High Court dismisses judicial review where applicant failed to show special circumstances for appeal time extension.

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2026] IEHC 38

[Record No. 2025/462JR]

BETWEEN

SMMZ

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Miriam O’Regan, delivered on the 27th day of January 2026.

Issues

1. The within matter raises a number of issues already dealt with by this Court in GB v IPAT & Ors. [2025] IEHC 543 (“GB”) in a judgment of 20 October 2025. A second judgment ([2025] IEHC 734) of 20 December 2025 dealt with whether or not s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 applies to the impugned decision. The parties have agreed that insofar as matters which have been dealt with in the judgments in GB aforesaid arise in the instant matter counsel will rely on their written submissions in asserting that one or both judgments were incorrect.

2. By reason of the foregoing two outstanding issues remain to be determined in this matter, not having been determined in GB, namely: –

(a) were adequate reasons were given for the decision; and

(b) an incorrect test was applied in arriving at the relevant decision.

Background

3. The applicant is an Egyptian national who applied for international protection in Ireland on 29 July 2024. Ultimately the International Protection Office (“IPO”) recommended to the Minister that the applicant be afforded neither refugee nor subsidiary protection status and the applicant was so advised in a letter of 8 January 2025 received by him on 9 January 2025. In this communication the applicant was advised of his right to appeal the decision to International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”) within a period of ten working days from 8 January 2025.

4. It appears that the applicant completed the necessary appeal form on 13 January 2025 and returned same to his solicitor on 22 January 2025. In the events the appeal application was made on 24 February 2025 wherein the applicant also sought an extension of time to maintain such appeal under Regulation 4(1) of the International Protection Act 2015 (Procedures and Periods for Appeals) Regulations 2017 (“the 2017 Regulations”). In order to succeed in an application for an extension of time the proofs identified in Regulation 4(5) apply.

5. In the submissions for an extension of time of the applicant’s solicitor of 24 February 2025 the reason for the delay was stated: – “Unfortunately through oversight and error that email from the applicant was missed by our office. The applicant is therefore blameless for the delay which has arisen. The error came to our attention today when the applicant contacted us, surprised at the issuing of an MDU letter dated 21 February 2025, to him stating that there was no open appeal… We regret that this error has occurred and I would respectfully ask that the applicant in this case is not prejudiced by an error on the part of our office.”

6. In the decision of IPAT of 25 February 2025 the requirements for an extension of time contained in Regulation 4(5) of the 2017 Regulations is set out and the Tribunal indicated that this was a cumulative test and both limbs must be satisfied, namely that the applicant has demonstrated that there were special circumstances as to why the notice of appeal was submitted after the prescribed period had expired and in the circumstances concerned it would be unjust not to extend the prescribed period. The Tribunal indicated that it was satisfied that the legislation prohibits it from extending the prescribed period unless the applicant has shown the necessary special circumstances. The content of the submission as to why the deadline was missed is recorded and thereafter it is indicated: – “The Tribunal considers this explanation to be inadequate in particular given the period of the delay of four weeks. The Tribunal is of the view that the applicant has not shown the necessary special circumstances to allow the Tribunal to extend the prescribed time period.”

7. On 12th May 2025 an application for leave to maintain judicial review proceedings came before the court and same was directed to be on notice to the respondent. Accordingly, the matter comes before this court on the basis of a telescoped hearing.

Submissions

8. The applicant complains that:-

a. no reasons were given as to why the detail furnished by the applicant's solicitor was considered inadequate nor were reasons given or an explanation furnished as to the impact of the period of delay of four weeks on the Tribunal's decision.

b. Insofar as the incorrect test was applied it is argued that by stating that the Tribunal was prohibited from extending the time an incorrect and extended test was applied as “prohibits” does not appear in the text of Regulation 4(5).

Reasons

9. The respondent relies on the judgment of Fennelly J in Mallak v Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform [2012] 3 IR 297; [2012] IESC 59 (“Mallak”), at p.66 where it was noted that there may be situations where the reasons for the decision are “obvious” and at p.732 where it stated that: - “It is not a matter of complying with a formal rule; the underlying objective is the attainment of fairness in the process”.

10. The respondent argues that the decision should be looked at, for the purposes of reasons, in the context of the submissions of 24 February 2025 which the respondent characterises as terse, brief and unparticularised. It is said that the essential rationale is clear, and the decision is proportionate and responsive to the submissions actually made. As aforesaid the submission was to the effect that the delay was due to oversight and error by the applicant’s solicitors rather than the applicant himself.

11. In Connolly v An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752; [2018] IESC 31 Clark CJ commented on the requirements regarding the adequacy of reasons given by a decision maker as: – “First, any person affected by a decision is at least entitled to know in general terms why the decision was made, in order to be fair to persons affected by binding decisions and also for the purposes of contributing to transparency. Second a person is entitled to have enough information to consider whether they can or should seek to avail of any appeal or bring judicial review of a decision. Further the requirement is for the purposes of allowing a court hearing an appeal from a review in a decision to actually engage properly in such an appeal or review.” At para. 47 it was indicated that such a general approach will vary greatly from case to case.

12. In my view the characterisation made by the respondent in respect of the content of the submissions of 24 February 2025 is accurate. It is clear from the decision the essential rationale for the refusal to extend time having regard to the submissions and the content of the 2017 Regulations.

13. Insofar as the impact of a four week delay is concerned this comprises a delay of more than twice the length of time afforded to an applicant to lodge an appeal with the only explanation for that period of time being “oversight and error” and “missed by our office”. In the context of such a lapse of time the Tribunal indicated that the applicant had not shown special circumstances.

14. In the events therefore the submission of the respondent is accepted to the effect that para.66 of the judgment of Fennelly J in Mallak aforesaid applies to the instant set of circumstances with additional reasons not being required for the purpose of disclosing the essential rationale on foot of which the decision was taken with the reasons being obvious from the terms of the decisions or capable of being inferred from its terms and context.

Incorrect test

15. I am satisfied that the correct test was indeed applied. Insofar as the Tribunal indicated that it was prohibited from extending the prescribed period unless an applicant has shown necessary special circumstances this reflects the wording of Regulation 4(5) which provides “the Tribunal shall not extend the prescribed period except where it is satisfied…”. Simply put it is demonstrably clear that the Tribunal is obliged not to extend the prescribed period absent special circumstances which amounts to a prohibition on extending the time without special circumstances.

16. The reliefs claimed by the applicant are therefore refused.

Costs

17. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, I will also take this opportunity to deal with the issue of costs. In the circumstances, given the respondents have been successful, they are presumptively entitled to their costs. Should the parties have any difficulty with the proposed costs order they should file submissions of not more than 1,000 words within 7 days of this judgment being delivered.