High Court upheld 10-year suspension and full costs order against solicitor for misconduct found by Tribunal.

[APPROVED]

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 348

Record No. 2026 No. 232 MCA

IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 53D RULE 5 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPERIOR

COURTS

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 82(2) OF

THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION ACT 2015

AND IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD O’BRIEN, A LEGAL PRACTITIONER,

FORMERLY PRACTISING AS EDWARD O’BRIEN J O’BRIEN SOLICITORS, 8A, THE VILLAGE CENTRE, LUCAN, COUNTY DUBLIN BETWEEN THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY APPLICANT AND EDWARD O’BRIEN RESPONDENT Ex tempore JUDGMENT of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court, delivered on the 19th day of May, 2026

1. Introduction

1. This is my judgment on an application brought by the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (the “Applicant” or the “LSRA” or the “Authority”) for various orders in relation to the Respondent solicitor, Edward O’Brien. The orders are sought under s. 82 and s. 85 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”).

2. In particular, orders are sought under s. 82(2) and/or s. 85(7)(c) of the 2015 Act prohibiting the Respondent from practising as a legal practitioner otherwise than as an employee for a period of 10 years and under s. 82(2) and/or s. 85(7)(h)(iii) of the 2015 Act directing the Respondent to pay the whole of the costs of the Applicant incurred in relation to the Inquiry before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (the “LPDT” or the “Tribunal”), which costs are to be assessed by a Legal Costs Adjudicator, in default of agreement. An order is also sought by the Applicant for the costs of this application.

3. The application is made in accordance with those statutory provisions and in accordance with the recently amended provisions of Order 53D, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (the “RSC” or the “Rules”). This is the first application made by the Authority for orders under those provisions of the Act and of the Rules.

4. The amended Order 53D, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts states that:

“5. (1) Following the delivery of a recommendation in accordance with rule 4, the Authority (or, where it was the applicant under section 77 of the Act of 2015, the Law Society) shall issue a notice of motion seeking such order under section 85(7) of the Act of 2015 as it considers appropriate and reasonable having regard to the determination and the recommendations of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit averring to the relevant facts or alleged facts and exhibiting true copies of all documents delivered to and produced before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal.

(2) The motion shall be served on each party who participated in the Inquiry of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal.”

That amendment was introduced by the Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 53D) 2026 (S.I. 158/2026)).

5. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent today. I was satisfied at the outset of this application that the Respondent has been properly served with the papers and is, therefore, aware that the Authority’s application is before the Court today. I was satisfied of proper service of this application on the Respondent based on the affidavit of service sworn by Holly McHale, Paralegal at Fieldfisher LLP, on the 15 May 2026.

2. Relevant Statutory Provisions

6. Before turning to the particular facts of this case, I should briefly outline the statutory provisions under which the application is made, in circumstances where, as I have mentioned, this is the first application brought by the Authority under the relevant provisions.

7. “Misconduct” by legal practitioners is defined in s. 50 of the 2015 Act. The subsection of that provision relevant to this application is 50(1)(h), which states that:

“50. (1) For the purposes of this Act, an act or omission of a legal practitioner may be considered as constituting misconduct where the act or omission—…

(h) in the case of a solicitor, is likely to bring the solicitors’ profession into disrepute…”

8. The provisions governing inquiries by the Tribunal are contained in s. 81 of the 2015 Act. Section 81(1)(8) of the 2015 Act provides that:

“(8) Having conducted the inquiry, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall make a determination whether or not, on the basis of the evidence properly before it, each act or omission to which the inquiry relates constitutes misconduct and, in that event, make a determination as to whether the issue of sanction should be dealt with pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of section 82.”

9. Section 82(1) of the 2015 Act provides for the circumstances in which the Tribunal may impose one or more sanctions on a legal practitioner following a determination by the Tribunal under s. 81(8) of the 2015 Act that there has been misconduct on the part of the legal practitioner and that the issue of sanction should be dealt with pursuant to that subsection. That subsection deals with imposition of sanctions falling short of suspension, restriction or prohibition.

10. Section 82(2) deals with more serious sanctions that can be imposed by the Tribunal, and states that:

“(2) Where, pursuant to the holding of an inquiry under this Part, the Disciplinary Tribunal makes a determination under section 81(8) that there has been misconduct by a legal practitioner and determines that the issue of sanction should be dealt with pursuant to this subsection, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall make a recommendation to the High Court that the Court make one or more than one of the orders specified in section 85(7)”.

11. I should say also that in s. 82(4) of the 2015 Act, it is said that where a financial penalty is imposed on a legal practitioner under s. 82(3) of the 2015 Act, the Tribunal “shall have regard to the means of the legal practitioner concerned.”

12. Under s. 83 of the 2015 Act, in certain circumstances and where applicable, it is open to the Authority, to the Law Society and to the legal practitioner to appeal an adverse finding made by the Tribunal under s. 81(8) of the 2015 Act to the High Court. None of these parties have done in this case, and so it is not necessary for me to deal with the provisions applicable to appeal on this application.

13. Section 85 of the 2015 deals with the consideration of a matter by the High Court where it is referred by the Tribunal. Section 85(3) states that:

“…the Court shall, having considered (where applicable) the recommendation of the Disciplinary Tribunal under section 82(2) and given each party who was a party participating in the inquiry of the Disciplinary Tribunal an opportunity to appear to make submissions in connection with the matter, decide upon the sanction to be imposed on the legal practitioner.”

Therefore, it is the Court that decides on the sanction to be imposed on the legal practitioner, having considered, amongst other things, the recommendation of the Tribunal under s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act.

14. The two relevant subsections of s. 85(7) of the 2015 Act for present purposes are s. 85(7)(c) and s. 85(7)(h)(iii).

15. Section 85(7)(c) states that: “(7) The Court, under this subsection, may by order direct one or more than one of the following:…

(c) that the legal practitioner be prohibited from practising as a legal practitioner otherwise than as an employee, and subject to such terms and conditions as the Court considers appropriate;…”

16. Section 85(7)(h)(iii) states that: “(7) The Court, under this subsection, may by order direct one or more than one of the following:…

(h) that the legal practitioner do one or more than one of the following:…

(iii) pay the whole or a part of the costs of the Disciplinary Tribunal or of any person making submissions to it or appearing before it, in respect of the inquiry concerned (which costs shall be assessed by a Legal Costs Adjudicator in default of agreement);…”

17. Section 85(8) of the 2015 Act provides that:

“In making an order under subsection (6) [where the Court, in imposing a sanction under s. 85(3) takes account of any finding of misconduct on the part of the legal practitioner concerned previously made by the Disciplinary Tribunal and not rescinded by the Court and of any order made by the Court under this Act or under the Solicitors Acts 1954 to 2015], the Court may, in addition—

(a) make such order as to costs incurred in the proceedings before it and the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal as the Court thinks fit,

(b) make an ancillary order in relation to the matter which the Court thinks fit.”

18. Those are the relevant provisions of the 2015 Act for present purposes. Specifically in relation to the role of the Court on an application such as this, it is clear from s. 85(3) of the 2015 Act that it is the function of the Court, and not the Tribunal, to decide on the sanction to be imposed on the legal practitioner.

3. The approach required to be taken by the Court on the Application

19. Mr McDowell BL for the Authority opened some relevant case law to me which sets out the approach that the Court should take on an application such as this. He submitted, correctly in my view, that the approach is similar to that which the Court took under the previous provisions in the Solicitors Acts 1954-2015. The first case opened to me was the Supreme Court case of Law Society of Ireland v Coleman [2018] IEHC 80, and in particular, paras. 60-62 of the judgment of McKechnie J, where he considered the Court’s role in imposing sanctions under the previous regime under the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 (the “1960 Act”) as amended by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 (the “1994 Act”). At para. 60, McKechnie J stated that:

“It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to review the precise parameters of the High Court’s powers or function when determining the Society’s application. It is sufficient to say that on the material which it ultimately has, it must be satisfied that the Tribunal was entitled, as a matter of law to reach the findings which it did. Precisely how and in what way it conducts this evaluation is not germane to this appeal. When it comes to sanction or penalty however, the Tribunal has no power to make any findings: it simply makes a recommendation. Similarly so, with a person’s fitness to practice as a solicitor: in which case it simply offers an opinion. Arguably therefore the court’s scrutiny must be even greater when exercising this aspect of its role.” (para. 60)

20. To briefly refer back to the present case, the Tribunal has chosen to take the course as is provided for under s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act to make a recommendation to the Court as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed on the Respondent arising from the findings of misconduct which it made.

21. Mc Kechnie J continued at para. 61:

“…the court, having considered the matter may give any decision or make any order it thinks fit, including of course exercising the powers contained in s. 8 of the 1960 Act. There is no question of being bound by an opinion expressed or by a recommendation made by the Tribunal. In addition, of course, the Law Society is expressly entitled to make submissions as to what its position is on the sanction front as is the respondent solicitor. As the case law shows, the High Court has on several occasions departed from the recommendations made and/or have refused to endorse the reliefs sought, by the Society. Even where granting such relief however, it is clear that in all cases the ultimate arbiter is the court.” (para. 61)

22. In the present case, as I will elaborate on later in my judgment, the Tribunal has made certain recommendations in relation to sanction. Those recommendations were consistent with the submissions made by the Authority to the Tribunal as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed on the Respondent. The Authority is now applying to the Court on this application to impose the sanctions recommended by the Tribunal. However, as was said by McKechnie J in Coleman, the ultimate arbiter on an application such as this is the Court.

23. McKechnie J then went on to refer to some other judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court at para. 62:

“In the Law Society v. Carroll & Colley [2009] IESC 41, [2009] 2 I.L.R.M. 77 (“Carroll & Colley”), both the High Court and Supreme Court rejected the relief sought by the Society and instead agreed with the recommendations of the Disciplinary Tribunal. In the Law Society v. Callanan (ex-tempore, 13th April, 2015), Kearns P. rejected both the Tribunal’s findings and the Law Society’s submissions, even if his

decision was later set aside on appeal. Further, when that case was subsequently reassessed by Kelly P., having been remitted by the Court of Appeal, he declined to follow the Tribunal and instead, accepting the Law Society’s submission, struck the solicitor from the Roll. He did so in a thirty-two-page judgment even though it was the Society’s motion only before him ([2018] IEHC 160). As is self evident, none of these decisions could have been arrived at lawfully unless the High Court had conducted an independent adjudication of the application before it. This in my view it must do. There can be no question of a rubber stamp type approach. Whilst the views of the Tribunal carry considerable weight, as indeed do those of the Society, nonetheless the High Court itself is obliged to embark upon an examination of the issues arising and after due consideration declare its own position. When one considers what is at stake, this

conclusion is inescapable.” (para. 62)

24. I accept that the approach as outlined by McKechnie J in Coleman is the appropriate approach which I should take on this application in imposing sanction under s. 85(3) of the 2015 Act.

25. My attention was also drawn by Mr McDowell BL to my judgment in Law Society v Corrigan [2023] IEHC 389 where, from para. 58 onwards, I set out the relevant legal principles under the previous regime in s. 8 of the 1960 Act applicable to a decision on sanction. At para. 62, I set out the principles to be applied by the Court on the application and I, in doing so, adopted those set out previously by Kelly P in Law Society v D’Alton [2019] IEHC 177 as follows:

“In approaching the question of penalty I have to have regard to:

(a) the protection of the public;

(b) the maintenance of the reputation of the solicitors’ profession ‘as one in which every member of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth (per Bingham M.R.)’; [in Bolton v. Law Society [1994] 1 W.L.R. 512]

(c) the punishment of the wrongdoer;

(d) the discouragement of other members of the profession who might be tempted to emulate the behaviour of the wrongdoer; and

(e) the concept of proportionality. The sanction must be proportionate and appropriate (per Kelly P. at para. 33)”.

26. I agree with the submission of Mr McDowell BL that those are the principles applicable to a

decision as to sanction on the Respondent on the present application and I will apply those principles to the facts of this application once I briefly set out the relevant circumstances of the case.

4. Relevant Facts

27. I now turn to the particular factual circumstances of this case. The background to this application is set out in the grounding affidavit of Antony Watson, Head of the Complaints, Investigations and Resolutions Department of the Authority, sworn on 11 May 2026. He refers to the various statutory provisions relevant to this application, and sets out that the 2015 Act confers various functions on the Authority with regard to the regulation of legal practitioners, including in relation to complaints and disciplinary hearings in respect of legal practitioners, pursuant to the provisions of Part 6 of the 2015 Act. He notes that the Tribunal is established under s. 74 of the 2015 Act and that ss. 75-81 of the 2015 Act deal with the composition, functions and powers of the Tribunal. He notes that, in summary, the Tribunal’s function is to consider applications for inquiries into legal practitioners brought under s. 77 of the 2015 Act, either by the Complaints Committee of the Authority (under s. 71(7) or s. 71(8)(c) of the 2015 Act)) or by the Law Society (under s. 14A(6) or s. 14(A)(7)(c) of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994)). Inquiries before the Tribunal are regulated by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal Regulations 2021 (S.I. 786/2021) (the “2021 Regulations”)).

28. As explained by Mr Watson, the Respondent is a solicitor who was first enrolled on the Roll of Solicitors on 31 January 2004. The Respondent has not held a practising certificate since the end of 2022. He was, in fact, suspended from practising as a solicitor by an order I made on an application by the Law Society on 8 May 2023.

29. Mr Watson explains that the inquiry in this case arose from a complaint made to the Authority by Permanent TSB on 27 September 2022 regarding the Respondent’s failure to comply with an undertaking given by him to Permanent TSB on 19 July 2018, concerning a property in Lucan, Co. Dublin. The Respondent had acted on behalf of the purchasers of the property and, in that context, he had given an undertaking to Permanent TSB in the Law Society’s standard form.

30. On 21 June 2023, the complaint was deemed admissible by the Authority and the Respondent was duly informed of that decision, pursuant to s. 57 of the 2015 Act. The complaint was then referred to the Authority’s Complaints Committee, which met to consider the matter on 8 October 2024. At that meeting, the Complaints Committee decided that the matter was more appropriate for consideration by the Tribunal in accordance with s. 71(7) of the 2015 Act, and directed the Authority to make an application to the Tribunal for an inquiry in relation to the complaint.

31. As is set out in another affidavit of Mr Watson, sworn on 2 May 2026, which grounded the application by the Complaints Committee to refer the matter to the Tribunal, there was virtually no engagement by the Respondent with the Authority in relation to the complaint. One brief piece of correspondence was received by the Authority from Mr Colm Hickey of Arthur McClean Solicitors LLP on 27 September 2024, stating that he was acting on the Respondent’s behalf in relation to the complaint. Mr Hickey provided a copy of the Respondent’s instructions to act on his behalf, dated 23 September 2024. However, despite the Authority having corresponded with Mr Hickey in relation to the matter thereafter, the Authority received no further correspondence from Mr Hickey on behalf of the Respondent in relation to the complaint.

32. The Complaints Committee of the Authority applied to the Tribunal for an inquiry in relation to the Respondent under s. 81 of the 2015 Act. The allegations against the Respondent were that he:

“(i) Failed to comply, either in a timely manner or at all, with the undertaking dated 19 July 2018 given to Permanent TSB in respect of the Property, either in part or in full, and in particular failed to furnish Permanent TSB with the following:

a. Certificate of Title in the Law Society’s standard form; b. All deeds and documents to the property, stamped and registered as appropriate;

c. The original Mortgage or, if Land Registry title, counterpart Mortgage (if available) and an up-to-date copy folio of the Property showing the Mortgage registered as a burden thereon;

d. Any deed of confirmation or life policy assignment; and

e. Land Registry dealing number to Permanent TSB.

(ii) Failed to lodge, within a reasonable timeframe or at all, the purchase deed/transfer and the Mortgage in relation to the property so as to ensure that Permanent TSB obtained a first legal mortgage/charge on the Property;

(iii) Failed to correspond adequately or at all with Permanent TSB with regard to the undertaking in respect of the Property”. Those allegations were alleged to constitute misconduct under s. 3(1) of the 1960 Act and s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act.

5. The Inquiry

33. The hearing of the Inquiry took place before the Tribunal on 27 January 2026. The Authority was represented by a solicitor and counsel at the Inquiry. However, the Respondent did not attend and was not legally represented. Evidence concerning service on the Respondent was given by two witnesses, Ms Regina Brennan of Permanent TSB and Mr Watson of the Authority. The Tribunal was satisfied as to service and it was, therefore, satisfied to proceed with the Inquiry, having taken the advice of its legal assessor, Mr Patrick McCann SC.

34. The Tribunal retired to consider the matter before delivering its decision on the allegations of misconduct. The Tribunal found that each of the allegations were proven as to fact and were proven also to constitute misconduct. The reasons for the Tribunal’s decision were set out in two documents, the Tribunal’s Notice of Determination dated 27 February 2026, and the Tribunal’s Recommendation dated 27 February 2026. It is unnecessary for me to set out the full details of both of those documents here. They are in similar terms and contain similar information. I will focus particularly on the Recommendation of the Tribunal, which is, of course, a recommendation by the Tribunal to the Court as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.

6. The Recommendation of the Tribunal

35. Having set out the relevant background information, including the allegations made against the Respondent and the evidence given and submissions made during the Inquiry, the Recommendation recorded the Tribunal’s decision that there had been misconduct on the part of the Respondent. The Tribunal explained that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the allegations made against the Respondent were proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Tribunal had regard to the evidence of Ms Brennan and Mr Watson, and noted that it accepted their uncontested evidence in its entirety. The Tribunal was persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that the facts as proven amounted to misconduct within the meaning of both section 3(1)(e) of the 1960 Act and s. 50(1)(h) of the 2015 Act, for the relevant time period before and after the coming into effect of the 2015 Act in October 2019.

36. The Tribunal was also satisfied that the conduct proven both respectively tended to and is likely to bring the solicitors’ profession into disrepute in respect of the relevant periods. In this respect, the Tribunal had regard to the Guide to Good Professional Conduct for Solicitors (3rd edition) and the Solicitors Guide to Professional Conduct (4th edition). The first Guide predated the coming into effect of the 2015 Act, and the second postdated it. The Tribunal had regard also to the submissions made on behalf of the Authority regarding the applicable case law, including Law Society v Tobin [2017] IECA 215 (Peart J).

37. The Recommendation noted that the issue of sanction should be dealt with pursuant to s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act, following submissions on behalf of the Authority. During the course of those submissions, reference was made to a letter dated 30 September 2025 received by the Authority from the Respondent in the context of an entirely separate matter in which the Respondent referenced financial means, which is a factor for consideration by the Tribunal pursuant to s. 82(4) of the 2015 Act when determining sanction.

38. The Authority made a submission to the Tribunal that the appropriate sanction to impose was to prohibit the Respondent from practising as a legal practitioner other than as an employee for a period of 10 years in accordance with s. 85(7)(c) of the 2015 Act and that the Respondent should be required to pay the costs of the Authority in respect of the Inquiry (those costs to be assessed by the Legal Costs Adjudicator, in default of agreement) in accordance with s. 85(7)(h)(iii) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal also received the advice of its legal assessor, Mr McCann SC, on that question.

39. The Tribunal decided to proceed in accordance with s. 82(2) of the 2015 Act, as mentioned above, and decided to make a recommendation to the High Court that the Court make one or more of the orders specified in s. 85(7) of the 2015 Act, namely, orders pursuant to s. 85(7)(c) and s. 85(7)(h)(iii) of the 2015 Act in the terms set out above.

40. The Tribunal then gave its opinion as to the appropriateness of the orders sought as follows. The Tribunal was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that non-compliance with undertakings by a registered legal practitioner amounts to serious misconduct and that the sanction recommended for imposition ought to reflect the Tribunal’s view of the seriousness of the misconduct. The Tribunal had regard to the underlying facts of the misconduct, the longstanding nature of the non-compliance, and that the non-compliance with the undertakings substantially persists. The Tribunal had regard to mitigating and aggravating factors.

41. In respect of aggravating factors, the Respondent did not attend the Inquiry hearing, was not represented at the hearing, offered no apology, demonstrated no insight and offered no remediation.

42. By way of mitigation, the Tribunal noted that in his letter dated 30 September 2025, the Respondent contended that he had ceased to practise law due to health difficulties, and that he has been out of work for a period since then. He wrote that he has only recently resumed employment. In this regard, the Tribunal had regard to the Respondent’s stated means. The Tribunal further had regard to the fact that the Respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

43. Having considered all of those factors, the Tribunal was satisfied that the recommendation as to sanction was proportionate and reasonably lenient.

7. Application of relevant legal principles to this case

44. That is the recommendation which the Tribunal now makes to the Court. It was submitted to the Court by the Authority, which urges the Court to adopt the recommendation, that the recommended sanction is one that would comply with the relevant legal principles which I have summarised earlier. I agree with the submission made on behalf of the Authority that the Court should give some weight to the views of the Tribunal in its Recommendation. I note that, in contrast to the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal (the “SDT”), the LPDT has a layperson majority. Nonetheless, however, I am satisfied that some weight must clearly be given to the Recommendation made by the Tribunal. As I mentioned earlier, s. 85(3) of the 2015 Act requires the Court to consider the recommendation of the Tribunal, as well as other matters including submissions of the parties, in deciding on the appropriate sanction to be imposed. Clearly, therefore, some weight must be given and some respect afforded to the views and recommendations of the Tribunal. I do not believe that it could be said that significant deference ought to be afforded to the Tribunal, and, in fairness, that was not the submission of the Authority.

45. The test applicable and the appropriate approach for the Court to take is that set out in the Coleman and Corrigan cases, as I mentioned earlier. Those cases confirm that the Court is the ultimate arbiter on an application such as this and that the Court is not bound by a recommendation as to sanction made by the Tribunal. The Court must be satisfied, as McKechnie J noted in Coleman, that the Tribunal was entitled as a matter of law to reach the findings which it did and to recommend the relevant sanction.

46. I summarised earlier the relevant legal principles governing sanction on a legal practitioner where the practitioner has been found guilty of professional misconduct. Those were set out by Kelly P in the D’Alton case and by me in Corrigan, and I do not need to reproduce them again here. However, I confirm that I have applied those principles in determining this application.

8. Decision on Application

47. In deciding whether to impose the sanction as recommended by the Tribunal, and as urged on by the Authority to the Court, I must be satisfied that the Tribunal applied the correct legal principles as set out in the D’Alton case. I am satisfied that the Tribunal did so in this case. The Tribunal did, in my view, fully comply with the relevant legal principles on sanctioning. Whilst this is in no sense a rubber-stamping exercise, and the Court must itself be satisfied that the sanctions sought to be imposed are appropriate, I am satisfied that they are. Therefore, in my view, the appropriate sanction to be imposed on the Respondent in this case is the sanction recommended by the Tribunal and that is urged on the Court by the Authority in its application. For those reasons, I will make orders in the terms of paras. 1 and 2 of the Originating Notice of Motion imposing the following sanctions on the Respondent. First, I will make an order under s. 82(2) and s. 85(7)(c) of the 2015 Act prohibiting the Respondent from practising as a legal practitioner otherwise than as an employee for a period of 10 years. I will, second, make an order under s. 82(2) and s. 85(7)(h)(iii) of the 2015 Act directing the Respondent to pay the whole of the costs of the Applicant incurred in relation to the Inquiry before the Tribunal, which costs are to be assessed by a Legal Costs Adjudicator, in default of agreement. I am satisfied that the Tribunal is clearly entitled to the costs of the Inquiry. If those costs were not paid by the Respondent, they would fall to be paid by other members of the profession who have not been and are not the subject of disciplinary proceedings. That would be most unfair, in my view.

48. An order is also sought by the Applicant for the costs of this application. As was submitted by Mr McDowell BL for the Authority, I have statutory jurisdiction to grant such an order under s. 85(8)(a) of the 2015 Act. In support of the application for the Authority’s costs, Mr McDowell BL submitted that these proceedings were necessitated by findings of misconduct pursuant to the 2015 Act and Order 53D RSC, and that the application for the Authority’s costs would be strengthened further by the Court adopting the recommendation as to sanction by the Tribunal. I accept that submission and I am satisfied that I should make an order that the Respondent pay the Authority’s costs for those reasons. The Authority’s application for the costs of this application is unanswerable in circumstances where I am making orders adopting the Tribunal’s

decision as to sanction and in light of the unfair consequences to the members of the legal profession should those costs not be paid by the Respondent.

9. Concluding Comment

49. In conclusion, I should note that I also dealt today with a separate application by the Authority for similar orders against the Respondent arising out of findings of misconduct due to the Respondent’s failure to comply with another undertaking given by him to Permanent TSB. I applied the principles outlined in this judgment and made similar orders to those made in this application.