High Court dismisses planning application for lack of standing, proper pleading, and proof of regulatory breach.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe High Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review proceedings against a planning decision, ruling he lacked standing and failed to properly plead his case. Although the applicant claimed a general environmental interest, the court found he had not participated in the planning process and could not demonstrate direct personal prejudice or proximity to the site. Furthermore, the applicant failed to discharge the onus of proof regarding a breach of environmental regulations, as he relied on an unamended version of the regulation without evidence of the necessary interplay with EPA licensing.
Legislator headnote
AI generateds. 50(3) of the Planning and Development Act 2000; s. 50A of the Planning and Development Act 2000; s. 50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000; An applicant must have sufficient interest or comply with s. 50(3) to have standing; points must be properly pleaded with requisite specificity; and the applicant must discharge the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief.
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AI generatedFull text
[2026] IEHC 281
THE HIGH COURT
PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT
[H.JR.2024.0001016]
IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 50, 50A AND 50B OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
ACT 2000
BETWEEN
MICHAEL DUFFY
APPLICANT
AND
AN COIMISIÚN PLEANÁLA
RESPONDENT
AND
CAHERMORRIS DEVELOPMENTS LTD
NOTICE PARTY
Date of impugned decision: 17 June 2024
Date proceedings commenced: 9 August 2024
Date of main hearing: 27 April 2026
Date draft judgment circulated: 29 April 2026
JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Friday 8 May 2026
1. In Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC
28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024), the Supreme Court per Murray J.
at paras. 39 et seq. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring) emphasised the
point that an applicant must plead the issues adequately. In Grace and Sweetman v. An Bord
Pleanála [2017] IESC 10, [2020] 3 I.R. 286, the Supreme Court held at 8.8 that “a person who
cannot show proximity to a proposed wind farm and did not participate in the process is unlikely to
have standing to make an argument more properly raised by a person more directly affected. In
our view a challenger who has not previously participated and cannot show any direct personal
prejudice must satisfy the leave judge that the point being made is one directed solely to the purpose
of the special protection of the site.” In Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported,
Supreme Court, 25 March 2026) at para. 96 per Donnelly J., the Supreme Court took the opportunity
to reemphasise that “the onus of proof must lie on an applicant for judicial review”. It is the function
of a trial court to apply these principles here. While I appreciate the sincerity of the applicant as a
litigant in person with a bona fide general interest in the environmentally correct treatment of
wastewater across the country, the legal question here is whether he has adequately pleaded the
case and has standing to advance it notwithstanding a lack of participation in the process and a lack
of proximity to the site, and if he has standing and has correctly pleaded his case, whether he has
in fact discharged the onus of proof to show that the decision in invalid.
Geographical context
2. The project (https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/317614) comprises a composite
application seeking retention and completion of a previously approved supermarket and fuel filling
station development. It includes (i) retention of the completed supermarket development previously
permitted under reg. ref. no. 20/384 (ABP‑308213‑20), including first‑floor staff room, meeting and
plant rooms, external plant, elevations, canopy, trolley rack, building fit‑out, signage, hard and soft
landscaping and a surface car park; (ii) retention of works associated with the fuel filling station
previously permitted under reg. ref. no. 19/1699 (ABP‑306850‑20), including site accesses, forecourt
layout, boundary wall, footpaths, lighting, landscaping and associated works; (iii) retention of a
two‑storey building (gross floor area 514 m2) to serve the fuel filling station previously permitted
under reg. ref. no. 20/1799 (ABP‑310047‑21), comprising at ground floor level a retail unit, deli and
seating area with ancillary facilities, and at first floor level overflow seating, toilets, staff facilities
and storage; (iv) retention of water and wastewater connections on the R358 College Road (Irish
Water Ref. CDS1900364701) serving the supermarket and fuel filling station; (v) completion of the
fuel filling station including construction of pump islands, pumps, forecourt canopy, delivery
set‑down area, service bay fit‑out, tank fill points, final surfacing, and signage, all in accordance with
earlier permissions; and (vi) the omission of condition 3 of permission reg. ref. no. 06/3886 (ABP
PL07.221318), as extended under subsequent permissions. The development is located at
Treanrevagh, College Road, Mountbellew, County Galway in the vicinity of the following:
https://maps.app.goo.gl/tzVDuGtPbf3jkFrr8.
Facts
3. The applicant challenges the decision of the commission, made by way of order (ABP-
317614-23) dated 17 June 2024 – pursuant to, inter alia, s. 37 of the Planning and Development
Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) and the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (the 2001 regulations)
– to grant retention permission and planning permission, subject to 17 conditions to the developer
for the specified development.
4. In 2007, planning permission (appeal ref. no. 07.221318) (the parent permission) was
granted by the commission for, inter alia, the demolition of a convent/school building and detached
house and the construction of a mixed-use development consisting of retail units and residential
units (including nine apartments and 37 houses) on a site at Treanrevagh, College Road,
Mountbellew, County Galway (the wider site).
5. As noted by the commission’s inspector (§4.0 et seq.), there has been a series of planning
permissions granted since – including numerous extensions to the duration of the parent permission
and permissions which amend the commercial development on the site. In respect of the latter,
these include planning permission for a fuel filling station (ABP-306850-20), planning permission for
a supermarket (ABP-308213-20), and planning permission for a filling station shop/deli (ABP-
310047-21).
6. The application for retention/planning permission in this case was concerned with the
southern portion of the wider site – the area outlined in red in the “Site Layout Plan Overall”. Same
concerns limited development, including an Aldi supermarket and fuel filling station (in contrast to
the significantly larger development the subject of the parent permission), and sought inter alia:
(i) retention permission for the works carried out after 31 December 2021 and
permitted by reg. ref. no. 20/384 (ABP-308213-20) – including staff room, meeting
room and plant room at first floor level, external plant and elevations, canopy, trolley
rack, building fit-out, signage, soft and hard landscaping, surface car park, and
completion of the previously approved supermarket;
(ii) to retain works at the fuel filling station permitted by reg. ref. no. 19/1699 (ABP-
306850-20) – including the formation of the site accesses and forecourt layout, the
construction of a boundary wall and footpaths, lighting, soft and hard landscaping,
and all associated works;
(iii) to retain a two-storey building (514 m2 gross floor area), approved under reg. ref.
no. 20/1799 (ABP-310047-21), which serves the fuel filling station – the said
building comprises: (i) a retail shop (100 m2 net retail floor area), (ii) a hot food/deli
counter and seating area (126 m2 total floor area) to facilitate the sale of hot and
cold food for consumption on and off the premises, along with a cold room, store,
lift and ATM all at ground floor level and (iii) overflow seating, toilets, a staff room,
cash office and storage at first floor level and all associated works; and
(iv) to retain connections to water and wastewater infrastructure at R358 College Road.
7. The application for planning permission sought, inter alia:
(i) Permission for the construction of pump islands, pumps and a forecourt canopy,
delivery set down area, service bay fit-out, tank offset fill delivery points, the
placement of final macadam layer and forecourt surface, and main ID signage and
fascia signage to complete a fuel filling station previously approved under
permissions reg. ref. no. 19/1699 (ABP-306850-20) and reg. ref. no. 20/1799 (ABP-
310047-21).
(ii) Permission to omit condition 3 of permission reg. ref. no. 06/3886 (ABP
PL07.221318), as extended pursuant to reg. ref. nos. 12/1428, 17/1699 and
21/2091. Condition 3, inter alia, limits the occupation of any building or dwelling
until the onsite wastewater treatment plant has been commissioned.
8. The developer lodged a planning application with the planning authority, Galway County
Council, in or around 4 May 2023 (planning reg. ref. no. 23/177). The application documentation
included a cover letter/report which addressed the planning history of the site and water/wastewater
connection agreed with Uisce Éireann (UE), a copy of the site notice, an appropriate assessment
(AA) screening report, UE connection orders and a series of drawings, including a drawing showing
the connection to public water/wastewater sought to be retained.
9. Whilst submissions/observations were made to the council on the application, including by
Mr Barry McCormack, the applicant did not participate in the planning process before the council.
10. At first instance, the council granted planning permission for the development, subject to
conditions. The council determined that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) was not required
and screened out the development for the purposes of AA.
11. The council’s decision was the subject matter of a number of third-party appeals to the
commission – lodged on 19 July 2023. The applicant did not participate in the appeal process in his
own personal capacity – rather, he acted as an agent for a third party who lodged an appeal, namely
Mr McCormack.
12. The developer responded to the various appeals lodged with the commission and addressed
the grounds of appeal advanced.
13. The commission appointed an inspector to consider the appeals and prepare a report on
same. In this respect, the inspector carried out a site inspection on 3 May 2024 and thereafter
prepared a report, dated 21 May 2024, which recommended that permission be granted for the
proposed development, subject to conditions.
14. The commission’s direction (BD-016568-24) (ABP-317614-23), dated 13 June 2024,
outlined that the commission considered the submissions on file and decided to “grant permission
generally in accordance with the inspector’s recommendation” for specified reasons and
considerations.
15. The impugned commission order (ABP-317614-23), dated 17 June 2024, detailed that:
“Having regard to the Galway County Development Plan 2022-2028, and the scale and
nature of the proposed development, and the pattern of existing and permitted development
in the area, it is considered that, subject to compliance with the conditions set out below,
the proposed development would not seriously injure the amenities of property in the
vicinity, would not be prejudicial to public health and would be acceptable in terms of traffic
safety and visual amenity. The proposed development would, therefore, be in accordance
with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”
16. The commission’s order included a series of conditions – including condition 2 (which
disapplied condition 3 of the parent permission), condition 6 and condition 13.
Procedural history
17. The applicant issued his statement of grounds and verifying affidavit on 9 August 2024, and
was granted leave to apply for judicial review on 9 September 2024.
18. The applicant issued his notice of motion, returnable to 14 October 2024.
19. The commission issued its opposition papers on 28 October 2025.
20. The notice party has not participated in these proceedings (no opposition papers have been
filed).
21. On 12 January 2026, the matter was given a hearing date of 27 April 2026.
22. The matter was listed for callover on 20 April 2026.
23. The matter was listed for hearing on 27 April 2026. Judgment was reserved at the end of
that hearing. I would like to record my thanks to the applicant and to all of the lawyers involved on
the opposing side for their unfailingly courteous, professional and helpful assistance. As I have
previously sought to make clear, insofar as any points advanced are not being accepted in this or
any other given judgment, that is solely to do with the inherent merits of such points and is no
reflection on those making or instructed to convey such points, a distinction that most certainly
should be, and I believe generally is in fact, self-evident to all concerned.
24. On 29 April 2026, a draft of the present judgment was sent to the parties to give an
opportunity to identify any errors. The rules of engagement in such a situation are that the draft is
without prejudice to the right of the court ultimately to issue a judgment in whatever form or with
whatever content it considers appropriate.
25. Any comments must be emailed to the court and uploaded to ShareFile in writing by the
notified deadline, and should not be to reargue the substance (submissions to that effect will be
disregarded) but are confined to matters such as:
(i) informing the court as to whether a formal judgment is required, and if so on what
issues;
(ii) informing the court as to whether a judgment might be oral or written or partly in
both modes;
(iii) any typographical, factual or legal errors in the decision;
(iv) any redaction of personal information that the party wishes to request;
(v) in the event that the court proposes to place pivotal reliance on any authority or
material not previously adverted to, as opposed to where such material merely
reinforces a point that the court was making in any event, any comment as to why
such material should not lead to the proposed conclusion; identifying points that the
court proposes to address but that the parties consider it unnecessary to address;
(vi) requesting the court to decide a point that, while unnecessary to decide, is one the
party considers could beneficially be decided;
(vii) identifying significant procedural, factual or legal points that the party considers that
the court was required to address but has not addressed or not provided reasons
for; and
(viii) any other suggestions as to the wording (as opposed to substance) of the decision
if the proposed wording causes any significant issue for a party for any identified
reason.
26. It is then entirely a matter for the court as to whether to list the matter for mention, or
whether to simply give judgment with or without amendment to respond to any such comments or
for any other reason that appears appropriate to the court. Any judgment may be given without
further notice following the expiry of the specified period, whether comments are made or not. That
period will not be extended save in exceptional circumstances. All parties involved are required to
positively confirm to the court the position including if they have no observations on the draft
legitimately falling within the foregoing parameters. Overall the draft judgment procedure is a
concession which parties can engage with but must do so with immediate dispatch, discipline and
focus – it is not the opening of a new phase of the litigation that gives rise to “an entitlement to
elaborate procedures at every point” (to use a phrase of O’Donnell C.J. (Dunne, Charleton and Baker
JJ. concurring) in O’Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 (Unreported, Supreme
Court, 10 May 2023) at para. 39); and still less should the procedure invite the perhaps “serious
error, to which lawyers are prone, to approach any such case on the tacit assumption that only
procedures which approximate to a criminal trial are fair, and anything which departs from that is
somehow dubious” (O’Donnell J. in O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75,
[2017] 3 I.R. 751, [2018] 1 I.L.R.M. 245, 780).
27. Draft judgments are not public domain materials and, while they can be shared between the
lawyers concerned and their clients, subject to the following, it is inappropriate for any person to
refer to them for any purpose other than to assist the court in relation to the finalisation of the
formal judgment. Therefore anyone with information as to the text, content or proposed outcome
of any draft is required not to publish or transmit such information to others save solely by way of
private transmission for the legitimate purposes of assisting in the finalisation of the judgment and
subject to a similar restriction on any recipient. Trial participants should take reasonable steps to
keep drafts confidential. On this topic, see Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58,
[2022] 1 W.L.R. 367, [24/01/2022] T.L.R. 1 which discusses why restriction on publication of draft
judgments is in the interests of the administration of justice; see also Baigent v. Random House
Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 (Ch), [2006] 5 WLUK 45, (2006) 150 S.J.L.B. 603 (Smith J.); R.
(Counsel General for Wales) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
[2022] EWCA Civ 181, [2022] 1 W.L.R. 1915, [2022] 4 All E.R. 599 (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR; Davies
and Dingemans LJJ. concurring); Public Institution for Social Security v. Banque Pictet & Cie SA and
others [2022] EWCA Civ 368, [2022] 3 WLUK 291, [2022] B.L.R. 349 (Carr LJ; Jackson and Simler
LJJ. concurring); Itkin v. Wood [2023] JRC 101 (Unreported, Royal Court of Jersey, 22 June 2023).
The contents of this paragraph constitute an immediately effective direction of the court to the
parties and anyone having notice of the draft judgment with effect from the date of circulation of
the draft.
28. The deadline for such comments from the parties was to be 16:00 on Tuesday 5 May 2026.
Neither of the participating parties had any comments.
Relief sought
29. The reliefs sought are as follows:
“1. By virtue of Order 84 Rule 20 to grant me the relief of leave to apply for Judicial
Review based on the facts listed in this grounding statement, my verifying affidavit and
exhibits herein.
2. Such declaration(s) of the legal rights and/or legal position of the applicant and
persons similarly situated and/or of the legal duties and/or legal position of the Respondent
as the Court considers appropriate.
3. An order of certiorari overturning the Order made by the Respondent on the 17th
day of June 2024 to grant permission and retention permission in appeal ABP-317614-23
(planning application 23/177).
4. A declaration that all development on the subject land is unauthorised development
by virtue of condition No. 3 of the Respondent’s decision in PL 07.221318.
5. A declaration that the Respondent failed to confirm compliance with conditions of
permission 21/2091 or to recognise that the works carried out after 31st December 2021
are unauthorised development requiring regularisation not included in the application.
6. A declaration that the Respondent erred regarding unauthorised development and
failed to identify that an unauthorised development complaint was made by the Applicant on
the 26th July 2023.
7. A declaration that the prior connection of a foul sewer to public wastewater
infrastructure at R358 College Road is unauthorised development.
8. A declaration that the red line boundary does not include the unauthorised foul sewer
which is sought to be retained and therefore cannot be considered in this appeal.
9. A declaration that the Respondent failed to recognise that by virtue of s.34 (12) that
the Planning Authority was precluded from validating and, thereafter, considering the
retention application 23/177, in circumstances where an environment impact assessment
and/or an appropriate assessment was required in respect of likely significant impacts from
the connection of the foul sewer on a connected European site or sites.
10. A declaration that the Respondent was precluded from considering a retention
permission for a connection to public wastewater infrastructure at R358 College Road in
circumstances where an environment impact assessment and/or an appropriate assessment
was required in respect of likely significant impacts from the connection of the foul sewer on
a connected European site or sites.
11. A Declaration that the Respondent did not consider, or properly consider, its
jurisdiction to carry out an appeal, with particular regard to Articles 19(1) (c), 19(4), 23(1)
(a), 26(3), 26(4) of S.I. No. 600/2001 - Planning and Development Regulations, 2001 as
amended, and sections 34(1) and 34(12) of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 as
amended.
12. A declaration that the Respondent did not have regard, or proper regard, to 3rd
party submissions which identified issues which constitute the grounds for this application.
13. A declaration that this application and appeal is an impermissible collateral attack
on conditions in permission (06/3886) PL 07.221318 and 21/2091.
14. A Declaration that the costs of the proceedings are covered by s.50B of the 2000
Act or should be measured on a not prohibitively expensive (‘NPE’) basis or, in the
alternative, a declaration that section 3 of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
2011 apply to these proceedings.
15. Such further Orders as the Court deems appropriate.
16. Liberty to apply.
17. The costs of the within proceedings.”
Grounds of challenge
30. The core grounds of challenge are as follows:
“Core Grounds:
1. Domestic Law Grounds:
1. The impugned decision is unlawful because the Respondent failed to carry out its
statutory duty to correctly assess the application for Environmental Impact Assessment
and/or Appropriate Assessment in accordance with s. 172(b), s.173(1), 177U(1),(2),
(4),(6),(8),(9), 177V(1),(2),(3) PDA, Regulations 4,5,6,8 of S.I. No. 272 of 2009 EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES (SURFACE WATERS) REGULATIONS 2009,
R42 S.I. No. 477 of 2011 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (BIRDS AND NATURAL HABITATS)
REGULATIONS 2011, R4&5 S.I. No. 272/2009 — European Communities Environmental
Objectives (Surface Waters) Regulations.
2. The impugned decision is unlawful because the Respondent failed to consider, or
properly consider, whether the existing wastewater loading, and the proposed loading,
required Environmental Impact Assessment and/or Appropriate Assessment given the
recognised hydraulic connectivity with European sites through the wastewater network. If,
as I believe, EIA and/or AA is required then, by virtue of s.34 (12), s.37 (7) and s.37 (8) of
the PDA, the decision maker must invalidate the application. This argument is strongly
supported by the decision of the Respondent to include condition No. 3 in the parent
permission PL 07.221318.
3. The impugned decision is unlawful because the Respondent neglected to assess the
wastewater loading or the impacts of that wastewater loading on the environment. The
Respondent failed in its duty prescribed in Regulation 43 of S.I. No. 684/2007 - Waste Water
Discharge (Authorisation) Regulations 2007 which mandates consideration of proposals
involving wastewater loadings by the Respondent (see regulation 43 at paragraph 15
herein).
4. The impugned decision is irrational in that the Respondent considered matters which
are irrelevant and did not consider relevant and important planning and environmental
matters raised by 3rd parties. The Respondent failed to have mandatory regard, or proper
regard, to 3rd party submissions as required in s.34 (3) PDA.
Core Grounds:
2. European Law Grounds:
5. The impugned decision is invalid because it contravenes A1,A4,A14 of the Water
Framework Directive 2000/60/EC and A1,A3,A4,A6,A11, of the EIA Directive 2011/92/EU as
amended by DIRECTIVE 2014/52/EU and A6(3) Habitats Directive 92 / 43 / EEC.
Core Grounds:
3. Legislative Validity Grounds
6. The impugned decision Exhibit MD1 is unlawful because the application is not in
compliance with Regulations 19(1) (c), 19(4), 23(1) (a), 26(3), 26(4) of S.I. No. 600/2001
- Planning and Development Regulations, 2001 as amended (PDR). Compliance with
statutory regulations is mandatory and non-compliance precludes a planning decision as
prescribed in s.34 (1) Planning and Development Act 2000 (PDA). The Respondent neglected
to consider, or properly consider, its jurisdiction to carry out an appeal in circumstances
where the original application is an invalid application.
7. The appeal decision of the Respondent is invalid as all development on the
application site is subject to condition No. 3 of a previous appeal decision in PL 07.221318
(the ‘parent permission’) Exhibit MD2 which precluded development until the planning
authority confirms in writing the commencement of works to upgrade the wastewater
treatment plant. S.160 and s.162 PDA apply to the unauthorised connection to the public
wastewater sewer.
8. The impugned decision is invalid because it is an impermissible collateral challenge
to an extant planning decision PL 07.221318. It is an abuse of process. If the Respondent
wished to ‘omit Condition No. 3 of permission Reg. Ref. No. 06/3886 (ABP PL07.221318 as
extended pursuant to Reg. Ref. Nos. 12/1428, 17/1699 and 21/2091’ it should have
judicially reviewed the original decision or any of the three s.42 extension of durations
decided in the interim. Exhibit MD3.”
31. The statement of case states that the following are not being pursued: reliefs 5 & 6 and
European law grounds 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. Also, references to EIA are not being
pursued and thus can be ignored.
The impugned decision
32. The impugned decision involves 6 elements – 4 elements of retention of previous
developments, one new grant of permission and the amendment of a previous grant.
33. It provides as follows:
“An Bord Pleanala
Board Order ABP-317614-23
Planning and Development Acts 2000 to 2022 Planning Authority: Galway County Council
Planning Register Reference Number: 23/177
Appeal by Liam Madden of Vitruvius Hibernicus, Convent Road, Longford, County Longford
and by Barry McCormack care of Michael J. Duffy of 1 Clos na hEaglaise, Kilfenora, County
Clare against the decision made on the 27th day of June, 2023 by Galway County Council to
grant subject to conditions a permission to Cahermorris Developments Limited care of Kieran
O'Malley and Company Limited of 2 Priory Office Park, Stillorgan Road, Blackrock, County
Dublin in accordance with plans and particulars lodged with the said Council:
Proposed Development: (1) Retention of works carried out since 31 December 2021
including the construction of the staff room, meeting room and plant room at first floor level
(121.5 square metres gross floor area), external plant and elevations, canopy, trolley rack,
building fit-out, signage, soft and hard landscaping, surface car park and all associated works
to complete the supermarket previously approved at register reference number 20/384
(ABP-308213-20); (2) Retention of works carried out since 31 December 2021 at the fuel
filling station including the formation of the site accesses and forecourt layout, the
construction of a boundary wall and footpaths, lighting, soft and hard landscaping and all
associated works previously approved at permission register reference number 19/1699
(ABP-306850-20); (3) Retention of a two-storey building (514 square metres gross floor
area to serve the fuel filling station comprising (i) a retail shop (100 square metres net retail
floor area); (ii) hot food/deli counter and seating area (126 square metres total floor area)
to include the sale of hot and cold food for consumption on and off the premises, cold room,
store, lift and ATM all at ground floor level; (iii) overflow seating, toilets, staff room, cash
office and storage at first floor level and all associated works previously approved at register
reference number 20/1799 (ABP-310047-21); (4) Retention of the connections to water and
wastewater infrastructure at R358 College Road (pursuant to Irish Water Connection
Reference CDS1900364701) to serve the supermarket and fuel filling station; (5) Permission
for the construction of works including the installation of the pump islands, pumps and
forecourt canopy, delivery set down area, service bay fit out, tank offset fill delivery points,
the placement of final macadam layer and forecourt surface, main ID signage and fascia
signage, and all associated works necessary to complete the fuel filling station previously
approved at permissions register reference number 19/1699 (ABP-306850-20) and register
reference number 20/1799 (ABP-310047-21); and (6) to omit condition number 3 of
permission register refence number 06/3886 (ABP PL 07.221318) as extended pursuant to
register reference numbers 12/1428, 17/1699 and 21/2091, all on an approximate 1.27
hectare site at Treanrevagh, Mountbellew, County Galway.
Decision
GRANT permission for the above proposed development in accordance with the said plans
and particulars based on the reasons and considerations under and subject to the conditions
set out below.
Reasons and Considerations
Having regard to the Galway County Development Plan 2022 -2028, and the scale and nature
of the proposed development, and the pattern of existing and permitted development in the
area, it is considered that, subject to compliance with the conditions set out below, the
proposed development would not seriously injure the amenities of property in the vicinity,
would not be prejudicial to public health and would be acceptable in terms of traffic safety
and visual amenity. The proposed development would, therefore, be in accordance with the
proper planning and sustainable development of the area.
Conditions
1. The development shall be carried out and completed in accordance with the plans
and particulars lodged with the application, except as may otherwise be required in order to
comply with the following conditions. Where such conditions require details to be agreed
with the planning authority, the developer shall agree such details in writing with the
planning authority prior to commencement of development and the development shall be
carried out and completed in accordance with the agreed particulars.
Reason: In the interest of clarity.
2. (a) This Order relates to the retention works already carried out and the
proposed works illustrated by drawing reference DWG.3 and entitled Proposed Site Layout
to be Retained and Completed and related plans and elevations, and the connections to
water and wastewater infrastructure at R358 set out within the ownership details illustrated
by drawing entitled Land Registry Compliant Map and detailed in drawing number 3021
entitled Proposed Site Layout proposed Drainage and Watermain Layout.
(b) Condition number 3 of permission granted under appeal reference number PL
07.221318/planning register reference number 06/3886 shall not apply to the elements of
the overall development proposed for retention and proposed development under this grant
of permission.
Reason: In the interest of clarity.
3. All lighting within the site shall be directed and cowled so as not to interfere with
passing traffic or the adjoining residential properties.
Reason: In the interest of residential amenity and traffic safety.
4. Details including samples of the materials, colours and textures of all the external
finishes to the proposed structures shall be submitted to, and agreed in writing with, the
planning authority prior to commencement of development.
Reason: In the interest of protecting the character of the area.
5. A comprehensive boundary/entrance treatment and landscaping scheme shall be
submitted to and agreed in writing with the planning authority. This scheme shall include
the following: -
(a) details of boundary/entrance treatments along the southern boundary of the site
adjoining the public road, including heights, materials and finishes; and
(b) Details of boundary treatments and landscaping measures for the remainder of the
site.
Upon receipt of written agreement from the planning authority the developer shall fully
implement the approved details within six months unless otherwise agreed in writing with
the planning authority.
Reason: In the interest of visual amenity and traffic safety.
6. Drainage arrangements, including the disposal of surface water, shall comply with
the requirements of the planning authority for such works and services. No surface water
from the proposed development, shall discharge onto the public road or adjoining properties.
Drainage details shall be submitted to and agreed in writing with the planning authority,
within six months of the date of this Order, and the developer shall submit written
confirmation, accompanied by photographs, to demonstrate that said works have been
satisfactorily undertaken.
Reason: To ensure adequate servicing of the development, and to prevent pollution.
7. The road works associated with the proposed development, including the setting out
of the entrances, paving and surface finishes, shall be carried out and completed in
accordance with the requirements of the planning authority. Pedestrian crossing facilities
shall be provided at all junctions. Prior to commencement of development, full details of
works to the public road and public realm shall be submitted to and agreed in writing with
the planning authority. All works shall be carried out at the developers' expense.
Reason: In the interest of traffic safety and orderly development.
8. Site development and building works shall be carried out only between the hours of
0800 to 1900 Mondays to Fridays inclusive, between 0800 hours to 1400 hours on Saturdays
and not at all on Sundays and public holidays. Deviation from these times will only be
allowed in exceptional circumstances where prior written approval has been received from
the planning authority.
Reason: In order to safeguard the residential amenities of property in the vicinity.
9. At least one Rapid EV charging point shall be provided at a suitable location within
the site and shall be operational prior to commencement of operation of the proposed filling
station. Details of the location of this facility shall be submitted to and agreed in writing
with the planning authority prior to commencement of development.
Reason: In order to provide for an appropriate standard of development.
10. The site shall be used as a petrol filling station and no part shall be used for the sale,
display, or repair of motor vehicles.
Reason: In the interest of protecting the amenities of the area.
!1. No advertisement or advertisement structure, other than those shown on the
drawings submitted with the application, shall be erected or displayed on the canopy on the
forecourt building or anywhere within the curtilage of the site, unless authorised by a further
grant of planning permission.
Reason: In the interest of visual amenity.
12. The hours of operation of petrol forecourt shall be between 0700 hours and 2300
hours.
Reason: In the interest of the residential amenities of property in the vicinity.
13. The developer shall enter into water and/or wastewater connection agreement(s)
with Uisce Eireann, prior to commencement of development.
Reason: In the interest of public health.
14. All service cables associated with the proposed development (such as electrical,
television, telephone and public lighting cables) shall be run underground within the site.
Reason: In the interest of the visual amenities of the area.
15. The construction of the development shall be managed in accordance with a
Construction Management Plan, which shall be submitted to, and agreed in writing with, the
planning authority prior to commencement of development. This plan shall provide details
of intended construction practice for the development, including noise management
measures and off-site disposal of construction/demolition waste.
Reason: In the interests of public safety and residential amenity.
16. Prior to commencement of development, a Resource Waste Management Plan
(RWMP) as set out in the EPA's Best Practice Guidelines for the Preparation of Resource and
Waste Management Plans for Construction and Demolition Projects (2021) shall be prepared
and submitted to the planning authority for written agreement. The RWMP shall include
specific proposals as to how the RWMP will be measured and monitored for effectiveness.
All records (including for waste and all resources) pursuant to the agreed RWMP shall be
made available for inspection at the site office at all times.
Reason: In the interest of reducing waste and encouraging recycling.
17. The developer shall pay to the planning authority a financial contribution in respect
of public infrastructure and facilities benefiting development in the area of the planning
authority that is provided or intended to be provided by or on behalf of the authority in
accordance with the terms of the Development Contribution Scheme made under section 48
of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended. The contribution shall be paid
prior to commencement of development or in such phased payments as the planning
authority may facilitate and shall be subject to any applicable indexation provisions of the
Scheme at the time of payment. Details of the application of the terms of the Scheme shall
be agreed between the planning authority and the developer or, in default of such
agreement, the matter shall be referred to An Bord Pleanala to determine the proper
application of the terms of the Scheme.
Reason: It is a requirement of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended, that a
condition requiring a contribution in accordance with the Development Contribution Scheme
made under section 48 of the Act be applied to the permission.”
Preliminary issues
34. The parties’ positions on preliminary issues as recorded in the statement of case are
summarised as follows:
“Applicant’s Position
29. None raised in the Statement of Grounds.
Commission’s Position
30. Issue 1: The Applicant lacks ‘sufficient interest’/standing to maintain these
proceedings and same should therefore be dismissed. The Applicant did not participate in
the planning process before the Council and has not explained this non-participation. The
Applicant was engaged as an agent for a third-party appeal – he cannot derive standing
from his principal. Otherwise, the Applicant made no submission to the Commission in his
own personal capacity and has not explained this omission. The Applicant does not reside
in proximity to the development and is not affected by same. The Applicant has not
demonstrated, in respect of the development, that he had/has legitimate interest in relation
to the protection of the environment or amenity insofar as same may be impacted by same.
31. Issue 2: Insofar as the within proceedings seek, in substance (via a series of
Declarations), this Honourable Court to find that the Developer is responsible for and/or has
carried out unauthorised development (see, for example Reliefs sought at §D(4)), this is not
permissible or appropriate – such relief can only be sought via proceedings under s.160 of
the PDA.
32. Issue 3: By way of general objection, the Applicant’s complaints are, in many
instances, not properly pleaded – comprising generic citations of Articles of various EU
Directives (see for example SoG, §12-§19) without making any attempt to plead/link same
to any infirmity in the Commission’s Decision. Equally, the complaints generally fail to refer
to the evidence actually before the Commission. For example, in the context of AA, no
reference is made to the Developer’s AA Screening Report – which supported the
Commission’s findings. This is perhaps best illustrated by the complete failure of the
Applicant to exhibit many of the documents relevant to the Commission’s Decision, including
the Developer’s application/appeal documents.”
35. Section 50(3) and (4) of the 2000 Act provides:
“(3) The Court shall not grant section 50 leave unless it is satisfied that—
(a) there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision or act concerned is
invalid or ought to be quashed,
(b) (i) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter which is the subject of the
application, or
(ii) where the decision or act concerned relates to a development identified in or
under regulations made under section 176, for the time being in force, as being
development which may have significant effects on the environment, the
applicant—
(I) is a body or organisation (other than a State authority, a public
authority or governmental body or agency) the aims or objectives of which
relate to the promotion of environmental protection,
(II) has, during the period of 12 months preceding the date of the
application, pursued those aims or objectives, and
(III) satisfies such requirements (if any) as a body or organisation, if it
were to make an appeal under section 37(4)(c), would have to satisfy by
virtue of section 37(4)(d)(iii) (and, for this purpose, any requirement
prescribed under section 37(4)(e)(iv) shall apply as if the reference in it to
the class of matter into which the decision, the subject of the appeal, falls
were a reference to the class of matter into which the decision or act, the
subject of the application for section 50 leave, falls), and
(c) the applicant has exhausted any available appeal procedures or any other administrative
remedy available to him or her in respect of the decision or act concerned.
(4) A sufficient interest for the purposes of subsection (3)(b)(i) is not limited to an interest
in land or other financial interest.”
36. Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011
on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment as
amended by directive 2014/52/EU (the EIA directive) does not protect wide access to justice for “the
public”, but only “the public concerned”, which it defines in art. 1(2)(e) as follows:
“‘public concerned’ means the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest
in, the environmental decision-making procedures referred to in Article 2(2). For the
purposes of this definition, non-governmental organisations promoting environmental
protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an
interest”
37. Article 11 states (emphasis added):
“Article 11
1. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with the relevant national legal system,
members of the public concerned:
(a) having a sufficient interest, or alternatively;
(b) maintaining the impairment of a right, where administrative procedural law of a Member
State requires this as a precondition;
have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial
body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions,
acts or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of this Directive.
2. Member States shall determine at what stage the decisions, acts or omissions may be
challenged.
3. What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be
determined by the Member States, consistently with the objective of giving the public
concerned wide access to justice. To that end, the interest of any non-governmental
organisation meeting the requirements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be deemed sufficient
for the purpose of point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article. Such organisations shall also be
deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of point (b) of paragraph
1 of this Article.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not exclude the possibility of a preliminary review
procedure before an administrative authority and shall not affect the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative review procedures prior to recourse to judicial review
procedures, where such a requirement exists under national law.
Any such procedure shall be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.
5. In order to further the effectiveness of the provisions of this Article, Member States shall
ensure that practical information is made available to the public on access to administrative
and judicial review procedures.”
38. This only applies to decisions subject to participation – that covers the substantive EIA, not
EIA screening as here.
39. The applicant has not challenged the validity of s. 50(3) by reference to the EIA directive
but even if he had that would not get off the ground in a mere screening case.
40. The applicant’s response in relation to standing is to rely on the following:
(i) lack of a lawful site notice;
(ii) making submissions in other cases;
(iii) the Aarhus Convention;
(iv) the fact that he says he uses the River Suck water body downriver for recreational
purposes;
(v) the Grace and Sweetman decision; and
(vi) his general interest in municipal wastewater treatment plants.
41. The site notice issue could be a valid basis for non-participation if there was an illegality in
the site notice and a proven causal link between that and the failure to make submissions, but there
is no illegality so this excuse does not arise (see further below). Nor is there satisfactory evidence
that would have established that he would have seen the notice but for the issue complained of.
42. Grace and Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IESC 10, [2020] 3 I.R. 286 and the
statutory scheme envisaged by s. 50(3) of the 2000 Act can be summarised by saying that standing
is conferred by:
(i) participation in the process (including where the applicant would have participated
but for a failure to give due notice of the administrative procedure);
(ii) being affected by the project having regard to factors such as proximate distance
from it and/or the nature of the project or the need for special protection of the
receiving environment; or
(iii) being an environmental NGO.
43. The applicant clearly satisfies none of these elements. If his various arguments were to be
accepted as conferring standing we would be very close to an actio popularis.
44. The use of the River Suck – 133 km long – in some unspecified way is far too remote from
any impacts of any single project. In any event there is no meaningful evidential foundation for this
point.
45. One particularly sub-optimal feature of this case is that the commission’s order specifically
records that the applicant’s role was acting on behalf of the appellants against the planning authority
decision. The reference is to the appellants “care of” the very applicant who now seeks relief by
way of judicial review. It is generally (and here) inappropriate for an agent to turn around and seek
to assert a substantive entitlement to challenge a decision in his or her own right.
46. Turning to the other preliminary issues, the declaratory reliefs are either an attempt to
circumvent or otherwise avoid the necessity to invoke the normal and appropriate statutory
procedures for determining whether unauthorised development has occurred (e.g., s. 160 of the
2000 Act – so judicial review is not the most appropriate remedy in any event) or a collateral attack
on the validity of the planning permission. Where other relief is relied on in substance to impugn an
individual decision the challenge of which is subject to statutory restrictions, the challenge to the
measure of general application is also subject to such restrictions: Nawaz v. Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 58, [2013] 1 I.R. 142 (per Clarke J.; Fennelly, O’Donnell,
McKechnie, MacMenamin JJ. concurring).
47. The complaints about unauthorised development which was regularised by the impugned
decision insofar as it allowed retention are an absolutely classic example of the application of the
Nawaz doctrine. A court could not grant the declarations sought in that regard without indirectly
casting doubt on the validity of the retention permission.
48. Furthermore, and perhaps even more fundamentally, the commission was not purporting to
determine (nor could it) whether existing development was unauthorised. That is not its role either
generally or in an application of this type. Hence judicial review of the commission’s decision is not
an appropriate vehicle in any event to challenge an issue on which it did not opine.
49. Complaints about the developer’s conduct do not properly arise from the facts. Complaints
regarding the development plan (albeit made in somewhat muted terms) are a collateral challenge
that cannot be raised without having joined the council.
50. If the declarations are to be read as purely historical – i.e., that the developments were
unauthorised prior to being regularised – that is academic and pointless, and potentially such a
waste of scarce court resources as to warrant consideration of s. 50B(3) of the 2000 Act.
51. As regards pleadings, the applicant’s pleadings are generally inadequate and largely consist
of generic recitations of general principles without an attempt to provide a route-map between any
complaint and the specific relief sought via the detailed facts. This echoes points previously made
in Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 27 September
2024) and Duffy v. Minister for Housing [2026] IEHC 46 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 30
January 2026). I do appreciate how difficult it must be for a litigant in person to navigate the
minefields of planning law, but unfortunately the same rules of engagement about pleadings apply
to all litigants.
52. As the commission correctly points out in submissions, “‘[r]ecital of high-level principles
does not create certiorari by osmosis – an applicant must specify a route-map connecting the
particular factual problem alleged with the particular relief sought via a chain of reasoning’ –
Cummins v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 521 (§44(iv)); and Ballyboden Tidy Towns v An Bord
Pleanála [2021] IEHC 648 (§20)”.
53. So I would dismiss the proceedings at the outset on the foregoing bases individually or
collectively. If I am wrong about that I will go on to consider the merits.
54. As follows from the above in any event, the applicant’s statement of grounds is unstructured
in that the core grounds do not align with the particulars set out. The parties’ position are thus set
out by reference to the issues raised in line with the agreed statement of case.
Domestic law issues
Issue 1 – condition 3 of the parent permission & related complaints
55. The pleaded complaints are at §7-§8, §11, §21-§23, §27 and §29-§35.
56. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:
“Applicant’s Position
35. Condition No. 3 of the parent permission in unambiguous. It states that no
construction shall begin and no house or building shall be occupied until confirmation that
the wwtp is commissioned.
36. The planning decision ABP-306850-20, which permitted the subject development,
the details of which did not seek a connection to the public sewer and therefore the AA
screening carried out by the Inspector in that application did not consider impacts of a
wastewater connection to the sewer.
37. The Inspector’s commentary in 7.6.2 is misdirected. The application specifically
seeks (retention) to omit condition No. 3 of the parent permission. This AA screening or any
previous AA screening does not consider likely impacts on European Sites from the foul water
connection proposed to be retained. The sole reason for Condition No. 3 of the parent
permission was to protect connected European Sites and surface waters. That connectivity
was recognised by the Inspector in respect of surface water discharging from the
development.
38. In paragraph 7.6.3 the Inspector refers to the details of this application but does not
refer to the wastewater connection. Wastewater arising is not mentioned anywhere in the
AA screening.
39. The Inspector (and the Commission) misdirected themselves by screening out Stage
2 AA in circumstances where there is identified connectivity to European Sites via the
overloaded wwtp which the Commission (Board) recognised and precluded since 2007.
40. The de minimis volume of wastewater defence now offered is not relevant when no
assessment in that regard was made.
41. For completeness in paragraph 7.3.5 the Inspector refers to the difference in
volumes of wastewater vis-a-vis that intended, and precluded, in the parent permission. This
argument is unsustainable in circumstances where a proper AA must take account of
cumulative or in-combination impacts. There were three subsequent planning applications,
on the remainder of the same lands the subject of the parent permission. This is analogous
to project splitting.
Commission’s Position
42. These are, in substance, the AA complaints pleaded at §1-§2, §5, §9, §19, §24, §28
which in fact Mr Duffy says below.
43. Whereas the Applicant has complaints what is said to be unauthorised development,
it is to be recalled that is the essence of a retention application – it arises because
development did not have permission.
44. In any event, the Inspector (inter alia, §7.6 and Appendix 2), with whom the
Commission agreed, determined that there was no need for AA – same was screened out.
The conclusions reached in this respect aligned with the Developer’s AA Screening Report
and the Council’s AA Screening conclusions. In screening out AA, the Inspector’s reasons
included, inter alia: the small scale and urban nature of the development; the location and
long distance from the nearest European Site and lack of connections; and the evidence
presented, including from the Council.
45. The Applicant does not engage with any of this rationale in his pleaded challenge
nor indeed the evidence all of which positively dealt with the lack of need for an AA. In
particular, the Developer’s AA Screening Report described the possible pathways to
European sites, and explained why there was a lack of impacts predicted. The only factual
basis for making this complaint that the Applicant relies on is that Condition 3 of the Parent
Permission was not applied to the development before the Commission. But this does not
evidence any flaw in the AA Screening. The point is that the works for which retention are
sought or permission sought (i.e. the fit out) were already considered in prior applications
and, as the AA Screening Report made clear, all relevant mitigation had already been
constructed and was in place. Hence the matters for which permission was sought here,
simply do not bring about a need for AA. This is all fully reasoned in the AA Screening
Report. The Applicant’s point, however, seems to be that there had to be AA by reason of
the connection to the wastewater systems as agreed to by Irish Water / Uisce Eireann.
46. Two fatal difficulties present for the Applicant in respect of his AA complaints:
(i) The pleadings are entirely inadequate for the purposes of advancing an AA
complaint. The Applicant does not identify any specific European Site in respect of which
these AA complaints are said to relate. Moreover, the pleadings say nothing about any
relevant Conservation Objectives or Qualifying Interests. A similar approach adopted by this
Applicant was dismissed in – Duffy v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558. This is particularly
significant given the distances involved in this case.
(ii) Noting the applicable standard of proof – that of a reasonable expert (per Reid) –
the Applicant has failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating any error in the
Commission’s AA Screening decision.
(iii) This is all particularly important where the unchallenged evidence is that the loading
into the wastewater system from the matters the subject matter of this permission are
actually less than what was in place previously. In essence, the Applicant’s case amounts
to saying that a party who obtains agreement to connect to an existing wastewater
connection with a lower PE than before (therefore improving matters, at least from this
perspective) has to carry out a full AA simply because one is connecting to a wastewater
system which the Applicant says (and has not proven in this case) is overloaded, but without
engaging at all with how that connects to concerns about habitats.
47. Insofar as the Applicant makes a related complaint regarding s.34(12) of the PDA,
same is misconceived. On the facts, the development was not required to be subject to AA
and the Applicant has not established anything to the contrary.”
57. The initial reason why this point fails is that the pleading is wholly inadequate. Pleading
requirements are particularly acute in complex matters of EU law (see Concerned Residents of
Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported,
Supreme Court, Murray J., 4 July 2024)), and an applicant cannot simply cite AA or other directives
at a high level but fail to identify the allegedly affected European site or engage with its conservation
objectives or qualifying interests.
58. If I am wrong about that, the applicant has in any event failed to discharge the burden of
proof to show that the AA screening was flawed. The terms of what the applicant calls the parent
permission are not preclusive of the legality of the commission’s decision here.
59. The applicant incorrectly uses the language of a “collateral attack” on a previous decision,
but that misunderstands the concept. The fact of a previous decision being in place does not preclude
an administrative decision-taker from making a further decision, which may in principle amend a
previous decision, which happened here.
60. The commission in any event had reasons for not applying condition 3 to this development.
As pointed out by the commission in submissions, “Condition 3 of the Parent Permission was not
applied to the development before the Commission because the evidence before the Commission
outlined that the public water/wastewater infrastructure had been determined by UE to have capacity
to facilitate the connection and a connection was so made”. As the commission points out, “UE is
the body responsible for such infrastructure and a body which is presumed will act/acted lawfully
(Duffy v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 (inter alia, §51)”.
61. The overall unreality to this point is that the impact of this development was deemed to be
less than that originally envisaged in the parent permission.
Issue 2 – validity of the planning application
62. The pleaded complaints are at §6 and §25.
63. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:
“Applicant’s Position
48. I say that there are two indisputable issues of invalidity of this application. Firstly
the evidence of three planning applications on these lands within a 6 month window without
flagging subsequent applications with site notices of a different colour as prescribed in
legislation.
49. Secondly, these site notices, evident in Planner’s Reports, are erected other than in
a public place. They were erected within the redline boundary on private lands which did not
require any letter of consent from the PA which would have been the case if this was a public
road.
50. Once I became aware of this issue I monitored the planning applications and have
submitted in three subsequent applications. Two of these have been refused permission
partly on wastewater grounds and the third is currently under appeal to the Respondent with
a decision date indicated for July 2026.
Commission’s Position
51. The Applicant has, to his credit, clarified his points to two and therefore the
Commission does not deal with anything save these two.
52. On the colour of the site notice, the Applicant says that the Site Notice did not comply
with Art.19(4) of the PDRs because it should have been on a yellow background – contending
that the application site here was the same as the site in planning application 22/1161 and
23/60139. There is no factual substance to this complaint – the two applications referred
to by the Applicant concern a different red-line site.
53. On the second point, he says that the Site Notice was not located ‘in a public place’,
contrary to Art.19. However, this is not what the PDRs require. Rather, the Site Notice is
to be fixed in a conspicuous position on or near the main entrance to the land to be easily
visible and legible by persons using the public road. The evidence before the Commission –
including the Site Layout Plan, Land Registry Compliant Map, the Council’s Planner’s Report
(and photograph therein) and the Developer’s appeal response – highlights that this was
done.”
64. The basic reason why this point fails is that it misunderstands the Planning and Development
Regulations 2001. Subsequent notices need only be in yellow if the application refers to the same
site. The applicant has failed to discharge the onus of proof to demonstrate that. As regards the
second point, the 2001 regulations do not require a site notice to be in a public place. The point is
simply based on a false premise.
EU law issues
Issue 3 – EIA complaints
65. The pleaded complaints are at §1-§2, §5 and §15-§18.
66. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:
“Applicant’s Position
54. I am not pursuing EIA complaints.
Commission’s Position
55. The Commission therefore makes no points here.”
67. These points therefore no longer arise.
Issue 4 – AA complaints
68. The pleaded complaints are at §1-§2, §5, §9, §19, §24 and §28.
69. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:
“Applicant’s Position
56. I am pursuing AA complaints on the lines stated above.
Commission’s Position
[blank – presumably as the position is outlined above]”
70. The basic reason why this point fails is that the applicant has failed to discharge the onus of
proof to demonstrate an inadequacy in the AA screening, as already stated above.
Issue 5 – water / wastewater
71. The pleaded complaints are at §1-§2, §3, §5 and §11-§14.
72. The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows:
“Applicant’s Position
57. As stated I am not pursuing the European Grounds. However I am maintaining that
the Respondent had a duty to comply with Regulation 43 of the Waste Water Discharge
(Authorisation) Regulations 2007 as amended in both AA screening and on the basis of
proper planning and sustainable development.
Commission’s Position
58. These complaints should be dismissed on the basis that similar complaints have
failed and have not been established evidentially, including by reference to the evidence
before the Commission – see An Taisce v An Bord Pleanála (No.1) [2021] IEHC 254,
Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 700; and
Ryanair DAC v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 74. In Salmon Watch Ireland CLG v ALAB
[2024] IEHC 421 (§1096), the Court rejected such complaints as ‘entirely abstract and
theoretical’. The Court noted that ‘while [the Applicant identified] matters not considered
by ALAB, they do not state any basis for the implied premise that those matters required
consideration. They do not lay any basis in particulars or facts for any case for certiorari’.
59. As to the Applicant’s complaint based on Reg.43 the Waste Water Discharge
(Authorisation) Regulations 2007, same was not raised before the Commission and cannot
be maintained now. In any event, the said complaint is misconceived as it is premised on
the unamended version of Reg.43 – Reg.43, as amended, does not apply in this case.
60. In any event, the unchallenged evidence is that the discharge involved here involves
a lower PE than the applied to the connections which are at issue.”
73. The basic reason why this point fails is that the applicant has failed to adequately plead a
breach of law and failed to discharge the onus of proof to show that (a) reg. 43 of the 2007
regulations applies, (b) reg. 43, if it applies, was breached in some identified manner.
74. Compounding this, the application seems to be premised on the original unamended version
of reg. 43 whereas this has in fact been amended twice by S.I. No. 652 of 2016 and S.I. No. 214 of
2020. The provision as amended relates to the interplay between planning and Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) discharge licensing. The applicant has failed to demonstrate evidentially
that there is such an interplay here and indeed there is no evidence of any licensing matter actually
before the EPA that would trigger the provision.
Summary
75. In outline summary, without taking from the more specific terms of this judgment:
(i) it is settled law that an applicant must have sufficient interest or otherwise comply
with s. 50(3) of the 2000 Act;
(ii) applying such law to the facts here, the applicant lacks such interest and does not
otherwise so comply;
(iii) it is settled law that an applicant’s point must be properly pleaded with the
requisite specificity;
(iv) applying such law to the facts here, the applicant has failed to comply with that
requirement;
(v) it is settled law that an applicant must have discharged the onus of proof to
establish all facts necessary for relief; and
(vi) applying such law to the facts here, the applicant has failed to discharge that onus.
Order
76. For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:
(i) the proceedings be dismissed;
(ii) unless any party applies otherwise by the time and in the manner set out below, the
foregoing order be perfected forthwith thereafter on the basis of no order as to costs
(including no order as to any reserved or adjourned costs or costs not otherwise
dealt with);
(iii) the foregoing proposed order be subject to contrary written legal submission or any
consequential application supported by a written legal submission, such submission
to be delivered within 7 days, with replies by other parties within a further 7 days;
(iv) for the avoidance of doubt, any unsuccessful application to vary any provisional
order as to costs proposed in this judgment may be addressed pursuant to O. 103
r. 40(4) RSC; and
(v) the matter be listed at 09:30 on Monday 18 May 2026 to confirm the foregoing.