High Court orders payment of client account funds to plaintiff and grants costs under Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

APPROVED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 27

Record No. 2011/6056P

BETWEEN/

DENIS DOYLE

PLAINTIFF

-AND-

JOE BUCKLEY (PRACTISING UNDER THE STYLE AND TITLE OF J. BUCKLEY

& COMPANY SOLICITORS)

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 14th day of January 2026

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary

1. The context to this application has a protracted and complex litigation history. That history has resulted in a number of judgments and orders of the Superior Courts and rulings of the (then) Taxing Master.

2. The orders and judgments include: orders of the High Court (Murphy J.) on 18th July 2011 and 29th July 2011; Doyle v. Buckley p/a Buckley & Co Solicitors [2013] IEHC

292 (Charleton J.); an order of Kearns P. dated in Doyle v. Buckley (1st July 2015); Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717; Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2023] IECA 288 (Maurice Collins, Haughton and Pilkington JJ, judgment of the court delivered by Collins J.). Here the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court (Binchy J.) refusing Mr. Buckley’s application for a review of a taxation conducted by Taxing Master O’Neill relating to work undertaken by the Defendant as solicitor on behalf of the Plaintiff.

3. Briefly, in the underlying proceedings commenced on 5th July 2011, the Plaintiff inter alia seeks a full account of the deposit of €600,000 paid to the Defendant, as the Plaintiff’s solicitor, by a company called Sandystream Limited (“Sandystream”) for the failed purchase of a property, when Sandystream went into liquidation, together with claims for damages for alleged breach of confidence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary relationship, breach of trust, misrepresentation conversion and detinue. The forfeited deposit was not paid over to the Plaintiff. The Defendant applied most of it (less €35,000 which the parties agreed was to be paid to the liquidator of Sandystream) in the discharge of fees which he alleges were due to him by the Plaintiff. Of the remaining €565,000, therefore, €45,146.99 is the sum which remained in the client account.

4. By order of the High Court dated 29th July 2011, the Defendant undertook to lodge into court this sum of €45,146.99 and gave various other undertakings in or around that time in relation to his assets and confirmed that if, at the end of the taxation process, it transpired that he owed a sum of money to the Plaintiff, that he would immediately pay such sum to the Plaintiff.

5. In the underlying proceedings, the Plaintiff alleges that the deposit sum was his lawful property and that he did not authorise or consent to the Defendant using same. The Defendant has delivered a full Defence and counterclaimed for the sum of €720,618 in respect of the alleged completion of professional work.

Background

6. In Doyle v. Buckley [2013] IEHC 292, the High Court (Charleton J.) acceded to the Plaintiff’s application and referred the Defendant’s Bill of Costs in Bills D215 and D226 to taxation by the Taxing Master and made other ancillary and consequential orders.

7. The taxation process became very protracted but the Taxing Master delivered his final ruling on 22nd May 2015 which resulted in a substantial reduction in the sum of €752,726 to the Defendant’s Bill of Costs. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant now owes him significant sums of money.

8. On 20th April 2016, the High Court (Twomey J.) refused an application brought by way of judicial review by the Defendant of the decision of the Taxing Master. On 13th October 2017, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from this decision.

9. On 9th November 2018, in Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717, the High Court (Binchy J.) refused the Defendant’s review of the Taxing Master’s decision on a number of Bills of Costs (except for the payment to an agricultural expert) and on 5th December 2018, Binchy J. ordered that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff the costs of the taxation review, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement and further ordered the sum of €25,000 be paid on account of such costs (which sum of €25,000 has been paid).

10. On 24th November 2023, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the High Court (Binchy J.) in Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2023] IECA 288.

11. Arising from the number of unsuccessful applications and appeals brought by the Defendant, the Plaintiff has obtained the followings costs orders against the Defendant: costs of the interlocutory application on 29th July 2011; costs of the motion to refer to taxation dated 12th April 2013; costs of the Defendant’s first challenge to taxation of costs on 1st July 2015; costs of the unsuccessful judicial review brought by the Defendant on 25th July 2016; costs of the Court of Appeal hearing on the judicial review case dated 8th March 2018; the balance of the costs of the hearing before the High Court (Binchy J.) dated 5th December 2018 after the deduction of €25,000 paid on account by the Defendant; and the costs of the hearing before the Court of Appeal in 2021. These sums are the subject of separate summary proceedings issued by the Plaintiff against the Defendant on 30th September 2019 under Record Number 2019/974S. In the application before me, the Plaintiff did not pursue his initial application to consolidate these summary proceedings with this underlying action.

APPLICATION DATED 22nd NOVEMBER 2024

12. The Plaintiff submits that, save for the payment of the €25,000 on foot of the order of Binchy J. (in December 2018), no monies have been recovered and the Plaintiff is concerned that the Defendant, who is now retired as a solicitor, will not have sufficient assets to meet the Plaintiff’s claims in the underlying proceedings in the event that he is successful.

13. Accordingly, the Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs by way of Notice of Motion dated 22nd November 2024:

(1) An order directing the payment out of the sum of €45,146.69 (lodged into court by the Defendant on foot of the order of the High Court dated 29th July 2011) together with any accrued interest thereon, to the Plaintiff.

(2) Further or in the alternative, an order pursuant to Order 99, rules 2(5) and or 7(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended (“the RSC 1986”)

and/or on foot of Practice Direction HC125 directing that the Defendant pay such monies to the Plaintiff on account as the court deems appropriate.

(3) An order directing the case management of these proceedings with such directions as this court deems meet.

(4) Further or in the alternative, an order directing that the Defendant furnish an Affidavit of Means of his assets and liabilities within such time period as may be ordered by the court.

(5) Further or in the alternative, an order directing the Defendant to take such steps as may be necessary to complete the finalisation of the Taxation of the Bills of Costs or to take up a Certificate of Taxation within such time frame directed by the court.

14. At the hearing of the application, Mr. O’Riordan BL, for the Plaintiff, indicated that he was not seeking, at this time, the relief sought at paragraph (6) of the Notice of Motion which was an order consolidating the High Court summary proceedings between the same parties under Record Number 2019/974S with these underlying proceedings. (The Notice of Motion also sought at paragraph (7), such further or other order as the court deemed appropriate and at paragraph (8), costs).

DISCUSSION & DECISION

15. Section 168(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) provides that “subject to the provisions of this Part, a court may, on application by a party to civil proceedings, at any stage in, and from time to time during, those proceedings–(a)

order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more other parties to the proceedings”.

16. Order 99, rule 2(5) of the RSC 1986 provides that an order may require the payment of an amount in respect of costs forthwith, notwithstanding that the proceedings have not been concluded.

17. Order 99, rule 7(1) of the RSC 1986 provides that an order for the payment of costs may require the costs to be paid forthwith, notwithstanding that the proceedings have not been concluded.

18. Practice Direction HC125 deals with the Payment on Account of Costs Pending Adjudication. It replaced HC71 and came into effect on 6th February 2024. It provides as follows:

“(1) This Practice Direction is issued in accordance with the general authority of the President of the High Court and ss. 11(12) and (13) of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020.

(2) This Practice Direction replaces Practice Direction HC71 (Payment on account of costs pending taxation) dated 28th March, 2017. Practice Direction HC71 is revoked with effect from Tuesday, 6th February, 2024, and is replaced, with effect from that date, by this Practice Direction.

(3) The attention of practitioners is drawn to the provisions of Order 99, r. 2(5) of the Rules of the Superior Courts and to the power of the Court to make orders requiring the payment of an amount in respect of costs on account.

(4) I hereby direct that in all cases where there is no dispute as to the liability for the payment of costs and in any other case which a judge thinks appropriate, an order may be made directing payment of a reasonable sum on account of costs within such period as may be specified by the judge pending the adjudication of such costs. Such orders may be made on an undertaking being given by the solicitor for the successful party that, in the event of adjudication realising a smaller sum than that directed to be paid on account, such overpayment will forthwith be repaid.

(5) This Practice Direction shall come into effect on Tuesday, 6th February, 2024.”

19. In Fitzpatrick v Behan [2021] IECA 23, the Court of Appeal (Edwards, Donnelly and Haughton JJ), in the judgment of Donnelly J., addressed the issue of an ‘interim payment order’ and Practice Direction HC71 (the predecessor to Practice Direction HC 125) at paragraphs 18 to 24 of its judgment as follows:

“Interim Payment Order

(18) The notice party pressed the Court to order an interim payment of €30,000 in this case. He relied upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to do so. He refers to the practice direction from the High Court regarding payment of interim costs and the increasing practice of the High Court to so order. Counsel relies upon “long delays already visited on the liquidation in enforcing costs Orders made to date caused by the Appellant’s conduct”. The second is that there are long delays in the adjudication process, and it is said that the financial burden should be borne by the appellant as the losing party rather than the company/its creditors. He submits that the Court should not ignore the history of this liquidation. The appellant has been pursuing remedies because he has not met costs orders.

(19) The notice party submits that if the Court is to make an interim payment order it is a cashflow issue. He submits that the appellant has never submitted that he is not in a position to pay them. He submits that the balance of fairness lies in the amount to be paid over on an interim basis. He gave an undertaking on behalf of his client to hold the money and to set off with other costs orders or, if simpler, repay any difference immediately should the costs be taxed at lesser amount. He also undertook to tax the costs of the appeal quickly.

(20) Counsel for the appellant submits that the notice party assumes the Court is going to award costs. That has not yet occurred. He submits that he would be entitled to a Bill of Costs from the solicitor of the notice party. He submitted that he would be entitled to make submissions on this Bill of Costs.

(21) HC71 governs practice in the High Court (Kelly P, 28 March, 2017). It reads: “In view of long delays in the taxation of costs, the attention of practitioners is drawn to the provisions of Order 99, rule 1B(5). I direct that in all cases where there is no dispute as to the liability for the payment of costs and in any other case which a judge thinks appropriate, an order may be made directing payment of a reasonable sum on account of costs within such period as may be specified by the judge pending the taxation of such costs. Such orders may be made on an undertaking being given by the solicitor for the successful party that, in the event of taxation realising a smaller sum than that directed to be paid on account, such overpayment will be repaid.”

(22) I consider that it would be anomalous if the Court of Appeal had no similar inherent jurisdiction. Although the system of taxation as such no longer applies, there are still long delays in the system of adjudication of costs and there is no reason why an unsuccessful litigant should automatically be entitled to the benefit of those delays. On the converse side a successful litigant should not have to bear the burden of the litigation.

(23) I also consider that the history of these proceedings is something that has to be taken into account. They have been long. In particular, these proceedings relate to the payment of three separate bills of costs which have now been outstanding for some time. The delay in paying them has been significantly contributed to by the taking of these proceedings. I do note that a payment of €18,000 was made as a condition of obtaining a stay on the overall payment of the costs pending the determination of this appeal.

(24) It is true to say that no Bill of Costs has been presented but that is not insurmountable. The Court is in a position to order an interim payment which would be highly unlikely to be more than what will be payable after costs are ascertained and adjudicated upon. I am satisfied that the Court should in this case, in light of the history of these proceedings and delays in the adjudication system, order an interim payment. The creditors of the company at the centre of this litigation should not have to bear the burden of all those delays. The notice party has proposed a sum of €30,000 to be paid on an interim payment. For the avoidance of any doubt I propose that this Court should order an interim payment of a more conservative figure of €20,000 on the undertaking of the notice party to hold that payment and to repay any difference should the ultimate amount of costs be adjudicated at less than that figure. The interim payment should be made within 21 days from the date of this judgment.”

20. In AX v BX [2023] IECA 109, the Court of Appeal (Woulfe, Maurice Collins and Binchy JJ) in the judgment of Woulfe J. (sitting as a judge of the Court of Appeal) at paragraph (17), referred to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Fitzpatrick v Behan [2021] IECA 23, where, as set out above, Donnelly J. had held that it would be anomalous if the Court of Appeal had no similar inherent jurisdiction to the High Court to make an interim payment which it held was consistent with (the recast) O.99, r. 2(5) and r. 7(1) of the RSC 1986.

21. The Rules of Court and practice direction(s) in relation to the payment out or on account of costs pending adjudication, recognises the effect of delays in the taxation process on cash flow whilst also recognising the interim nature of the payment. Delany and McGrath on Civil Procedure (Fifth Edition) in referring to O. 99, rr. 2(5) and 7(1) of the RSC 1986 and the predecessor of Practice Direction HC125 – P/D HC71 – and the process of costs adjudication before the Legal Costs Adjudicator, observe at p. 1200 (paragraph 24-340) that “Given that there may be a delay before the adjudication process is concluded, a practice direction now provides for the court to make an order for payment on account in cases where the issue of costs is not controversial”.

22. The following matters are relevant when considering whether I should make an order directing the payment out of a sum of money on account in relation to costs or as sought in the alternative, in this case, the payment out to the Plaintiff of the sum of €45,146.69 (together with any accrued interest) which was initially lodged into court by the Defendant on foot of the Order of the High Court dated 29th July 2011.

23. First, in the Statement of Account dated 22nd July 2011 exhibited at Exhibit “JB2” to the Affidavit of Mr. Buckley sworn on 22nd July 2011, the subtotal claimed for Fees, Outlays, Disbursements (from Office Account) and VAT dated 19/12/2009 in the following: in Matter Ref: D254 - Denis Doyle v. Sandystream Developments Limited (In Voluntary Liquidation) and Bernard Doyle (By Order) High Court Record No. 2007/8814p; Matter Ref: D215 – Sale of landfill lands to Sandystream Developments Ltd; Matter Ref: D226 – Sale of farmlands to Sandystream Developments Ltd (as per attached Schedule) - was initially €410.257.52, whereas (as confirmed below) the process of taxation by the Taxing Master – which was confirmed by the High Court and the Court of Appeal – reduced this figure of €410.257.52 to approximately €145,000 (inclusive of VAT) (or approximately €128,000 (exclusive of VAT)).

24. Second, in the Table produced at paragraph (xviii) and pages 6-7 of Mr. Buckley’s written submissions dated 7th June 2025, the Defendant claims that a sum of approximately €72,799 is outstanding and due to him and this is vehemently disputed by the Plaintiff.

25. Third, whilst the Defendant submits that contested facts cannot be resolved in this application and further alleges the making on behalf of the Plaintiff of what he says are “a number of inaccurate representations”, including the Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhibit letters of engagement which were previously exhibited before the Taxing Master, and that the Plaintiff was a only a notice (or interested) party in the taxation process, the following matters have, at this juncture (and some considerable time after the Statement of Account dated 22nd July 2011) been found and determined by the Taxing Master, and upheld by the High Court (Binchy J.) in Buckley v. Taxing Master O’Neill and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717 and further affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Buckley v Taxing Master O’Neill and Doyle (party interested) [2013] IECA 288 (Maurice Collins, Haughton and Pilkington JJ, judgment of the court delivered by Collins J.):

(i) The Taxing Master found in his final ruling on 22nd May 2015 that the overall bill as submitted by Mr. Buckley should be reduced by the amount of €752,726 (subject to the amount claimed on behalf of an agricultural economist being vouched);

(ii) In the matter of Bill Reference Number D151 – The County Council of the County of Wicklow v. Denis Doyle, Edward Doyle, Michael Doyle, Margaret Doyle and Desmond Doyle – the Taxing Master reduced Bills of €66,072 and €71,000 to €26,000;

(iii) In File D215 – sale of lands to Sandystream Developments, the High Court (Binchy J.) refers to this at paragraphs 72 and 73 of his judgment in Buckley v Taxing Master O’Neill and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717 describing it as one of the files expressly directed for taxation by the High Court (Charleton J.) and concerning the proposed sale of a portion of the landfill lands owned by the Plaintiff to Sandystream for a consideration of €10.5 million, which represented a price per acre of €1.5 million and where Taxing Master O’Neill had recorded the Defendant quoting an initial estimated fee in a range from €85,000 to €110,000 and in the final account, professional fees were claimed in the sum of €92,250, and outlays were claimed in the sum of €26,278 giving a total of €118,528. The Taxing Master considered that an appropriate fee would be €40,000, taking into account the nature of the work, its complexity, importance and value, and the time spent on the matter.

(iv) In relation to File D226 and the further sale of lands to Sandystream, which also comprised a conveyancing matter, the fee charged by the Defendant for his work between February 2006 and October 2008 was €125,000 (including a discount of €3,800) which was reduced by the Taxing Master to €43,218.75.

(v) In his judgment at paragraph 93 of Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717, Binchy J., in upholding the reduction made by the Taxing Master in relation to File D240 and the sale of lands to Greystones Partnership, stated that this item represented the largest reduction in fees charged in this case, with the figure of €344,733 (plus VAT at the rate of 21%) reduced by the Taxing Master to the sum of €70,000.

(vi) File D54 – Doyle v. Sandystream was concerned with specific performance proceedings which were ultimately settled with the liquidator, on the basis that the Plaintiff could retain €565,000 out of the €600,000 deposit paid by Sandystream prior to its liquidation, with the sum of €35,000 paid to the liquidator. On this file, the Taxing Master assessed the fee at €35,000 and Binchy J. observed at paragraph 112 of his judgment in Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717 that “this was an action for specific performance of a contract having a value of €10,000,000. The proceedings were at quite an advanced stage when the defendant went into liquidation. Realistically, the case then almost certainly became an exercise in trying to ensure that the plaintiff could retain the deposit of €600,000. The applicant secured a good result for the respondent in this regard.”

(vii) Files D151A/1-4 concerned the various processes concerning initial proposals from Wicklow County Council to compulsory acquire (and later to acquire by way of agreement) lands owned by the Plaintiff for the construction of a dual carriageway. The Council, at a late stage, had withdrawn from the CPO process and reached an agreement with the Plaintiff for the acquisition of the lands in File references D151A(i) and (ii) which also included an agreement to pay all of the associated costs and with the assistance of Behan and Associates, Legal Costs Accountants, this was agreed at €67,000. Having considered files D151 A/1-4, the Taxing Master considered that costs in respect of all of these files had already been recovered from Wicklow County Council (on a solicitor and client basis) save for the sum of €1,000 (plus VAT) to cover whatever additional work the Defendant had in relaying the observations of Behan and Associates to Mr. Farrelly (the agricultural expert). At paragraph 122 of his judgment Binchy J. observes that “In effect therefore, it appears that the [Taxing Master] disallowed all the fees claimed by the [Defendant] in these matters save for the sum of €1,000 plus VAT, on the basis that the [Defendant] had already been paid by the county council, on the equivalent of a solicitor and client basis.”

(viii) In relation to the Bill of Costs in File D151/6 and an instruction fee of €60,000, the Defendant had stated that approximately €50,000 related to services he had provided, at the request of the Plaintiff, to a third party in connection with an election petition. The Taxing Master determined that he could not take any work associated with the recovery of this sum into account when considering the fees properly payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and allowed the sum of €6,000 plus VAT and outlay.

26. Fourth, in an open letter sent from J. Buckley Company Solicitors dated 26th November 2018 (counsel for the Plaintiff clarified that this letter which, as exhibited, was dated ‘26th November 2019’, contained a typographical error and should in fact be dated 26th November 2018 - the letter was also stamped 28th November 2018) to the Plaintiff’s then solicitors in relation to Buckley v. O’Neill and Doyle, the Defendant had stated as follows:

“Further to correspondence exchanged last week our assessment of the net refundable costs payable to your client (subsequent to taxation and the judgment in Review as handed down by Binchy, J.) on foot of our undertaking to the High Court, is €424,110. We enclose a Reconciliation of Invoices and Receipts showing how the figure is computed. We also enclose a summary of invoices and bills issued to your client between 2005 and 2011, payments received on foot of those invoices and bills, and the allocation of those payments over the different matters handled on behalf of your client.

The Tab references are to the invoices and bills as issued – making up, as you are aware, a large lever arch file – which has been furnished (twice) to your client’s cost accountant, before and (secondly) in the course of taxation and including those invoices which were agreed in the course of taxation as being in order and not requiring to be taxed. Finally, we enclose (annotated) copies of our ledger cards (previously furnished) reflecting and vouching the several transactions. If you disagree with our assessment or have any queries in relation to any of the amounts set out in any of the enclosures, please revert setting out your queries or points of disagreement to enable us consider and address same. You might kindly note that this correspondence in written an open basis with a view to concluding this complex and protracted matter. However, in circumstances where Binchy, J. has not as yet made final orders, nothing contained herein must be taken as prejudicing our right to appeal the outcome of the review.”

27. Accordingly, the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments respectively in Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717 and Buckley v. O’Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2023] IECA 288 have set out in detail the complex and protracted nature of the litigation and events surrounding the taxation of costs both before, and after, the payment into court of the sum of €45,146.69 pursuant to the Order of the High Court (Roderick Murphy J.) on 29th July 2011.

28. This interlocutory application must, therefore, be seen in the context of those subsequent staging posts which have occurred since 2011 many of which involved the final determinations of matters between the parties.

29. Having regard to those matters and to the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Fitzpatrick v. Behan [2021] IECA 23 and AX v. BX [2023] IECA 109 and in considering the matters which Order 99, rules 2(5) and 7(1) of the RSC 1986 and Practice Direction HC125 seek to address, I consider that this is an appropriate case to direct the payment out of the sum of €45,146.69 (previously lodged into court to the credit of the action by the Defendant on foot of the Order of the High Court (Mr. Justice Roderick Murphy) dated 29th July 2011) together with any accrued interest thereon, to the Plaintiff, on account and in relation to the costs which he has incurred, subject to the Plaintiff’s solicitor undertaking that in the event of an adjudication realising a smaller sum than that directed to be paid on account, such overpayment, if any, will be repaid forthwith. On the basis of such an undertaking, I propose to make an order and direct that such payment be made within three weeks of the perfection of this order.

30. Throughout this application, on the Plaintiff’s behalf, it has been sought to highlight matters which seek to question the Defendant’s credibility. The Defendant, for his part, has sought to emphasise that the Plaintiff has not presented the full picture and is engaged in cherry-picking and presenting a selective narrative. Both parties have pointed to the delay in these proceedings, which have been ongoing since 2011, and both have stated that the matters need to be resolved. Mr. Buckley refers to what he describes as the absolute horror which this litigation has visited upon him for the past seven years and during the course of his retirement. Mr. Doyle, in his Affidavit of 21st November 2024, sets out the chronology of events which have transpired and states that the deposit monies were at all times his lawful property (save for the agreed fees of €35,000 paid to the Liquidator of Sandystream) and that he did not authorise any deduction from the deposit monies. Both parties allege that sums of money are due to them from the other party. Both parties further agree that I cannot determine disputed issues of fact on an interlocutory application such as this. It is the case, however, (and as I have set out earlier in this judgment) given the protracted nature of the dispute between the parties, since the order of Murphy J. on 29th July 2011, that a number of matters have in fact since been determined by the Taxing Master and confirmed in the judgments of the Superior Courts. As set out above, this provides the context for the making of the orders which I proposed, including the payment out of the sum of €45,146.69 together with any accrued interest thereon to the Plaintiff on the terms as directed.

31. Similarly, the protracted nature of these matters has resulted in a number of developments since the order of the High Court (Murphy J.) on 18th July 2011 (perfected on 22nd July 2011), where, at that time, the court inter alia directed that the Defendant provide a full account in relation to the €600,000, a full account on Affidavit in respect of the basis on which he asserted any rights to retain the said deposit plus interest.

32. In his order of 18th July 2011, Murphy J. noted and accepted the Defendant’s undertakings (in paragraphs 15 and 16 of his Affidavit sworn on 18th July 2011) as follows: “(a) I hereby solemnly and conscientiously undertake to the Court not to deplete my assets which in any event are very considerably in excess of €600,000 and to preserve in their unaltered and original state all the Plaintiff’s financial and other records pending the resolution of each and every issue raised in the General Endorsement of Claim in the Plenary Summons issued herein” and “(b) I further solemnly and conscientiously undertake to this Honourable Court that should the Taxing Master upon the taking of an account certify that there must in any event be monies payable by me to the Plaintiff that I shall forthwith and immediately pay such sum to the Plaintiff or bring such monies as thee Taxing Master may direct into Court and should it transpire at the end of taxation that there is any sum due from me to the Plaintiff I shall forthwith and immediately pay such sum to the Plaintiff”.

33. Accordingly, having regard to the terms of the High Court Order dated 18th July 2011 and to the efflux of time and developments outlined in this judgment since 18th July 2011, I consider that it is appropriate that I order that the Defendant furnish an Affidavit of Means of his assets and liabilities within three weeks of the perfection of the Order arising out of this judgment.

34. In relation to the other matters raised on behalf of the Plaintiff in this application, it appears that save for the question of the costs of this application and the vouching of matters in relation to the agricultural expert, the taxation of costs process is effectively at an end subject to the issuing of a Certificate of Taxation.

35. The position of the Plaintiff is that since the application for a Certificate of Taxation will necessitate the payment of stamp duty, he says that it is unfair for him to be required to make that application. He seeks, as part of case management directions, an order (at paragraph (5) of the Notice of Motion dated 21st November 2024) directing the Defendant to take such steps as may be necessary to complete the finalisation of the Taxation of the Bills of Costs or to take up a Certificate of Taxation within a time frame directed by the Court.

36. It is, of course, the case that the Plaintiff was within his rights, as he has set out, to have sought to refer a number of invoices allegedly levied by the Defendant to the (then) Taxing Master in order to be taxed, if, for example, he believed that Bills of Costs were excessive and, therefore, to seek to have the amount determined by the Taxing Master. This process had a number of consequences: it resulted in litigation, including the initial judgment of the High Court (Charleton J.) on 25th March 2013; it resulted in the final ruling of the Taxing Master on 22nd May 2015 which set out reductions from the Bill of Costs raised by the Defendant in the amount of €752,726; it resulted in a number of the Bills of Costs being the subject of a decision of the High Court which was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

37. I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has set out a basis for the making of an order directing the Defendant to take such steps as may be necessary to complete the finalisation of the Taxation of the Bills of Costs or to take up the Certificate of Taxation or that the requirement to pay stamp duty (or any other sum) is a sufficient basis for making the order sought. In addition, I note that at paragraph (24) of his Affidavit sworn on 21st November 2024, Mr. Doyle avers that “the taxation process is now effectively finalised save that a Certificate of Taxation must issue. I say that I am liaising with my Legal Costs Accountant in respect of the steps required to be taken for the issue of the Certificate of Taxation”.

38. I, therefore, refuse the relief sought at paragraph (5) of the Notice of Motion dated 21st November 2024.

39. The pleadings which the parties have furnished as part of this application in the Notice of Motion filed on 22nd November 2024 confirm that a Plenary Summons was dated 5th July 2011, the Entry of Appearance was dated 14th July 2011, the Statement of Claim was delivered 19th August 2011 and the Defence was delivered on 27th October 2011. In the order of Murphy J. dated 29th July 2011, I note that the directions included at paragraph “(4) that the Plaintiff be at liberty to issue a Notice for Particulars within two weeks from the date of delivery of the Defence or within such further time as may be agreed between the parties” and “(5) that the Defendant be at liberty to deliver replies to such Particulars within two weeks from the date of the delivery of the Notice for Particulars or within such further time as may be agreed between the parties.” It is not clear whether the parties ever gave effect to these directions.

40. In the circumstances, whilst I am not making an order in this regard, the parties are requested to seek to agree draft directions, including appropriate for mention dates before the Non-Jury List Judge (to ensure that any proposed directions are complied with) in order to facilitate an application being made, in due course, to the Non-Jury List Judge for a hearing date of these proceedings.

PROPOSED ORDER

41. Accordingly, for the reasons set out in this judgment, I propose to make the following orders:

(i) An order directing the payment out of the sum of €45,146.69 (previously lodged on foot of the Order of the High Court (Murphy J.) dated 29th July 2011) together with any accrued interest thereon, to the Plaintiff, on account and in relation to the costs which he has incurred, subject to the Plaintiff’s solicitors undertaking that in the event of an adjudication realising a smaller sum of costs than that directed to be paid on account, such overpayment, if any, will be repaid forthwith. On the basis of such an undertaking being furnished, such payment is to be made within three weeks of the perfection of this order;

(ii) An order directing that the Defendant furnish an Affidavit of Means of his assets and liabilities within three weeks of the perfection of this order;

(iii) subject to hearing from the parties, as the Plaintiff has been successful in the principal part of this motion, my provisional view is that he is entitled to the costs of this application having regard to the provisions of section 168(1) and section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and O. 99 of (the recast) RSC 1986;

42. I shall put the matter in for mention before me at 10.30am on Thursday 29th January 2026 to address any ancillary or consequential matters, including the question of costs.

CONLETH BRADLEY

14th January 2026