues arise and he is of average intelligence. It is expressed that “there are no concerns observed about his capacity to understand, articulate his views and engage in decision making processes around his care status.”

All his interactions and behaviours are described as being age appropriate. He would appear to have a clear understanding of adoption and views it as part of becoming a full member of his de facto family, as conferring on him a status of family membership like all others in the unit and of making him “officially” part of this family. He referenced the permanence of adoption. He expressed positivity concerning this and concerning the fact that he would become a full and equal part of the family unit in which he has resided all his life. He demonstrated a clear knowledge of his birth family, a desire to stay in touch with the members of this family and a confidence that his “Mammy” would facilitate this, as she has always done. Asked about his view if his birth parents did not agree with the adoption, he expressed the view that he would still want it to happen. The duration of the adoption process, not unusually, was somewhat wearing for M and a sense of wanting this process to conclude was clearly expressed – “I just really want to be adopted and be the same as everyone else in my family … I’ve been wanting it to happen for ages.”.

Reflecting on the long duration of her involvement with M, the GAL concludes her report stating: “His views on wanting to be adopted have been consistent throughout with no concerns regarding the independence of his views noted.”

THE LAW AND CONCLUSIONS

23. I have referenced the decision of the Supreme Court in the B Case previously herein and the very comprehensive analysis of the law contained therein. Applying the principles set out by Hogan J. therein, it appears to me that the proofs required to be satisfied for the purposes of this application have been satisfied and I must make the Orders sought.

24. As regards, Section 54(2A) (a) I believe that there has been a failure of duty on the part of the birth parents as such term has been legally interpreted. The provision requires a failure of duty towards the child for a continuous period of not less than 36 months immediately preceding the application to such extent that the safety or welfare of the child is likely to be prejudicially affected. As in the B Case, M has been in foster care since birth. The birth father acknowledges that he has not cared for M at any time. The position is similar to that expressed by Hogan J. at paragraph 63 of his judgment. For a variety of reasons, the birth father here has been unable to discharge his parental rights for virtually the entirety of M’s life. No personal blame is to be ascribed in this regard, rather the plain fact of the matter is that all decisions regarding the education, welfare, up bringing and day-to-day care of M were taken by the Second and Third Named Applicants. As in the B Case, to the credit of the birth father here, he sought to maintain contact with the child and to have regular access but, again as in the B Case, I find that, at most, the birth father may be likened to a caring relative in M’s life as he never exercised any decision-making role regarding the education and welfare of the child. Indeed, it should be stated that the maintenance of access would appear to have been fulfilled significantly due to the efforts of the Second and Third Named Applicants who organised it, brought M on the journey necessary to achieve it and accompanied him to it.

25. As regards Section 54(2A) (b) of the 2010 Act, it is important, as with (a) above, to consider the full language of the legislative provision and not simply a part of it. The sub-section references not simply an inability to care for the child but such inability “to the extent that the child’s safety or welfare would be prejudicially affected”.

Clearly, the birth father here is caring for two other children and there is no evidence that he is unable to do so or that he is not doing so successfully. However, this application relates to M, not to any other children. The provision relates to the subjective situation of M. In this context, I find that the evidence before me satisfies the proof required that the birth parents in this instance are unable to care for M to the extent that this child’s safety or welfare would be prejudicially affected. M was born with very significant additional needs. The birth father acknowledges this and acknowledged in submission that care appropriate and necessary to these needs was required and was provided through the fosterage arrangement put in place. There is no suggestion that there has been any deviation or deficit in this regard. The evidence supports a finding that M has done well in the care of the Second and Third Named Applicant and the very high level of care and commitment they have shown towards this child was acknowledged by both parents. In this context, the inconsistent positions of the birth father at various stages over the course of M’s life and over the course of the adoption application and over the course of this application were concerning. The Affidavit sworn by him indicated a desire to have M return to his care and/or that such a return would be considered and investigated. The position adopted at hearing appeared somewhat different, it appearing to be accepted that M ought to remain in the current care arrangements. It appears to me that such inconsistency has a potential to cause considerable instability for M and, based upon this and the success of his current circumstances, I find that there is evidential support that there is an inability to care for M to the extent that safety and welfare would be prejudicially affected. Again, I make reference and I believe that my conclusion is supported by the B Case. In this regard, I refer to paragraphs 65 and 66 of the

decision of Hogan J.:

“65. …. It is not a question of parental capacity simpliciter because the subsection goes on instead to stipulate that this parental care must be exercisable in a manner “that will not prejudicially affect…her safety or welfare.” All the evidence is that Ms. B.’s welfare would be best served by leaving her to reside in the only house which she has known as her family home. This is where her centre of interests lies, and she has come to love and value the rural life and landscape which her foster home offers. She should not be uprooted from that home environment, not least given the nature of her disability and personal disadvantage.

66. Section 54(2)(b) is accordingly not concerned with parental capacity in the abstract. This statutory test is rather concerned with the concrete welfare and interests of the particular child in question. Given the circumstances of Ms. B.’s life to date, any arrangements in her living environment would cause a very significant rupture in her life and would be fraught with risk.”

26. Indeed, there is a distinguishing feature in this case due to the uncertainty of the position of the birth father relating to the alteration of the living circumstances of M, which circumstances have pertained since he was 5 weeks old. This was not a feature in the B Case and the dicta of Hogan J. indicate that such a situation would have further raised concerns as regard the likely prejudice to the child’s safety or welfare.

In this regard, I refer to paragraph 67 of the decision:

“67. I appreciate, of course, that it is no part of Ms. C.’s case that in the event that this appeal were to succeed that Ms. B. would then come to live with her. The point, however, is that Ms. C.’s own subjective intentions in this regard are not directly relevant to the application of this specific statutory test. Rather the High Court is required to ask itself whether the natural parents would be in a position to care for the child in a manner which would not prejudicially affect her safety or welfare. Here I agree with the comments of Whelan J. in the Court of Appeal to the effect that any conclusion to the contrary simply overlooks what she described as “the lived reality” of Ms. B.

To that extent, therefore, I consider that this test is also satisfied in that there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. B’s mother would be able to care for her in a way which would not prejudicially affect her welfare.”

27. The statutory term of “abandonment” has been the subject of long and consistent adverse judicial comment and its “special legal meaning”3 in the adoption context has been rehearsed in many decisions. The provisions of section 54(2A)(c) of the 2010 Act are directed at the “abandonment of parental rights vis-à-vis the child”

(Hogan J., paragraph 68). I must adopt the dicta of Hogan J. at paragraph 70 of the B Case:

“70. …. Ms. C agreed to the continuing care of Ms. B by Ms. A. She has left to Ms. A all the critical decisions regarding Ms. B.’s education and wellbeing. The fact that Ms. C visited her fairly regularly during the course of her childhood cannot take from the reality of abandonment of parental rights visà-vis Ms. B.”

and also, the dicta of McGuinness J. in Northern Area Health Board v An Bord Uchtala [2002] 4 IR 252 at 276:

see Child and Family Agency and Anr v. The Adoption Authority of Ireland and Others [2023] IESC 12, Southern Health Board v an Bord Uchtála [2000] 1 IR 165, Northern Area Health Board v An Bord Uchtala [2002] 4 IR 252.

“Here P. O’D has agreed to the continuing care of J. by Mr and Mrs H. over virtually J's entire life to date. She is, in addition, happy that this situation should continue. She has allowed and willingly continues to allow J. to become in a practical sense a member of the H. family. She has, in my view, abandoned the custody and care of her daughter to Mr and Mrs H. She has left and will continue to leave to them the crucial decisions regarding J's health and education and the carrying into effect of those decisions, together with the by no means insubstantial financial costs that arise from them. In my view this situation amounts in a real and objective sense to abandonment of her rights as a parent. As Walsh J. pointed out in the passage quoted above [from G. v. An Bord Úchtala [1980] IR 32 at 67-68] a parent may be deemed to have abandoned his position as a parent. In my view the infrequent visits by

P. to her 27 daughter, largely initiated by others, are not inconsistent with the reality of her abandonment of her position as a parent. It is true that P. has consistently expressed her opposition to adoption. I would, however, agree that such opposition in itself does not contradict the fact of abandonment. The test of abandonment must be an objective one.”

28. The love which the birth father has for M is not in question. The difficult circumstances which the family traversed cannot be doubted. However, it is the lived reality of M’s life that his birth parents have at no time in his life exercised parental rights vis-à-vis him. That role has been abdicated to others. In the present case, I was to a degree struck by the focus of the birth father being upon the impact of this application and of the historical circumstances of this case upon him and his other children. At no point was any application made to enhance the position of the birth family vis-à-vis M. Efforts in this regard otherwise than through the court process were unclear, unprogressed and inconsistent. The only concrete step taken in this regard would appear to have been the progressing of the issue of guardianship in or about 2024 (when the child was 11/12 years) which status was achieved through the consent of the birth mother and not through court application. However, having become a guardian, this status does not appear to have altered the exercise of parental role and assumption of parental responsibility vis-à-vis M. The exercise of such positions remained with the Second and Third Named Applicants.

29. No issue arises in this case concerning section 54(2A) (d) or (e) of the 2010 Act.

30. I must now consider section 54(2A) (f) of the 2010 Act being the issue of proportionality. In this regard, I also have the most comprehensive analysis of Hogan J.. At paragraph 75 he states:

“75. …. Adoption is an institution which is designed to meet the deep-seated human needs for family stability, security and the ties and love of a family in circumstances where – for whatever reason – the natural parents have been unable to provide such an environment for the child. Adoption is accordingly rather more than simply the question of a name or a right to inherit or even the entitlement to look to others for guidance and direction in the making of important life decisions such as might in the past have been provided by wardship or now (since 26 April 2023) by assisted decision-making. Adoption is rather a question of status which has lifetime consequences going well beyond the issue of care during the minority of the child. The making of an adoption order reflects the fact that a new family relationship has been created and this is one which is underpinned and supported by the State and its legal system. This point is underscored by the fact that this very institution is provided for and acknowledged by two separate constitutional provisions, namely, Article 37.2 and Article 42A.”

31. Having considered all of the evidence adduced and having heard the voice of the child, I find that M “is entitled to enjoy the emotional and legal security of family membership which adoption entails.”.4

32. Being satisfied that the proofs required by Section 54(2A) of the 2010 Act are satisfied, I must now consider the requirements of Section 54(3) of the 2010 Act. In this context, the constitutional rights of the birth parents and the child, the voice of the child and the best interests of the child arise. I find that the totality of the evidence in

Child and Family Agency and Anr v. The Adoption Authority of Ireland and Others [2023] IESC 12, para 79, Hogan J..

this case supports the reliefs sought by the Applicants being granted. As Hogan J.

states at paragraph 83:

“83. …. it is very much in the interest of Ms. B that she should enjoy the emotional security and other supports which membership of the family of Ms.

A – the family which, after all, who has cared for her all her life - would actually provide. While I appreciate that Ms. B may not have a precise conception of what this step actually entails in law, it seems clear that Barrett

J. found, having discussed the matter with her, that she is in favour of this step. This is further supported by the averments of the principal social worker familiar with this case.”5

33. I have had regard to the wishes of M, as expressed in the Report of the GAL, I have considered all of the evidence presented as it relates to M’s history and current circumstances and I have had regard to the criteria set out in section 19 of the 2010 Act pertaining to the ascertainment of M’s best interests. All of these factors, in my view, support the granting of the reliefs sought herein. In consequence, I will make the Orders sought at paragraphs (A) and (B) of the reliefs sought in the Special Summons herein.

Child and Family Agency and Anr v. The Adoption Authority of Ireland and Others [2023] IESC 12.