High Court refuses judicial review leave citing no legal remedy for inconsistent decisions across different defendants.

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

2025 No. 1486 JR

[2026] IEHC 352

BETWEEN:

VICTORIA POLYAKOVA

APPLICANT

AND

A JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT [MIDLAND CIRCUIT]

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on 12th June, 2026

A. Introduction

1. This is an application for leave to review the decision of a Circuit Court Judge on the basis of bias and bad faith, and due to a claim that the decision is inconsistent with a previous decision taken by a different judge in respect of a different defendant.

2. The final decision of the Circuit Court Judge is one in respect of her jurisdiction to hear the case, which the Judge was entitled to make, and which was not irrational. There is no principle of law which requires the High Court to interfere with decisions of the Circuit Court to ensure that cases involving different parties are legally and factually consistent. While judges must make decisions in accordance with law, there is no remedy available, by way of judicial review, to enforce a policy of consistency between cases in the Circuit (or District) Courts, nor is there any precedent for this proposition.

If a litigant pursues a case against different parties in separate, sequential proceedings, it is always possible that different arguments will lead to different results.

3. The Applicant cannot substantiate her claims of bias or bad faith on the part of the Judge. Leave to apply for judicial review is refused.

B. Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

4. The law in relation to leave applications is well established. In G v. D.P.P. [1994] 1 I.R.

374 the Supreme Court set out the following propositions: the applicant must show that the only effective remedy is judicial review. If another remedy is available, the applicant must show that the more appropriate remedy is judicial review. The burden of proof is on the applicant, who must establish an arguable case in law. In other words, the applicant must have no better remedy available to him and must persuade the Court that the case has some prospect of success.

5. Accordingly, this Applicant must show that she has an arguable case, or some prospect of success, in her arguments that the Judge was biased or made her decision in bad faith, or that the decision was irrational or that Order 84 provides a remedy to ensure that previous decisions made by the Circuit Court in proceedings arising from the same facts (but involving a different corporate defendant) are consistent.

C. Procedural Background and Serial Litigation

6. The application for leave was originally listed in December 2025 but was adjourned from time to time to allow the Applicant to file additional affidavits and submissions from two previous defamation claims. In her first hearing before this Court, the Applicant insisted that a decision of the Circuit Court on 4th July 2025 (the impugned

decision) could not be allowed to stand as it contradicted a previous decision of the Circuit Court, in a case taken by the same Applicant against a different corporate defendant. While the Applicant had exhibited some of the pleadings from the proceedings leading to the impugned decision, she did not exhibit the relevant supporting material nor did she exhibit the pleadings relating to the first decision, said to be inconsistent with the impugned decision. These pleadings, arising from a 2021 defamation case, were lodged at the request of the High Court.

7. The final hearing of this leave application proceeded on 18th May 2026 on the understanding that if the DAR transcript, which had been ordered but not yet received by the end of April of 2026, had not been received by the hearing date, this Court would listen to the DAR of the impugned decision.

8. This case requires some consideration of the phenomenon of serial litigation. In the context of appeal hearings, the Supreme Court, in Ambrose v. Shevlin [2015] IESC 10 considered the balance to be struck when allowing new grounds to be raised. Clarke

J. (as he then was) observed that it is important to balance competing considerations and that a litigant should not lose because a decisive point was not made at trial, noting at paragraph 4.12 the “desirability that parties be required to make their full case at trial. An overly generous approach to permitting new grounds to be raised for the first time on appeal can only encourage either sloppiness or imprecision in the way in which cases are run, or, indeed, attempts to take tactical advantage by only bringing forward a part of a claimant's true case in the knowledge that there will be a good chance that, if it does not work at trial, a different tack can be adopted on appeal…

9. He continued:

4.13 In addition, there can be a very real risk of injustice to the opposing party if new grounds are permitted to be raised for the first time on appeal. Precisely how a case was run at trial may well have been influenced, in ways that may not be completely obvious, by the issues which seemed to be before the court. All litigation (or at least almost all litigation) involves some degree of tactical decision by the advisers of both parties. Such tactical decisions often involve weighing up the pros and cons of a particular course of action. Those decisions are taken on the basis of the case as it reasonably appears to stand at the time the decision is taken. The more easily a party can reinvent their case on appeal, the greater the risk that real prejudice will be caused…

10. While the Shevlin case dealt with appeals, these comments may also be applied to cases in which the same events are considered in respect of different parties, in serial litigation. Also pertinent is the principle that a litigant must bring her entire case in one set of proceedings, rather than attempting to isolate issues in separate proceedings or in serial litigation raising different issues in respect of the same events. There is a wealth of case law which confirms this principle, usually referred to as the rule in Henderson v. Henderson ((1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313), and the decision of the Supreme Court in A.A. v The Medical Council [2003] IESC 70 is helpful in setting out the reasons for this rule. There, Hardiman J. considered the applicant’s failure to raise the issue of legal aid in his first set of judicial review proceedings, which failure was “the determining feature” of subsequent proceedings. The Court observed that:

“[T]he issues in relation to legal aid are, therefore, to adapt the language of Henderson, issues "which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time" of the first proceedings.”

11. A.A. leaves one in no doubt as to the importance of this principle and the objectives it achieves: finality in litigation, efficiency in the administration of justice and the minimisation of prejudice to parties who might otherwise be the victim of repeated and strategically timed litigation.

12. The cases above are not directly applicable, simply because this Applicant pursued two different defendants in two separate actions. However, the principles may assist her in recognising why this application cannot succeed. Any inconsistency in separate decisions regarding the same facts can be avoided by joinder of all the relevant parties in one set of proceedings. This is not obligatory but may avoid any perceived inconsistency. While this course was not chosen, it is important to note that this Court makes no finding as to whether a case against either or both defendants in a single action in Dublin would have succeeded. Separate grounds to dismiss her case were argued in the two cases and either (or both) motions to dismiss could have succeeded if both actions had been pursued together. It is not the function of this Court to assess the strength of her claims but to review the ruling made by the last Judge to deal with her litigation. To assess that decision the Court must review the previous proceedings.

D. The Proceedings against AXA

13. The Applicant’s claim is grounded on two main arguments: bias and bad faith, and what she refers to as “the established principles of corporate legal personality.” After two adjournments to allow the Applicant to substantiate her case, the Court now has the pleadings and submissions in both previous cases and has listened to the DAR of the final ruling. Corporate legal personality was not raised as an issue in any of the pleadings or submissions, nor was it mentioned in that final ruling.

14. The first case began as a claim by this Applicant against her insurer, AXA, in the Circuit Court in Dublin. In 2019, AXA wrote to the Applicant and advised that they would not renew her car insurance. This decision was based on a claim made by a third-party driver against the Applicant, which she still disputes, and a payment made by AXA to that claimant in respect of a collision. In the wake of this claim, the Applicant engaged in lengthy correspondence with employees of AXA, made various claims against the company and its employees directly, and made various assertions about AXA and its employees on social media.

15. Following AXA’s refusal to renew her insurance, the Applicant then contacted three brokers. Her husband, on her behalf, told an agent for City Financial Marketing Group Limited [CFM]during a phone call, that she had been unable to renew her insurance.

CFM initially agreed to broker a contract with AXA to insure her, however the Applicant subsequently learned that AXA refused to underwrite the policy, and it was therefore cancelled. When asked why, AXA replied via the broker that she had not disclosed “relevant facts” to her broker, as set out in correspondence exhibited at VP3.

16. The Applicant sued AXA for defamation and negligence on the basis that she, or her husband on her behalf, had revealed to the broker that AXA would not renew her insurance. While this might be seen as a somewhat limited disclosure, it is not necessary for this Court to comment on that issue. Very briefly summarised, she argued that the letter at VP3 was untrue and suggested that she was deceitful.

17. Before the Applicant’s defamation case came on for hearing, AXA succeeded in a motion to dismiss her case in the Circuit Court in Dublin on 4th July 2021. The ruling itself was not exhibited (it is unlikely that it was a written ruling) but the Defendant’s motion papers were exhibited. The motion included three grounds for dismissal: that there was no breach of contract on the part of AXA; that there was no defamation on the part of AXA; and that any publication by AXA was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. Written submissions focused on the fact that any defamation was on an occasion of qualified privilege and was de minimis, in that the allegation of a failure to disclose facts was communicated to only one person.

18. The case against AXA was dismissed. There was no reference in the motion to the jurisdiction of the contract nor was there a reference to corporate personality. There is no evidence that either issue was part of the ruling. Thus, the claim that the first

decision was binding on any other party in terms of corporate entities or jurisdiction has not been established. The only pleaded bases for this decision were that there was no breach of contract, no defamation, or, if there was a defamatory statement, it was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. Thus, whatever the probable basis for that

decision to dismiss, it was not the legal personality of AXA or any other entity.

E. The Proceedings against CFM, the Broker

19. The Applicant subsequently issued defamation proceedings against the broker, CFM, in Athlone District Court. She was now acting as a litigant in person. While breach of contract was pleaded, there was no claim for damages in this regard. CFM replied with a motion to dismiss. The grounds included that defamation is not available as a remedy in the District Court and that the Applicant had sued in the wrong district.

CFM argued that the contract relied upon had been agreed in Dublin and further, if she was claiming in tort law, she should have sued in Dublin, not in the Midlands.

20. The District Judge acceded to the motion to dismiss. The Applicant appealed this dismissal of her case against CFM to the Circuit Court. While she seeks to challenge the District Court decision, this has been superseded by the Circuit Court decision on appeal, which is the only decision potentially amenable to judicial review. The Circuit Court case was a full, de novo appeal. However, the Applicant has confirmed to this Court that the defamation aspect of the case is now irrelevant. As I understand it, the Applicant therefore is no longer pursuing the defamation claim. This is an unusual concession in a case such as this as defamation was the core of the case against AXA and appeared to be the core of the case against CFM.

21. The grounds set out by CFM in its motion to dismiss the proceedings were threefold:

that the contract was concluded in Dublin and therefore the Circuit Court in the Midlands had no jurisdiction; that the matters at issue had been determined in the earlier 2021 decision of His Honour Judge O’Connor, which decision had not been appealed; and that the claim was an abuse of process. Her Honour Judge Fergus dismissed the claim in 2025 on the single ground that she was satisfied that the contract between CFM and the Applicant had been concluded in Dublin as that was the principal place of business of CFM and, therefore, any claim of breach of contract or of breach of tort law, had occurred in Dublin and had to proceed in Dublin.

22. The Circuit Court Judge had the benefit of a full set of pleadings and heard both sides on CFM’s motion to dismiss the claim. An action must be brought where the wrong occurred or where the respondent has its principal place of business. Accordingly, the Judge concluded, the case was in the wrong Circuit and could not succeed. The Judge did not mention separate corporate entities but made a decision based on evidence of where the Defendant had its principal place of business and having heard submissions made by both parties.

23. The Judge specifically refused to accept evidence that the Applicant tried to adduce in respect of a counter-offer, on the basis that this was not before the District Court and the evidence had been available to the Applicant at that stage. Therefore, the evidence was not “new” evidence. This was a decision that the Judge was entitled to make.

F. Different Proceedings, Different Conclusions?

24. The Applicant claims in her statement of grounds that in “the Athlone proceedings, the District Court reached the directly opposite conclusion to the Dublin Circuit Court, holding that [AXA] and [CFM] should be treated as a single entity for jurisdictional purposes.” The Applicant goes on to plead, at paragraph 20, that the Circuit Court “upheld the District Court’s determination that the entities should be treated as unified for jurisdictional purposes”.

There was no reference to a finding of unified entities in the ruling of the Circuit Court, which referred only to the fact that CFM had its principal place of business in Dublin, leading to the conclusion that the Applicant had sued in the wrong circuit.

25. The claim made in paragraph 10 of the statement of grounds is that the Dublin Circuit Court dismissed the Applicant’s claim in 2021 “on the grounds that the alleged defamatory statements were made by the broker in its independent capacity, not by AXA.” This was not pleaded in the 2021 motion to dismiss. It appears, therefore, unlikely that this was the basis of the decision. However, even if this was the finding of the Court in 2021, any contradiction that might arise in a later case is usually avoided by joining all relevant defendants to the original action. This is one of the objectives of the rules of court governing the joinder of parties: to avoid inconsistency. Further, even if there was a finding against CFM in the first case, this would not prevent the second case being dismissed as it was brought in the wrong jurisdiction.

26. More fundamentally, the evidence points to a finding that the dismissal of the first action in 2021 was on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of defamation. The second action was commenced in a court that had no jurisdiction to hear it, and the appeal was heard on a Circuit with no admissible evidence of a contract concluded in that Circuit. There is no basis on which the Applicant is entitled to review the impugned decision as there is no evidence of irrationality or unfairness in the process.

Even if there was authority for the proposition that the remedy of judicial review is available to address inconsistent decisions, and there is not, there is no evidence that corporate personality was a material factor in either case or that the decisions were inconsistent in any significant way.

27. Judicial review is not an opportunity to launch a collateral attack on an earlier judgment with a new argument that appears, with hindsight or out of context, to suggest a possible injustice. The Applicant chose to pursue separate proceedings against different defendants and has not survived either motion to dismiss her actions.

The evidence before me is that the two motions to dismiss proceeded on different grounds in the two separate actions but there is no evidence before me that this Applicant had a case against CFM that was defeated by any impropriety, unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Judge. The Circuit Court Judge made no finding about AXA in 2025 but dealt with the sole defendant in her Court: CFM.

28. For the avoidance of doubt, even if the District Court had found as a fact in the most recent action that the two entities should be treated as a single entity, which was neither pleaded nor a fact necessary to decide, the Applicant had a full appeal to the Circuit Court and availed of this right in 2025. There, she was entitled to raise relevant issues and make submissions about where the case ought to be heard and, if she wished, to raise issues of corporate identity. It is clear from the pleadings and from the DAR of the hearing in 2025, that she was given every opportunity to make her case.

Her case was that the contract she concluded with CFM was in Athlone, but the Judge refused to admit this evidence and ruled against her. There was no Circuit Court finding in respect of the two entities being the same and there is no sense, legal or otherwise, in the submission that the Circuit Court is in any way endorsing such a District Court finding (if there was such a finding). In a de novo hearing, the Circuit Court finding stands alone.

29. For clarity, this Court makes no finding that the Applicant would have succeeded against either or both defendants had she sued them together. Rather, it recognises that the courts can only rule on the issues raised by the parties before them and not on issues raised in previous cases, save in very well-defined circumstances such as res judicata or issue estoppel. There was no ruling based on these principles here, although res judicata was argued in the 2025 case. It is clear from the ruling delivered by the Judge that this was not the basis on which she dismissed the claim but, as set out above, on the basis of a factual finding that there was no contract concluded in the Midlands.

G. Bias and Bad Faith

30. The Supreme Court reviewed the law regarding bias in Kelly v. U.C.D. [2025] IESC 6.

In his judgment, O’Donnell C.J. emphasises the importance of an impartial tribunal, describing it as the personal entitlement of the parties and a basic requirement of the administration of justice guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution. He notes that within this context, judges are required to hear cases assigned to them; judges are not entitled to choose the parties before them, and parties are not entitled to choose their judges. The test for bias is confirmed, at paragraph 2, as follows: “where the reasonable and informed onlooker would have a reasonable apprehension that the judge would not be able to give the matter an impartial hearing and decision by reference only to the facts and law.”

31. O’Donnell C.J. suggests several potential factors which might create an apprehension of bias, namely: where a judge has an interest (direct or indirect) in the case, has made a prior public commitment to the position of a party relating to the merits of the case, where a judge has connections with a party or witness whose credibility is at issue, or with a lawyer in the case, or where the judge has extraneous information not acquired from the evidence in the case. While this list is not exhaustive, it is a useful checklist against which facts can be assessed.

32. Turning to the facts of this case: the Circuit Court Judge made a decision with which the Applicant does not agree. There is no evidence here of a prior connection or of a financial or other interest, on the part of the Judge in the case. In every case there is a losing party and that party often seeks to challenge the result. Judicial review may be appropriate where a decision has been reached on the grounds of procedural unfairness, bias or irrationality. In this instance, there was ample evidence on which the Judge could make the impugned decision and there is no evidence of bias.

33. In her statement of grounds at D13, the Applicant pleads that “the [Circuit] Court ignored contradictions and accepted the version most favourable to the Notice Party, undermining the fairness of the hearing.” This is the essence of the adversarial process.

When a judge makes a decision, she invariably accepts one version of events and rejects the other. This is not unfair, it is the judge’s function. There is no need to exhaustively list the arguments made before accepting one submission and making a

decision such as that made here: the Judge determined that Dublin was the correct jurisdiction based on CFM’s place of business. The Judge explicitly ruled on the Applicant’s evidence of a counter-offer. In her ruling, the Judge accepted the argument that there was no entitlement to adduce the evidence, as it was not new evidence.

34. The Applicant refers repeatedly to the fact that the Judge decided against her without taking into account that CFM and AXA were separate legal entities, which she describes as “a matter of judicial record” as it was contained in the “established Dublin Circuit Court ruling of 4th July 2021”. As discussed above, there is no evidence that any finding in 2021 was a ruling on whether AXA and CFM were separate legal entities.

The 2021 decision concerned the dismissal of the Applicant’s claim against AXA. It was not a precedent as to the nature of the relationship between the parties. As is clear from the pleadings and written submissions that were exhibited at the direction of this Court, the issues in 2021 were confined to whether any contract was breached and whether there was a claim in defamation.

35. When asked what she considered to be unfair, my note of what the Applicant said is that a previous court found that they were different legal entities. She added: “What I passed to CFM was not the same as what I said to AXA. Should be the same. Judge in Dublin did not agree with that and said no, not same legal entities so not the same what I said to AXA.

AXA has nothing to do with information passed to broker. Do not agree with Judge as according to her decision I made two contracts with CFM and AXA. Not the same, so CFM – 2 contracts one in Dublin and one in the Midlands.” While it is somewhat difficult to decipher exactly what the argument is from this submission, this is in part because the Applicant does not speak English as a first language. Her pleadings are more helpful in isolating the points the Applicant seeks to make. While there may have been one contract only, or two separate contracts, the Applicant does not address the evidence that CFM is based in Dublin. It may be that the Applicant has conflated two corporate entities, but the deponent in the Circuit Court did not do so. He deposed to the fact that Dublin was where CFM had its principal place of business. He did not mention AXA, nor did the Judge. No matter whether one or two contracts were in issue, this is relevant to the jurisdiction in which CFM was pursued for a remedy and there is no evidence of bias in the sense of any pre-judgment or inappropriate, personal interest in the case.

36. The Circuit Court Judge is also said to have made comments which the Applicant submits give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Applicant expressly relies on mala fides on the part of the Judge. Paragraphs 44 to 46, inclusive, in the pleadings contain the relevant claims in this regard and state that the Judge “made comments about my personal character which were irrelevant to the legal issues before the Court.” From the DAR of the hearing, the Judge referred to two transcripts of a call between the Applicant’s husband and CFM. There were differences in the transcripts which the Applicant sought to explain on the basis that she had legal advice when compiling the second exhibit. The Judge commented: “You cannot pick different bits” and also referred to her affidavits as voluminous. None of this suggests bias on the part of the Judge.

37. Nor do these comments support a claim of bad faith on the part of the Judge. Such a claim must include evidence of dishonesty on the part of the Judge. The authors of Hogan, Morgan, Daly; Administrative Law in Ireland, 5th Ed. 2019, provide a helpful definition of bad faith, at paragraph 14.01: “Bias may be conscious or unconscious and does not necessarily mean ‘a corrupt state of mind’. This is one of the features which distinguishes bias from bad faith (mala fides), though admittedly there is a great deal of overlap between the two concepts”. They go on, in Chapter 17, to conclude that bad faith may be distinguished from bias … in that bias may have an objective existence, without any element of consciousness similar to the criminal law concept of mens rea; whereas the essence of bad faith is dishonesty.”

38. There is no evidence of any dishonesty or corruption in this case. The Judge made a

decision with which the Applicant does not agree. There is no suggestion of dishonesty, nor is there any evidence to support an allegation of bad faith.

39. The only other ground relied upon under the heading of bias is that the Judge disregarded the Applicant’s arguments that AXA and CFM were separate entities.

This has already been referred to above. The Judge did not specifically address this argument in her ruling but even if such arguments were made, the only defendant before her was CFM, and she made a decision based on the admissible evidence of its place of business. This does not constitute evidence of bias on the part of the Judge.

G. Conclusions

40. Leave to apply for judicial review is refused in respect of all the grounds raised. The Applicant is not entitled to a review of her litigation on the basis of inconsistency when she pursued different parties in different court jurisdictions. There is no evidence to support the claim that the Judge made a decision that was inconsistent with any authority that was binding on her, nor has the Applicant established irrationality, bias or bad faith on the part of the Judge.

41. The Applicant represented herself and the proposed Respondent was not on notice of this application, so the question of legal costs does not arise.