High Court quashes IAPT asylum decision due to denial of oral hearing for sick applicant.

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 325

[Record No. 2024/1055JR]

BETWEEN

J.R. (GEORGIA)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barr delivered electronically on the 27th day of May 2026.

Introduction.

1. The applicant is a Georgian national who is currently 26 years of age. He applied for international protection in the State on 9 March 2023 on the grounds that he had been a supporter of an opposition political party in Georgia and had attended a number of rallies in support of LGBT rights. He stated that he had been assaulted by members of the security forces and/or police after a number of these rallies. He stated that he had suffered injuries in the form of fractures to his hand and wrist on two separate occasions which had required operative treatment in hospital. He had also been assaulted on a third occasion, but that had not required hospital treatment. The applicant also claimed that the police had circulated a rumour in his hometown to the effect that he was gay; as a result whereof, he had been subjected to harassment and bullying by people in the town. He also stated that he and members of his family had been threatened by the police due to his attendance at these rallies. He stated that he had been told to leave the country.

2. The applicant fled from Georgia on 15 December 2022, going first to Greece; thence to Italy; thence to the UK and onwards to Ireland, arriving in the State on 6 January 2023.

3. Having gone through the usual processes, on 2 August 2023, the International Protection Officer (hereinafter “IPO” ) made a recommendation that the applicant should not be granted asylum or international protection. Essentially this was on the grounds that his narrative lacked credibility.

4. The applicant appealed by notice of appeal dated 31 August 2023. In his letter accompanying his grounds of appeal, the applicant requested an oral hearing of his appeal.

5. As part of the documentation submitted for his appeal, the applicant furnished a medical report from Dr. Joan Elizabeth Giller dated 11 April 2024. The content of this medical report will be discussed in detail later in the judgment. In summary, Dr. Giller made a diagnosis that the applicant was suffering from complex post-traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter “CPTSD”), severe depression and generalised anxiety disorder. She found that his psychiatric symptoms were highly consistent with his history of having suffered trauma in Georgia in the form of multiple beatings and having a fear for his life. Those symptoms were exacerbated by a physical attack that the applicant had suffered at the hands of a drunk man while sleeping homeless on the streets of Dublin.

6. By decision dated 18 July 2024, the respondent refused to conduct an oral hearing of the appeal. The respondent affirmed the recommendation of the IPO on the basis that the applicant's evidence of having attended various rallies in support of LGBT rights in Georgia and of having been assaulted by the security forces and/or police after some of the rallies; and that the police had circulated a rumour in his hometown that he was gay; and that they had threatened him and his family; was not credible due to vagueness and inconsistencies in the accounts given in his questionnaire and in his interviews. Overall, his application was rejected for lack of credibility.

7. In these proceedings the applicant challenges the appeal decision of the respondent on the following grounds: that the applicant ought to have been granted an oral hearing; that the decision-maker failed to set out clearly why the applicant's accounts of having been assaulted after various rallies was found not to be credible; but merely made an omnibus finding of lack of credibility at the conclusion of the decision; and that the decision-maker did not properly consider country of origin information which supported the applicant's case.

Relevant Dates.

8. The following is a brief summary of relevant dates: the applicant was born in January 2000. Having completed his schooling, he attended university in Tbilisi for a number of years. However, he did not conclude his degree in tourism studies. In one account he stated that he had had to discontinue university studies due to financial circumstances, but elsewhere he stated that he had had to leave the capital city due to threats to his safety due to his attendance at rallies in support of LGBT rights. It appears that the applicant then took up work as an unofficial tour guide at or near his home town.

9. As already noted, the applicant fled Georgia on 15 December 2022, arriving in the State on 6 January 2023. On 9 March 2023, he applied for international protection. He completed an application form and a questionnaire.

10. On 29 March 2023, the applicant had the first of two interviews pursuant to s.35 of the International Protection Act 2015. In that interview he gave a narrative of having attended three rallies in support of either the opposition party, UNM, or in support of LGBT rights, in June 2021, April 2022 and September 2022. He stated that following each of these rallies he had been beaten up by members of the security forces or police. He stated that they had threatened him that if he did not cease his activities in support of the opposition party or in support of gay rights, he would face the prospect that he would be arrested on trumped up charges and would be put in prison. Threats were also made against members of his family. The applicant stated that after two of these rallies he had required treatment in hospital for fractures to his left wrist and hand. The applicant furnished photographs showing his wrist and hand in bandages. He also furnished two medical reports confirming that he had received treatment in hospital in August 2021 and April 2022 for these injuries.

11. On 17 July 2023, the applicant had a further short interview to clarify certain inconsistencies that had arisen in relation to the account given in his first interview. While the applicant's present firm of solicitors is noted as representing him on the form filled out in respect of the second interview, it does not appear that any solicitor had actually accompanied the applicant to that interview. The applicant's file had been referred to the applicant’s current solicitors by the Law Centre in Smithfield by letter dated 25 April 2023.

12. On 2 August 2023, the IPO issued a recommendation that the applicant should not be granted either asylum or international protection. This decision was reached on the basis that the applicant's narrative lacked credibility.

13. On 31 August 2023, a notice of appeal was filed by solicitors acting on behalf of the applicant. In the letter which accompanied the grounds of appeal, a request was made that the appeal hearing should be by way of an oral hearing, notwithstanding that Georgia was designated as a safe country.

14. In furtherance of the appeal, the applicant was referred to Dr. Joan Elizabeth Giller. She conducted a remote interview with the applicant on 28 February 2024. She had a face-to-face interview with him on 13 March 2024. She issued her report on 11 April 2024. The content of that report will be examined in detail later in the judgment.

15. On 7 May 2024, Dr. Giller’s report was furnished to the respondent. It was furnished again along with further submissions on 16 April 2024.

16. On 18 July 2024, the respondent issued his decision on the appeal. In the

decision, he refused the request for an oral hearing. The decision went on to find that the applicant’s account lacked credibility. That conclusion was reached on the following basis: on the grounds that the applicant had been inconsistent in relation to the number of assaults that had actually occurred. At one point he had stated that there had been two assaults; whereas at another point in the interviews he had stated that there had been three assaults. The decision-maker also found that there were inconsistencies with the applicant's accounts of the various rallies that he had attended; in particular, it was noted that he had stated that he had attended a large rally outside the parliament building in Tbilisi when a Russian politician was addressing the Georgian parliament. He had stated that that rally had occurred in August 2021; whereas published records had shown that that rally had occurred in June 2019, which was prior to the time when the applicant stated that he had commenced being active in the opposition party, which he stated had occurred in or around March 2020.

17. The appeal decision also found that the applicant's evidence was vague insofar as he did not know who had organised the various rallies that he had attended in support of LGBT rights, even those that had been held in his hometown. It was noted that in relation to the rumour which the police were supposed to have circulated in his hometown to the effect that he was gay; he could only say that it was his belief that such a rumour had been circulated. He had no concrete proof in that regard. It was noted that the applicant did not have any documentation to prove his membership of the opposition UNM party. Nor had he reported any of the assaults or threats that had supposedly been made by the security services and/or police.

18. While the decision-maker had accepted the medical evidence that had been presented, and in particular had accepted Dr. Giller’s evidence, and on that basis, had applied a lower bar in relation to the applicant's evidence concerning dates of the various rallies; nevertheless the decision-maker held that taking the narrative in the round, it lacked credibility. On this basis his appeal was rejected.

19. By order dated 13 December 2024, the applicant was given leave to proceed to challenge the appeal decision by way of judicial review.

The Giller Report.

20. Given the importance of this medical report to the judgment of the court in this matter, it is necessary to summarise the report in some detail. Dr. Giller is a registered medical practitioner and is a member of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. She has an MA degree with distinction in social anthropology and an MA degree in counselling and psychotherapy. She is accredited with the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy.

21. Dr. Giller has worked in the UK as an obstetrician/gynaecologist. She has also worked in primary healthcare in Thailand with refugees from Myanmar. She has worked in Uganda for the UK-based organisation Freedom From Torture. Until December 2017, she was employed as an area medical officer in community service for the HSE, West Cork. This work included health screening for asylum seekers. From 2020 to 2023, she worked for Spirasi at the National Centre for Torture Survivors as a psychotherapist and medical legal report writer. Since that time she has continued to work independently writing medical legal reports. She also works in private practice as a psychotherapist in West Cork and on a voluntary basis in a direct provision centre with ARC Cancer Support Services in West Cork.

22. Dr. Giller stated that she has over 25 years’ experience writing medical legal reports, mainly in asylum and immigration cases both in the UK and in Ireland. She has undergone training from Bond Solon Legal Training Consultancy in London. She stated that during the three years she spent in Uganda with the Medical Foundation, she had documented hundreds of cases of torture and rape. She has done consultancies in the field of gender-based violence for the organisation Save the Children in Southern Sudan and Darfur and conducted research into the sexual exploitation of children in camps for the internally displaced in Liberia. She has researched and written about the medical and psychological sequalae of rape and other forms of gender based violence. She has several peer reviewed publications on the psychological effects of war related violence and torture.

23. In her medical report, Dr. Giller stated that her diagnosis and conclusions had been made on the basis of two interviews held with the applicant. The first was an online interview held on 28 February 2024. The second was an in-person interview held on 13 March 2024. In her report, Dr. Giller gave an account of the symptoms that had been recounted to her by the applicant. He had described symptoms that she felt were compatible with a diagnosis of complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) including flashbacks and distressing nightmares of being attacked; avoidance of internal and external reminders of the assaults; and extreme symptoms of hyper arousal. She stated that the applicant also displayed affective dysregulation, which is difficulty calming himself when he is agitated, and feeling emotionally numb. She noted that he had a severely negative self-concept and had difficulty making and maintaining emotional relationships with other people. She stated that in her opinion the symptoms were compatible with CPTSD, which had been confirmed by the psychological testing that she had carried out. She concluded by stating that the symptoms of CPTSD were highly consistent under the terms of the Istanbul Protocol with the trauma that the applicant had reported.

24. Dr. Giller was also of the opinion that the applicant was displaying symptoms of depressive disorder at a severe level. The symptoms of this condition were low mood, lack of self-confidence, severe feelings of hopelessness, anhedonia, which is a markedly diminished interest or pleasure in activities, insomnia, reduced appetite, fatigue and loss of energy, worthlessness, excessive guilt, difficulty paying attention, concentrating and recalling from memory and thoughts of death and dying. She stated that these symptoms were at the severe end of the spectrum, as the applicant had scored 37/50 on testing, with a diagnosis of severe depression being anything above a score of 30. She was of the view that his symptoms were consistent with the losses that he had suffered in his life as a result of the trauma that he had experienced, including the separation from his family, his country and his culture and the failure of his marriage.

25. Dr. Giller was also of the view that the applicant had symptoms of generalised anxiety disorder in the form of excessive worry, feelings of fear, restlessness, fatigue, irritability, muscle tension, poor concentration, insomnia, tension headaches and panic attacks with shortness of breath, fast heartbeat, sweating and dizziness. Again, the severity of these symptoms were ranked as being severe. She was also of the view that these symptoms were consistent with the trauma that he had described, coupled with his extreme fear of being returned to Georgia where he believed that he would face the likelihood of being killed.

26. Dr. Giller noted that the applicant complained of extremely poor memory, particularly in relation to dates and times. She stated that that was frequently found in patients suffering from PTSD and severe psychological distress. It could make the recounting of specific details of traumatic experience and their aftermath very difficult, especially when the person was in a stressful situation. She cited the relevant portion of the Istanbul Protocol in this regard. She concluded by stating that in her opinion the applicant's difficulties with memory recall were the result of his current poor psychological state, rather than any cognitive problems.

27. She stated that the applicant presented as a very earnest and very troubled young man, who was suffering severely psychologically. She stated that if he is returned to Georgia where he experienced extreme fear, his mental state would be likely to decompensate significantly, with a concomitant increase in the risk of suicide.

28. Dr. Giller noted that the scarring that was evident in the photographs that had been presented and on physical examination was consistent with the applicant's account of multiple beatings and the fixation of broken bones in his hand.

29. The doctor was of the opinion that the applicant was suffering from CPTSD, severe depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder as defined in the medical literature. Together those were highly consistent pursuant to the revised Istanbul Protocol with his history of having suffered trauma in Georgia in the form of multiple beatings and fear for his life. She stated that the symptoms were exacerbated by the physical attack that he had suffered on the streets of Dublin when he was homeless.

30. Dr. Giller stated that in her opinion the clinical evidence was highly consistent with the applicant's account of trauma and his extreme fear of returning to Georgia where he believed that he would be likely to be killed by the special police forces. She concluded by stating that the applicant was a gentle young man who was very psychologically vulnerable in his current situation. He had lost his relationship with his wife in Georgia since he came to Ireland. He feared that he may be killed by state security police if he returned there. In her clinical opinion if he was returned to Georgia he would decompensate mentally which would then significantly increase his risk of suicide.

Discussion and Conclusions.

31. The first issue which must be determined is whether the applicant ought to have been afforded an oral hearing of his appeal. The principles that should be applied in considering whether an oral hearing is necessary when the applicant is seeking international protection from a designated safe country, were considered by Ferriter J. in KS v IPAT [2026] IEHC 13.

32. In reviewing the relevant legal authorities, Ferriter J. referred to the decision in Sun v the Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors. [2013] 2 IR 555. In that case Cooke J. had had to consider the effectiveness of the remedy by way of appeal to the Tribunal where the applicant had been automatically deprived of an oral rehearing before the Tribunal by reason only of the fact that a finding had been made at first instance to the effect that the applicant was a national of a designated “safe country”. In that case, Cooke J. held that where an application for asylum had been rejected on the basis that the applicant had been found not to be telling the truth, the issue of personal credibility was clearly fundamental to the appeal and, accordingly, to the character of the appeal procedure as providing a remedy which was effective to rectify the basis upon which the claim had been rejected. He went on to state that it was clear that the effectiveness of the appeal remedy as a matter of law was dependent upon the availability to the applicant of an opportunity of persuading the deciding authority on appeal that he or she was personally credible in the matter.

33. Ferriter J. went on to hold that it had been accepted in the case law that where there were disputed accounts of a relevant incident or event, it was probably necessary to hold an oral hearing in order to resolve these conflicting accounts. Similarly, it had been held that where credibility findings were based on the demeanour of the applicant in presenting his narrative, perhaps because he had been evasive when answering questions during an interview, in those circumstances an oral hearing would also be necessary.

34. Ferriter J. also noted that it was important to be aware that an applicant could also be disbelieved and therefore be held to have lacked credibility on non-demeanour type grounds, such as when the content of his or her story on its own terms lacks coherence or plausibility, or contains material inconsistencies such that a view can be safely arrived at without the need for any further oral hearing, that the account should not be accepted.

35. Ferriter J. summarised his conclusions in the following way at para 59 of his judgment:

“Again, there is no hard and fast rule and each case will fall to be assessed on its own facts. There may be a spectrum of cases between “pure” demeanourtype rejection of personal credibility to cases where an objective assessment of the case advanced by an applicant on its own terms demonstrates that the case cannot stand up. There may be cases where there are contested facts in the sense explained by O'Donnell J. in MM which require an oral hearing to resolve. It is possible to envisage a variety of scenarios (such as where new issues or evidence going to credibility arises on an appeal) that can only be fairly tested orally on the appeal or that may, depending on the circumstances be fairly determined on the basis of the papers and written representations alone. The overriding requirement is that the appellant gets an opportunity to fairly make his case”

36. In the present case, when the applicant sought an oral hearing, the report from Dr. Giller had not come to hand. For that reason, the basis on which the oral hearing was sought, was confined to what may be termed the usual grounds for seeking such a hearing, namely that as his credibility was being rejected on the basis that his account of events which could have occurred was deemed not credible, fairness required that the applicant be given the opportunity to give his evidence in person at the appeal hearing. However, by the time the appeal came to be heard, the report from Dr. Giller was before the respondent.

37. I am satisfied that in addition to what may be termed the usual circumstances in which an oral hearing may be required as outlined in the KS judgment, there is a further category of cases when an oral hearing may be required in the interests of justice.

38. If there is credible evidence before the decision maker on an appeal that the appellant was suffering from some significant mental impairment at the time when he filled out the questionnaire and had his interviews, it may be necessary in the interests of justice that the appellant be afforded an oral hearing with the assistance of a lawyer representing them, so that their case can be fully put before the Tribunal.

39. In the present case, there was cogent evidence from a doctor with extensive experience in assessing victims of torture and persecution, that the applicant was suffering from CPTSD, severe depression and generalised anxiety disorder. There was no evidence that these psychiatric conditions were of recent origin. In other words, there was no evidence that the cause of these symptoms had only arisen since the applicant's arrival in Ireland. Dr. Giller's report clearly stated that she found the symptoms that she had diagnosed as being highly consistent with the trauma described by the applicant.

40. I am satisfied from reading Dr. Giller's report that on the balance of probabilities the applicant was suffering from significant psychiatric conditions in the form of CPTSD, depression and anxiety when he filled out his questionnaire and had his interviews.

41. As these appear to have been conducted without the applicant having a legal representative present, I am satisfied that as that evidence was obtained from him when he was very sick, the interests of justice required that his appeal be heard on oral evidence, rather than on the evidence obtained during interviews when he was very unwell, as found by Dr Giller.

42. I hold that for the appeal hearing to have been held on the basis of documentary evidence obtained when the applicant was very sick and was without the assistance of a lawyer, was unfair. I hold that the requirements of a fair appeal required that there should have been an oral hearing.

43. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the substantive grounds of the challenge to the respondent's decision because even if I were to hold that the conclusions reached were reasonably open to the decision maker on the evidence before him, I would have to strike down the decision as having been obtained following an unfair appeal hearing.

Proposed Final Order.

44. As the court has found that the applicant was denied a fair hearing on his appeal, the court will grant certiorari of the respondent's decision dated 18 July 2024.

45. The court proposes to remit the matter back to the respondent to be considered afresh by way of an oral appeal before another member of the Tribunal.

46. As this judgment has been delivered electronically, the parties shall have three weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions of not more than 1000 words on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise.

47. The matter shall be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 25 June 2026 for the purpose of making final orders.