High Court orders surrender of Polish national to Poland despite family life and medical concerns.

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 2025 298 EXT

[2026] IEHC 289

BETWEEN

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

AND

PRZEMYSLAW SCHROEDER

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 8 May 2026

Introduction

1. This is an application for the surrender of the respondent to the Republic of Poland (“the issuing state”) on foot of a European Arrest Warrant dated the 11th of December 2023 and updated on the 26th of January 2024 (“the warrant”).

2. The respondent’s surrender is sought for the purpose of prosecuting him for eight offences.

3. Part E of the warrant sets out in considerable detail the factual particulars of the offences. In broad terms, it is alleged that the respondent, acting with another for financial gain, used a company to cause another to dispose of their property on the basis of misleading information about the financial condition of the company and its ability to fulfill the conditions of an agreement to deliver goods ordered and paid for.

4. The respondent was arrested on foot of a SIS alert and brought before this Court on the 18th of November 2025. The warrant was produced to the Court on the 20th of November 2025. No issue has been raised by the respondent in relation to his identity, and I am satisfied that the respondent is the person identified in the warrant.

5. The respondent is a Polish national and objects to his surrender.

6. A notice of objection was filed on behalf of the respondent on the 12th of January 2026, pursuant to Order 98, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.

Background

7. The notice indicated that the respondent does not consent to his surrender and is not waiving the rule against specialty in the event that an order for surrender is made. The only substantive point raised in the notice was a complaint that the warrant appeared to have been issued on the 11th of December 2023 but was updated on the 26th of January 2024.

8. In his written submissions, the respondent also sought to argue that: “Whilst bearing in mind the exceptionality of refusal of surrender for incompatibility with personal rights, the respondent requests reliance on his family life as may be set out in affidavit evidence: MJE v. Vestartas [2020] IESC

12 at § [94].”

9. In supplemental written submissions, the respondent sought to expand his argument to include an objection to surrender on the basis of conditions of detention in the issuing state given the respondent’s particular medical diagnoses. In the hearing before me, this was the aspect of matters in respect of which most emphasis was placed.

10. The respondent’s solicitor swore an affidavit on the 15th of January 2026 and exhibited a short medical certificate written by Dr. Emilia Janowska, Internal Medicine Specialist at a Primary Healthcare Clinic in Wejherowo, Poland. The certificate appears to be dated the 18th of October 2022.

11. This certificate indicated diagnoses of deep vein thrombosis, chronic pancreatitis and diabetes and a history of intestinal resection and stoma reconstruction.

12. Having regard to the date on which the certificate appears to have been issued, I gave the respondent an opportunity to put more up-to-date medical information before the Court.

13. The respondent’s solicitor swore a supplemental affidavit on the 23rd of January 2026 and exhibited a medical report from the respondent’s general practitioner, Dr. Robert Vukelich, dated the 20th of January 2026. This report indicated a history of insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, pancreatic necrosis and cardiopulmonary insufficiency.

14. Dr. Vukelich stated that the medications currently being prescribed to the respondent were in keeping with his past medical and surgical history. He indicated that it was absolutely critical that such medications are taken by the respondent on a daily basis “or it would have detrimental effects on his health and wellbeing potentially causing death.”

15. It was on this basis that the supplemental submissions were filed on behalf of the respondent.

Discussion

16. Further information was sought pursuant to section 20 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) on the 2nd of December 2025 due to a lack of clarity regarding some of the recitals on the warrant.

17. Under the heading ‘Enforceable Judgment’, Part B of the warrant provides for an “order issued in preliminary proceedings to detain the person on remand” while Part C states that the sentence or detention order imposed was one of 30 days and that a 30 day sentence remained to be served.

18. The issuing judicial authority was asked to confirm whether the surrender of the respondent was sought for the purpose of serving a sentence of imprisonment or to stand trial. Further details were also sought in relation to the 30 day period of detention and the nature of the preliminary proceedings referred to in the warrant.

19. It was apparent from the face of the warrant that both possible responses at Part D (1) and (2) were struck out in relation to the issue of whether the respondent appeared in person at the trial resulting in the decision. It was also apparent that Part D (3) and (4)

had been completed in relation to the question of personal service of the decision. Clarification was therefore sought in relation to this part of the warrant.

20. By response dated the 3rd of December 2025, the issuing judicial authority confirmed that the warrant had been issued in order to conduct criminal proceedings against the respondent and that these proceedings were in the “phase of pre-trial proceedings.” It was confirmed that no judgment had been delivered or sentence passed in the case and therefore the reference to a 30 day custodial sentence was erroneous. The reference to ‘30 days’ actually concerned a decision issued in the pre-trial proceedings: “… to apply the measure of provisional detention for 30 days with respect to the requested person and to initiate a search for him with a domestic wanted notice in view of the fact that he was hiding from the law enforcement authorities.”

21. It was also confirmed that, in relation to service of the decision, Part D was completed incorrectly as no judgment had in fact been delivered in the case.

22. Arising out of Dr. Vukelich’s report in relation to the respondent’s medical condition and the submissions sought to be advanced in relation to prison conditions, a further request for information was made on the 23rd of January 2026.

23. In that request, information was sought in relation to where the respondent might be detained if surrendered and assurances were sought in relation to his medical treatment.

24. The issuing judicial authority was given information in relation to the medical history of the respondent and furnished with Dr. Vukelich’s report, which included a list of medications that the respondent was being prescribed at the time.

25. In its response dated the 29th of January 2026, the issuing judicial authority confirmed that the respondent would be detained at the Remand Centre in Gdańsk. It was confirmed that he would be provided with professional medical care at the Remand Centre immediately upon admission and that medical care, to include a hospital and outpatient clinic, would also be available on public holidays, at nights and at weekends, as well as during any transitional period and/or quarantine.

26. A guarantee in relation to medical treatment was given in the following terms: “continuation of medical treatment by administering the prescribed medication to the provisionally detained on a regular basis is guaranteed.” (Emphasis added.)

27. It was also indicated that the Code of Criminal Procedure in Poland guaranteed: “… treatment of the provisionally detained at a specialist health care institution, if this is required because of his/her health condition.”

28. It was confirmed that the respondent would have access to medical consultations by a general practitioner, medical specialist consultations by a surgeon, gastroenterologist and diabetologist, emergency medical treatment, hospitalisation and rehabilitation.

29. It was indicated that the staff at the hospital and outpatient clinic included “highly qualified specialists” experienced in treating vascular diseases, diabetes and gastrointestinal diseases and that the available medical procedures “meet the current European and world standards.”

Decision

30. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the case now “turned on the assurances given” and that while the response goes some way towards providing confidence, it did not fully address the questions asked and that there was, in reality, no guarantee in relation to the provision of the respondent’s necessary medication.

31. Counsel for the applicant submitted that there was “no ambiguity” as clear assurances had now been given.

32. I agree with counsel for the applicant. I am satisfied that the assurances given in relation to the range of available treatment and expertise meets all of the concerns raised. I am also of the view that the assurances given in relation to the continuation of “the prescribed medication” are clear, specific and responsive to the request, which listed the medications, and are not part of a “general assertion” as submitted on behalf of the respondent. The assurances are detailed and comprehensive.

33. It seems to me that the case of Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Machaczka [2012] IEHC 434 is clearly distinguishable in circumstances where that case involved a multiplicity of factors and true exceptionality in terms of disruption to family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

34. In Machaczka, the respondent suffered from a progressive schizoaffective disorder and there was evidence as to the unavailability of a relevant drug and cognitive behavioural therapy in the issuing state. Edwards J. also noted that the respondent had previously been found to be unfit to be tried.

35. Edwards J. held: “The principles of mutual trust and confidence upon which the European arrest warrant system is predicated, and the concurrent requirement that the decisions of courts and judicial authorities in other member states should be afforded mutual recognition, though very important, are not so far reaching as to give rise to a conclusive presumption that an issuing state will respect a respondent’s rights. In particular, they are not to be so slavishly adhered to as to, in effect, so blinker a court in an executing member state as to cause it to ignore or overlook a real risk of a breach of the right to life or bodily integrity where it genuinely exists.”

36. He went on to say that “this is nothing new” and adopted the well-established principle in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Rettinger [2010] 3 I.R. 783 that the court’s enquiry is directed towards the level of danger to which the respondent is exposed. Edwards J. made it clear that it is open to an issuing state to dispel any doubts by evidence. In my view, this has been done by the issuing state in this case.

37. Edwards J. also held:

“… the Court is not satisfied that articles 2 and 3 E.C.H.R. are engaged at all in the circumstances of this case, but even if they are engaged, the Court is not satisfied in any event that there are substantial grounds for believing that if the respondent were returned to the requesting state he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a breach of his right to life as guaranteed under article

2 E.C.H.R., or of being ill-treated contrary to article 3 E.C.H.R.”

38. He then went on to say: “The question for the Court in the present case is whether truly exceptional circumstances exist such as would justify this Court in concluding that it would be a disproportionate measure to surrender the respondent having regard to his rights, and those of his partner Ms. Malecki, and their two daughters, to respect for their family life under article 8 E.C.H.R. After much reflection I have concluded that truly exceptional circumstances do exist.”

39. I am satisfied that there is no substance to the complaint regarding the fact that the face of warrant bares a statement indicating that it was updated on the 26th of January 2024. It is unclear to me how this fact, without more, could be a basis for a refusal to surrender (insofar as that is suggested, which is itself unclear). This does not seem to me to be a material factor in assessing the validity of the warrant. In my view, the manner in which a warrant is updated is a matter for the issuing state. Once the warrant is endorsed, the fact that is has been updated is not a bar to surrender.

40. I am satisfied that the requirements of section 11 of the 2003 Act have been met in relation to the classification of the offences concerned under the law of the issuing state and that the description of the facts underpinning the offences are clearly set out in Part E of the warrant.

41. I am satisfied that the name and nationality of the respondent is clearly set out on the face of the warrant and that he was lawfully brought before the Court on the 18th of November 2025.

42. The name and address of the judicial authority that issued the warrant and its telephone number, fax number and email address are set out on the face of the warrant.

43. In relation to the ‘tick box’ offences as provided for under the European Council Framework Decision dated the 13th of June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, the offence ticked is “swindling.” Therefore, there is no requirement to demonstrate correspondence. The ticked box applies to all of the offences in respect of which surrender is sought. If there was any doubt on that question, the factual particulars clearly correspond with the offence of making gain or causing loss by deception as set out in section 6 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) Offences Act 2001.

44. Part C of the warrant provides that the maximum sentence that can be imposed in respect of each offence is one of eight years. I am satisfied that the minimum gravity requirement has thus been met.

45. I am satisfied that I am not required to refuse the respondent’s surrender under sections 22, 23 or 24 of the 2003 Act. I am also satisfied that I am not required to refuse surrender for any other reason pursuant to Part 3 of the 2003 Act.

Conclusion

46. For the reasons set out above I reject the points of objection raised by the respondent to surrender. I, therefore, propose to make an order for surrender to such person as is duly authorised to receive him on behalf of the issuing state.