High Court allows appeal, finding Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review valuation split decisions under s.17(2)(b).

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2026] IEHC 375 RECORD NO. H.SS.2025.0002003 RECORD NO. H.SS.2025.0002005

BETWEEN

DAA PLC

APPELLANT

-AND-

THE COMMISSIONER OF VALUATION

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 12th day of June, 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. This matter comes before me on foot of two appeals by way of cases stated brought under s. 39(5) of the Valuation Act, 2001 (as amended) (the “2001 Act”) in respect of the two decisions of the Valuation Tribunal (hereinafter “the Tribunal”) delivered on the 16th of June, 2023, on appeal from valuations made by the Commissioner of Valuation (hereinafter the “Commissioner”). Instead of valuing Dublin Airport as a single “relevant property”, as previously, the Commissioner decided, as part of a 2019 revaluation, to cause Dublin Airport to be valued as three separate relevant properties namely:

(i) the main airport, comprising, in essence, the Terminal buildings and their associated piers, the taxiways and runways (the “Main Airport”),

(ii) the car parks (the “Car Parks”); and

(iii) а miscellaneous range of ancillary buildings around Dublin Airport campus (the “External Buildings”).

2. The decision to split the unit of valuation into three parts was made by a valuation officer pursuant to s.17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act and was communicated by the service of three separate valuation certificates on the 10th of September, 2019.

3. The splitting of the unit of valuation and the level/method of valuation thereafter applied by the Commissioner triggered a dispute between DAA and the Commissioner leading to three separate appeals to the Tribunal in respect of each unit of valuation.

4. The three appeals were consolidated and heard together by the Tribunal over 21 days between September, 2020 and September 2021. Due to changes in the constitution of the Tribunal, despite the delivery of two of the three pending decisions in June, 2023, the decision in the third appeal has not yet been delivered.

5. On these appeals by way of cases stated, I am asked to decide:

I. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision under s. 17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act to split Dublin Airport into three properties?

II. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that it could not consider whether the s. 17(2)(b) power was properly exercised?

III. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by excluding risk factors (relevant to a hypothetical tenant) when forecasting future income in the rent and receipts (“R & E”) Valuation?

IV. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by accepting that risk factors exist but still concluding that car parks are a low-risk business and fixing the tenant’s share at 20% without properly reflecting those risks?

V. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by issuing decisions in the car parks and external building appeals without issuing a decision in the related airport appeal even though they were heard together?

BACKGROUND

6. Dublin Airport is a large, integrated airport complex (about 2,600 acres) owned and operated by DAA Plc. Dublin Airport is of national importance, handling around 85% of Ireland’s air traffic. The airport has developed incrementally over decades, with terminals, runways, car parks, and ancillary buildings forming an interconnected system. Car parks are central to operations due to lack of rail/metro access, making them functionally important to passenger flow and revenue. By the valuation date in 2019, passenger numbers were nearing the planning cap of 32 million passengers per annum (mppa). Car parks had expanded to 24,567 spaces across 27 locations.

7. Historically, the Dublin Airport (including car parks and buildings) was treated as one single “relevant property” for rating purposes, albeit different methods of valuation were used in respect of component parts. In 2019, a county-wide revaluation was completed.

8. A proposal to change the approach to the valuation of Dublin Airport was communicated by a valuation officer by the issue of three separate Proposed Valuation Certificates in June, 2019. The DAA made representations in writing in respect of the proposal to change the unit of valuation, contending that as the properties were all owned and occupied by the DAA for purposes connected with and integral to the operation of Dublin Airport, they ought properly to be comprised as a single unit of valuation.

9. Notwithstanding these representations, the Commissioner restructured the valuation of Dublin Airport into three separate entries, namely, the Main Airport, Car Parks and External Buildings. The final valuation decision in this regard was made and on the 10th of September, 2019 and communicated through the issue of final valuation certificates issued for all three properties.

10. The valuation officer valued the three separate units with a combined net annual value of €186,550,000. The Commissioner ascribed a valuation of €154.9m to the Main Airport, €27.25m to the Car Parks and the External Buildings were given a valuation of €4.41m. Reflecting the final valuation certificates issued, a new valuation list was published on the 17th of September, 2019, effective from 31st of October, 2019.

11. In rating valuation, the contractor’s method was previously used in the valuation of that part of Dublin Airport compromising the Main Airport. The DAA contends the contractor’s method is the appropriate method of valuation for the entire airport (including all three component parts) and they refer to the approach taken in the UK, reflected in the Rating Manual published by the UK Valuation Office Agency, in particular Section 250 of the Manual and the test of “paramount control”. It was stressed during the hearing before me on behalf of the Commissioner, however, that the Rating Manual is intended to guide UK and not Irish law.

12. The contractor’s method is a long-established method of valuation in this jurisdiction.

It was referred to by Murnaghan J. in his judgment in Commissioner of Valuation v.

Dundalk Urban District Council [1932] I.R. 273 as applicable in some special cases where it is difficult to imagine a letting to a hypothetical tenant (at p. 288). The contractor’s method estimates the net annual value (NAV) of a property by calculating the cost of building the property and then converting that cost into an annual rental value. It is a method typically applied to specialised or monopoly-type or unique properties where there is no open market rent and the property is rarely, if ever, let. It finds statutory recognition in the terms of s. 50 of the 2001 Act (set out below).

13. On the 14th of October, 2019, the DAA filed three appeals to the Tribunal under s.34 of the 2001 Act in which the DAA challenged the division of Dublin Airport into three units and the valuation methods and figures. In the grounds of appeal advanced in each case, it was contended on behalf of the DAA that the Valuation Officer had erred in failing to treat the properties the subject matter of the Valuation Certificates as a single “relevant property” unit of valuation for the purposes of the 2001 Act and/or in treating the Car Parks and the External Buildings as a single rateable property to be valued separately from the Main Airport. A further ground of appeal advanced was that the Valuation Officer erred in not applying the contractor’s basis of valuation to all properties the subject of the three valuations.

14. DAA’s core argument on appeal was that Dublin Airport is an integrated economic unit and the car parks and external buildings are functionally essential and not separate standalone businesses. The evidence led before the Tribunal included operational evidence (integration of airport functions) and expert valuation evidence.

15. The following individuals gave evidence as to fact on behalf of DAA: Mr. Hugh Madden, Consultant engaged by DAA and former Head of Commercial Operations, Commercial Revenue, and Group Property Development; Mr. John Brennan, General Manager Commercial, Dublin Airport; Mr. Edward Rowney, Head of Finance, DAA Plc; Mr. Gary McLean, General Manager Operations, Dublin Airport and Mr. David Frizell, Consultant, Project Management Services for DAA. These witnesses provided evidence about the operation, management, finances and development of Dublin Airport and its car parks and buildings.

16. The DAA also called a range of expert witnesses from valuation, planning, construction, and related fields: Mr. Stuart Hicks, Dunlop Heywood as valuation expert; Mr. Michael Rowbottom, Dunlop Heywood as valuation expert; Mr. John O’Malley of Kieran O’Malley & Co. as town planning consultant; Mr. Kevin Michie of Chandler KBS as construction/quantity surveying expert; Mr. Martin O’Donnell, CBRE as property/valuation expert and Mr. Shaun Ferguson, TODD Architects, as architectural expert. These experts gave opinion evidence on matters such as the appropriate method of valuation (e.g. contractor’s basis vs receipts & expenditure), planning and development context, and physical and operational characteristics of the airport and its car parks.

17. The DAA’s primary case before the Tribunal was that Dublin Airport (as one unit)

should be valued using the contractor’s basis only. The DAA’s alternative case (if Car Parks and External Buildings were valued separately from the Main Airport) relied in respect of the car parks on a Receipts & Expenditure (R&E) method (producing the valuation of about €16.6 million referred to above and the comparative (rental) method in respect of External Buildings, not the contractor’s method. The comparative method consisted of analysis of comparable properties and proposed rental levels for individual buildings within the External Buildings category. The evidence addressed the correct level of value for individual external buildings (including a number of specified buildings considered by the Tribunal) on a comparative/rental valuation approach.

18. In advocating for the use of the contractor’s method, the DAA’s experts emphasised the lack of reliable comparable properties and the need for a method reflecting the specialised nature of Dublin Airport. Taken together, the DAA’s evidence sought to support its primary position that Dublin Airport (including car parks and external buildings) should be valued as a single unit, and its alternative valuation case for the Car Parks and External Buildings (if treated separately), including a proposed valuation figure.

19. For his part, the Commissioner also called several witnesses to provide expert evidence including: Mr. Dean Robinson, Valuation Office as valuation expert; Mr. John Downey, Downey Planning as planning expert; Mr. Paul Mitchell, Quantity Surveyor, Mitchell McDermott Construction Consultants Ltd.; and Mr. David Hart, Clarity Economic Consulting as economic expert. Unlike the DAA, the Commissioner’s case was presented entirely through expert witnesses. These experts provided evidence on valuation methodology (including comparable, receipts and expenditure and dual approaches), planning context relevant to the property, construction and cost issues and economic analysis, including revenue and market considerations.

20. In the case presented on behalf of the Commissioner, the Car Parks, External Buildings and Main Airport were treated as separate properties. A dual approach to valuation was used with respect the car parks, combining comparable (rental) evidence and receipts and expenditure analysis. The evidence used the car park income for 2015–2017 as baseline data and adjustments were made for growth trends, capacity limits and external risks (e.g. Brexit, planning caps). The Commissioner’s position was that all relevant valuation evidence can be used, not just one method. It was contended that different methods should be weighed together to arrive at NAV. Regarding the External

Buildings, the Commissioner’s case relied on a conventional comparative valuation using market evidence.

21. The parties adopted different valuations supported by the evidence led. As already noted above, the DAA contended for a valuation of circa €16.6m for the car parks using R&E, whereas the Commissioner contended for a higher valuation of €25.7m using a blended method in respect of the car park.

22. The Tribunal decisions delivered on the 16th of June, 2023, concerned the Car Parks appeal and the External Buildings appeal. In each of the two decided appeals, the Tribunal determined the power to divide property under s.17 of the 2001 Act lies with the valuation officer. It was concluded in identical terms in each of the two decisions that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to overturn that decision. In consequence, the Tribunal considered that the relevant property formerly treated in a single unit as Dublin Airport had to be treated as three separate properties for the purpose of the appeals. It reached this decision notwithstanding findings made that the carparks and the external buildings were an integral part of the airport and occupied by the DAA for airport business purposes (as recorded at paras. 28 and 29 of the carpark and external buildings judgments respectively).

23. In its decisions in two of the three appeals, having ruled against the DAA on the jurisdictional issue, the Tribunal proceeded to recalculate the valuation step-by-step. In the case of the Car Parks, the Tribunal rejected both the comparative approach in relation to the valuation of the carparks (lack of reliable comparators) and the Commission’s “hybrid” valuation method. Instead, it adopted a pure R&E approach to the valuation relying on ss.48 and 19 to recalculate value. Adjusting income and costs, it determined the tenant’s share at 20%. On this basis it assessed a net annual value of €23.9m for the car parks, reducing the Commissioner’s valuation from €27.25m.

24. In the case of the External Buildings (comprising some 32 properties landside in various locations around the Main Airport campus), the Tribunal held that the comparative method of valuation was the appropriate method of valuation. Under s.48 of the 2001 Act, the Tribunal estimated the rent at which each property might reasonably be expected to let looking at rental evidence and comparable properties. The Tribunal aggregated the NAVs of all buildings to reach a total NAV for all external buildings in the sum of €4,585,000, higher than the Commissioner’s original valuation of €4,410,000.

25. On the 11th of July 2023, the DAA declared dissatisfaction with the Tribunal decisions and requested a case stated (within statutory time). As the third decision in respect of the airport has still not been delivered, it is unknown what approach would have been taken as regards the Main Airport. Specifically, it is unknown whether the overall rates bill would be reduced following a decision on the third appeal to such an extent as to obviate the necessity for an appeal. Nonetheless, the DAA considers that by treating Dublin Airport as comprised of three separate units for rates purposes and using methods other than the contractor’s method in respect of the entirety of Dublin Airport (comprised of the now three separate units), it is exposed to a potential liability to a higher rates bill on foot of a calculation of rates on an incorrect basis. For this reason, it seeks to appeal against both the decision that Tribunal has no jurisdiction in respect of the splitting of the units of valuation and the decision of the Tribunal as to the valuation of the Car Parks and External Buildings as separate units.

26. Notwithstanding the passage of several years, no decision has ever been delivered in respect of the third appeal. The Tribunal has now been reconstituted with the result that the third appeal needs to be reheard by a differently constituted Tribunal. It is considered nonetheless appropriate to proceed with these appeals by way of case stated so that the questions arising are clarified before a reconstituted Tribunal would proceed to determine the third appeal.

27. On the 3rd of December, 2025, the case stated in each case was formally prepared and signed by Tribunal. The appeals were filed in the Central Office on the 4th of February, 2026.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

28. The key provisions of the 2001 Act for the purpose of the within proceedings is s. 17 in relation to the unit of valuation.

29. Before considering s. 17, however, it is appropriate to refer to the concept of a “relevant property” as the unit of valuation which is used in the 2001 Act. A “relevant property”

is defined by reference to Schedule 3 of the Act, which identifies 14 categories of property, including buildings and lands used or developed for any purpose, which constitute relevant property subject to the condition that the property concerned is occupied and the nature of the occupation is such as to constitute rateable occupation of the property. Rateable occupation, in turn, is defined by reference to the law in force prior to the enactment of the legislation. It is by reference to the relevant property that a valuation is made (s.19), entered on the valuation list (s. 23) and certified by the issue of a valuation certificate (s.24). Under Schedule 3 (b) “relevant property” includes lands used or developed for any purpose (irrespective of whether such lands are surfaced) and any constructions affixed thereto which pertain to that use or development. The DAA contends that Dublin Airport is embraced within the definition of Schedule 3(b) of the 2001 Act on the basis that car parks and external buildings are integral to its operation.

30. Further, under s. 3 of the 2001 Act (the interpretation provision), a “material change in circumstances” is defined in a manner which consists of a property previously valued as a single relevant property becoming liable to be valued as 2 or more relevant properties.

31. Under s. 17, the core rule is that each “relevant property” is valued separately. Section 17(1) provides:

“(1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 53, where a valuation falls to be made under this Act of relevant properties, each separate relevant property shall be valued separately and entered as a separate item in the relevant valuation list.”

32. Exception from this core rule is prescribed under ss. 17(2) and 17(3). These provisions vest the valuation officer with a permissive power, as he or she thinks appropriate (in the case of s. 17(2)) or necessary to arrive at true economic value (under s. 17(3)), to

value separate properties together or to value parts of a property separately, in accordance with those provisions.

33. Under s.17(2)(a) of the 2001 Act the Commissioner has a discretion to combine contiguous properties into one, whereas under s.17(2)(b), the Commissioner can split one property into separate parts if capable of separate occupation. Section 17(2)

provides as follows:

“Notwithstanding subsection (1), for the purposes of any valuation falling to be made under this Act, an officer may, if he or she thinks it proper to do so having regard to the circumstances of the matter –

(a) value or cause to be valued contiguous relevant properties that are occupied by one person as a single relevant property even though those properties are held under different titles, and

(b) if a relevant property comprises 2 or more parts capable of being occupied separately, value or cause to be valued the several parts as separate relevant properties even though those parts are occupied by the one person.”

34. Section 17(3) permits the Commissioner to combine non-contiguous properties where needed to reflect economic reality providing as follows:

“Notwithstanding subsection (1), for the purposes of any valuation falling to be made under this Act, in the case of non-contiguous relevant properties that are occupied by the one person an officer may value or cause to be valued those properties as a single relevant property if, in the opinion of the officer, a valuation that reflects those properties' true economic nature cannot be arrived at (because of the particular character of those properties) without treating them in that manner.”

35. Section 17(4) provides:

“Where the officer values or causes to be valued relevant properties or, as the case may be, parts of a relevant property in the manner referred to in subsection

(2) or (3), the relevant properties or parts shall be treated as a single relevant property or, as the case may be, separate relevant properties for all the other purposes of this Act.”

36. The effect of s.17(4) is that once split/combined, those parts are treated as separate properties for all purposes of the Act. Under s. 17(5), the “officer” referred to in s.

17(2) means a “valuation manager” or a “revision manager”. Accordingly, the decision to split under s. 17(2) may be made on a revaluation or a revision.

37. The Act does not contemplate the issuance of a discrete determination of the valuation officer which records the exercise of a discretion under ss. 17(2) or 17(3). Rather, the effect of the valuation officer's decision is reflected in the valuation certificate subsequently issued in respect of the property as so constituted and in the valuation list published.

38. Section 28 of the 2001 Act makes provisions for revision of valuation lists by a revision manager. Under s. 28(4) a revision manager may, where it is considered that a material change of circumstances has occurred (which as defined under s. 3 includes a decision by the revision manager to split the unit of valuation), amend the valuation of a property as it appears on the list, exclude a property from the list (on the basis that it is no longer a relevant property, no longer exists or falls within Schedule 4) or amend any other material particular in relation to that property as it appears on the list.

39. Section 34 of the 2001 Act provides for a right of appeal to the Tribunal. A core issue in these cases is whether s. 34 allows appeal of a s.17 decision as to the unit of valuation.

Section 34 provides as follows:

“(1) In relation to a property, a specified person may appeal in writing to the Tribunal against-

(a) a determination under section 19 or 28 of the value,

(b) any other detail stated in the relevant valuation list,

(c) any decision under this Act to include or not include the property in the relevant valuation list or to exclude the property from the list,

(d) any decision by the revision manager under section 28(4)(a) or (b),

(e) in the case of a decision by the revision manager concerned to so exclude the property, any detail stated in the notice concerned issued under section 28(7), or

(f) any decision of the revision manager concerned that the circumstances referred to in section 28(4) do not exist for the exercise of the powers under that section in relation to the property.”

40. The ratepayer has the right to appeal, inter alia, under s.34(1)(a) of the 2001 Act in relation to the valuation (NAV), under s.34(1)(b) in relation to any other “detail” in the valuation list and under s.34(1)(c) in respect of decisions to include/exclude property from the list. The question for me is whether any of these provisions embrace an appeal in respect of a decision by a valuation officer under s. 17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act. In this regard, it is noted that while certain decisions of a revision officer are embraced by s.

34(1)(a), (d), (e) or (f), no express reference is made to a decision by a revision officer to split the unit of valuation under s. 17(2) of the 2001 Act.

41. Section 37 provides for the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In relevant part it provides as follows:

“(1) The Tribunal shall consider an appeal made to it under section 34; in considering the appeal, unless the issues in the appeal do not relate to the value of property, the Tribunal shall achieve a determination of the value of the property concerned that accords –

(a) with that required to be achieved by section 19(5), or

(b) in the case of an appeal from a valuation made under section 28, with that required to be achieved by section 49.

(2) Having considered the appeal, the Tribunal may, as it thinks appropriate—

(a) disallow the appeal and, accordingly, confirm the decision of the Commissioner, valuation manager or revision manager, as appropriate, or

(b) allow the appeal and, accordingly, do whichever of the following is appropriate—

(i) decide that the circumstances referred to in section 28(4) existed for the exercise of the powers under that section,

(ii) in accordance with the matters set out in section 19(5) or 49, as appropriate, increase or decrease the valuation as stated in the valuation certificate,

(iii) decide that the property ought to be included in the relevant valuation list, and determine the valuation in accordance with the matters set out in section 49,

(iv) decide that the property, ought to be excluded from the relevant valuation list,

(v) decide to amalgamate relevant properties, the subject of 2 or more appeals, and determine the valuation of the amalgamated property, in accordance with the matters set out in section 49,

(vi) decide that the property ought to be subdivided into 2 or more relevant properties, and determine the valuation of each such subdivided property in accordance with the matters set out in section 49,

(vii) amend any detail, other than the valuation, as stated in the valuation certificate,

(viii) amend any detail stated in the notification made under section 28(7).

(3) The Tribunal shall endeavour to make a decision on an appeal made to it under section 34 within 6 months from the date of its having received the appeal.

(4) For the avoidance of doubt, neither subsection (1) (a) or (2) (b) (ii) (so far as it relates to section 19(5) ) nor section 19(5) shall require the Tribunal to achieve the determination of the value of a property concerned by reference to any particular method of valuation and the Tribunal may arrive at its determination by reference to whatever method of valuation or combination of methods of valuation as the Tribunal, in its discretion, may deem appropriate.”

42. Powers vested in the Tribunal under s. 37 include a power to increase or decrease valuation and to amend details in valuation list. Reliance was placed in argument on the fact that there is no equivalent provision in English law allowing the Tribunal to achieve the determination of the value of a property concerned by reference to whatever method or combination of methods of valuation as the Tribunal deems appropriate in the manner provided under s. 37(4) of the 2001 Act. This is relevant to the case made on behalf of the Commissioner that the contractor’s rate should not be applied in respect of Dublin Airport, as it is under UK law in respect of airports, because the law is different as between the two jurisdictions.

43. Sections 19 and 48 are addressed to how value is determined. Under s. 19(5) the valuation must achieve correctness and equity relative to comparable properties. Under s. 48, the NAV is the rent the property could reasonably fetch annually assuming the tenant pays rates, repairs, insurance etc.

44. Section 49 provides for a method of valuation where a revision has occurred under s.

28(4). It was contended on behalf of the Commissioner that this provision is not material to the issues on these appeals which it is agreed do not concern revision decisions. Nonetheless, it bears note that s. 37(2)(b)(v) expressly vests the Tribunal with a power to amalgamate relevant properties, the subject of 2 or more appeals, and determine the valuation of the amalgamated property, in accordance with the matters set out in s. 49. In my view a question arises as to whether this power applies only in cases where a revision has occurred or whether it extends to decisions on a revaluation.

45. Section 50 provides for valuation on “the contractor’s method”. As set out above, this is the method of valuation preferred by DAA if the entire of Dublin Airport (including car parks and external buildings) are treated as a single “relevant property”. Section 50 provides:

“If, in determining the net annual value of property or any part of it in accordance with section 48 , a method of valuation relying on the notional cost of constructing or providing the property or part is used, then, notwithstanding subsection (3) of that section, the net annual value of the property or part, for the purposes of that section, shall be an amount equal to 5 per cent of the aggregate of the replacement cost, depreciated where appropriate, of the property or part and the site value of the property or, as the case may be, part.”

Again, significance is attached on behalf of the Commissioner to the fact that s. 50 expressly envisages the application of the contractor’s method to the who of the property or part of it.

46. Section 39 provides for an appeal to High Court by way of case stated, allowing an appeal to High Court on a point of law only. Under s. 39, the Tribunal must “state and sign a case” for High Court determination, as has occurred in the case of these appeals.

Section 39 provides as follows:

“(1) After the determination of an appeal under section 37 by the Tribunal, any party to the appeal, if dissatisfied with the determination as being erroneous in point of law, may declare in writing to the Tribunal his or her dissatisfaction and such a declaration shall be made within 21 days from the date of the Tribunal's having made its determination.

(2) The party, having declared his or her dissatisfaction, may, within 28 days from the date of the said determination, by notice in writing addressed to the chairperson of the Tribunal, require the Tribunal to state and sign a case for the opinion of the High Court thereon within 3 months from the date of receipt of such notice.

(3) The case shall set forth the facts and the determination of the Tribunal and the party requiring it shall transmit the case, when stated and signed by the chairperson of the Tribunal, to the High Court within 7 days from the date of receiving it.

(4) At or before the time when he or she transmits the case to the High Court, the party requiring it shall serve notice in writing of the fact that the case has been stated on his or her application, together with a copy of the case, on each other party to the appeal referred to in subsection (1).

(5) The High Court shall hear and determine any question or questions of law arising on the case, and shall reverse, affirm or amend the determination in respect of which the case has been stated, or shall remit the matter to the Tribunal with the opinion of the Court thereon, or may make such other order in relation to the matter as the Court thinks fit.

(6) The High Court may cause the case to be sent back for amendment, and thereupon the case shall be amended accordingly, and judgement shall be delivered after it has been amended.

(7) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from the decision of the High Court under this section.”

47. These appeals only came before the High Court for hearing in May, 2026, in respect of a revaluation confirmed in September, 2019. It is apparent from the time periods indicated in s. 39, that whatever about the letter of the law, a delay of this order does not meet the spirit of s. 39 which envisages a timely referral to the High Court. No issue has been raised before me in relation to compliance with the terms of s. 39 of the 2001 Act in the progression of these appeals by way of case stated notwithstanding the significant delays apparent on the face of the record.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

Overview

48. As apparent from the foregoing, in exercise of its jurisdiction under s. 37 of the 2001 Act, the Tribunal decided in a reasoned manner that it could adjust valuation but could not revisit the s.17 split as it considered it had no jurisdiction to do so. The Tribunal reduced the Car Park valuation to €23.9m. In valuing the External Buildings, the Tribunal adopted the comparative approach. Allowing the appeal in part, the Tribunal fixed the NAV of the External Buildings at €4,585,00. The fact that a decision on the third appeal has never been delivered means that the overall rates bill for the three separate units (formerly composed in the single unit of Dublin Airport) has not yet been determined on appeal, making it difficult to assess what, if any, consequence the splitting of Dublin Airport into three relevant properties has for the overall rateable valuation of Dublin Airport and the liability to rates of the DAA.

49. Before proceeding to address the issues arising on these appeals, I wish to record that I accept that it is possible and even likely, as contended on behalf of the Commissioner, that the splitting of Dublin Airport into three relevant properties for valuation purposes would ultimately have no bearing on the overall or cumulative valuation of the combined properties, particularly in light of the fact that the law in this jurisdiction (which differs from UK law) provides that in determining valuation it is permissible in to do so by reference to whatever method of valuation or combination of methods of valuation as may be considered appropriate (s. 37(4)). This is underscored by the fact that it is also expressly envisaged under s. 50 of the 2001 Act that the contractor’s method may be deployed to determine valuation of part only of the property. It bears emphasis, as outlined in submissions before me, that even on the previous valuation when Dublin Airport was treated as one relevant property, the contractor’s method of valuation was not deployed in respect of the car-parks and external buildings, but only to the main airport itself resulting in a situation where the car-parks and the external buildings were valued using the R & E approach and comparative evidence. Presuming, as indeed does not appear unlikely, the Tribunal were to adopt a similar valuation approach, there should be no difference in valuation deriving from the valuation of Dublin Airport as one unit or as three separate units.

50. I also understand and accept the case made that there is an administrative convenience to treating the Car Parks and External Buildings separately from the Main Airport to avoid the necessity to revalue the whole Dublin Airport complex just because there is a change in the number of car parking spaces or the occupation of external buildings.

While the identification of the property unit may be an administrative matter, however, it is not entirely without implications for the valuation exercise. It is at least arguable that the splitting of the property has deprived the DAA of a stronger platform from which to contend for a broader application of the contractor’s method of valuation with potential increased exposure to liability to rates in consequence to a higher valuation of the overall property for rates purposes. Indeed, it was accepted in oral argument by counsel on behalf of the Commissioner that were the DAA successful in persuading the Tribunal that it was appropriate to apply the contractor’s method to all aspects of Dublin Airport (including carparks and external buildings), as it contends, then this would undoubtedly result in a lower valuation.

51. The merits of the DAA’s position with regard to a broader application of the contractor’s method falls to be determined in the light of the terms of s. 50 of the 2001 Act. It is hotly contested on behalf of the Commissioner. It is not for me to step into the shoes of the Tribunal in deciding on the valuation of this property. Quite apart from the limits of my jurisdiction, I lack the expertise to do so. Whether there is sufficient merit to the DAA’s contention for a broader application of the contractor’s method in the case of Dublin Airport, is a matter quintessentially for the valuation officer at first instance and the Tribunal on appeal.

52. My point of departure, therefore, in proceeding to address the issues arising on these appeals by way of case stated is that the splitting of the property on the 2019 revaluation has the potential to impact on its proper valuation to the possible detriment of the DAA.

Whether it actually operates to its detriment remains an open question, particularly in circumstances where a decision on third appeal has not been delivered making it impossible to assess the overall impact of the change in approach to the valuation unit.

It is unlikely, however, that the application of the contractor’s method to the valuation of Main Airport could result in an overall reduction in rates liability sufficient to remediate the loss arising were the Tribunal, properly seised of all matters, to determine that the contractor’s method should be applied to Dublin Airport as a single unit, having reversed the decision of the valuation officer to split the unit of valuation (presuming a jurisdiction to do so).

53. My jurisdiction on an appeal by way of case stated is well established and does not permit an appeal on the merits. Something akin to a mistaken view of the law, a wrong interpretation of the documents or unreasonable findings not supported by the evidence to permit interference by a court (see review of case-law addressing the role of the Court in an appeal by way of case stated in Iarnród Éireann v. Commissioner of Valuation

[2022] IEHC 668 and Stanberry Investments Limited v. Commissioner of Valuation [2020] IECA 33), is required for orders setting aside the decisions of the Tribunal to be made.

54. As apparent from the questions stated, the issues arising on these appeals can be loosely grouped into three, namely, jurisdictional (Q.1 and 2), valuation methodology (Q. 3 and 4) and procedural (Q. 5.). I propose to address these in turn but on the basis posited on behalf of the DAA, without real demur from the Commissioner, that where I am satisfied that the Tribunal erred as to jurisdiction in refusing to entertain an appeal in respect of the unit of valuation adopted by the valuation officer, then the appeal should be allowed. I accept that in such circumstances there would be no necessity to rule on the appeal in respect of valuation methodology or the failure on the part of the Tribunal to determine all three appeals whilst constituted of the three members who heard the appeals together over a protracted period of time, as the appropriate order would, in any event, be a remittal for fresh consideration in light of the jurisdictional clarification afforded by the terms of the decision on the jurisdictional issue.

Jurisdictional Issue

55. As apparent from its written decisions, the Tribunal dealt with jurisdiction as a threshold legal issue and ultimately took a restrictive view of its powers. It stressed that its powers are strictly limited by statute. The Tribunal proceeded on the established basis that it has no inherent jurisdiction, only the powers expressly (or necessarily) given by the 2001 Act stating (at paras. 38 and 39 of the Car Park and External Buildings decisions respectively):

“The jurisdiction of the Valuation Tribunal is derived exclusively from statute.”

56. The Tribunal emphasised that s.17 gives the power to split or combine properties and that power is given to a valuation manager/revision manager, not the Tribunal.

Therefore, the choice of unit of valuation is an administrative decision by the Commissioner’s officer. In arriving at this decision, the Tribunal carefully analysed the appeal structure noting that appeals about value under s.34(1)(a) comprise a jurisdiction whereby the Tribunal can check if valuation complies with s.19(5) and increase or decrease value but, on the Tribunal’s interpretation of the statutory scheme, only for properties already defined.

57. The Tribunal concluded that while an appeal about “details” is permitted under s.34(1)(b) of the 2001 Act and the Tribunal can amend details such as address, area, or descriptive details, it cannot change the identity or extent of the property itself. The Tribunal further concluded that while under s. 34(1)(c), the Tribunal can determine appeals about inclusion/exclusion (s.34(1)(c)), it can remove a property only if it no longer exists or is not rateable. The Tribunal found it has no power to reconsider how the property was divided under s.17. In sum, the Tribunal’s central conclusion (at para.38 of Tribunal decision on car-parks appeal and para. 39 of the external buildings appeal):

“The Tribunal does not have the express power … to hear an appeal from any

decision made under s.17(2)(b).”

58. In essence, therefore, the Tribunal concluded that it cannot review the decision to split Dublin Airport or examine whether that decision was correct or justified. The Tribunal considered that the effect of s.17(4) reinforces this because once a property is split the parts are treated as separate relevant properties for all purposes, including appeals.

Accordingly, the Tribunal was satisfied that it should take the split as given and proceed to value each part separately. The Tribunal explicitly rejected the argument that it should review a decision under s.17. The Tribunal found the legality of a s.17 decision is a matter for the High Court (by way of judicial review) and not for the Tribunal.

59. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that its jurisdiction is limited to valuing properties as defined by the valuation officer and it cannot revisit or alter the decision to define or split the property under s.17. The Tribunal reached the conclusion that the powers under s. 37 do not extend to reviewing s.17 decisions having regard to the terms of s. 34. The effect of this conclusion is said to have been that the DAA could not argue that the airport should be treated as one property (central to its contention that the contractor’s method of valuation was appropriate) and the Tribunal had to accept the three-property structure. In consequence, in its decision the Tribunal only addressed how much the car parks and external buildings were worth, not whether they should have been separated at all.

60. The Commissioner stands over the Tribunal’s decision maintaining that the decision to split the properties under s. 17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act was an administrative decision which is amenable to challenge by way of judicial review only because no provision for an appeal against such a decision has been made.

61. In contrast with the Tribunal’s view, accepted on behalf of the Commissioner, the DAA’s argument on jurisdiction is that the Tribunal is vested with a de novo jurisdiction to determine everything effecting valuation and is not limited to only that which is expressly listed in s. 34 of the 2001 Act. Although it is common case and not in dispute that no inherent jurisdiction exists in the Tribunal (as clearly found in Celtic Roads Group (Portlaoise) Ltd. & Anor. v. the Valuation Tribunal [2013] IEHC 180 at para.

25), it is contended on behalf of the DAA that in a de novo hearing, as the Tribunal cannot determine value without first defining the property, it follows that the unit of valuation is inseparable from valuation and must therefore fall within s.34 appeal rights.

Specifically, it is argued that as s. 34(1)(a) provides for an appeal in respect of the determination of value and s. 37 requires the Tribunal to ensure the correctness of value, this in turn requires identifying the correct property to value as otherwise valuation could be fundamentally wrong.

62. Placing reliance on “any detail” in s.34(1)(b), the DAA also argues that the description/extent of the property is a “detail” in the valuation list and therefore it can be appealed. The details recorded on the valuation list, as per the document handed into court during the hearing, however, does not extend to recording the description/extent of the property. Rather the details appear to be limited to the property number, the property address, the category, the use and the valuation. In the case of the External Buildings, the valuation certificate issued on the 11th of September, 2019, assigns a property number and the category of property is stated to be “Office” and use is also described as “Office (3rd Generation)”. In the case of the Car Parks, the category was given as “miscellaneous” and the use as “car park (multistorey)”. In the case of the Main Airport itself, the category was given as “utility” and the use as “airport”. In all cases the address was given as “Dublin Airport, County Dublin”. The power in s.

34(1)(b) to amend these details does not seem to me to necessarily lead to a conclusion that the Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction in respect of the characterization of the unit of valuation, although it is not inconsistent with such a power. The power provided for in s. 34(1)(b) could be exercised to ensure that the valuation list properly records the correct details as determined by decision of the Tribunal which might include ensuring that the list details change where there is a split or an amalgamation by the Tribunal in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

63. Importantly, s. 34(1)(c) provides for an appeal from any decision to include or not to include the property in the relevant valuation list. Thus, the appeal against the inclusion of the car parks and the external buildings as separate entries could be construed as coming within the ambit of s. 34(1)(c).

64. It seems to me that construing s. 34(1)(a), (b) and (c) together provides support for an interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as extending to the identification of the property as part and parcel of arriving at a correct valuation for rating purposes. If it is accepted that the identification of the property unit effects rateable valuation, then it seems to me to follow that in conferring a jurisdiction to determine appeals as to the correctness of valuation, as the Oireachtas has done, it is at least implicit that one must start by correctly identifying what the property to be valued is.

65. This interpretation of the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s. 34 as equipping the Tribunal with appellate jurisdiction to ensure that properties are properly valued for rates purposes is strengthened by the language of s. 37 of the 2001 Act. Section 37(1)

concerns the consideration of appeals by the Tribunal and provides that the Tribunal “shall achieve a determination of the value of the property concerned that accords with that required to be achieved by section 19(5)”. It is notable, as pointed out on behalf of the DAA, that the reference here is to achieving the correct value of “the property concerned” rather than “the relevant property”. Where the identification of the property to be valued bears on the correct valuation, it would appear to be necessarily implied

that an appeal to establish the correct valuation encompasses a jurisdiction to decide on the proper identification of the property to be valued.

66. Section 37(2) of the 2001 Act sets out what the Tribunal can do on appeal. Section 37(2)(b)(ii) provides for a power to increase or decrease valuation which the DAA contends evidences a broad jurisdiction in respect of all matters bearing on valuation even though reference is confined to s. 19(5) and 49, without mention of s. 17. It was pointed out on behalf of the Commissioner that s. 37(2)(b)(iii) and (iv) are significant because they provide respectively for a power to decide that the property ought to be included or excluded from the relevant valuation list but no similar provision is made for a decision to amalgamate or subdivide in accordance with s. 17. On one view of these provisions, however, a decision to amalgamate or subdivide may be encapsulated within a decision to include or exclude. The question in these cases was whether to include as one relevant property (thereby excluding separate inclusion of carparks and external buildings) or as three separate relevant properties.

67. Of some significance to my mind and as noted above, the Tribunal’s powers under s.

37(2)(b)(v) of the 2001 Act extend to deciding to amalgamate relevant properties, the subject of 2 or more appeals and determine the valuation of the amalgamated property, in accordance with the matters set out in s. 49. Similarly, s. 37(2)(b)(vi) refers to the Tribunal’s power to decide that the property ought to be subdivided into 2 or more relevant properties and determine the valuation of each such subdivided property in accordance with the matters set out in s. 49. When this was raised with counsel for the Commissioner during the hearing before me, the case made on behalf of the Commissioner was that the Tribunal’s powers are tied to decisions appealable under s.34 and are not expanded by the terms of s. 37, albeit it was conceded that s. 37 may serve as an aid to properly interpreting the scope of an appeal under s. 34.

68. It was further submitted that the reference to s. 49 in s. 37(2)(b)(v) and (vi) should be read as linking the Tribunal’s powers under s. 37(2)(b)(v) and (vi) to revision decisions only because under the Act s. 49 is expressed to apply to revisions. Again, great emphasis was placed on the fact that no reference is made to a decision under s. 17 in s. 37. The contention on behalf of the Commissioner that the reference to s. 49 in s.

37(2)(b)(v) and (vi) must be read as tying the exercise of the power to a revision

decision is not very persuasive, however, in circumstances where a similar reference is made to s. 49 in s. 37(2)(b)(iii) relating to a decision to include a property, a decision which it was accepted on behalf of the Commissioner can be made both at revaluation and revision stage. Furthermore, on a revision decision, the source of the power to split remains s. 17(2)(b). On the Commissioner’s argument, the decision to split which impacts on a valuation upon revision is amenable to appeal but a decision at revaluation stage is not, even though in both instances the decision to split is in exercise of a power under s. 17(2). I find it difficult to follow the logic of the contended for legislative intention to distinguish between the two.

69. In my view, the Commissioner’s submission, as summarized above, begs the question as to why the Tribunal would have more expansive powers regarding the treatment of the property unit for valuation purposes on appeal from a revision decision than on appeal from a revaluation decision, although such a disparity in power appears to be the logic of the Commissioner’s submission. I have not identified a satisfactory response to this question in the arguments advanced on behalf of the Commissioner.

70. It seems to me that the interpretation pressed on behalf of the Commissioner is but one of two possible interpretations of s. 37(2)(b)(v) and (vi). The alternative interpretation to that adopted by the Commissioner and the Tribunal is that rather than tying the power to amalgamate to appeals against revision decisions, the reference to s. 49 in s.

37(2)(b)(v) and (vi) is intended to guide the Tribunal as to the proper approach to valuation in circumstances where it decides on appeal to amalgamate relevant properties the subject of 2 or more appeals or subdivide a property. This interpretation sits more easily with a similar reference to s. 49 in s. 37(2)(b)(iii) as it is accepted that a decision to include a property may be made either during the revaluation or revision process. On this alternative interpretation it would have been open to the Tribunal to amalgamate the three relevant properties the subject of the three appeals in this case and to arrive at a valuation decision guided by the terms of s. 49 of the 2001 Act (which in turn envisages recourse to ss. 48 and 50 of the 2001 Act where no comparable properties are identifiable).

71. Although the DAA relied on s. 37(2)(b)(v) to argue before the Tribunal that it had power on hearing an appeal to amalgamate the properties, the Tribunal rejected that argument finding it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the underlying s. 17 decision and therefore the properties must be treated as already separate for appeal purposes. While the Tribunal confirmed that amalgamation under s. 37 cannot be used to challenge or undo the unit of valuation, it seems to me that in so doing it did not test the logic of this narrow interpretation of the Tribunal’s powers by addressing why the Tribunal would be vested with a power to amalgamate at all if the unit of valuation was beyond its remit or, indeed, why that power would arise in respect of a revision decision (without being expressly identified in s. 28(4)(a) or (b)) but not in respect of a revaluation decision.

The only real response to these questions, which bear on the proper interpretation of the scope of the appeal under s. 34, in the arguments pressed on behalf of the Commissioner is the fact that no express reference was made to s. 17 of the 2001 Act in provision for an appeal under s. 34 and, as a creature of statute, all jurisdiction must be vested in the Tribunal by statute.

72. The argument pressed on behalf of the Commissioner in reliance on the absence of any express reference to s. 17 of the 2001 in s. 34 is not without substance as there is an express reference to an appeal under s. 28 in s. 34(1)(d), (e) and (f) which ostensibly might suggest a different legislative intention with regard to decisions under s. 17 and

28 respectively. Closer scrutiny of these references, however, confirms that insofar as express provision is made for an appeal in respect of a decision under s. 28 in s. 34 of the 2001 Act (in distinction to a decision under s. 17), this does not extend to express provision for amalgamating or subdividing relevant properties on such an appeal. This being so, it seems to me then to follow that the power under s. 37(2)(b)(v) and (vi) must be rooted in the valuation exercise which the Tribunal has been vested with jurisdiction to conduct on appeal, be that under ss. 19 or 49. There is no basis in these circumstances for treating a decision to split a property during a revision process any differently to the

decision as part of a revaluation process. While for the purpose of s. 28, the amalgamation or split is ipso facto treated pursuant to statute as a “material change in circumstances”, all that is required to give rise to this material change in circumstances under the statutory definition provided in s. 3 of the 2001 Act at (e) and (f) is the revision officer’s decision (also made under s. 17(2)) that the property previously valued as a single relevant property or as two or more relevant properties has become liable to be valued on a different basis.

73. The proper approach to the interpretation of the 2001 Act was considered in some length in the Commission of Valuation v. Carlton Hotel Dublin Airport Limited & Ors. [2016]

2 I.R. 385, [2013] IEHC 170 (hereinafter “Carlton Hotel”). In her decision for the Supreme Court, O’Malley J. described the purpose and effect of the 2001 Act before finding that the 2001 Act established an “unusually extensive appeal system” (para. 64)

and an appellant was entitled to appeal on “any appropriate ground” (para. 63), albeit this finding was made with respect of the valuation methodology to be applied and not the unit of valuation as arises in these proceedings. It is nonetheless clear that Carlton Hotel is authority for an extensive appellate jurisdiction in respect of the valuation of properties and the Supreme Court found an entitlement to appeal in respect of the valuation methodology used even though s. 34 does not expressly provide for an appeal in respect of the methodology adopted.

74. The words used by the Oireachtas are the best source for determining the intention of the Oireachtas when enacting legislation. When, applying the ratio of Heather Hill Management Co. CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] 2 I.R. 222, [2022] IESC 43, the wording of s. 34 of the 2001 Act is considered within the legislative scheme of the 2001 Act as a whole or the context in which, and purpose for which, it was enacted, it seems to me clear, consistent with the decision in Carlton Hotel, that s. 34 properly interpreted provides for a full right of appeal in respect of all valuation decisions made. The reference in s. 34(1) to an appeal in respect of a property rather than a “relevant property” reads as intentionally broad. Such broad interpretation is also consistent with an interpretation of s. 34(1) as providing for an appeal in respect of the correctness of the valuation of a property and is not tied to the “relevant property” as determined administratively. By providing for an appeal in these terms, the unit of valuation of the property is properly part and parcel of the question of the corrective valuation of the property in the rateable occupation of the DAA at Dublin Airport.

75. It is recalled that while hypothetical considerations often inform valuation decisions, valuation decisions are not made in the abstract but by reference to actual or real properties using established methodologies provided for under the legislative scheme.

It is established that decisions regarding appropriate methodologies are subject to appeal (as found in Carlton Hotel) even though not expressly provided for in the terms of s. 34 of the 2001 Act. In turn, however, those decisions are predicated on the identity of the rateable unit. Identifying the appropriate unit of property is relevant to determining which of the distinct valuation methodologies prescribed under the 2001 Act or combination thereof should properly apply.

76. In this instance, the identity of the rateable unit was changed as part of the revaluation process, potentially impacting on the decision regarding the appropriate valuation methodology. Accordingly, an entitlement to appeal in respect of methodology, found to be extensive in Carlton Hotel, is curtailed or restricted unless on appeal the Tribunal also has jurisdiction to decide, de novo, the appropriate unit of property for valuation purposes.

77. Implying the limitations contended for by the Commissioner in reliance on the absence of an express reference to s. 17(2)(b) in s. 34 but in the face of a broad appeal against a valuation decision, depends not only on an interpolation into the statutory language of a restriction on the interpretation of a determination of the value under ss. 19 or 28 as excluding an appeal in respect of the identity of the unit of valuation but, similar to the case of Redwood Extended Care Facility v. Tailte Éireann [2026] IESC 3 (see para. 54), does not present “any reason of context or purpose” for so doing.

78. To the extent that somewhat tentative reliance is placed on the decision in Honeybridge Limited and Anor. v. Commissioner of Valuation (Judgment of Hyland J., 21st of December, 2020) as authority for the proposition that a decision to split the unit of valuation under s. 17(2) of the 2001 Act is not amenable to appeal under s. 34, I am satisfied that this reliance is misplaced. Honeybridge was concerned with an appeal to the Tribunal in a case in which it had been conceded that a material change of circumstances had occurred. Even though there was no appeal against the finding of fact that there had been a material change in circumstances leading to revision, the Tribunal found that the evidence relied upon as demonstrating a material change of circumstances was not sufficient to warrant the exercise by the revision officer of her discretionary power to revise. The Tribunal proceeded to conclude that the discretion of the revision officer under s. 17 to make decisions on valuing contiguous properties as one relevant property or valuing one property as separate relevant properties had not been activated.

79. The decision in Honeybridge falls to be understood in the context in which it was decided. It appears from the judgment in Honeybridge that the appellant did not participate in the appeal by way of case stated and in consequence there was no legitimus contradictor. Accordingly, the Court had the benefit of submissions from the Commissioner only. The Court referred to s. 37 to support a finding that the Tribunal is not at large as to the decision it may make on appeal. It was concluded that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction derives exclusively from the 2001 Act. Relying on the requirement in s. 35 to specify the grounds of appeal, the Court found that there is no provision in s. 37 to decide a matter not encompassed in the appeal and the Tribunal may only consider the “appeal made to it”. The Court noted that by deciding a point which was not the subject of appeal, the Tribunal failed to afford the parties an opportunity to put their case and address any points raised resulting in procedural unfairness.

80. The Court proceeded further to conclude that the Tribunal had no power under s. 37 to decide that no material change of circumstance took place simpliciter despite a decision by the revision officer to contrary effect. Instead, the Tribunal must either disallow the appeal and confirm the decision of the respondent or allow the appeal and amend the value of the property. In Honeybridge, the Tribunal disallowed the appeal but did not confirm the decision of the Commissioner contrary to the terms of s. 37(2)(a) of the 2001 Act. This was the fundamental flaw identified by the High Court.

81. I am satisfied that Honeybridge is not an authority for the proposition that in dealing with grounds of appeal in which it is claimed that an incorrect valuation is arrived at based on an inappropriate identification of the property unit, as in this case, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to allow the appeal and amend the value of the property on the basis of a different identification of the unit of property, which is the relief sought on behalf of the DAA in this case.

82. Insofar the Court in Honeybridge went further in making obiter observations regarding the absence of the identification by the Tribunal of provision for an appeal in respect of a decision under s. 17 of the 2001 Act, those observations were couched with reference to the fact that no decision had been made under s. 17 of the Act and there had been no appeal against a decision under s. 17 with the result that all references to s. 17 were irrelevant and erroneous in law. It is unclear whether any argument at all had been made before the Tribunal in relation to s. 17 in that case.

83. In fact, the decision the subject of appeal in relation to a material change of circumstances was noted in the judgment in Honeybridge to have been made by a revision officer under s. 28(4) of the 2001 Act, rather than s. 17. Section 37(2)(b)(i)

expressly provides that the Tribunal may allow an appeal and in allowing the appeal, decide that the circumstances referred to in s. 28(4) existed for the exercise of the powers under that section or, alternatively, under s. 37(2)(b)(v) and (vi), decide to amalgamate relevant properties or subdivide them into 2 or more relevant properties.

The implications of these provisions for the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction are not addressed at all in Honeybridge.

84. In contrast, in this case it is accepted that a decision was made under s. 17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act. The decision under s. 17(2)(b) was relied upon in the valuation methodology used and the valuations arrived at in respect of three relevant properties instead of just one. Unlike the position in Honeybridge, an appeal has been taken against this decision on the identified ground that in consequence of the decision to split the unit under s.

17(2)(b), the property has not been properly valued in accordance with law.

85. It is clear from the foregoing that the circumstances of this case are entirely distinguishable from those in Honeybridge. I am satisfied that the decision in Honeybridge should not be treated as binding authority for the proposition that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to allow related appeals and value property for rates on the basis of an amalgamation of relevant properties, in a case where grounds of appeal have been properly advanced to the effect that the property the subject of separate appeals before the Tribunal has been improperly valued by reason of the identification of the relevant property unit. It is apparent from the responses recorded to the questions arising on the case stated in the judgment that the question of whether an appeal lay from a decision under s. 17 of the 2001 Act was not before the Court in Honeybridge and did not properly arise for determination on that appeal.

86. When account is taken of considerations of context and purpose, I am satisfied that the legislative intention underpinning the appeal provisions of the 2001 Act was to provide an extensive appeal system under which an appellant was entitled to appeal on any appropriate ground which, in the context of an appeal against valuation, comprises an appeal in respect of the unit of property used in the valuation process. In my view, this is the only interpretation consistent with the fact that on appeal the Tribunal is expressly vested with a jurisdiction to amalgamate relevant properties the subject of separate appeals and to proceed to determine the valuation of the amalgamated property. It is also the construction which best aligns with the legislative intention of providing an appellate remedy by an independent tribunal in respect of valuation decisions.

87. Limiting the remedy available in respect of the identification of the unit of property to be valued, does not serve the purpose of providing for an effective appeal in respect of valuation decisions in circumstances where judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision but rather the decision-making process and the application of the correct legal test. It seems clear that in providing for an appeal to the Tribunal, the Oireachtas intended to remove rating appeals from the courts and vest appellate jurisdiction in an expert appellate body competent to decide on valuation matters. It would be inconsistent with this intention to require, as the Commissioner contends, a ratepayer to go to the Courts rather than the appellate body in respect of a central aspect of the valuation determination, namely the identification of the property to be valued.

Valuation Methodology

88. In circumstances where the Tribunal concluded that it had no jurisdiction to revisit the

decision under s. 17(2)(b), it did not consider the correct property unit for valuation purposes and, in turn, did not proceed to consider what the correct methodology might be were it to conclude that the proper unit of valuation was Dublin Airport as a whole rather than a part only of the airport operation. Accordingly, by reason of its error as to its jurisdiction, the Tribunal did not properly determine the valuation of the property.

89. In view of my findings on the jurisdiction issue, it is not necessary for me to further consider whether the Tribunal erred in its approach to the valuation of the relevant properties as already determined as the issue of the identification of the property will now fall to be considered by the Tribunal in a fresh hearing. This has the undoubted advantage of ensuring that the reconstituted Tribunal seized of the remaining appeal is free to reach conclusions on all three appeals unaffected by previous findings which have implications for outstanding decisions. All matters now require to be considered de novo but on the basis that the Tribunal has full jurisdiction to consider the proper identification of the unit of valuation as part of an appeal relating to the correctness of the valuation of the property and I propose to make no further findings in this regard.

Procedural Issue

90. While it is no longer necessary for me to make any decision on the lawfulness of the Tribunal delivering decisions in two of the three appeals in a manner which means that time runs for the bringing of an appeal by way of case stated before the DAA knows the overall valuation decision of the Tribunal, it may properly be observed that irrespective of the lawfulness of the Tribunal’s actions in delivering decisions in only two of the three related appeals, there is no doubt that the failure on the part of the Tribunal to deliver timely decisions in all three cases reflects poorly on the system in place and is deeply unsatisfactory.

91. Although I expressly make no finding that remittal for fresh consideration by a newly constituted Tribunal would be necessary because of the failure of the Tribunal to decide the third appeal and nothing I say should be construed as indicating that remittal would be warranted on this basis alone, suffice to say that I consider it a welcome consequence of my decision on the jurisdictional question that the Tribunal constituted to deal with the third appeal will now be able to do so without the limitation which the existing decisions impose on the proper exercise of its jurisdiction and in a manner which allows it to fully discharge its function in determining valuation of the property for rates purposes in accordance with law.

CONCLUSION

92. For the reasons set out above, I will answer the questions in the case stated as follows:

I. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision under s. 17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act to split Dublin Airport into three properties? No.

II. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that it could not consider whether the s. 17(2)(b) power was properly exercised? No.

III. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by excluding risk factors (relevant to a hypothetical tenant) when forecasting future income in the R & E Valuation? A response to this question is not required as a newly constituted Tribunal will reconsider the valuation question based on a broader jurisdiction than previous Tribunal decided it enjoyed.

IV. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by accepting that risk factors exist but still concluding that car parks are a low-risk business and fixing the tenant’s share at 20% without properly reflecting those risks? For the same reasons as at III above, I have concluded that a response is not now required to this question to determine this appeal.

V. Whether the Tribunal erred in law by issuing decisions in the car parks and external building appeals without issuing a decision in the related airport appeal even though they were heard together? As noted above, I have concluded that a response is not required to this question as the matter will now be remitted for reconsideration by a freshly constituted Tribunal with full jurisdiction to determine all three appeals in accordance with law following a rehearing.

93. I will further direct that these matters be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing before a different division of the Tribunal. It may be possible for the parties to agree to admit the transcript of previous evidence heard or some of it, thereby reducing the time required to hear the appeals. I will hear the parties in respect of any consequential matters. The matter will be listed for mention before me upon the expiry of fourteen days from the electronic delivery of this judgment for the purpose of making final orders as agreed by the parties or otherwise.