High Court dismisses judicial review as Tribunal lacks statutory power to reconsider prior refusal decisions.

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2026] IEHC 39

[Record No. 2025/412JR]

BETWEEN

YSA

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Miriam O’Regan, delivered on the 27th day of January 2026.

Introduction

1. The within matter raises a number of similar points dealt with in a recent judgment of this Court being GB v IPAT & Ors. [2025] IEHC 543 (“GB”) delivered on 20 October 2025. In addition, a second judgment in the same matter ([2025] IEHC 734) was delivered on 18 December 2025 addressing whether or not s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants Act 2020 applied in respect of maintaining Judicial Review. Insofar as issues raised in this matter overlap with matters dealt with in GB aforesaid the parties rely on their submissions in arguing one or both judgements were incorrectly decided and the matter therefore was heard on the basis of additional issues raised over those dealt with in GB.

Background

2. The applicant is a Jordanian national who came to Ireland on 5 August 2024 and applied for international protection on 6 August 2024. Following the statutory process the International Protection Office (“IPO”) recommended to the Minister that the applicant be afforded neither refugee nor subsidiary protection status. The applicant was advised of such refusal of his application on 11 November 2024. In that letter he was also advised that he had 15 working days to appeal such a decision which period expired on 2 December 2024. A notice of appeal was not lodged within the period provided and the applicant was served with a voluntary return letter on 10 February 2025. On 11 February 2025 the applicant’s solicitor dispatched a request for an extension of time to lodge an appeal. It was indicated that following a consultation between solicitor and applicant the solicitors had taken the initial steps on his application to appeal but unfortunately due to an administrative error the appeal was not submitted. It was said that it was always the intention of the applicant to have the appeal submitted on time. The letter went on to state: “Please accept our humblest apologies in relation to the clerical oversight which has caused this situation”.

3. In the decision of the Tribunal by way of email of 17 February 2025 reference is made to the applicant solicitor’s email of 11 February 2025 and thereafter the provisions of Regulation 4(5) of the International Protection Act 2015 (Procedures and Periods for Appeals) Regulations 2017 (“the 2017 Regulations”) are set out. The explanation given by the solicitor in the email of 11 February 2025 is set out, and in this regard, it is said that the Tribunal considers the explanation to be vague non-specific and inadequate and that “administrative error” or “clerical oversight” does not, in the absence of further clear and detailed explanation, meet the statutory threshold of “special circumstances”. In its conclusion it is said that the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal of special circumstances which prevented the notice of appeal from being submitted during the prescribed period. However, no such special circumstances were shown and therefore the Tribunal refused to extend the prescribed period.

4. In a further email of 17 February 2025 from the applicant’s solicitors, further information in relation to the reasons why the clerical error happened is set out. Confirmation was given that the applicant instructed the solicitor’s office on 8 November 2024 to come on record on his behalf. He signed an appeal on 14 November 2024 in respect of the negative

decision of 11 November 2024. However, this was misfiled. It was said that the IPO decision was not sent by the IPO to the solicitors and this would have been one of the triggers used in the processing of an applicant’s appeal and accordingly the fact that the solicitors misfiled the appeal signature page was compounded by the timing of the decision and/or not receiving the negative decision papers from the IPO which resulted in no appeal being lodged despite the applicant's instructions otherwise.

5. The Tribunal responded in an email of 20 February 2025 referencing the aforesaid submissions of 17 February 2025 and indicating that the appeal that was lodged was ten weeks late which is approximately four times the statutory time period for an appeal. The more detailed information was noted however it was said that the appeal had already been rejected and the Tribunal did not have the power to reopen a rejected appeal. It referenced the power to correct errors or omissions in Regulation 10(1) of the 2017 Regulations and also the decision of Humphreys J in ND v IPAT & Anor. [2020] IEHC 451 (“ND”) to the effect that Regulation

10 does not give any authority to set aside a decision. The Tribunal concluded with indicating that it is a creature of statute and is obliged to follow its legislative remit.

Proceedings

6. Leave was granted to the applicant to maintain judicial review proceedings on 28 April 2025. Following the decision in GB aforesaid the applicant submits that two additional arguments are outstanding by the instant applicant:

(1) the Tribunal was required to seek further information of the applicant prior to making a negative decision on the extension of time; and

(2) the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier decision inter alia of 17 February 2025.

Need to Seek Further Information

7. Both arguments are made on the basis that fair procedure would require same.

8. Regulation 4(2) of the 2017 Regulations is relied on, which provides that: – “Where the Tribunal receives a notice of appeal after the prescribed period and the notice does not contain a request for an extension of the prescribed period or set out the reasons why the applicant was unable to bring the notice of appeal within the prescribed period the Tribunal shall, by notice in writing, inform the applicant that his or her appeal has been received after the prescribed period has expired and that the Tribunal intends to reject the appeal on that basis.” Thereafter under Regulation 4(3) such applicant has three working days of receipt of the notice to seek an extension of the prescribed period.

9. In JVVM & Anor v The Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 506 Stack J in an ex tempore judgment of 19 September 2025 at para. 23 indicated that suggesting that Regulation 4(2) of the 2017 Regulations obliges the Tribunal to invite further representations in the circumstances is unarguable and that Regulation 4(2) is intended to notify a claimant of a default in applying for an extension of time. However, in the case before Stack J, as in the instant case, an extension of time was in fact sought.

10. In my view Stack J was correct to say that the argument advanced in respect of Regulation 4(2) was unarguable – the wording of the Regulation clearly applies to an entirely different set of circumstances and I am satisfied that in those circumstances no basis has been provided to suggest that the Tribunal is obliged before reaching a negative decision on an extension of time to identify the shortcomings in the submissions already made by the applicant to enable him make further submissions with a view to securing a more favourable outcome and accordingly the applicant's argument in this regard must fail. The Applicant argues that there is no rule precluding the Tribunal from seeking further submissions, however, on the assumption that this is correct, the argument in the Statement of Grounds is to the effect that the Tribunal wrongly proceeded to refuse the extension without informing the Applicant of the deficiencies in his application.

11. It seems the applicant is conflating a power and an obligation. Furthermore, as the Tribunal is a creature of statute the issue is not one of finding a rule or provision precluding the Tribunal seeking further submissions but rather finding a provision enabling or empowering it to do so.

Power to Reconsider an earlier Decision

12. In respect of the argument that the Tribunal has power to reconsider a prior decision it seems to me the fact that Regulation 10 of the 2017 Regulations affords the Tribunal capacity to correct errors and omissions is in itself indicative of a limited capacity on the part of the Tribunal to interfere with a decision already made.

13. It has been argued that in the decision of Humphreys J in ND., above, the court was dealing with a substantial decision under the provisions of the 2015 Act rather than under the 2017 Regulations. However, clearly Humphreys J did state at para. 22 that Regulation 10 of the 2017 Regulations allows for correction of errors but that did not mean the Tribunal had authority to set aside the decision in full and rehear the matter and he further indicated that there was not any other legal authority for such an approach.

14. Notwithstanding the applicant's complaint that the comments of Humphreys J were obiter I agree with those views. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and any power it has must be identified in legislation.

15. In addition, the respondent's makes the valid argument that if such asserted power is available to the Tribunal there is no indication of the parameters of such power, where such authority derives from, in what circumstances it might be triggered, when it might arise, end or otherwise be lost and is not in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation.

16. The applicant's argument to the effect that the case of Danqua v Minister for Justice (No. 2) [2017] 3 IR 192; [2017] IECA 20 affords jurisdiction to reconsider an earlier decision is in my view also unstateable and is in the events entirely unparticularised.

17. For the reasons above I am satisfied that the applicant has not demonstrated a power on the part of the Tribunal to set aside an earlier decision and reconsider same.

18. The applicant in oral submissions has confirmed that the concept of legal certainty has been dealt with in GB in the context of an effective remedy and has further confirmed that no argument is being pursued under the ECHR point mentioned in the statement of grounds.

19. In the circumstances the relief claimed by the applicant is refused.

Costs

20. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, I will also take this opportunity to deal with the issue of costs. In the circumstances, given the respondents have been successful, they are presumptively entitled to their costs. Should the parties have any difficulty with the proposed costs order they should file submissions of not more than 1,000 words within 7 days of this judgment being delivered.