High Court dismisses extension of time appeal as Medical Practitioners Act 2007 time limit is absolute.

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 240

[Record No. 2025/68 MCA]

BETWEEN

MOHAMED AKASHA AHMED

APPLICANT

AND

THE MEDICAL COUNCIL

RESPONDENT

APPROVED JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins on 14th April 2026

Introduction

1. The applicant is seeking an extension of time to bring an application under s. 75 of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 (as amended) (the “2007 Act”) to appeal the respondent’s

decision to cancel his registration as a medical practitioner. This judgment is principally concerned with an issue of statutory interpretation, namely the correct meaning of s. 75(1), which confers on a registered medical practitioner a right of appeal to the High Court from a

decision by the Medical Council to impose a sanction.

2. The respondent opposes the application on jurisdictional grounds and submits that the time limit imposed by the Oireachtas in s. 75(1) of the 2007 Act is absolute, with the result that the court is not empowered to grant an extension of time. The applicant contends that the provision should be strictly construed; does not rule out a power to extend time; and that the court should avail of its inherent power under the Superior Court Rules (RSC) (for instance, O. 84C which makes general provision for statutory appeals) to extend the time in which an appeal can be brought.

3. Travelling alongside Dr. Akasha’s application to extend time is a separate application entitled Medical Council v. Mohamed Akasha Ahmed Akasha (2025/73 MCA) in which the Medical Council seeks an order pursuant to s. 76 of the 2007 Act confirming its decision to cancel Dr. Akasha’s registration under s. 71(1)(f).

4. It is agreed by the parties that the Council’s confirmation application should be paused pending the determination of this application. In the event that the court determines that there is jurisdiction to extend time, and that the merits of the case warrant such an extension, the parties are agreed that, under the statutory scheme, the appropriate sequence would be for Dr. Akasha’s appeal to be heard first.

Background facts

5. By way of a report dated 10th October 2024, the Medical Council’s Fitness to Practise Committee (“the Committee”) found Dr. Akasha guilty of professional misconduct and of acting in contravention of the provisions of the 2007 Act.

6. The Council met on 11th December 2024 to consider the Committee’s report and hear submissions in relation to sanction. Submissions were made on behalf of the CEO of the Medical Council and by Dr. Akasha, who was representing himself (though he had been previously represented by a solicitor at the Fitness to Practise inquiry).

7. At the conclusion of its meeting on 11th December, the Council decided to cancel Dr. Akasha’s registration, and the following is a summary of its reasoning for coming to that

decision. Firstly, the Council addressed its regulatory function and noted that it is in the public interest that it ensures the protection of the public, upholds professional standards and maintains public confidence in the profession. The Council also stated that it was required to have regard to the principles of proportionality in measuring the registrant’s proven misconduct against the range of sanctions permitted under the 2007 Act, and that it must have regard to any mitigating factors proffered by the registrant. These mitigating factors included:

(1) The registrant is a Sudanese national with family still in Sudan.

(2) He had not worked for 18 months up until that point.

(3) His marriage had broken down acrimoniously.

(4) He was no longer legally represented.

(5) He had apologised to the Medical Council.

(6) There were no other legal issues concerning his practice of medicine.

8. The Council was satisfied that the Committee’s conclusions detailed serious findings of dishonesty on the part of the registrant. The Council noted that the Committee took into account the registrant’s mitigating factors, including his health circumstances, prior unblemished record and admission in relation to one of the allegations.

9. The Council noted that the most significant issue arising from the registrant’s conduct was his absence of insight - the Committee had found that he was untruthful in his evidence and displayed no insight into his actions. The Council agreed with the Committee that the finding of dishonesty was difficult to address by the imposition of conditions, particularly where it was accompanied by a demonstrable lack of insight. In the view of the Committee, the registrant’s dishonesty and evidence were so egregious that the imposition of a suspension would be inadequate to uphold the standards of, and public confidence in, the medical profession.

10. The Council was also concerned by the registrant’s failure to demonstrate any insight into his conduct during his submissions before the Council itself. For example, he blamed his ex-wife and her new partner for the incorrect entries on his annual retention application forms (ARAFs) and did not accept any responsibility in relation to their completion. Honesty, integrity and probity are essential requirements for any doctor practising medicine and, in the Council’s view, where dishonesty is coupled with a consistent lack of insight on the part of a doctor, the prescribed sanction must be of the most serious type. While there had been an apology by the registrant, this did not remedy his lack of insight into the wrongdoing.

11. The Council agreed with the recommendation as to sanction made by the Committee and found that, in the overall circumstances of the case, cancellation was a proportionate and appropriate sanction that would uphold professional standards and maintain public confidence in the profession. The Council also decided that it was in the public interest to publish its

decision pursuant to s. 85 of the 2007 Act.

12. By email dated 12th December 2024, Dr. Akasha was provided with a notice of the Council’s decision to cancel his registration, which included the date of the decision and the reasons for same, as required under s. 73(1) of the 2007 Act. He was also advised of his right to appeal the Council’s decision, as required by s. 73(2). The time period within which Dr. Akasha could have appealed the Council’s decision (21 days from the s. 73(1) notice) expired on 2nd January 2025. However, on 12th February 2025 he issued a notice of motion seeking an extension of time to appeal the decision.

13. The Council submits that Dr. Akasha’s appeal of its decision is out of time and can only proceed if the court grants an extension. It is submitted, however, that it is not open to the court to grant an extension because it is clear from both the language of s. 75 and a number of the surrounding sections, and also from the broader scheme of Part 9 of the Act, that the Oireachtas intended the 21-day time limit to be absolute.

14. The Council has provided detailed written submissions on the interpretation of s. 75. The court also heard oral submissions from the parties on the merits of the extension of time application in the event that the court decided it had a jurisdiction to grant same.

15. Dr. Akasha put forward several reasons as to why, in his submission, the justice of the case required granting him an extension of time. He also swore an affidavit on 26th March 2025 setting out extensive reasons why an extension should be granted. In that affidavit, he explains that he came to Ireland in 2013 and worked throughout the country in over 20 different hospitals. He says that he built up a strong reputation among other doctors and his colleagues, and that he sacrificed his life and those of his family members by working during the COVID-

19 pandemic, despite his serious illness and his father’s chronic diseases. Unfortunately, Dr. Akasha’s father, who lived in Sudan, passed away in early 2021 and he is very upset that he could not help or visit his father due to his work commitments in Ireland.

16. In his affidavit, Dr. Akasha stood over his position that his former wife was to blame for the incorrect entries on the ARAFs. I will not go into the detail of this assertion as it is not necessary to the legal issue the court must decide.

17. Dr. Akasha also stated in his affidavit that, since 2020, he has unfortunately suffered with pemphigus vulgaris, a rare autoimmune disease, causing bleeding and blistering all over his body. In the beginning the disease was benign, but became very harsh from about 2022 onwards, resulting in him having to take time off work. He was on very heavy medication and in 2024 he was bed-ridden due to the condition flaring up, and this continued until the beginning of 2025. He states on affidavit that this was the reason he was unable to appeal on time.

18. Addressing the Eire Continental criteria (Eire Continental Trading Co. v. Clonmel Foods [1955] I.R. 170), the applicant says that he formed the intention to appeal within the applicable time frame, and that he communicated this to the respondent’s solicitors. He maintains that he telephoned the respondent’s solicitors on 18th and 20th December 2024 regarding the appeal process but received no response, and he is critical of the solicitors firm in this regard (this aspect is disputed). He is also critical of the way in which his former solicitor dealt with his case. The applicant contends that, in the overall circumstances of the case, justice requires that the court should exercise its discretion to extend time to enable him to appeal the Council’s decision.

Issue of statutory interpretation

19. I propose to divide my analysis of the statutory interpretation issue into four parts: Part (A) will consider Supreme Court guidance on the approach to take when considering an issue of statutory interpretation. Part (B) will address relevant provisions of the 2007 Act. Part (C) will address the decision of the Supreme Court in Kirwan v. O’Leary and Others [2023] IESC

27. Part (D) will address the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal respectively in Property Services Regulatory Authority v. Dooley ([2023] IEHC 419 and [2024] IECA 251). Finally, Part (E) will address the court’s conclusions on the interpretive question.

Part A: Supreme Court guidance on statutory interpretation – Heather Hill

20. In Heather Hill Management Company CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] 2 I.R. 222 Murray J. carried out an extensive review of the case law on statutory interpretation. He observed at para. 113 that modern authorities make clear that “in no case can the process of ascertaining the “legislative intent” or the “will of the Oireachtas” be reduced to the reflexive rehearsal of the literal meaning of words, or the determination of the plain meaning of an individual section viewed in isolation from either the text of a statute as a whole or the context in which, and purpose for which, it was enacted”.

21. The Supreme Court in Heather Hill emphasised the fundamental principle that the words of a statute are the first port of call in its interpretation. While the court has to construe the words having regard to the context of the section of the Act in which those words appear, the pre-existing relevant legal framework and the object of the legislation insofar as discernible, the onus is on those contending that a statutory provision does not have the effect suggested by the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature to establish that that is the case.

22. Similar themes are emphasised by the Supreme Court in A, B, C (A Minor Suing by His Next Friend, A) v. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade [2023] IESC 10.

23. I will now endeavour to apply these principles in order to interpret the meaning of the language used by the Oireachtas in s. 75 of the 2007 Act, and this in turn necessitates a consideration of several provisions of the 2007 Act.

Part B: The relevant provisions of the 2007 Act

24. Part 9 of the 2007 Act deals with the imposition of sanctions upon registered medical practitioners following a report of the Fitness to Practice Committee. Section 73 of the Act requires the Council to notify a registered medical practitioner who is the subject of a sanction of its decision once it has considered the Committee’s report. Section 73(2) provides: “(2) Where the Council has decided to impose a sanction on a registered medical practitioner (other than a sanction arising from measures referred to in section 71(2) or 71A(2)), the Council shall give notice in writing to the practitioner of the practitioner’s entitlement, under section 75, to appeal to the Court against the

decision.” Section 74 (2) provides: “(2) A decision under section 71(1) or 71A(1) to impose a sanction (being a sanction referred to in section 71(1)(a) or 71A(1)(a)) on a registered medical practitioner shall not take effect unless –

(a) the decision is confirmed by the Court on an application under section 75, or

(b) the 21 days referred to in section 75(1) within which the practitioner may appeal to the Court against the decision expires without the practitioner making such appeal.”

25. The effect of s. 74(2) is that a decision to impose a sanction will not take effect unless and until it is confirmed by the High Court. A singular exception to this arises where the sanction imposed is either advice, admonishment or censure, and the registrant chooses not to appeal that sanction. Accordingly, a decision to impose a sanction of advice, admonishment or censure will take effect after the expiration of the 21-day time period referred to in s. 75(1) and an appeal is not made.

26. I accept the Medical Council’s submission that this provision is more consistent with the time limit in s. 75 being absolute, and that it is difficult to reconcile an interpretation of s.

75 that allows for an extension of time to appeal with s. 74, which anchors the automatic activation of a sanction to the expiration of a statutorily imposed time limit.

27. Turning then to the section that I have to interpret, s. 75 provides as follows: “(1) A registered medical practitioner the subject of a decision under section 71(1) or 71A(1) to impose a sanction (other than a sanction arising from measures referred to in section 71(2) or 71A(2)) may, not later than 21 days after the notice under section 73(1) of the decision was given by the Council, appeal to the Court against the

decision.” (emphasis added).

28. As the underlined words indicate, the Oireachtas chose to confer a right of appeal in permissive terms (“may”), but immediately qualified that right in negative terms (“not later than 21 days after the notice… of the decision was given”).

29. All things being equal, statutory language indicating that an appeal cannot be brought after a certain period, together with the absence of any express facility to extend that period, suggests to me that the Oireachtas intended that the time limit would be absolute. In my view, the argument for an absolute interpretation is stronger where the Oireachtas uses language such as “may, not later than” as distinct from language indicating that an appeal may be brought within a certain period.

30. The contention that s. 75 imposes an absolute time limit is supported further by the language used in s. 76 which provides as follows: “(1) Where a registered medical practitioner does not, within the period allowed under section 75 (1), appeal to the Court against a decision under section 71 or 71A to impose a sanction (other than a sanction referred to in section 71(1)(a) or 71A(1)(a) or arising from measures referred to in section 71(2) or 71A(2)) on the practitioner, the Council shall, as soon as is practicable after the expiration of that period, make an application to the Court for the confirmation of the decision.

(2) An application under subsection (1) may be made on an ex parte basis.

(3) The Court shall, on the hearing of an application under subsection (1), confirm the

decision under section 71 or 71A the subject of the application unless the Court sees good reason not to do so and direct how the costs of the application are to be borne.”

31. It is evident that s. 76(1) requires a confirmation application to be brought where a registered medical practitioner does not appeal “within the period allowed under section 75(1)”, that period being 21 days. It is also relevant that s. 76(1) requires that a confirmation application shall be brought “as soon as is practicable after the expiration of that period”.

32. The Medical Council submits that, relying on the interpretation espoused by Barniville

P. and Butler J. in their respective decisions in Dooley, the requirement to have a sanction confirmed is difficult to reconcile with there being a jurisdiction to extend time to appeal, given that the obligation to apply for confirmation is triggered by the expiration of the identified appeal period. In my view, this point is well made.

33. Section 76 is relevant in one other important respect: the Act ensures that the High Court conducts a supervisory jurisdiction in the case of more serious sanctions, even where no appeal is pursued by the medical practitioner. In a confirmation application, a medical practitioner will be entitled to make submissions on sanction before the High Court in opposing the Council’s application. Therefore, as the medical practitioner will still have an opportunity to participate in the confirmation hearing, the impact of an absolute time limit under s. 75 on the registered medical practitioner’s right to litigate will be more limited.

34. This is relevant to the statutory interpretation question that I have to consider with respect to s. 75, because the continued entitlement of a registrant to litigate the question of sanction considerably reduces the potential harshness associated with a finding that the time limit is absolute and, irrespective of the circumstances, incapable of extension.

35. This point should not be overstated, however, because a medical practitioner making submissions on sanction in a s. 75 appeal is not in the same position as a medical practitioner opposing a confirmation application under s. 76. That is because s. 76(3) requires the High Court to confirm a decision “unless the Court sees good reason not to do so”. This creates something of a default position, whereby the court must approve the sanction unless persuaded otherwise. The High Court’s confirmation jurisdiction under s. 76(3), therefore, is not the same as an appeal tribunal hearing an appeal on the merits.

36. In Medical Council v. Lohan-Mannion [2017] IEHC 401, Kelly P. went further and stated that s. 76 imposes a “Wednesbury unreasonableness” threshold (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 K.B. 223) such that the court may decline to confirm the decision only where it has been demonstrated that no reasonable council could arrive at the decision the subject of the confirmation application.

37. It should be noted, however, that Kelly P.’s observations in that regard were obiter. While the former President expressed the view at para. 62 that the court could only refuse the order sought “…if …[it is] of opinion that the Medical Council came to such an unreasonable

decision that no reasonable medical council could have so done”, he was ultimately persuaded in that case that the decision of the Medical Council adequately protected the public interest.

38. Returning to the 2007 Act, it seems to me that s. 74(2)(b) also supports the Council’s interpretation of s. 75 as imposing an absolute time limit. Under s. 74(2)(b), a decision to impose a sanction of advice, admonishment or censure will not take effect unless the decision is confirmed by the High Court on an application under s. 75, or 21 days has elapsed without the practitioner making an appeal. In my view, the Council is correct in contending that s. 74(2)(b) does not sit comfortably with there being an implied power to extend time for appeal under s. 75. Under s. 74(2)(b), these lesser sanctions take effect even if they have not been confirmed by the High Court, once the 21-day period within which the medical practitioner may appeal has expired. Again, this is a contextual indicator which, in my view, supports the proposition that the time period in s. 75 was intended by the Oireachtas to be absolute.

39. Finally under this heading, we have s. 77(2) of the 2007 Act, which confirms that a

decision of the High Court on appeal is final, save where leave is granted by either the High Court or the Supreme Court (now the Court of Appeal), on a specified question of law. Without overstating the point, it may be said that this section, which provides for the finality of proceedings, is also indicative of a parliamentary intention to avoid protracted litigation in a professional disciplinary context and is consistent with there being an absolute time limit in s. 75, so that appeals are dealt with expeditiously and without undue delay.

Part C: Kirwan v. O’Leary and Others

40. The main argument in support of Dr. Akasha’s application for the court to “read in” to s. 75 a power to extend time is the principle that a statutory provision imposing a restriction on a person’s rights to litigate and earn a living should be construed strictly. In my view, this is undoubtedly a correct statement of Irish law which has been confirmed by the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Kirwan. In that case, Mr. Kirwan submitted two complaints to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) about his former solicitors. The SDT decided that neither complaint disclosed a prima facie case of misconduct. Mr. Kirwan appealed this

decision to the High Court under s. 7(12B) of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 (the “1960 Act”), which provides as follows: “An appeal against a finding of the Disciplinary Tribunal under subsection (12A) of this section shall be made within 21 days of the receipt by the appellant of notification in writing of the finding”. (emphasis added)

41. Mr. Kirwan sent his appeal papers to the registrar of the High Court by registered post within the 21-day time period. However, the motions were only issued by the Central Office after the 21-day time period had expired. Mr. Kirwan argued that, as he sent the appeal papers to the registrar within the relevant time period, he made the appeals within time. However, Irvine P. in the High Court held that the appeal was not “made” until his motions had issued from the Central Office, and therefore the appeals were not made within the period specified.

42. Of greater relevance to the interpretive question I have to decide is the fact that Irvine

P. also held that the time limit imposed by s. 7(12B) of the 1960 Act was mandatory and could not be extended by the court. Mr. Kirwan appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of Irvine P. with respect to the finding that the appeal papers were not filed within the 21-day period. However, the Supreme Court allowed Mr. Kirwan’s appeal on the question whether the court had a power to extend time. Unsurprisingly, the present applicant relies four-square on this decision.

43. There was a divergence of opinion in the Supreme Court on the issue of statutory interpretation. The majority decision held that the language used in s. 7 of the 1960 Act did not oust the High Court’s jurisdiction to extend time to appeal in an appropriate case. The dissenting judgment was given by Woulfe J., who felt, like Irvine P. in the High Court, that the language of the section was clear and unambiguous. Woulfe J. observed that the natural corollary of stating that any appeal “shall be made” within the strict 21-day period is that it shall not be made outside that period. Moreover, he felt that, had it been the intention of the Oireachtas to permit the court to extend the 21-day time limit in certain circumstances, it could have done so by adding words such as “or such further period as the High Court considers just and equitable in the circumstances” after the reference to the 21-day period.

44. Interestingly, Woulfe J. expressed a concern that a construction of the 1960 Act that read in a power to extend time risked causing uncertainty in professional regulatory law, where certainty and finality are important values and where a right of appeal is connected with an obligation on a regulatory body to bring a confirmation application to the High Court at the expiration of the fixed period allowing for an appeal.

45. The view that is binding upon me is, of course, that of the majority in Kirwan, which held that the language in s. 7(12B) of the 1960 Act was open to interpretation and did not preclude the possibility of an extension of time. Importantly for present purposes, Murray J., for the majority, emphasised at para. 71 that the Oireachtas easily could have expressed that it intended for an appeal period to be absolute by saying, for example, that proceedings “shall not be brought after…” or by providing that the decision shall become binding “unless, before that expiry, an appeal… is made within the relevant period”.

46. Murray J. held that, while the wording that an appeal “shall be made” suggested a parliamentary intention to exclude an appeal outside of that period, it did not expressly negate the possibility of the appeal period being extendable. He held at para. 92 that, by granting a right of appeal in respect of a decision of the SDT, the constitutional right to litigate was engaged, and on that basis the case fell to be resolved “by treating the engagement of the right to litigate as generating a principle of strict construction”.

47. Murray J. further held that, having regard to the specific context in which s. 7 of the 1960 Act operated, and also stressing the unique relationship between the jurisdiction of the High Court and the supervision of the solicitors’ profession, it was appropriate that s. 7 should be interpreted as allowing for an extension of time to appeal in an appropriate case.

48. The main point of difference between the majority and minority decisions of the Supreme Court in Kirwan was the weight that each decision attached to the “constitutional context” of the imposition of a time limit to appeal. Murray J. held that a strict construction of the legislation was required because Mr. Kirwan’s right to litigate and have access to the courts was affected by the time limit imposed in the section. Thus, he held that considerable weight should be attached to the constitutional context of the case, even though the source of Mr. Kirwan’s right of appeal was statutory rather than constitutional. This analysis by the majority built on, and extended, the analysis carried out by Finlay Geoghegan J. in Law Society v. Tobin [2016] IECA 26.

49. At para. 89 of his judgment, Murray J. stated the following: “Viewed one way, none of this [the analysis carried out by Irvine P.] is wrong per se. What it does not take account of, however, are the related considerations that once the Oireachtas has conferred a cause of action, it has triggered the right to litigate of those who may avail of it, that once that right is engaged a statutory provision that regulates it will be construed strictly, and the fact that the language used in [the] provision in issue in this case does not clearly or unambiguously preclude the co-existence of a power of the Court to extend time”.

50. It seems to me that there are at least three aspects of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kirwan that Dr. Akasha may potentially rely upon in support of his contention that the court should read into s. 75 of the 2007 Act a power to extend time. The first and primary point is that the Supreme Court made a clear-cut finding in Kirwan that a statutory provision which imposes a restriction on a person’s right to litigate must be construed strictly.

51. The second point potentially favouring Dr. Akasha’s interpretation is the marked extent to which the Supreme Court emphasised the constitutional context of a time limit on a right of appeal, even where the right to appeal derives from statute, as opposed to the Constitution.

52. The third point to be mined from Kirwan, from Dr. Akasha’s point of view, is the argument that, even where the language of a statute may require an appeal to be brought within a certain time period, that requirement is not incompatible, in all cases, with the court enjoying a power to extend time where it is deemed appropriate.

53. Murray J. addresses this issue at para. 76 of his judgment in Kirwan. Referencing the language used in s. 7(12B) of the 1960 Act, namely that an appeal “shall be made within…”, Murray J. states that: “… it must also be observed that this language neither expressly, nor necessarily, negates the prospect that the time period it thus fixes for the bringing of an appeal could be extended. In its own terms, the statement that an appeal ‘shall be made’ within a particular period is not in itself inconsistent with the relevant legislation or, for that matter, another provision in separate legislation (primary or delegated) enabling and prescribing the terms under which that time might be extended. It is quite possible to reconcile and combine that seemingly mandatory language (‘shall be made’) with an exceptional facility to extend the time for appeal.”

54. At para. 105(vi) of the judgment, Murray J. states as follows: “By granting a right of appeal against the decision of the SDT, the Oireachtas has engaged the applicant’s constitutional right to litigate. The fact that the right to proceed to Court to appeal the decision in question is statutory does not affect this. Having conferred that right, a provision which restricts it must be strictly construed. Here, the language of s. 7(12B) does not preclude the possibility of an extension of time and, having regard in particular to the specific context in which that provision operates viz the regulation of the solicitors’ profession, it is appropriate that the section should be interpreted as enabling the grant of an extension of time for the making of an appeal in an appropriate case.”

55. Undoubtedly, these are important points that, on one view, potentially support Dr. Akasha’s case for reading-in a power to extend time to appeal in the present case. However, as this case involves the interpretation of a different statutory provision, it seems to me that the court’s first task is to ascertain the plain meaning of the words actually chosen by the Oireachtas when enacting s. 75 of the 2007 Act. Before doing that, however, it is necessary to consider the guidance of both the High Court and Court of Appeal in Property Services Regulatory Authority v. Dooley, to which case I now turn.

Part D: The decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal in Dooley

56. It should be noted that the judgment of the High Court in Dooley was delivered prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirwan. Indeed, Barniville P. recorded at para. 69 of his judgment that counsel for Mr. Dooley had conceded that the right of appeal at issue in Dooley was different to that under consideration in Law Society v. Tobin.

57. The provision interpreted in Dooley was s. 70(1) of the Property Services (Regulation) Act 2011 (the “2011 Act”). It is worth quoting it in full because it contains very similar language to the section I have to interpret: “A licensee the subject of a decision under section 68(4)(a) by the Authority to impose a major sanction on the licensee may, not later than 30 days from the date the licensee received the notice under section 68(7) of the decision, appeal to the High Court against the decision.” (emphasis added)

58. The Property Services Regulatory Authority (PSRA) carried out an investigation into a complaint that had been made against the appellant, Mr. Dooley, who, at the time, was a licensed property professional. The PSRA found that the appellant was guilty of improper conduct and imposed a sanction upon him, namely a fine of €10,000. The questions before the High Court were, whether the appellant could seek to appeal that decision outside of the 30- day time limit fixed by section 70(1) of the 2011 Act and, if so, whether time should be extended to permit the appeal to be brought. Barniville P. decided both of those questions against the appellant.

59. Mr. Dooley appealed to the Court of Appeal. Subsequent to the High Court delivering its judgment in Dooley, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Kirwan. In the Court of Appeal, Mr. Dooley relied on Kirwan to contend that the time limit contained in section 70(1) of the 2011 Act was not absolute and could be extended by court in accordance with Order 84C, rule 2 RSC. However, the respondent contended that the statutory scheme in issue in Dooley was very different to that in Kirwan, and that that judgment did not affect the correctness of the High Court’s decision.

60. Butler J., for the Court of Appeal held, firstly, that Barniville P. was correct in his interpretation of s. 70(1) of the 2011 Act, albeit that the approach to the interpretation of the section was now informed by Kirwan. Nonetheless, she held that, even when the Kirwan approach was applied to the case, the court’s view on the correct interpretation of the section did not change - the court was satisfied that the time limit created by s. 70(1) of the 2011 Act was absolute and did not permit an extension of time. Her conclusion was based both on the language used in the section and the scheme of the Act, in particular the requirement that an application be made to confirm the sanction.

61. At para. 78 of her judgment, Butler J. emphasised that in Kirwan, the Supreme Court was not positing that the conclusion reached - that the time limit under consideration in that case was not absolute - was a conclusion that would necessarily govern all time limits in similar regulatory statutes. Instead, Butler J. emphasised that the provision at issue in each case had to be interpreted “by reference to the particular language used by the Oireachtas in light of the statutory scheme as a whole and having regard to the constitutional context”.

62. Importantly for the interpretive exercise I must carry out, Butler J. at para. 80 noted that Kirwan made it clear that statutory language which “stipulates that the action or appeal cannot be brought after that period will generally be construed as imposing such an absolute limit”. Butler J. felt that this significant feature was also present in Dooley.

63. The second feature identified by Murray J. in Kirwan as being indicative of an absolute time limit, which was also found by Butler J. to be present in Dooley in the context of the 2011 Act, arose from the effect of a time period expiring without an appeal being brought. Butler J. explained the importance of this aspect of the statutory framework at paras. 85 and 86 as follows: “85. There is a distinction between Kirwan and this case which is potentially relevant in this regard. The appeal provision in Kirwan related to a range of scenarios where either a complaint was dismissed or, if the complaint was upheld, a very minor sanction such as a warning or caution was imposed. In those circumstances the matter would proceed no further and would not come before the High Court in the absence of an appeal. In other words, on the facts of Kirwan if the time limit were absolute, the High Court would never consider whether the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the appellant’s complaint was correct. On the other hand, alternative scenarios, where a complaint was upheld and a more serious sanction imposed, were subject to different provisions which required in all such cases that the Law Society prepare a report for the High Court and seek confirmation of its decision. Thus, in those cases an application was required to the High Court even where an appeal was brought by the solicitor concerned and the rules made provision for the sequencing of the two sets of proceedings where both arose.

86. The position under the 2011 Act is materially different. When s. 70(1) is read in conjunction with s. 71(1) and, to a lesser extent, ss. 69 and 72, it is clear that the scheme of the 2011 Act allows for the possibility of an appeal but, if an appeal is not taken within the stipulated time limit, then a different procedure becomes mandatory. The application by the PSRA for confirmation of its decision cannot be bought in parallel to an appeal by a licensee since under s. 71(1) it is a precondition to the bringing of such an application that the licensee has not brought an appeal within the relevant period. In my view this is crucial. Both procedures result in the matter being brought before the High Court. The two procedures are not simply alternatives, they are mutually exclusive.” (emphasis added)

64. As noted in the Medical Council’s submissions in this case, the two features of the 2011 Act which led Butler J. to conclude that the time period in that case was absolute - even when subjecting the Act to the higher degree of scrutiny required by Kirwan - are both present in the Act I am required to interpret here, the 2007 Act.

65. Upholding the President’s analysis in Dooley, Butler J. noted at para. 89 that the possibility of an extension of time to appeal a decision does not sit comfortably with the obligation to seek confirmation of that decision once the limitation period has expired and the practitioner has not brought an appeal. The fact that other legislative schemes contemplate this possibility has no bearing on what the Oireachtas intended as regards the 2011 Act.

66. In light of this guidance from the Court of Appeal in Dooley, I accept the Medical Council’s submission in the present case that identical considerations arise in the 2007 Act by reason of the interplay between ss. 75 and 76. A construction of s. 75 of the 2007 Act which allows for an extension of time is very difficult to reconcile with the analyses of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Dooley.

67. Finally under this heading, it is important to note that, by way of determination dated 11th April 2025, the Supreme Court refused to grant Mr. Dooley leave to appeal to that court.

Part E: Application of these principles to the interpretation of s. 75 of the 2007 Act

68. The Medical Council submits that all of the factors relied upon by the Court of Appeal in Dooley are present in the relevant sections of the 2007 Act such that the Court of Appeal

decision is binding upon this court. I am not sure that I would go that far in circumstances where the court is tasked with interpreting a different statute which has its own individual nuances and language. Nonetheless, it is, at the very minimum, clear that the analysis carried out by Barniville P. and subsequently by Butler J. in Dooley provides strong guidance to this court on the interpretation question that I have to decide. The analyses of both courts in that case undoubtedly support a finding that s. 75(1) of the 2007 Act should be interpreted as imposing an absolute time limit on a registrant’s appeal.

69. However, as we have seen, the decision of the Supreme Court in Kirwan also makes it clear that I must construe s. 75(1) strictly. That is because it is a statutory provision that imposes a restriction on a person’s right to litigate. While that is so, it does not mean that I must follow the conclusion reached by the court in that case and read in a power to extend time, principally because the provision under discussion in Kirwan (“may appeal to the High Court within the period specified”) contains very different language from the provision I have to interpret here (“may, not later than 21 days after the notice… was given by the Council, appeal…”).

70. Importantly, in the course of his discussion of the interpretive issues, Murray J. made clear at para. 80 of Kirwan that statutory language stipulating that an action or appeal cannot be brought after a period will generally be construed as imposing an absolute time limit.

71. As well as the language indicating an absolute time limit, the second crucial feature of s. 75 relevant to the interpretive issue I have to decide is the effect that the expiration of the relevant period has on the bringing of an appeal. Coming back to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dooley, and similar to the situation that obtains under the 2007 Act, an application by the PSRA for confirmation of its decision cannot be brought in parallel with an appeal by a licensee. As Butler J. noted, under s. 71(1) of the 2011 Act it is a precondition to the bringing of a confirmation application that the licensee has not brought an appeal within the relevant period. The identical feature that obtains under the 2007 Act again supports the argument that the analysis of the Court of Appeal in Dooley should govern the interpretive question I have to decide.

Does s. 75 of the 2007 Act oust the general power under the RSC to extend time?

72. Since I am satisfied that I must give s. 75 a strict construction, I must then decide, borrowing the language of Murray J. in Kirwan, whether the language used in s. 75 does or does not “clearly or unambiguously preclude the co-existence of a power of the Court to extend time”. This question in turn necessitates a consideration of the actual words chosen by the Oireachtas when enacting the section.

73. As noted by the Supreme Court in several decisions, including Heather Hill, the words of the statute are the first port of call in its interpretation.

74. Looking at the language of the section, it seems to me that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words “may, not later than 21 days after the notice … of the decision was given by the Council, appeal to the Court …” is clear and unambiguous. The use of the language “not later than” indicates that, if a medical practitioner chooses to appeal the Council’s

decision, he must do so not later than 21 days from when the notice was given. The usage of this negative language, combined with the absence of any provision giving the court a power to extend time, and further supported by the other indicators within the statutory scheme, in my view, puts the matter beyond serious doubt.

75. For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain above, I am satisfied that the language of the section, viewed in its proper Heather Hill context, clearly and unambiguously precludes a reading-in of a power to extend time. The text of the statute, when viewed in its proper context, ousts any assumed jurisdiction under the Rules of the Superior Courts to extend time for bringing an appeal.

76. Viewing the text of the statute in its proper context, the judgments of both the Supreme Court in Kirwan and the Court of Appeal in Dooley, in my view, support the conclusion that the Oireachtas, when enacting s. 75 of the 2007 Act, intended that the time period for bringing an appeal would be absolute, such that the High Court would not enjoy a power to extend time.

77. This conclusion is clear from the wording of s. 75(1) itself, and also from the wording of other relevant sections of the Act addressed above, including ss. 76(1), 74(2)(b) and 77(2). This interpretation is also consistent with the broader framework of the 2007 Act. Further, the similarities between the 2007 Act and the 2011 Act considered in Dooley are so marked and fundamental that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dooley constitutes very strong persuasive authority on the interpretation question before me.

78. Finally, it must be stated that, where primary legislation such as the 2007 Act prescribes an absolute time limit for the institution of legal proceedings, the Rules of Court cannot purport to amend the legislation by enabling that time limit to be extended (see para. 101 of Kirwan (Murray J.) citing with approval the judgment of Hogan J. in Keon v. Gibbs [2017] IECA 195 (para. 26)).

Conclusion

79. For all these reasons, I hold that s. 75(1) of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007, when interpreted correctly, imposes an absolute time limit that is not capable of being extended.

80. Since Dr. Akasha did not appeal within time, it follows that the court has no jurisdiction to grant him an extension of time under s. 75. It is not necessary, therefore, for the court to consider the adequacy of the reasons advanced by Dr. Akasha for seeking an extension.

81. Instead, the Council’s application to confirm the sanction of cancellation pursuant to s. 76(1) of the 2007 Act will now fall to be determined by the court. Dr. Akasha will, of course, have a right to participate in that hearing and, if he wishes, to make submissions opposing the Council’s confirmation application.

Signed:

Micheál O’Higgins

Appearances: The applicant appeared as a litigant in person. The respondent was represented by Eoghan O’Sullivan BL instructed by Fieldfisher Ireland LLP.