High Court dismisses judicial review of University's decision to withdraw student due to course time limit expiry.

[2026] IEHC 385

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2024/1221 JR]

BETWEEN:

TIMOTHY ORIMOLUSI

APPLICANT

AND

THE PROVOST, FELLOWS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN,

TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY OF

IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 17th day of June, 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. The applicant in this case commenced proceedings seeking to quash a series of decisions made by the first respondent (the University) on a large variety of grounds. While the second respondent, the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (the PSI) was a party to the proceedings, the applicant’s primary and overwhelming focus was on decisions made by the University, and the PSI did not participate in the proceedings.

2. At the relevant time, the applicant was a postgraduate student in the School of Pharmacy. The applicant was pursuing a course that he expected would lead to the award of an

M. Pharm degree. The particular benefit of obtaining an M. Pharm from Trinity College was that, subject to certain further steps, a successful candidate was entitled to be registered as a pharmacist with the PSI. The structure of the course undertaken by the applicant involved an initial four-year B. Sc (Pharm) undergraduate degree followed by a final postgraduate year. The final postgraduate year comprised academic work and practical work. In addition to successfully completing those elements in the M. Pharm course, a candidate also had to pass a Professional Registration Examination (the PRE). A further feature of the course undertaken by the applicant was that it was subject to an overarching time limit. The overall M. Pharm course, taking into account the initial four-year BSc (Pharm) undergraduate course, must be completed within a period of eight years, with the possibility of that time period being extended in exceptional cases by one further year. For reasons that will be explained, the prescribed period expired before the applicant completed the overall course.

3. The case that the applicant sought to make was multifaceted. At its heart was the process by which the School of Pharmacy commenced and pursued a process concerning the applicant’s fitness to practise. That process involved a series of procedures including internal appeals and ended with a decision made by the Visitors. The applicant met with adverse outcomes at all stages in the process invoked by the School of Pharmacy, and, ultimately, he was withdrawn from the M. Pharm course. Hence, while he obtained his B. Sc (Pharm) undergraduate degree he did not obtain the M. Pharm qualification and therefore was not eligible for registration as a pharmacist.

4. In this judgment it will be necessary to consider a number of significant preliminary issues, including whether the decision-making process in this case is amenable to judicial review and if so whether the applicant is entitled to challenge the decisions that were made prior to the decision of the Visitors. As part of that process, it will be necessary to consider the body of documents that set out the internal processes of the University and the School of Pharmacy together with the structures established for considering a student’s fitness to practise. Before that it will be necessary briefly to describe the proceedings.

THE PROCEEDINGS

5. The proceedings were commenced when the applicant made an ex parte application to the court on the 27 November 2024 seeking leave to apply for judicial review. The High Court granted the applicant leave to apply for judicial review on the 9 December 2024. Subsequently and following the receipt of certain additional material, on the 26 May 2025 the High Court granted the applicant leave to amend his statement of grounds.

6. The amended statement of grounds is a lengthy document that runs to just over 35 pages. By way of summary, the applicant seeks a variety of orders of certiorari quashing decisions made by various elements within Trinity College which led to a decision by the Visitors on the 12 December 2024 which affirmed decisions finding that the applicant was not fit to practise as a pharmacist.

7. As part of the grant of leave, the applicant applied for and was granted an order anonymising his identity for the purposes of these proceedings. In a separate application, that issue was the subject of a detailed and considered judgment delivered by Simons J. on the 6 February 2026. The judgment in question considered solely the question of whether requests for anonymity and reporting restrictions should be granted. The court concluded that reporting restrictions in the form of an anonymisation order should be refused and that the reporting restrictions which had been imposed by order of the court on the 30 June 2025 should be vacated. However, the court as part of its order imposed temporary reporting restrictions in order to safeguard the applicant’s right of appeal. This was on the basis that any appeal to the Court of Appeal or an application for leave to apply to the Supreme Court would be rendered nugatory were the applicant's name to be published immediately. The court understands that there was no appeal against the orders made by Simons J., and therefore this judgment is not subject to any reporting restrictions.

8. The applicant commenced his pharmacy studies in the University on the 1 October 2015. Due to difficulties that he encountered the applicant dropped out of his course for a period and then returned to his studies. The applicant’s progression through his undergraduate career was difficult and protracted. Ultimately, he obtained his B. Sc (Pharm) degree and progressed into the M. Pharm course.

9. As will be set out in more detail below, as a result of matters encountered by the applicant he was referred to the School of Pharmacy Fitness to Practise Committee (the School FTP) in October 2023. The School FTP conducted a hearing on the 15 November 2023. The committee found that the concerns of the School of Pharmacy in referring the case to the fitness to practise committee were well-founded. The committee recommended that the applicant be withdrawn from the M. Pharm programme. As part of that decision the committee noted that because the applicant's registration on the M. Pharm year of the programme expired at the end of September 2023, the effect of the decision was that he would not be permitted to repeat outstanding assessments and proceed to the professional registration examination.

10. The recommendation of the School FTP committee was referred to the Dean of Graduate Studies for approval. On the 29 November 2023, the Dean of Graduate Studies approved the decision of the committee. Thereafter the applicant appealed the decision to the College Fitness to Practise Committee (the College FTP) on the 1 December 2023. The College FTP heard the applicant's appeal on the 29 January 2024. The majority of the College FTP affirmed the decision to withdraw the applicant from the M. Pharm programme, with one member of the committee dissenting.

11. The applicant thereafter appealed the decision of the College FTP to the College Visitors pursuant to the College Statutes. Accordingly, the appeal was heard by the Pro- Chancellor of TCD, Mr. Frank Clarke SC, and the judicial visitor, the Honourable Mr. Justice Birmingham. The appeal was heard on the 24 July 2024. On the 30 July 2024, the Visitors delivered an oral decision upholding the decision of the College FTP and agreed to give written reasons at a later stage. The Visitors provided a detailed written decision on the 12 December 2024.

12. The legal grounds on which the applicant was granted leave to seek judicial review relied on contentions about the processes and procedures involved at almost every step in the above decisions as well as certain elements in the substance of the decisions themselves. There was a particular emphasis on the precise interaction and relationship between the various College policy documents and rules.

13. In the first instance, the applicant contended that the decisions of the college and the respective committees and visitors were disproportionate, unreasonable, irrational, ultra vires, unfair and unjust, and arrived at in breach of the applicant’s right to fair procedures, in breach of statute and were otherwise unlawful. The precise arguments in that regard were that: a. The college failed to follow its own statutes, regulations or policies; b. The School of Pharmacy referred the applicant to the Junior Dean at an earlier stage, and by taking that course it was putting him to the hazard when the conclusion of the Junior Dean should have brought matters to an end; c. The School of Pharmacy should not have raised additional matters relating to the applicant’s course of study as an undergraduate and that those matters could not justify the school's subsequent decision to refer the matter to the School FTP committee; d. Alternatively, that some of the complaints made amounted to a device or stratagem to justify the subsequent referral decision; e. The accusation of various infractions of college discipline which occurred when the applicant was an undergraduate was in breach of natural and constitutional justice; f. Taking into account incidents relating to the applicant's undergraduate course was improper; g. The College failed to follow the policies and the college documents, including consultation with the Junior Dean, in relation to referring a “concern” to the School FTP committee; h. The referral of the applicant to the School FTP was ultra vires or without jurisdiction; i. The initiation of the FTP process was ultra vires the relevant rules.

j. The applicant was improperly exposed to a situation analogous to res judicata or double jeopardy; k. The School of Pharmacy was estopped from referring the applicant to the School FTP committee; l. The referral to the School FTP committee amounted to an abuse of process; m. The matter was unduly delayed in light of the time constraints under which the applicant was operating; n. The School of Pharmacy failed to act in the best interests of the applicant in breach of the School’s charter; o. The College FTP failed to give any clear reasons why the committee found the School of Pharmacy’s concerns to be well-founded. p. Separately, it was alleged that in the case of the College FTP there was a reversal of the onus of proof, that there was a conflation of the principles within the code of conduct relating to clinical placements with college disciplinary issues; q. There was a failure to give reasons as to how the applicant's case gave rise to an exceptional situation whereby matters of a disciplinary nature including plagiarism were being considered as part of the fitness to practise process and the chairperson of the School of Pharmacy should not have given evidence on behalf of the school.

14. As can be seen, the complaints relating to the School and College FTPs comprised both fair procedure type points and points relating to jurisdiction and legal powers. In relation to the

decision of the college Visitors, the applicant set out approximately 40 different grounds of complaint about both the process, reasoning and decision of the Visitors in reaching their

decision. This element in the case will be dealt with in detail below.

15. On the 30 September 2024, the applicant swore a short verifying affidavit which also exhibited certain materials. A further affidavit sworn on behalf of the applicant by his solicitor Ms. McEntee on the 27 November 2024 for the purpose of exhibiting further documentation that was said to be relevant to the case. Ms. McEntee swore a further affidavit on behalf of the applicant on the 11 March 2025 in which she explained the need to seek leave to amend the statement of grounds on the basis that the written decision of the Visitors had become available since the initial grant of leave.

16. A statement of opposition was filed on behalf of the respondents on the 15 July 2025. In light of the extensive nature of the amended statement of grounds, the statement of opposition is equally extensive and took issue with the case made by the applicant. In addition to disputing the claims made by the applicant, the respondents make a number of preliminary objections. The preliminary objections can usefully be grouped into three descending categories of assertion.

17. In the first instance, the respondents suggest that in circumstances where the applicant had been afforded an initial hearing, a further hearing and an appeal to the Visitors, the court ought to decline to intervene in an internal fitness to practise process of the respondent. Essentially, this amounted to a contention that what occurred between the applicant and the University was a private matter of internal procedure and thus not amenable to judicial review.

18. Secondly, an argument was made that the challenges to the processes and procedures that predated the decision of the Visitors were out of time and that there was a failure to make an application for leave to apply for judicial review within three months from the date on which the grounds for the application first arose.

19. Third, it was argued that in circumstances where the applicant exercised rights of appeal against decisions at first instance and second instance, he was precluded from applying by way of an application for judicial review for the earlier decisions.

SUMMARY OF THE COLLEGE STATUTES

20. The case made out by the parties involved a consideration of a number of policy documents and statutes.

21. It can be noted that pursuant to s. 14 of the Universities Act 1997, a university has the entitlement to regulate its affairs in accordance with its independent ethos and traditions and the traditional principles of academic freedom. In addition by s. 31 of the 1997 Act, a University may have a charter setting out the objects and functions in respect of its academic and administrative affairs, the composition of its governing authority and functions, the rights of its employees and students and their responsibility towards the university and responsibility of the university towards them, the arrangements for review of or appeals against decisions of the governing authority or the academic council which affect employees or students and any other matters the governing authority may consider relevant. The only apparent restriction on the content of the university charters is that they do not conflict with the 1997 Act themselves. In this case, the applicant did not ground any argument in the provisions of the 1997 Act nor is there any argument that the content of the various documents produced by Trinity College Dublin conflicted with any statutory provision that touches on the performance of functions in Trinity College Dublin.

22. With regard to the internal college documents, the primary document is the 2010 Consolidated Statutes of Trinity College Dublin of the University of Dublin, which was updated to February 2022 (the 2010 Statute). The 2010 Statute is divided into divisions or chapters. The chapter dealing with powers of the Visitors is in the earlier stage of the document under the heading “Division-General”.

23. Under the 2010 Statute the Visitors are to be independent in the performance of their functions. The judicial visitor is appointed by the government, and the Chancellor is described as “the primary visitor” but he must accord due deference to the opinion of the judicial visitor on legal issues. According to regulation no. 4 in the Statute, the Visitors shall perform their functions with due enquiry and in accordance with the provision of the statutes. Regulation 4(5) provides that decisions of the Visitors shall be binding upon all members of the community, provided that this shall not affect any further right of appeal and review available under the law of the land.

24. By regulation 5, the Visitors are the final authority with regard to the interpretation of any provisions in the chapters or schedules of the statutes. The primary role of the visitors for the purposes of these proceedings is set out in regulation 7 which provides effectively for appeals to the Visitors from decisions made by the Board, and, in that regard, makes provision for appellants to be legally advised. In terms of remedies, regulation 9 provides that having heard an appeal the Visitors may confirm the decision of the Board in whole or in part, or amend it, or declare it null and void, or make such further other orders they deem fit. It is clear from the terms of the 2010 Statute that the Visitors enjoy a wide power to address issues, including the interpretation of the University statutes and policies.

25. The division concerning conduct has a portion relating to student conduct and capacity. In relation to student conduct and capacity, the Statutes set out five schedules dealing in turn with student conduct and capacity, discipline, mental health, fitness to study, and fitness to practise. Regulations 1 through to 5, deal with the power to make the policies and procedures that are set out in the schedules. Prima facie, this suggests different processes and procedures to deal with the different categories of matters set out in the schedules. Regulation 2 deals with discipline and provides for a disciplinary code “including the disciplinary functions of the Junior Dean, and the composition and procedures of a Panel of Enquiry”. Regulation 5 deals with students’ fitness to practise trades or professions during their courses of study and after graduation.

26. In terms of the potential for an interrelationship between matters dealt with in the schedules, regulation 7(2) provides “although matters appropriate to a schedule (other than schedule 1 on the Committee on Student Conduct and Capacity) should not normally be dealt with pursuant to another Schedule, nevertheless separate aspects of a case may be dealt with pursuant to separate Schedules” [emphasis added], and at regulation 7(3) “although some class of matter may raise issues pursuant to an existing Schedule, Board may provide in a further Schedule that it should normally be dealt with pursuant to that further Schedule.”

27. In relation to discipline, Schedule 2 provides that the Junior Dean investigates the commission of offences and is required to conduct an interview with the student. Following an interview and the completion of the initial investigation and having decided whether a case has been established, the Junior Dean is required to determine whether each offence concerned is a major or minor offence. The Junior Dean may impose a penalty and there is provision for various appeal procedures within that context.

28. Schedule 5 is titled “Fitness to Practise” and requires each school in which fitness to practise matters can normally arise to formulate a policy in relation to such matters and constitute a fitness to practise committee. Referrals to a fitness to practise committee are to be made by “an appropriate person”, which for the purposes of schedule 5 is the Junior Dean, the head of the relevant discipline, or the head of the relevant school. The schedule notes that the fitness to practise committee is to determine its own procedures and perform its functions with due enquiry. If a committee decides that concerns relating to a student's fitness to practise are well-founded it is equipped to make a number of different actions from cautioning the student to recommending that the student be withdrawn from college or suspended, or referring any aspect of the matter to the Dean of Students to be dealt with pursuant to any other schedule in the chapter. The schedule also provides for “a College fitness to practise committee” which will hear appeals from the school's fitness to practise committee decisions by way of a full rehearing. (Regulation 4 (4)).

29. More detail in relation to the manner in which matters at issue in these proceedings can be addressed is set out in what is described as the Calendar 2022-2023. The Calendar deals with general matters relating to graduate students. The regulations set out in the Calendar are administered by the Dean of Graduate Studies who acts in conjunction with various other identified persons, including Heads of School and Directors of Teaching and Learning, and committees of the various professional schools.

30. In addition to dealing with matters such as term times, fees and other administrative matters, the Calendar deals specifically with the question of plagiarism at s. 49. The following is stated at s. 49:- “Plagiarism is the act of presenting the work, form of words, or ideas of others as one's own, without due acknowledgement. Plagiarism can arise from deliberate actions and also through careless thinking and/or methodology. The offence lies not in the attitude or intention of the perpetrator, but in the action and in its consequences. It is the responsibility of the author of any work to ensure that he/she does not commit plagiarism. Plagiarism is considered to be academically fraudulent, and an offence against academic integrity that is subject to the disciplinary procedures of the University.”

31. Section 54 of the Calendar sets out the following:-

“54. If plagiarism as referred to in section 49 above is suspected, the Director of Teaching and Learning (Postgraduate) or his/her designate will arrange an informal meeting with the student, the student supervisor and/or the academic staff member concerned, to put their suspicions to the student and give the student the opportunity to respond. Students may nominate a Graduate Student Union representative or PG adviser to accompany them to the meeting. The student will be requested to respond in writing stating his/her agreement to attend such a meeting and confirming on which of the suggested dates and times it will be possible for them to attend. If the student does not in this manner agree to attend such a meeting, the Director of Teaching and Learning (postgraduate), or designate, may refer the case directly to the Junior Dean, who will interview the student and may implement the procedures as referred to in section 5 (other General Regulations). If the Director of Teaching and Learning (postgraduate) forms the view that plagiarism has taken place, he/she must decide if the offence can be dealt with under the summary procedure set out below. In order for this summary procedure to be followed, all parties noted must be in agreement and must state their agreement in writing to the Director of Teaching and Learning (Postgraduate) or designate. If one of the parties to the informal meeting withholds his/her written agreement to the application of the summary procedure, or if the facts of the case are in dispute, or if the director of teaching and learning (postgraduate) feels that the penalties provided for under the summary procedure below are inappropriate given the circumstances of the case, he/she will refer the case directly to the Junior Dean, who will interview the student and may implement the procedures set out in Section 5 (Other General Regulations).”

32. It is noted in this section that nothing provided for under the summary procedure diminishes or prejudices the disciplinary powers of the Junior Dean under the 2010 consolidated statutes.

33. The Fitness to Practise policy is set out in a separate document, and it notes that where a member of college staff or work-based placement staff or other appropriate individual has a concern regarding a student’s fitness to practise, he/she should refer the student's case, in the first instance to the relevant Head of Discipline (or in the case of a single discipline school, the Head of School). After consulting with the Junior Dean, the Head of School/Discipline shall decide whether to refer the case to the Junior Dean to be dealt with under College’s disciplinary code or to have the case dealt with under the procedures for dealing with fitness to practise cases that do not constitute disciplinary offences. The procedures for dealing with fitness to practise cases are set out in Schedule 3 to the General Fitness to Practise policy.

34. Part 3 of the General Fitness to Practise policy notes that fitness to practise matters should not normally be dealt with as matters of discipline, but there will be some exceptional cases where this would be necessary, either in whole or in part. Where it is decided that a case or a part thereof should be treated as a disciplinary manner, the case shall be dealt with in accordance with the College’s disciplinary procedures as set out in Schedule 1 to the chapter on student conduct in the 2010 Statutes.

35. With regard to other fitness to practise cases, section 3(d) notes that “fitness to practise cases that do not constitute disciplinary offences should be referred by the Head of School/discipline or the Junior Dean, as the case may be, to the School Fitness to Practise Committee (the “School Committee”) …”.

36. An appeal against a decision of the School FTP committee may be taken to the College FTP committee by either party to the original decision. The College FTP committee is to comprise a chairperson who is a practising lawyer, two members of staff drawn from disciplines that have fitness to practise requirements and two external (i.e., non-staff) members one of whom shall be drawn from the discipline of the student and the other who shall be a layperson. An appeal can be taken from the College committee to the Visitors in relation to fitness to practise committee matters pursuant to the relevant chapter of the 2010 statutes.

37. The appendix to the General Policy on fitness to practise notes schedule 3 to the chapter on student conduct in the 2010 Statutes, and it reiterates at s. 2(4) that where a case comes before Junior Dean pursuant to schedules 1 or 2 which in fact raises or includes fitness to practise matters, the Junior Dean shall decide whether and to what extent the case ought to be referred to the committee.

38. The final document referred to in the proceedings was the School of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Science Fitness to Practise policy and procedures. That document sets out procedures for dealing with complaints. At first instance, this involves referrals to the relevant Director of Teaching and Learning. This is a function delegated by the Head of School to the Director of Teaching and Learning, and in the event that there is a conflict of interest, the Head of School is to resume the function or delegate it to another appropriate office holder within the School. Section 3(1) provides that the Director must discuss the case with the Junior Dean.

39. Following the consultation, the Director and Junior Dean must decide which process, fitness to practise or other, to apply. The section provides “in making this decision, the Director/Junior Dean must first consider whether concern could fall under disciplinary cases, …. The College Policy clearly outlines that these three categories should not in the first instance be dealt with under the fitness to practise procedures” [emphasis added]

40. Section 3.2 deals with common issues which may arise in the first instance and are not normally handled as fitness to practise matters. It is noted that fitness to practise matters should not normally be dealt with as matters of discipline, but that there will be some exceptional cases where this will be necessary, either in whole or in part. The section notes that “where it is decided that a case or a part thereof should be treated as a disciplinary manner, the case shall be dealt with in accordance with College's disciplinary procedures as set out in Schedule 2 to the Chapter on Student Conduct and Capacity in the 2010 Statutes.” In relation to plagiarism, the section notes that as a general matter cases of plagiarism should be dealt with under the regulations outlined in the College Calendar and not under the fitness to practise policy.

41. Thereafter the policy set out procedures in relation to the initial investigation of the complaint, the collection of evidence and hearings before the fitness to practise committee. Once a decision is made by the School FTP committee there is provision for an appeal to the College FTP committee, and thereafter an entitlement of an appeal to the College Visitors.

THE INTERACTION WITH PHARMACY ACT 2007

42. Under the provisions of the Pharmacy Act 2007, as amended, persons may be registered in the register of pharmacists if they hold a qualification appropriate for practise in accordance with section 16 (section 14(1)(e)). Section 16 is complemented by schedule 2 to the 2007 Act which makes further provision as to the recognition of professional qualifications in pharmacy.

43. S.I. 377/2014, the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (Education and Training) (Integrated Course) Rules 2014, provides at reg. 5 that “a person who in accordance with these Rules holds a Masters degree in pharmacy that is recognised and approved by the Council in accordance with Part 3 shall be regarded as holding a qualification appropriate for practise.”

44. The regulations then go on to describe the process for the recognition and approval of programmes of education and training leading to the award of a Masters degree in pharmacy and indicates the necessary components and approvals that are required for that purpose. It was common case that the University’s M. Pharm programme was such an approved programme. Of note for these proceedings, part 5 provides for a requirement at reg. 18 that a recognised institution shall at the end of the fifth year following completion of the training referred to in rule 14 (1b) (which is the in-service practical training) hold an examination and which shall be known as the professional registration examination and which may be repeated at the discretion of the institution. In addition, by reg. 19, the recognised institution is required to support the operation of a code of conduct for pharmacy students which is to be drawn up in consultation with the Council. In preparing that code of conduct, it is necessary to have regard to the code of conduct established for pharmacists under the Act.

45. Critically, for the purpose of these proceedings, by regulation 20 it is provided that: “20. No Masters degree in pharmacy shall be awarded to any person by a recognised institution, for the purpose of being recognised under these rules as a qualification appropriate for practise, unless the head or acting head of the school of pharmacy in the said institution has confirmed –

(a) ….,

(b) …, and

(c) his or her overall satisfaction that the person concerned is fit to be a registered pharmacist.”

46. Finally, reg. 21 provides that a person who commences a course under the rules leading to the award of a qualification appropriate for practise shall, in order to be eligible to obtain such award, complete the said course within eight years of the date on which he or she commences that course and regulation 21(2) provides that a recognised institution may “in exceptional circumstances” extend the period prescribed by a period of one year in order that a student be eligible to obtain the award of a qualification appropriate for practise.

THE M. Pharm COURSE

47. As required by the 2014 Rules, the M. Pharm programme (also known as the Pharmacy (Integrated) Programme) is a five-year programme offered by the School of Pharmacy which is recognised and approved under the 2014 Rules as a programme leading to the award of a Master’s degree in pharmacy. Students may exit the course at the end of their fourth year with a B. Sc in pharmacy. Alternatively, as chosen by the applicant, they can continue on to complete the fifth year and seek to obtain the M. Pharm qualification. It was common case that the code of conduct for pharmacy students operated by the university is a code of conduct drawn up with regard to the code of conduct established for pharmacists under the Pharmacy Act 2007.

48. The University produces a Pharmacy Student Handbook years 1 to 5 (“Student Handbook”) which confirms that students undertaking the M. Pharm programme are expected to abide by the College Code of Conduct, and the attention of students is drawn to other matters including the College’s general regulations on fitness to practise. Progression from each academic year is subject to “Examination and Progression Regulations, Academic year 2022 to 2023”, which are set out within the student handbook and also the “Examination and Progression Regulations, Academic year 2023 to 2024” in respect of the M. Pharm degree. In order to graduate with the M. Pharm degree students must pass the prescribed examinations and assessments and satisfy the requirement set out in the 2014 Rules, which require students to complete the Pharmacy (Integrated) Programme within eight years of the date on which they commenced the programme. The handbook notes that under the terms of the legislation the University has no discretion to extend the period beyond nine years from the date on which the student commenced the programme and that is in the exceptional circumstances where the period of eight years is extended by one more year.

49. In accordance with rule 18 of the 2014 Rules, the professional registration examination is held at the end of the fifth year of the M. Pharm programme following completion of inservice practical training. In that regard, the Examination and Progression Regulations make clear that it is necessary for students to have satisfactorily completed all other components of the programme in order to be eligible to sit the PRE. The annual sitting of the PRE takes place after the standard reassessment session in late September early October. Where a student does not complete the PRE, it is possible for a further sitting to be scheduled in February within a new academic year and candidates who require to take the PRE at that sitting may apply to do so on an “off books” basis. According to the University, the PRE may be attempted on a maximum of four occasions; however, because of the application of statutory timelines for the completion of the M. Pharm programme, a student will not be permitted to attempt the PRE even if he/she has not attempted it on four occasions.

THE APPLICANT'S ACADEMIC CAREER

50. The applicant commenced the M. Pharm programme on the 1 October 2015. It is clear from the papers that he faced a number of difficulties throughout his academic career. There is some dispute on the papers as to why those difficulties arose. In large part, the applicant attributes the difficulties to matters outside of his control, such as financial difficulties, some emotional/mental health difficulties relating to personal events, and misunderstandings.

51. Notwithstanding these explanations, the factual position appears to be that during his first year the applicant did not attend for group work face-to-face meetings on the 9 December 2015. He did not attend to repeat a code of conduct assessment or complete a further assessment on the 15 December 2015.

52. In the academic year 2016/2017 the applicant registered as a senior freshman on the M. Pharm programme but failed his annual assessments and the repeat sittings. The applicant was permitted to repeat the senior freshman year in the academic year 2017/2018, however he failed to register in the time permitted and was deemed withdrawn on the 3 December 2017. Following some discussion, the applicant was permitted to be readmitted and register late. However, he failed his annual assessments and the repeat sittings. As a consequence, having failed to progress from a senior freshman year, his results were published as “failexclude” and he was excluded from the programme. Subsequently, the applicant received permission to be placed off books for the year 2018/2019. In 2019/2020, following appeal to the college academic appeals committee and in circumstances where the regulations generally do not permit a student to attempt a year for a third time, the applicant was permitted to register for his senior freshman year for a third time.

53. During his senior freshman year in 2020, the applicant acknowledged plagiarism in two modules PHU22101 and PHU22102. On the 15 June 2020, the Junior Dean and a senior lecturer of the university deliberated on the applicant's case and decided that he would be required to resubmit work which would be capped at a pass mark, write essays on plagiarism and on the code of conduct, and retake the student code of conduct ceremony prior to the commencement of the next academic year. A recording of level 3 plagiarism was made on the student portal in respect of the applicant, and it was determined by the Junior Dean that “any further breach of the student code of conduct will result in a full fitness to practise hearing”. An entry was made on the log of concerns relating to the applicant arising from those matters. The applicant was notified of the outcome by email from Dr. John Walsh, the Director of Teaching and Learning (Undergraduate) on the 15 June 2020.

54. At the annual sittings in his senior freshman year, the applicant failed four of seven assessments but then passed all four of those assessments at the repeat sittings. As a result, he progressed to his junior sophister year. At the annual assessments in this junior sophister year, the applicant failed four of seven assessments, but passed each of them at the repeat sittings. In his senior sophister year, the applicant failed to register within the time permitted and he was withdrawn from the course on the 3 November 2022. Following an appeal, the applicant was permitted to be readmitted to the register and resume studies. He failed all annual assessments but went on to pass each of them at the repeat sittings. Accordingly, after significant difficulties, the applicant successfully achieved the B. Sc (Pharm) degree.

Issues in the M. Pharm year

55. The deadline for registration for the M. Pharm year 2022-2023 was on the 11 October 2022. An invitation to register was issued to the applicant on the 13 September 2022. On the

14 September 2022, the applicant completed the first five steps for online registration however he did not complete registration. The applicant was issued with reminders to register on three occasions in late September 2022. On the 29 September 2022, the applicant was notified that registration must be completed by the 11 October 2022 and that should he fail to do so he would be deemed to be withdrawn and that an application for readmission would have to be made to the Dean of Graduate Studies. The applicant was issued two further withdrawal warnings on the 29 September and the 6 October 2022, and the registration deadline was extended for him from the 11 October to the 25 October 2022. Thereafter two further withdrawal warnings were issued on the 12 October and the 19 October 2022.

56. The applicant failed to register, he was deemed withdrawn from the M. Pharm programme on the 28 October 2022 and notified through the student portal. On the 2 November 2022, the applicant procured another student to sign him onto a mandatory attendance workshop. At that point, the applicant had been notified that he had been deemed withdrawn from the M. Pharm programme. The other student later admitted that he had signed the applicant in when he had not been present, and the applicant thereafter emailed the module coordinator to apologise. The relevant module coordinator, Prof Cristín Ryan emailed Prof John Gilmer, Head of the School of Pharmacy, in relation to the matter on the 3 November 2022.

57. On the 3 November 2022, the applicant emailed a member of the School of Pharmacy's administration to access to the online platform “Blackboard” so that he could sit an examination in module PHP55104 which was scheduled for the 4 November 2022. A review of the applicant's record confirmed that he had failed to register and been withdrawn from the M. Pharm programme, and therefore was not eligible to sit the examination for the relevant module. The applicant was advised of this and informed that if he was in a position to register in the coming days he should contact the School so that permission could be sought from the Dean of Graduate Studies for him to be readmitted.

58. On the 4 November 2022, the applicant emailed “postgrad.support@tcd.ie” stating that he had informed his senior tutor of his financial difficulties and was told that he would be provided with as much assistance as possible and that he should not worry. It was further indicated that the applicant did not hear back despite a series of follow up emails.

59. On the 10 November 2022, the applicant emailed Prof Gilmer and he stated: “I am writing to you to follow up on my email that I send during the summer when I reached out to you in relation to a pressing matter but received no reply” and further stated that he felt he was being punished for not replying to correspondence regarding academic registration “even though I had contacted them regarding the situation” and that he considered it would be unfortunate for him not to continue with his studies due to a financial problem, “that I tried to look for advice on how to manage when reaching out to both yourself and the senior tutor…”

60. On the 10 November 2022, Prof Gilmer replied to the applicant to note that having reviewed his records he had identified two emails received from the applicant over the summer period. On the 2 June 2022, the applicant had requested informal access to his exam results in circumstances where they were withheld due to non-payment of fees. On the 3 September 2022, the applicant had sent an email stating that he was hoping to meet Prof Gilmer at a particular date. Neither email referred to financial difficulties or otherwise referred to a pressing matter. Prof Gilmer also noted that the applicant had not made the faculty of the school aware that he had not registered.

61. As a result of all the foregoing and following a meeting with Prof Gilmer on the 14 November 2022, the applicant emailed the Dean of Graduate Studies on the 15 November 2022 and acknowledged that he realised that he “did not present the leadership of the school in a fair manner” and that his correspondence “painted an ill-fitting picture of their character”.

62. On the 15 November 2022, the Dean of Graduate Studies confirmed that in light of the support from the school, the applicant would be permitted to register so long as fees were paid no later than 12 noon on the 21 November 2022.

63. According to the University, during the M. Pharm year there was a lack of engagement by the applicant in team-based components of a group research project in module PHP55400. The applicant was spoken to by the module coordinator and project supervisor and a 20% mark reduction was applied in the project components where lack of engagement had been identified.

64. The applicant also registered for two modules: PHP55100 (supply of medicines and organisation and management skills) and PHP55104 (advanced pharmaceutics). The University operated a plagiarism detection software programme called “Turnitin”. By reference to that software, it was determined that the applicant’s submission in respect of his assessment on module at PHP55100 had a 61% similarity index with a previous submission. On further investigation, it was noted that the applicant’s submission was very similar to a submission from a student in the previous academic year. This included entire sections of the submission that appeared to have been copied and pasted directly.

65. In the course of a summary procedure on the 28 July 2023, chaired by Prof Christín Ryan and attended by Dr. Cadogan, Director of Teaching and Learning (Postgraduate) and module coordinator, the applicant asserted that he had worked collaboratively with other students on assignments. However, on further questioning he admitted that he had drawn from the submission of another student and accepted that he had plagiarised material. It was decided that the applicant would undertake a viva voce examination with the module coordinator and another academic.

66. At this point it can be noted that the minutes of the plagiarism summary meeting that occurred in July 2023 did not note the previous plagiarism offences which had been recorded against the applicant during his undergraduate career. The University acknowledged that this was an error in the recording system and noted that during the course of a senior freshman year in 2020, the applicant had acknowledged plagiarism in two modules: PHU22101 and PHU22102, following which he had been advised that any further breach of the code of conduct would result in a full fitness to practise hearing.

67. The repeat sittings of the assessment in module PHP55104 took place on campus on the 28 July 2023. Because the applicant had failed to register at the time, the repeat sitting was his first time sitting the assessment. The assessment was conducted on an open book basis and students were permitted 90 minutes to complete the exam and a further period of 20 minutes was allowed to upload their work to the relevant platform. Again, the applicant's submission was identified as having a 64% similarity index to previously submitted work, according to the analysis conducted by reference to the Turnitin software.

68. The applicant was informed by Dr. Cadogan of the concerns in relation to plagiarism on the 4 September 2023. The applicant was warned by Dr. Cadogan that if the plagiarism concern was upheld this would have serious implications in terms of the applicant's eligibility to sit the PRE, and that he could not realistically see the process concluding prior to the September sitting of the PRE.

69. On the 4 September 2023, the applicant replied by email expressing disappointment and upset. The applicant stated that he believed that an allegation preventing him from sitting the PRE was unfair and having regard to the academic and personal obstacles he had overcome that year. The applicant urged Dr. Cadogan to permit him to sit the PRE that month. On the same date, Dr. Cadogan replied stating that he did not have a discretion to permit the applicant to sit the PRE and that because the plagiarism concern had been raised it was necessary that the relevant procedures be followed.

70. On the 6 September 2023, a meeting was held which was attended by the applicant, a TCD Student’s Union education officer, Dr. Cadogan, Prof Carsten Erhardt (the module coordinator) and Dr. Deirdre D’Arcy (Associate Director of Teaching and Learning (Postgraduate)). At the meeting the applicant admitted to plagiarising material from another student. The applicant stated that this was unintentional and that he had brought a bundle of notes into the open book exam and that these notes included material provided by another student within the year, and that he had not realised he was transcribing from them directly. It was noted at the meeting that plagiarism was an offence even if unintended, a matter which reflects the position in the University's policy documents. The outcome of the meeting was that there was a direct referral to the Junior Dean.

71. On the 19 September 2023, the applicant met with the Junior Dean in relation to the referral of plagiarism in module PHP55104. On the following day, an executive officer emailed the applicant notifying him that the Junior Dean had decided that the piece of work was inadmissible and the mark would be set to 0. It was further decided that – if permitted by the rules of the course to resit the assessment – the mark in any such assessment would be capped at the pass mark and the instance of plagiarism was to be recorded as a level 4 plagiarism offence.

72. On the 21 September 2023, the applicant emailed Prof Erhardt in relation to the opportunity to re-sit the exam in module PHP55104. On the 22 September 2023, Dr. Cadogan replied to this email noting that it raised a number of complex issues, with respect to the applicant's record and college and M. Pharm training regulations. The applicant was advised the Dr. Cadogan would write to him as soon as he could clarify the matter but he was reminded that he was not eligible to sit the PRE which was scheduled for the following day (23 September 2023).

73. On the 27 September 2023, the applicant emailed Dr. Deirdre D’Arcy noting that during the initial hearing it was noted that the Dean's determination was “the final call”. The applicant stated that he was surprised by Dr. Cadogan's reference to the question of his resitting the examination. The applicant noted that he did not wish to miss graduation on the 25 October 2023 and the opportunity to sit the PRE in February 2024. That email was forwarded to Dr. Cadogan who in turn replied on the 29 September 2023, and the applicant was notified that in order to be eligible to graduate with the M Pharm degree, the regulations require that all components of the course have to be passed including a pass mark in the PRE. It was explained that, as such, it was not possible to be conferred with the M. Pharm degree and later attempt to sit the PRE.

74. In or around that time a decision was made by Prof Gilmer to refer concerns relating to the applicant’s fitness to practise to the school committee.

75. On the 10 October 2023, Dr. Cadogan wrote to the applicant by email to note that the Junior Dean's decision to record a level 4 plagiarism offence on his record was the latest in a year in which the applicant had been warned in relation to arranging for the falsification of an attendance record, misrepresenting the school in correspondence in relation to fees, and another recent finding of plagiarism regarding the assessment from module PHP 55100. In light of that, it was indicated that the School had very significant concerns in relation to the applicant's ability to abide by the code of conduct which in turn was modelled on the PSI code of conduct, and the School had significant concerns in relation to his suitability to be a pharmacist. It was noted to be of particular concern that the recent repeated breaches of the code of conduct arose in his final year at a time when a student was expected to be in the final phase of preparation for professional life. Dr. Cadogan referred to an earlier decision of the Junior Dean that any further breach of the code of conduct was to result in a full fitness to practise hearing, and a list of events on his record were attached the email.

76. Accordingly, as the applicant was informed, his case was referred to the School FTP committee for consideration and a copy of the relevant policy was attached for his information.

77. Entirely separate to the question of fitness to practise, the email noted that there was an issue regarding the applicant’s eligibility to sit the exam in which he was found to have submitted plagiarised material. In that regard it was noted that both College and PSI regulations (2014 Rules) required that the course be completed within eight years, subject to an extension of an additional one year in exceptional circumstances. Under M. Pharm course regulations, a student who fails to successfully complete the course may apply to the course committee for permission to repeat the year on the payment of full tuition fees and charges. However, Dr. Cadogan noted that the Dean of Graduate Studies was prepared to consider granting an opportunity to attempt the assessment in module PHP55104 on an “off books” basis and if successful, a sitting of the PRE. As to whether the school would support this pathway, Dr. Cadogan noted that that would be dependent on the recommendation of the School FTP committee.

78. The referral submitted by Prof Gilmer to the School FTP committee set out a number of grounds. First, the School had concerns with regard to the applicant's ability to abide by the student code of conduct; second, there was a concern with respect to the applicant's ability to adhere to College regulations in respect of the conduct of examinations and assessed works; and third, the School had concerns with respect to the applicant's honesty and trustworthiness in respect of the behaviours he demonstrated in the M. Pharm year 2022 to 2023.

79. The hearing was held in the school boardroom on the 15 November 2023. The applicant was attended by an education officer from the Student Union. The decision was delivered on the 17 November 2023, and the School FTP recommended that the applicant remain withdrawn from the M. Pharm programme (in circumstances where his registration on the M. Pharm programme had expired at that point).

80. On the 29 November 2023, the applicant was advised in writing of the decision of the School FTP committee which, in the interim, had been sent to the Dean of Graduate Studies for review and approval. A copy of the summary decision was shared with the applicant and he was also informed of his right of appeal to the College committee.

81. The applicant appealed the decision to the College FTP committee. At that point, the applicant was legally represented and had delivered grounds of appeal on the 10 January 2024. The School also delivered outline submissions prior to the hearing. The hearing took place on the 29 January 2024, and the committee reconvened on the 31 January 2024 to deliberate. The applicant was informed of the draft decision of the College committee on the

8 February 2024, in circumstances where the draft decision had been submitted to the University Council for approval at a meeting on the 14 February 2024. The University Council approved the recommendation of the College FTP committee on the 14 February 2024, and the applicant was informed of the decision on the same date. On the 28 February 2024, the Board approved the minutes of the University Council's decision to approve the recommendation of the college committee.

82. Thereafter the applicant appealed to the College Visitors. At this point and before considering the decision of the Visitors, it is necessary to consider the preliminary objections raised by the University.

THE AMENABILITY OF THE DECISIONS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

83. The parties identified a number of authorities that were said to support their respective positions, including reasonably well-known decisions such as Flanagan v. UCD [1988] I.R. 724, Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384, Zhang v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2013] IEHC 390, Fassi v. Dublin City University [2015] IEHC 38, and Galbraith v. Dublin City University [2022] IEHC 520.

84. The question of whether bodies such as the University, when they carry out the type of functions under review in these proceedings, are amenable to judicial review has been considered on a number of occasions and it is difficult to identify a governing principle or series of principles that can be applied. Instead, particular features appear to have assumed importance on the particular facts of each case. The parties did not refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shatter v. Guerin [2021] 2 I.R. 415. It can be noted that one of the features identified by the Court in that case as being relevant to the question of whether a challenge by judicial review was available was the source of the power in question.

85. In Zhang v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2013] IEHC 390, Dunne J. noted that the extent to which certain bodies are amenable to judicial review “is a somewhat vexed question and has given rise to a considerable body of case law.” Dunne J. referred to the observations of Denham J. in O'Donnell v. Tipperary South Riding County Council [2005] 2 I.R. 483 where she stated: - “The burden is on the County Council to show that the contract between the parties is one of private law. I adopt the approach taken by Finlay C.J. in Beirne v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána I.L.R.M. 1 at p.2, where he stated ‘The principle, which, in general, excludes from the ambit of judicial review decisions made in the realm of private law by persons or tribunals whose authority derives from contract is ... confined to cases or instances where the duty being performed by the decision making authority is manifestly a private duty and where his right to make it derives solely from contract or solely from consent or the agreement of the parties affected. Where the duty being carried out by a decision-making authority ... is of a nature which might ordinarily be seen as coming within the public domain, that decision can only be excluded from the reach of the jurisdiction in judicial review if it can be shown that it solely and exclusively derived from an individual contract made in private law.’”

86. In the O'Donnell case, on the facts, it was found that the employment of a station officer of a fire station was a matter within the public domain and therefore amenable to judicial review.

87. The question of the relationship between the power being exercised and some underlying statutory position relating to the body exercising the powers was referred to by Smith J. in Quinn v. King’s Inns [2004] 4 I.R. 344 where at p. 364 the court noted:- “In my judgment the instant case falls four square within the decision in Rajah v. the College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384. The examination board's jurisdiction derives from the education rules of the respondent. The applicant was accepted as an applicant in the entrance examination on the basis of those rules. Accordingly, insofar as the decision involved in those proceedings is concerned, the applicant's rights are determined by a contract and the matter is essentially a private one relating to the rights of a student with respect to the respondent. The fact that the respondent's powers may initially derive from a charter is removed and indirect to the consideration of the instant case - as was made clear in Re Malone's Application [1998] N.I. 67, it is necessary to consider the nature of the power as well as its source. The examination board when deciding to fail the applicant was not exercising a disciplinary function and so is clearly distinguishable from Geoghegan v. Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland [1995] 3 I.R. 86”

88. In the Zhang case, Dunne J. noted that the issue in that case involved the exercise of a disciplinary function and in those circumstances the powers of the Institute of Technology in relation to the making of regulation derived from statutes, the Regional Technical Colleges Act 1992, and the decision of the respondent was amenable to judicial review. The court noted that if this was a case in which what was at issue was not a disciplinary matter, then the decision in Quinn would have a bearing on her review of the matter.

89. The case law regarding universities was also in consideration in Fassi and Dublin City University [2015] IEHC 38, a decision of Noonan J. In that case, the decision under question was one in which the applicant was deemed unsuitable to continue his studies as a result of poor academic performance. Noonan J. conducted a detailed consideration of the existing authorities in the area and in relation to the question of amenability he stated at para. 29 that:- “29 … the authorities suggest that in general, a body which derives its jurisdiction from contract or otherwise from the consent of its members will not be amenable to judicial review. Like every general rule, there are exceptions and it remains for the court to decide even where the relationship is based on contract if there is a sufficiently public element to confer jurisdiction. The fact that the body in question is established by statute will of itself not normally be sufficient.

30. Decisions of educational institutions will not be reviewable where they relate solely to matters of academic judgment. That is not to say that such a

decision is automatically immune from review merely because it purports to be in the academic realm and one could conceive of situations where for example a decision might be shown to arise from entirely improper considerations or be motivated by mala fides. Absent that, the court will not intervene. The position may be different, however, where issues of discipline are concerned and the court may review decisions taken in breach of natural and constitutional justice.”

90. More recently in Galbraith v. Dublin City University [2022] IEHC 520 the applicant failed in an application for judicial review where she was unable to complete her third year and challenged a refusal to enter her into her fourth year of a bachelor of education programme. In that decision Barrett J. found that the decisions complained of were not amenable to judicial review, relying primarily on Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384 and Fassi v. DCU [2015] IEHC 38. In seeking to assert that there was a sufficiently public element presenting in the case to make the case amenable to judicial review, the applicant relied on the fact that the decision made had a relationship to the teaching Council standard which provided for the duration and nature of teaching practise which was required to be a feature in a degree of the nature undertaken by the applicant. This was not deemed sufficient by Barrett J. who observed at para. 28 that because DCU offered a degree which satisfied the criteria necessary for graduates holding that degree to become registered primary school teachers that that somehow involved DCU discharging a public function to comply with teaching standards set by the teaching Council, a body established by statute. Likewise, the court found that the fact that DCU was established by statute or that it offered a degree which is structured in such a way that a graduate holding that degree can become an accredited national school teacher did not affect the fact that the matters at issue between the applicant and DCU were entirely private in nature. Accordingly, the court found there was not a sufficiently public element presenting in the case to render the decisions amenable to judicial review.

91. For the purposes of this case, it can be noted that the applicant urged that the question of plagiarism was a strong element in the complaints made by the School of Pharmacy and that under the relevant College Statutes and policy documents plagiarism is identified as primarily a disciplinary matter. In addition, emphasis was placed on the relationship between the School of Pharmacy fitness to practise policy and the M. Pharm course, on the one hand, and the regulations made under the Pharmacy Acts, on the other. The respondent submitted that this case properly considered was a matter of private law concerning the terms on which the applicant accepted entry to Trinity College and undertook the M. Pharm course.

92. In my view the issues are very finely balanced. In respect of this aspect of the case, the applicant did not seek to rely on any provision in the Universities Act, 1997. Similarly, no particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the University was established by statute or charter. Hence, the source of the powers and procedures that are the subject of the decisions that the applicant seeks to challenge are internal University statutes and policies, which are private and not public in nature and source.

93. I accept that under the College Statutes plagiarism is identified as something that ordinarily should be approached as a matter of discipline, but not exclusively so. Moreover, the University decisions that are under challenge were not framed as emerging from disciplinary concerns but related to the broader questions framed by Prof Gilmer when the matter was referred to the School FTP committee. In many respects the facts in this case resemble the situation in Galbraith, where it was found that the decisions made by DCU were not amenable to judicial review.

94. Despite the above and with some considerable hesitation, I am persuaded that the decisions under review are amenable to judicial review. This is on the narrow ground that in the particular circumstances of this case the following features suggest that the function performed by the University bodies cannot be described, to adopt the language of Finlay C.J. in Beirne, manifestly private or deriving solely from contract.

95. The particular features that I have found persuasive are that (a) under the 2014 Regulations, the School’s code of conduct is mandated to be modelled on the PSI code of conduct; (b) the question of the applicant’s fitness to practise related at least in part to his fitness to practise in a regulated profession; (c) while the immediate question of his fitness to practise was not the question that the Head of School was required to certify under the 2014 Regulations, clearly there must be a relationship between the process initiated by Prof Gilmer and his decision whether to certify under the Regulations; and, (d) there was a backdrop of plagiarism to the complaints made by the School of Pharmacy, which has a disciplinary element even if the complaint was not directed to a disciplinary process per se.

96. Of the four features identified above, I consider that in the particular features of this case the third feature is the most compelling. On one view the certification of fitness to practise under the 2014 Regulations is part of a separate process to the internal fitness to practise processes. However, it is clear that Prof Gilmer, quite reasonably, saw a link between the two processes, and gave the strong impression in his correspondence to the Visitors that there was a connection between the two processes. Similarly, it was clear from my reading of the Visitors’ written decision that they understood that the University fitness to practise processes at least in some respects fed into the regulatory process.

97. As noted, I consider that this was finely balanced, and it is important to emphasise that the court is not making a general finding that ordinarily the processes of the University are amenable to judicial review.

WHAT DECISIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT?

98. Finding that the decisions in respect of which leave was granted to challenge are amenable to judicial review does not mean that all the decisions that the applicant seeks to quash should be considered by the court. The respondent argued that the applicant essentially was out of time to challenge the decisions made prior to the decision of the Visitors and / or that the applicant effectively was estopped from challenging processes and decisions where he had chosen to pursue the alternative internal appeals remedies. Before considering the recent authoritative case law from the Supreme Court on alternative remedies and judicial review it is helpful to consider the decision of the court of Appeal in Arthropharm (Europe) Limited v. the Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109.

99. Arthropharm principally was concerned with the application of judicial review time limits in a commercial regulatory context. However, from paragraph 140 of the judgment, the Court addressed the issue of alternative remedies, and the starting point was described as follows by Murray J.: “140. Three relevant propositions are well established by the case law. First, the existence of a remedy which affords an adequate alternative to judicial review represents a discretionary bar to the grant of that relief. Often where an applicant pursues that alternative remedy he will lose his right to relief by way of judicial review of the original decision, most usually because that decision is rendered moot by outcome of the alternative process. In circumstances where this is not the case and the original decision can be said to still be live and justiciable, the fact that an applicant has pursued the alternative route may afford an excuse for his failure to seek judicial review within the permitted time period and it is that consideration that underlay the comments of Collins J. in Murphy v. Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission upon which Arthropharm relies here.

141. At the same time, and second, an applicant for judicial review cannot obtain an extension of time by corresponding with the original decision maker, asking them to reconsider their decision and then asserting that there is a new ‘decision’ to review when they respond (or as the case may be, fail to do so): “[a] decision which is a reiteration of a previous decision is not a new decision. Time therefore begins to run when the final decision is made”. (Finnerty v. Western Health Board [1998] IEHC 143, per Carroll J., approved in Sfar v. Revenue Commissioners at para 41.)

142. The third principle is related to the second but focusses not primarily on the substance of the underlying decision but looks instead at the grounds of the challenge that are sought to be made to it. It would make a nonsense of the time limit imposed by Order 84 Rule 21 if an applicant could under the guise of a challenge made to a decision within time, obtain the invalidation of an earlier

decision for which time had run and expired. The rule against collateral attack prevents this. It was most recently explained in Independent Newspapers plc v. IA [2020] IECA 19 as follows (at para. 56): ‘A ‘collateral attack’ in this sense arises in multi-stage decision making processes in which later decisions inevitably depend on and assume the legality of an earlier determination. In that situation, a challenge to the later decision may directly or indirectly present an issue as to the legality of the earlier one. Such an indirect attack is not permissible where the earlier decision could and should have been challenged within a fixed period which has passed. The rationale underlying the relevant case law is that a party who has the benefit of an administrative decision which is not challenged within a legally mandated timeframe should not be exposed to the risk of having the validity of that decision subsequently challenged in later proceedings which seek to quash the validity of a subsequent decision (Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] 2 IR 250, at p.264)’”

100. Turning to the factual situation in these proceedings, a number of matters are clear. First, this was not a classic multistage process, of the type described in cases such as Crayden v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] 3 I.R. 785, where a single overall process comprised a number of sequential stages. Here, with the exception of the appeal to the Visitors, each stage in the fitness to practise process was theoretically free standing, albeit carrying the possibility of a further appeal: School FTP to College FTP, and College FTP to the Visitors. In that sense, the validity of a later stage was not dependent on the validity of something found at an earlier stage. In fact, each appeal allowed for de novo consideration of the core questions. Second, notwithstanding the above, I am satisfied that once the applicant made a choice to move forward with the internal appeal process, the result was that the earlier decision was rendered moot because the de novo appeal and consequent decision became a self-standing new event that carried its own consequences and that impacted the applicant.

101. As a consequence, it seems to me that once the applicant elected to appeal one of the decisions, it followed that he elected not to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. As each stage effectively was self-contained in the sense described, any attempt now at the end of the overall process to seek to challenge an earlier part of the process by way of judicial review manifestly is out of time. It would also be a somewhat futile exercise, as the original

decision under challenge would not be the decision that actually impacted the applicant. Moreover, it would be wrong in principle and defeat the requirement on an applicant for judicial review to exhaust alternative remedies if, having exhausted those remedies, he simply reverted to seeking to review the original decisions by way of judicial review.

102. That view is reinforced by the very clear recent restatement by the Supreme Court of the law relating to alternative remedies. In Amariei v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22, a decision handed down on the 25 March 2026, the Supreme Court conducted a comprehensive review of the law relating to alternative remedies in the context of applications for judicial review. That decision was handed down after the oral arguments in this case, but I did not consider it necessary to ask the parties to make submissions on its impacts as the

decision is very clear and fully binding on this court.

103. The judgment commences with an important reiteration that judicial review is different to an appeal on the facts because it is not concerned with the merits of the decision but is concerned only with the legality of a decision. That is a feature that must be borne in mind in this case.

104. The specific issue that arose in Amariei was the question of where an applicant for social welfare benefits or allowances is dissatisfied with a decision of an appeal officer what effect does (a) the availability of an application to the chief appeals officer under s. 318 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and (b) the possibility of a statutory appeal under s. 327 of the same Act have on the entitlement to proceed by way of an application for judicial review of the appeal officers decision.

105. Having conducted an extensive review of the law in relation to the availability of the remedy of certiorari in circumstances where an alternative remedy was available, the Court identified the rationales underlying the principle and the court noted that the rationale for the principle is multifaceted. The first rationale was that effect should be given to the legislation enacted by the Oireachtas. Second, there may be advantages in having an appeal over judicial review particularly in the context of specialist bodies. Third it was noted that the range of matters that an appellant body may deal with is often wider than that available in judicial review. The Supreme Court also noted that scarce judicial resources should not be utilised where there was a reasonable alternative remedy, whether that remedy was statutory or part of an internal administrative process.

106. For the purposes of this case, it can be noted that this is not a case where the process was governed by legislation – the issue related to the application of internal University processes that led to the impugned decisions. However, I am satisfied (a) that this was a case that involved the application some measure of specialist knowledge by the two fitness to practise committees together with the ultimate decision of the Visitors; and (b) that the University decisionmakers were entitled (if not required) to take account of a broader range of matters than a court will consider in a judicial review case.

107. In terms of how the discretion should be exercised, at para. 60 of Amariei, Donnelly J. noted “in judicial review, the High Court exercises supervision over administrative bodies and courts of limited jurisdiction and in that way acts as a safeguard to the rule of law. There is a public interest in ensuring that those bodies and courts act in accordance with law.”

108. The Supreme Court noted that the assessment of whether a remedy is adequate depends on all the circumstances of the case. As noted at para. 85 “the correct position is that the circumstances must be considered against the backdrop of the multifaceted rationale outlined above for the requirement to exhaust alternative remedies and also in light of the principles outlined in the case law as to what is an adequate alternative remedy.”

109. The Court went on to state the general proposition, at para. 99, “our national procedural rules require, for all the reasons set out in this judgment, that an applicant exhaust alternative remedies before applying for judicial review. That alternative remedy will be one where the applicant's rights and interests will be capable of being vindicated. In the application for judicial review, the existence of an alternative remedy will, most usually, be readily identifiable as a matter of law e.g. an appeal from one court jurisdiction to another, as statutory appeal to the court, an appellate structure apparent in legislation… or an internal appellate structure.”

110. In a complementary judgment delivered on the same day and which cross-references Amariei, AB v. Chief International Protection Officer [2026] IESC 23, the Supreme Court stated the following:

“91. In R. (Glencore Energy UK Limited) v. Revenue and Customs

Commissioners [2017] 4 WLR 213 …the Court of Appeal of England and Wales refused to claim for judicial review of a decision of the respondents on grounds of fair procedures because of the existence of alternative remedies within the taxing statutes including an appeal to a First Tier Tribunal. In doing so, Sales LJ., relying on In re Preston [1985] AC 835 said that the judicial review process should not be allowed to supplant the normal statutory procedure ‘unless the circumstances are exceptional and involve an abuse of power of a serious character’. The abuse of power involved is something that must go to fundamental rule of law standards. Whether one frames the issue as an abuse of power or a fundamental denial of justice as the article 40.4 decisions indicate, it is only where the rule of law is undermined by the earlier decision that judicial review will provide the remedy even where there is an adequate alternative remedy for the underlying claim.

92. This perspective brings coherence to the test when a remedy is adequate or when the exigencies of justice will require judicial review. An appeal is a full one when it exists for the very purpose of ensuring that mishaps or illegalities whether they be of procedure or of fact/law can be rectified. Where a breach of fair procedures is claimed in respect of a decision given at first instance for which there is an appeal capable of remedying that breach by providing the fairness missing at the earlier stage, it is only when the breach is such that there is a default of fundamental requirements, or some kind of fundamental denial of justice or a fundamental flaw in the decision-making process, that the appeal does not provide an adequate remedy. Those phrases are chosen deliberately. They do not reflect ‘degrees of unfairness’; they indicate objectively identifiable situations where the initial ‘hearing’ may not have amounted to a hearing at all, or where a fundamental requirement has been ignored. A complete denial of rights will amount to a fundamental denial of justice such that the rule of law considerations will require, exceptional to the general rule, that judicial review will be available despite the existence of a statutory appeal.

93. It is apparent from this analysis and that carried out in an Amariei that the dicta in Stefan v. Minister for Justice ‘[t]he applicant is entitled to a primary

decision in accordance with fair procedures and an appeal from that decision… A fair appeal does not cure an unfair hearing’ taken in isolation, did not and does not represent the position at law. Even at the time the judgment was delivered, there were situations where fair procedures may have been breached at the initial stage yet judicial review did not lie to cure the defective process (see The State (Stanbridge) v. Mahon). Having regard to the requirement that it is only where there is a fundamental denial of justice that judicial review will lie in respect of a first instance decision, I am satisfied that future reliance on the above dicta is apt to mislead.

94. The cases where those types of fundamental flaws arise will be exceptional and rare. In the case of an application for international protection, ignoring the requirement to have a personal interview carried out with the applicant or refusing to engage with or hear from the applicant as to any evidence or submissions at all would be a fundamental denial of justice. In that context, there would have been no provision at all of a functioning first instance system of international protection in accordance with law.”

111. It follows from the foregoing that, if the applicant had sought to commence judicial review proceedings after either the decision of the School FTP or College FTP committees, the likelihood is that the existence of alternative remedies would have required that his proceedings be dismissed as barred. This does not mean that the relevant authorities can be read as suggesting that a judicial review is merely postponed pending the determination of the alternative remedies where, as occurred here, the alternative remedies offer the opportunity to revisit any issues that arose with the earlier decisions. It seems to me that it would be invidious and contrary to principle for an applicant to exhaust alternative remedies and being dissatisfied with that outcome in essence seek to revisit all the decisions by way of a judicial review challenge.

112. In those premises, I am satisfied that the respondents are correct that any challenge by way of judicial review must be limited to a challenge to a decision of the Visitors, and I will not consider the earlier decisions save as context for the decision made by the Visitors. The court is not engaged in a consideration of the merits of the decision, only its legality.

113. Part and parcel of the approach to a judicial review of the decision of the Visitors is that the court will only consider arguments that were raised with the Visitors. It is well established that an applicant for judicial review cannot seek to challenge a decision on the basis of a matter that was not raised with or determined at first instance, see for instance the observations of Henchy J. at p.326 of Corrigan v. Irish Land Commission [1977] I.R. 317.

THE PROCESS BEFORE AND DECISION OF THE VISITORS

The issues

114. It can be recalled that by the time that the applicant initiated the appeal to the Visitors he was, and had been for some time, in receipt of legal advice, and he was represented by senior and junior counsel and solicitors before that body. The applicant presented written grounds of appeal and written submissions. As noted above, the court is clear that it would not be permissible for the applicant at this point to seek to raise issues that were not raised before the Visitors. Accordingly, it is important to consider precisely what the applicant sought to agitate before that body, and, in that connection, it must be highlighted that the applicant accepted the factual accuracy of the events that the School of Pharmacy had listed as the concerns giving rise to the referral to the fitness to practise committees. The applicant – with the exception of an issue relating to jurisdiction that was raised for the first time on the day before the hearing before the Visitors – was asking the Visitors to overturn the decision of the College FTP committee on the basis that the outcome was disproportionate.

115. The written submissions presented by the applicant to the Visitors set out the applicant’s arguments as to why, adopting the language of the College Statutes, he claimed that he had suffered or was liable to suffer an injustice in consequence of a decision made by the Board. It can be recalled that the decision of the Board was dated the 28 February 2024, and it approved the minutes of a University Council decision of the 14 February 2024 to approve the recommendation of the majority of the College FTP committee that the applicant be withdrawn from the M. Pharm (Integrated) Programme. The grounds of appeal were as follows: a. First, that the decision was disproportionate and did not take into account the applicant’s relevant circumstances. This related primarily to the practical and financial difficulties encountered by the applicant throughout his time in the University. It included a statement to the effect that the applicant had not denied the concerns that had been raised and had apologised for the issues. b. Second, the applicant referred to the “log of concerns” prepared by the School of Pharmacy relating to him and which had been referred to the School FTP committee. Again, the applicant’s submissions recorded that he “has taken responsibility for each and every instance recorded within the said document…”. Hence rather than taking issue with the concerns, the applicant sought to contextualise the various events. He provided his accounts of the circumstances surrounding the recorded concerns.

116. In order to understand what was before the Visitors it is necessary to set out the recorded concerns that gave rise to the fitness to practise inquiries and to reiterate that the applicant accepted the events, albeit while attempting to proceed with an explanation as to why they occurred. The list of concerns was presented as follows:

(a) Year 1 PHU1106: Student did not engage in the ‘repeat’ groupwork assignment, did not attend for ‘repeat’ Code of Conduct assessment dates, and did not provide a timely explanation for non-engagement in these aspects of ‘Professionalism & Ethics’ assessments for PHU1106.

(b) Year 2 PHU22106: Student was absent for four days of a 10-day placement and did not always inform either the School’s Practice Educator or the placement provider on days that they would not be there, and/or do so in a timely manner. This led to the pharmacy supervisor contacting APPEL and APPEL subsequently contacting the Practice Educator to establish reasons for absence.

(c) Year 2 PHU22101: Plagiarism: copying another student’s work.

(d) Year 2 PHU22102: Plagiarism: copying another student’s work.

(e) Year 4 placement: Student failed to register within the required time period and was, therefore, temporarily removed from the experiential learning placement.

(f) Year 4 PHU44106: Coursework submitted late.

(g) Year 5 All modules: Student failed to register within the required time period and was, therefore, temporarily removed from the course.

(h) Year 5 PHP55106: Student arranged for another student to sign their name on attendance sheet when they were absent from a mandatory workshop.

(i) Year 5 PHP55400: Lack of engagement in the team-based components of the group project.

(j) Year 5 PHP55100: Plagiarism: copying another student’s work.

(k) Year 5 PHP55104: Plagiarism: Copying another student’s work.

117. The applicant submitted that the Visitors should consider the context for the events that the applicant had set out together with his financial situation. In relation to the plagiarism issues, the applicant submitted that “it was unusual for matters of plagiarism to be dealt with under fitness to practise” rather than under the disciplinary policy. That position altered significantly on the eve of the hearing before the Visitors, when the applicant submitted that in fact matters that could be characterised as disciplinary should not have been referred to the FTP committees.

118. The applicant sought to provide some explanation for the events. It was also noted that the Junior Dean had accepted that the plagiarism in PHP55104 was unintentional, deemed the work inadmissible and noted that if the applicant was permitted to re-sit the assessment the mark would be capped at the pass mark. The applicant also referred to character references that had been submitted together with his positive employment history in the pharmacy sector.

119. Having made those points, the applicant submitted that the decision of the College FTP committee was disproportionate. This was said to be so, particularly in light of the fact that the applicant had accepted his wrongdoing and taken the admonishments and penalties that had been applied in connection with matters prior to the FTP processes.

120. The respondent also provided written submissions to the Visitors and took a markedly different approach to the position of the applicant. The submissions set out the various codes of conduct and the concerns of the School of Pharmacy about the applicant. There was a detailed rehearsal of the relevant events and an account of the interactions between the applicant and academics and administrators within the School. The respondents responded in detail to the points raised by the applicant and concluded as follows: “5.1 The Appellant has breached the Code of Conduct on multiple occasions including three instances of plagiarism in his final year of training. He had demonstrated repeated incidences of dishonesty in his dealings with members of the School of Pharmacy … and failed to acknowledge or accept responsibility, at the time for those incidences. Despite numerous attempts by the School to assist him in dealing with these issues, the Appellant has failed, refused or neglected to correct his behaviour. The School has grave concerns about the suitability of the Appellant to practise as a pharmacist and the safety of the public were he to do so. The School, it is submitted, does not state this lightly.”

121. Prof Gilmer wrote to the Visitors on the 10 July 2024, explaining that due to long standing prior commitments he would not be able to attend the scheduled hearing on the 24 July 2024. In the letter, as noted above, he referred to the 2014 Regulations and noted that the College FTP committee had recorded his evidence as expressing concerns about the applicant’s fitness to practise as a pharmacist. The letter confirmed that Prof Gilmer “remained of the opinion, supported by my academic colleagues in the Practise of Pharmacy that the behaviours demonstrated by Mr Orimolusi during his time on the MPharm (Integrated) programme are not compatible with the very high standards of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness expected and required by qualified Pharmacists to ensure patient safety.”

122. The applicant’s legal representatives wrote to the respondents on the 23 July 2024. The letter identified a further ground of appeal that the applicant wished to agitate, querying “the referral of the case of plagiarism in module PHP55104: Advanced Pharmaceutics to the School FTP committee by the relevant Director of Teaching and Learning Dr Cathal Cadogan and whether jurisdiction for doing so existed under the Consolidated Statutes and/or the Calendar/Rules/Codes made thereunder. In the alternative the appellant will assert that the referral of this matter to the School’s FTP Committee after an initial decision had been made by the School to refer the matter to the Junior Dean (who determined that Mr Orimolusi be allowed to re-sit the exam in question if the rules of the course so permitted) amounts to a breach of fair procedures with the result that it would be unjust to affirm the finding/recommendation if either that Committee or the College FTP Committee.”

123. The letter also requested access to the Turnitin “match breakdown” page in order to clarify whether the 62% match related to more than one student paper. The letter went on to address some logistical issues, and also proposed some alternative measures that would have allowed the applicant to finish out his exams and the PRE prior to the hearing before the Visitors.

The decision

124. As noted above, following the hearing on the 24 July 2024, the Visitors gave an oral ruling refusing the appeal and agreed to provide a written decision at a later date.

125. The written decision from the Visitors is comprehensive and succinct and runs to 22 pages. The decision began by summarising the background to the Board decision, the School’s concerns about the applicant, and set out an overview of the applicant’s academic career. It is very clear to me from the decision that the Visitors had considered the various submissions, documents and arguments.

126. Before setting out a summary of the applicant’s academic career, the Visitors expressly noted that there was an issue between the parties regarding whether it was legitimate to have regard to the entire time that the applicant spent in the University or whether regard should only be had to his final, M. Pharm, year. It was apparent from the decision that the Visitors had regard to the overall history but placed particular emphasis on the events that occurred in the final year.

127. In relation to the log of concerns provided by the School, the Visitors noted that not all events were of equal significance and some “certainly if considered in isolation, would not be regarded as being of any great significance.” The Visitors went through the various incidents of concern that occurred over the M. Pharm year, and noted the explanations provided by the applicant. In relation to the involvement of the Junior Dean, the Visitors noted the essentially jurisdictional argument made by the applicant. The Visitors addressed the plagiarism concerns from the M. Pharm year and explained the categories of offence described in the disciplinary regulations. The Visitors also spent some time exploring the circumstances at the start of the applicant’s M. Pharm year when there was a failure to register in time and the applicant’s explanation regarding his financial difficulties.

128. The Visitors then addressed the decision of the School FTP committee, and the finding that despite some sympathy for the position of the applicant his circumstances did not mitigate the consistent breaches of the Code of Conduct and disregard for the rules and regulations governing the M. Pharm programme. In that regard, the Visitors also explained the requirement set out in reg. 20 of the 2014 Regulations that the Head of School confirm his satisfaction that the person concerned is fit to be a registered Pharmacist.

129. The Visitors explained the decision of the College FTP committee, noting the dissent, and noted that the College FTP had decided that the conduct of the applicant from 2015 to 2023 “taken as an agglomeration, not only constituted breaches of the Code of Conduct, but also revealed a pattern of behaviour characterised by, at best, dissimulation, and at worst, dishonesty or deception and/or poor judgements in the choices made by him, culminating in repeated instances of plagiarism in his final M Pharm year.”

130. In relation to the hearing before the Visitors, it was noted that the applicant’s legal representatives had been written on the day before the hearing, and they noted the additional grounds of appeal set out in the letter. The Visitors commenced their substantive analysis with a consideration of the jurisdictional issues raised by the applicant. When counsel for the appellant attempted to raise the jurisdictional issues, this had been objected to by the respondents. The argument being that the issue had not been raised previously before the School FTP committee, the College FTP committee, or the Board, and was not referred to in the notice of appeal or in the written submissions.

131. The Visitors decided that they would allow the issue to be argued, but would address it in the written ruling. In the written ruling, the Visitors deprecated the manner in which the jurisdiction issue was raised and stated that it was not acceptable for a significant issue to be raised for the first time, literally on the eve of the hearing. The Visitors noted the case law regarding when new issues could be argued for the first time on appeal, but considered them to be of limited assistance given the sui generis nature of appeals to the Visitors.

132. The Visitors expressed the view that the argument challenging jurisdiction in any event was misconceived. The Visitors disagreed that essentially there was a binary choice to be made between referral to the Junior Dean or bringing the matter to the attention of the School FTP committee. That argument was described at the hearing of these proceedings as the “fork in the road” argument. Having regard to the fitness to practise policy documents, the Visitors suggested that there may have been some merit to the argument if there was a single allegation of misconduct. However, the Visitors considered it perfectly clear that what this case was about a multiplicity of concerns, what was described by the College FTP committee as an “agglomeration of issues”.

133. In relation to the merits of the appeal, the Visitors attached weight to the fact that the School of Pharmacy had raised concerns about the applicant’s fitness to practise, having regard to the statutory obligation to certify under the 2014 regulations. The Visitors also dealt with the question of whether they should apply a form of curial deference to the decisions of the FTP committees. This had been contended for by the respondents and opposed by the applicant. The Visitors noted that there were three professors on the School FTP committee, two from the School of Pharmacy and one from the School of Social Work. In the case of the College FTP committee, it was chaired by a practising lawyer and included a professor from the School of Psychology, a professor from the School of Medicine, an external member of the university board and a pharmacist. In those circumstances, the Visitors considered that the bodies were deserving of respect.

134. The Visitors went on to deal with the merits of the decision relatively briefly. However, it should be noted that this was a case in which the underlying facts had been accepted by the applicant: he had fully acknowledged the events that gave rise to the concerns and rested his arguments – other than the fork in the road jurisdiction argument – on the submission that the outcome was disproportionate.

135. The Visitors expressed the view that the conclusions of the College FTP committee were set out in a comprehensive and reasoned decision. The Visitors reiterated that while it may have been the case that individual transgressions could have been dealt with leniently, here it was the agglomeration of issues which led to the significant concern. That concern was heightened in the applicant’s case where there was a particular need to be confident that someone admitted to the pharmacy profession is a person of competence, honesty and integrity.

136. In those circumstances, the Visitors decided to uphold the decision of the unanimous School FTP committee and did not see a justification for interfering with the decision of the College FTP committee.

DISCUSSION

137. As noted above, the role of the court is not to form its own view on the decision or to seek to substitute its views for those of the Visitors. The court is concerned with the question of the legality of the decision. It is important to bear in mind that this is not a case in which the Visitors were required to interpret a piece of legislation. Instead, they were dealing with matters by reference to internal University documents and general principles of fair process. The 2010 Statutes clearly afford the Visitors a wide level of discretion, they are required to perform their functions “with due enquiry and in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes” (s.4(2)). It can also be observed that the 2010 Statutes envisage that the Visitors are empowered to determine the proper interpretation of the Statutes (s.5). While s. 5 refers to that task being carried out in situations where the Board refers matters to the Visitors as a dubium – which did not occur in this case – the existence of the power strongly suggests that the Visitors are empowered to determine disputed questions of interpretation and internal jurisdiction of the type that was put to them. All of the provisions relating to the functions of the Visitors in the 2010 Statutes strongly suggest that, when they are considering an appeal, they enjoy a very wide discretion. For these reasons, the court should show considerable deference both to their decisions and the process by which they chose to reach their decision. The analysis below should be understood in that context.

138. A further point which must be reiterated is that the Visitors were asked by the applicant to deal with the appeal on the basis that the core facts had been accepted. In that regard the function being discharged was to consider whether the College FTP committee decision amounted to an injustice in all the circumstances.

139. In his amended statement of grounds, at para. 133 (q), the applicant identifies 27 separate grounds on which he contends that the Visitors’ decision should be quashed. There was a strong element of repetition in the matters set out, and I will group the complaints thematically.

140. The first ground was that the Visitors did not give timely reasons for their decision. I disagree. The urgency attached to the matter by the applicant was related to the then impending deadline to re-sit exams and sit the PRE before the time within which he was permitted to obtain the M. Pharm expired. The reality was that the decision was made very promptly and before that short time frame expired. As explained by the Visitors at para. 23 and 24 of the

decision, the oral decision was delivered so that the applicant was left in no doubt as to what that decision was, and what the consequences would be for him. The Visitors proposed in light of the time constraints that they would consider the matter and, announce a decision at an early stage but provide reasons at a later stage. The decision expressly records that the parties were in agreement with that course of action.

141. The need for a reasoned written decision is not self-standing or provided for expressly in the Statutes. Instead, it is a function of fair procedures and operates to ensure that a person affected by a decision has the opportunity to consider whether to take further legal steps. In this case the applicant in fact was in a position to commence his judicial review proceedings and the court later permitted an amendment to his statement of grounds once the written

decision had been obtained and considered. There is no doubt that given the range of issues that the applicant sought to raise that the written decision would require a reasonable period to prepare and this is what occurred. The court is satisfied that the written decision was delivered within a reasonable time period. To avoid doubt, the court is further satisfied that the decision was clearly reasoned to the extent required by the law, as explained for instance in Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 I.R. 752.

142. Relatedly, it is worth making the further general point at this stage that it is well established that a decisionmaker is not obliged to deal with each and every contention raised by an applicant seriatim, or to structure a decision by reference to the applicant’s formulation of his or her case. Again, the purpose of the written decision is to allow the affected person and their legal advisors and, if necessary, a court to understand in a broad sense why a decision was made. In turn, that facilitates the affected person to make an informed decision as to whether further steps should be taken. In this case, I am fully satisfied that the Visitors were cognisant of the arguments that the applicant sought to make; the decision is readily comprehensible and it is clear that the main arguments agitated by the applicant were addressed.

143. In those premises the asserted failure to provide the written decision in a timely manner appears incorrect when the applicant knew what the decision was, agreed that the written

decision would be provided at a later date, it did not impact on his ability to commence these proceedings, and there is no suggestion that if the written decision was provided at the same time as the oral decision (which would have been extremely difficult to achieve) it would have altered his position regarding his ability to finish out the M. Pharm programme.

144. The next group of grounds pursued by the applicant related to contentions that the Visitors did not make specific rulings on the legal/jurisdictional matters raised by the applicant, and did not take proper account of the University statutes. In addition, there was a complaint that the Visitors should not have taken account of the matters that were complained of while the applicant was an undergraduate.

145. In the first instance I am satisfied that these matters were addressed in the decision. Second, certain of the legal issues raised by the applicant in his statement of grounds – such as objective bias on the part of the chair of the School FTP committee and the composition of the various committees – were not matters that were properly before the Visitors. Third, as noted above, the interpretation of the College Statutes is a matter for the Visitors and I do not consider that the court is entitled to step into their shoes on that matter. In any event, it seems clear that the Visitors were correct in their characterisation of the applicant’s arguments. It must be recalled that the Visitors were required to treat both sides fairly in this process. That fairness was jeopardised by the approach adopted by the applicant in seeking to make new arguments at the last minute and by making arguments about matters that had not been raised at the earlier stages.

146. In relation to the argument that the plagiarism concerns should not have been considered as part of the fitness to practise processes, I am satisfied that the Visitors were correct to treat that argument as misplaced. The relevant documents do not draw a bright line distinction between disciplinary and fitness to practise processes. The processes deal with different types of concerns and must take account of different issues. It is clear that an individual complaint of plagiarism normally should be the subject of the established disciplinary procedures, involving primarily the Junior Dean, and may lead to the imposition of penalties. There is no penalisation involved in the fitness to practise process, it is directed to a different process that, arguably, is broader and requires a more nuanced exercise of informed judgement.

147. Hence, it seems to me that the double jeopardy and ‘fork in the road’ arguments agitated by the applicant cannot be sustained. Essentially, my view is that concerns about patterns of behaviour and conduct can be the subject of a fitness to practise inquiry even where an individual element in the overall pattern could have been or had been dealt with as a disciplinary matter. This is reflected in the caveat in s. 3.2(a) of the School of Pharmacy’s Fitness to Practise Policy document which stated that plagiarism matters “generally” should not be dealt with as a fitness to practise matter. In this case, the applicant was not being punished for individual instances of plagiarism but instead the repeated and accepted acts of plagiarism formed part of the overall concerns about his fitness to practise. The Visitors’ written

decision was premised on that understanding, which is why, as I understand the document, they observed in effect that the focus on the individual plagiarism issues overlooked the broader point that the individual instances formed part of the overall picture that gave rise to the School of Pharmacy’s concerns. The Visitors clearly engaged with and addressed the argument by rejecting the applicant’s theory that when plagiarism arose there was a binary choice to have it addressed either in a disciplinary or fitness to practise process.

148. Finally in this regard, I do not accept that the Visitors were in error in addressing the issues that occurred while the applicant was an undergraduate. In my view the Visitors were entitled to have regard to the full suite of concerns set out by the School of Pharmacy. The M. Pharm programme is designed expressly to afford a student the opportunity to obtain a primary degree, a master’s degree and professional qualification as part of a continuum. It is not at all clear how or why the School of Pharmacy could disregard issues of concern arising when the applicant was an undergraduate when considering his overall fitness to practise. In any event and perhaps more importantly, it is clear that the Visitors placed particular emphasis on the incidents that occurred after the applicant completed his undergraduate career. This is clear from p. 13 of the decision where the Visitors note that the “preponderance of the incidents occurred during the Appellant’s fifth year of the course of study (the M Pharm year) …”.

149. The applicant complained that he had not been afforded proper access to the Turnitin data. I consider that this complaint was misconceived. First, it appears that this was a matter raised in correspondence on the day before the hearing. Second, the relevant University documents make clear that students are responsible for their work and that plagiarism is a serious issue whether it is unintentional or accidental. In circumstances where the applicant had accepted that he committed plagiarism and had set out his explanations in his submissions it is not at all clear that access to the Turnitin materials, if granted, could have added to his case.

150. Next, there were complaints about the Visitors’ approach to curial deference and the approach to be adopted to the decisions of the FTP committees. This element of the argument was with respect somewhat confusing. My understanding of the argument was that the issue of curial deference was raised but not addressed. However, the decision is clear in finding that the Visitors ought to show respect to the views of both FTP committees in light of their composition and the nature of the inquiry at hand. In my view, again, this was an approach that the Visitors were entitled to adopt, and while they expressed respect for the views of the committees there is no sense from the decision that the Visitors afforded undue or excessive deference to the earlier decisions.

151. In addition, the applicant complained that the Visitors did not afford sufficient weight to the mitigatory matters raised on his behalf, and by implication finding that he was not a person of integrity. Dealing with the latter point, the Visitors did not make any express finding that the applicant was a person who lacked integrity. However, there is no escaping the fact that the overall process involved the ventilation by the School of Pharmacy of real concerns that the applicant to that point had not satisfied the School that he was fit to practise as a registered pharmacist. There has never been any suggestion that that the approach of the School was other than bona fide, even if the applicant considered that their views were wrong and the processes unfair. The Visitors were entitled to have regard to the firm but sympathetic views of the School, which had been summarised in the letter from Prof Gilmer referred to above.

152. In relation to the question of mitigation and the references obtained by the applicant, and the weight to be attached to those matters, these quintessentially were matters for the Visitors to weigh. It is true that the various references were not individually described. Any fair reading of the decision shows that the Visitors were very much aware of and referred expressly and sympathetically to many of the mitigatory factors that the applicant had advanced.

153. There was a complaint that the Visitors effectively upheld the decision of the School FTP committee when they were dealing with an appeal from the College FTP committee. In addition, there was a complaint that the Visitors did not consider a complaint of objective bias on the part of the School FTP committee, and that at the School FTP hearing the applicant was not legally represented.

154. Again, I consider that this complaint is misplaced and misreads the decision given by the Visitors. The relevant portion in the decision is at p. 22 of the decision and needs to be read in context: “Of course, it is disappointing that somebody is leaving College after eight years without being to join [sic] the profession he had long aspired to be a part of. However, it is the case that his studies have not been completely in vain. He has achieved a Bachelors degree in Pharmacy. Overall, while we are far from unsympathetic to the situation in which the Appellant placed himself and now finds himself, we are not of the view that we would be justified in interfering with the decision of the College Committee. In effect we have upheld the decision of the unanimous School Committee.”

155. In the premises it is clear from a reading of the overall decision that the Visitors properly considered and analysed the applicant’s arguments and the decision of the College Committee. As set out above, they found that it should not be interfered with. That is the primary operative

decision. Insofar as the Visitors explain that this means that the decision of the School Committee was upheld, strictly this was not something that the Visitors were asked to do. However, I am satisfied that this amounted to a further explanation simply recording that the

decision reached by the Visitors was one that had been reached consistently by the other bodies involved in the process. As such it was no more than stating a fact.

CONCLUSION

156. Accordingly for all the reasons set out above (a) I have found, with some hesitation, that in this case the University procedures are amenable to judicial review; (b) I have decided that the court should only consider the challenge to the decision made by the Visitors which was pronounced on the 30 July 2024 and explained in the written decision of the 6 December 2024; and (c) found that the applicant cannot succeed in his challenge to that decision. In those premises the applicant’s claims will be refused.

157. As this judgment is being delivered electronically my provisional view is that having successfully defended these judicial review proceedings the University prima facie is entitled to its costs having regard to the relevant provisions of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. However, I will list the matter before me at 10.30am on Wednesday, the 1 July 2026 when the parties can make arguments in relation to costs or any other matters relevant to the making of final orders.