High Court refuses costs to lay litigant for political opinion claims in planning review case.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

THE HIGH COURT PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2026] IEHC 22 Record No: 2024 4410 HP BETWEEN ALAN CROGHAN AMANDA FARRELLY and MELISSA KELLY PLAINTIFFS AND PAUL COLLINS TANYA HENNIGAN TOWNBE UNLIMITED COMPANY THE COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SIOCHANA RODERICK O’GORMAN THE MINISTER FOR CHILDREN, EQUALITY, DISABILITY, INTEGRATION AND YOUTH DUBLIN CITY COUNCIL THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND THE MINISTER FOR HOUSING LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HERITAGE

DEFENDANTS

COSTS RULING OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND, DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON 15 JANUARY 2026

Contents COSTS RULING OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND, DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON 15 JANUARY 2026 ............... 1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2

Parties’ Positions as to Costs ........................................................................................................................... 2

Scope of Costs Awardable to Lay Litigants ...................................................................................................... 3

COSTS PROTECTION ................................................................................................................................. 3

INTERLOCUTORY COSTS ISSUE .................................................................................................................. 4

Interlocutory Event for Costs Purposes ........................................................................................................... 4

Ss 168(1) & (2) and 169(1) Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 & Order 99 Rule 2 RSC ................................. 4

Interlocutory Injunction Judgment of October 2024 ...................................................................................... 6

Injunction Application Not Made & Case Not Pleaded ................................................................................... 7

Unstateable Case for Interlocutory Injunction ................................................................................................ 8

Mr Croghan’s Position.................................................................................................................................... 10

Ms Farrelly’s Position ..................................................................................................................................... 11

Hardship – Croghan & Farrelly....................................................................................................................... 12

Ms Kelly’s Position ......................................................................................................................................... 13

Decision - Interlocutory Costs Application by State & Dublin City Council ................................................... 14

Townbe’s Interlocutory Costs ........................................................................................................................ 14

Ms Kelly’s Application for Interlocutory Costs ............................................................................................... 20

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

COSTS OF MOOT PROCEEDINGS.............................................................................................................. 20

Factual Background to Moot ......................................................................................................................... 20

Law on Costs of a Moot – Hughes & PT......................................................................................................... 22

Cunningham .................................................................................................................................................. 23

Judgment of 18 July 2025 Declining to Hear Any Moot ................................................................................ 24

Ruling of 14 November 2025 on Final Orders ............................................................................................... 25

Decision - Costs of Moot – Townbe & Council............................................................................................... 25

Ms Kelly’s Letter of 5 December 2025 ........................................................................................................... 25

Reasons for Unilateral State Decision to Abandon the Project ..................................................................... 26

The Conduct Issue ......................................................................................................................................... 28

Decision on Ms Kelly’s Application for Costs ................................................................................................. 29

ORDERS ................................................................................................................................................. 29

INTRODUCTION

1. This is my ruling1 as to the costs of these proceedings which, I have already ruled, are to be entirely struck out as moot. This ruling is to be considered in light of and read with my judgment of 31 October 2024,2 refusing the Plaintiff's applications for interlocutory injunctions; my judgment of 18 July 2025,3 declaring much of the case to be moot and declining to hear it further, but allowing argument as to possibly surviving elements; and finally, my ruling ex tempore of 14 November 2025 to the effect that no remaining elements of the case required to be heard and accordingly, final orders would be made striking out all proceedings. I adjourned all costs issues, and it is to those adjourned issues that this ruling addresses itself.

2. I should say that insofar as I refer to "Townbe" in this ruling, I follow a practice which has been adopted throughout these proceedings of using that word, "Townbe", to refer to the first three Defendants collectively as the intending developers of IPAS accommodation on the former Crown Paints Site in Coolock, Dublin (the “Site”), which development the Plaintiffs, by these plenary proceedings, sought to prevent. The Townbe Defendants were jointly represented. I refer to all collectively of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Defendants as "the State" – they, also, were jointly represented.

PARTIES’ POSITIONS AS TO COSTS

3. Briefly, the parties’ positions as to the costs of the proceedings are as follows.

• All Defendants seek the costs of the Plaintiffs' failed interlocutory injunction application, but no costs orders as to the proceedings generally and other than that interlocutory injunction application. I note that Dublin City Council initially intimated that it would seek the costs of a day’s argument as to final

This judgment was delivered orally and ex tempore on 15 January 2026. This written version has been prepared in light of the stenographic record

thereof. To the extent of any textual differences from the judgment as orally delivered this written version conforms to the principles as to ex tempore

judgments identified in Walsh v Walsh [2017] IEHC 181, [2017] 2 JIC 0207. The substance and the resulting orders do not differ.

2 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2025] IEHC 413.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

orders on foot of the judgment of 18 July 2025. But it no longer pursues that application, so I need not further consider it.

• Mr. Croghan and Ms. Farrelly oppose the making of any order for costs against them but seek no costs.

• Ms. Kelly seeks the costs of the entire proceedings.

4. I have considered the various written submissions and inter partes correspondence as to costs, which were exchanged at my direction, and I heard oral argument as to the costs issues on 12 January 2026. I should note that this is not a case in which the interlocutory costs issue was deferred to the trial of the action but events, in the form of my declaration of a moot and decision to strike out the proceedings, simply overtook the hearing of the interlocutory costs issue.

SCOPE OF COSTS AWARDABLE TO LAY LITIGANTS

5. Particular rules govern the scope of the costs awardable to a lay litigant. This is relevant not to the

decision I will make but by way of a general observation as it bears upon the prospects of Ms. Kelly’s recovering costs of these proceedings in any particular amount. In summary, the costs which Ms. Kelly might recover if she is successful in her application for the costs of the entire proceedings will be limited to her expenses and outlay. The relevant decisions are Re Irish Life and Permanent Plc, Dowling v Minister for Finance;4 Dawson v Irish Brokers Association5 (a Supreme Court case); Tracey v District Judge McCarthy;6 Tracey v McDowell;7 and Gilroy v O'Leary & Google.8 In summary, it can be said that any order for costs in favour of a lay litigant, such as Ms. Kelly, can encompass expenses and outlays only and does not include costs for the lay litigant’s deployment in the litigation of their own expertise, time and effort. The principle applicable is that a party to litigation must know their case, at their own expense.

6. I need not express a view as to what precisely are the expenses and outlays recoverable by a lay

litigant – that will be addressed by the Legal Costs Adjudicator if I make a costs order in favour of Ms. Kelly. It

is inevitable, however, that the amount of any costs recoverable by Ms. Kelly would be far less than would have been recoverable had she been legally represented.

COSTS PROTECTION

7. The question arises whether this is a case to which statutory costs protections apply so as to immunise the Plaintiffs from awards of costs against them. I am satisfied, first, that section 50 PDA 2000,9

4 Re Irish Life and Permanent Plc, Dowling v Minister for Finance [2023] IEHC 33.

Dawson v Irish Brokers Association [2022] 2 ILRM 210.

6 Tracey v District Judge McCarthy [2021] IESC 37.

7 Tracey v McDowell [2021] IESC 38.

8 Gilroy v O’Leary and Google [2025] IECA 42.

Planning and Development Act 2000 as amended

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

which provides costs protection in specified circumstances, does not apply in this case as these are not judicial review proceedings.

8. I am satisfied, secondly, that Part 2 of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011, which also provides costs protection in certain circumstances in "environmental proceedings", does not apply here. Ms. Kelly says that these are environmental proceedings, but she did not address the specifics of Part 2 of the 2011 Act. In this context, the commonly used phrase "environmental proceedings" is in fact a convenient but not precisely accurate colloquial shorthand for the types of proceedings for which the 2011 Act provides costs protection. Not all environmental proceedings within the common meaning of that phrase are costs protected by the 2011 Act.

9. The State, the Council and Townbe did address the specifics of Part 2 of the 2011 Act, submitting that sections 3 and 4 do not apply in this case as the proceedings were not taken to ensure "compliance with, or the enforcement of, a statutory requirement or condition or other requirement specified in or attached to a licence, registration, permit, permission, lease, notice or consent or in respect of the contravention of, or the failure to comply with such licence, registration, permit, permission, lease, notice or consent."

10. I consider that the Plaintiffs’ proceedings were based on the alleged absence of any relevant licence, permit or permission, not upon its breach. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Defendants' submissions are correct, and that costs protection does not apply to these proceedings.

INTERLOCUTORY COSTS ISSUE

Interlocutory Event for Costs Purposes

11. Turning to the interlocutory costs issue, the first task is to identify the interlocutory event for costs purposes. Unequivocally and simply, the Plaintiffs lost and the Defendants won the interlocutory injunction application. If costs are to follow the event, that is the event which they must follow.

SS 168(1) & (2) AND 169(1) LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION ACT 2015 & ORDER 99 RULE 2 RSC

12. Sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 provide for the award of costs in civil proceedings. Section 168 provides the statutory jurisdiction to make costs orders, it says that, subject to the provisions of Part 11 of that Act,

"... a court may, on application by a party to civil proceedings, at any stage in, and from time to time during, those proceedings —

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

(a) order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more other parties to the proceedings."

13. Section 168 goes on to make certain provisions as to how those costs might be awarded, in terms of a portion of another party’s costs or costs from or until a specified date and other variations on that theme.

14. Section 169(1) is significant to the present case. It states that:

"A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties."10

There follows a non-exhaustive list of considerations which might affect an order varying from the entitlement of the successful party to recover costs, I will mention only three which appear potentially relevant. These are:

"(a) conduct before and during the proceedings,

(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings,

(c) the manner in which the parties conducted all or any part of their cases."

15. I should mention, also, that Order 99, Rule 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides that:

"Subject to the provisions of statute (including sections 168 and 169 of the 2015 Act) and except as otherwise provided by these Rules:

(1) The costs of and incidental to every proceeding in the Superior Courts shall be in the discretion of those Courts respectively."

…………..

(3) The High Court, upon determining any interlocutory application, shall make an award of costs save where it is not possible justly to adjudicate upon liability for costs on the basis of the interlocutory application."

16. I observe that Rule 2(3) was intended to alter the previous de facto practice which had been, in most cases, to adjourn the question of interlocutory costs to the trial of the action. I mention that only because, as I have said at the outset of this ruling, this was not a case in which I had adjourned the costs issue to the trial. It is, rather, a case in which the orders declaring the case moot and declining to proceed to hear it overtook in point of time the determination of the interlocutory costs issue.

S169(1) Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

17. I am satisfied that section 169 applies discretely to the costs of interlocutory motions or at least that the court is entitled to apply it by analogy - Pembroke Equity.11 I am satisfied that, as the Plaintiffs’ interlocutory injunction application failed, the effect of section 169 in the present case, as to the costs of the interlocutory injunction application, is that the entirely successful Defendants are presumptively entitled to an award of costs against the Plaintiffs, unless I order otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties.

18. Collins J in Pembroke Equity, citing the Supreme Court in Godsil,12 said that the general principle that costs follow the event is the "overriding start point on any question of contested costs".13 Citing Daly v Ardstone Capital,14 Collins J said:

"Where the party seeking costs has been entirely successful - it should lean towards ordering costs to follow the event."15

And, having cited sections 169 and Order 99, Rule 2(3), Collins J said:

"If costs are generally to be determined at interlocutory stage, it can only be on the basis of a general rule that the successful party should get their costs."16

19. In Smith v Cisco Systems,17 the Court of Appeal was concerned with the costs of a failed interlocutory recusal application. The Court cited Pembroke and Daly v Ardstone Capital and held that the correct starting point as to costs of interlocutory matters must in all cases be section 168 and, in particular, section 169.18 The court held that the essential effect of section 169 is that, where a party is entirely successful in an interlocutory application, costs follow the event of that success unless the court otherwise orders.

INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION JUDGMENT OF OCTOBER 2024

20. I turn now to the interlocutory injunction judgment which I delivered in this matter in October 2024. I refused to grant injunctions which had been sought, first, to restrain the housing of migrants in the Coolock Crown Paints Site and second, requiring relevant public representatives to adhere to the precautionary principle and immediately halt the project of housing migrants on the Site. I refused those applications for interlocutory injunctions because the case in law on which the application was based was unstateable. I was also highly critical of the Plaintiffs’ conduct of the case.

11 Pembroke Equity Partners v Corrigan [2022] IECA 142 §§ 26 & 27.

12 Godsil v. Ireland [2015] IESC 103, [2015] 4 IR 535.

13 Pembroke, §23 Daly v Ardstone Capital [2020] IEHC 345, §15.

15 Pembroke, §27.

16 Pembroke, §27.

17 Smith v Cisco Systems [2023] IECA 238.

Smith v Cisco §8.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

21. As a general observation, and while I do not intend their forensic dissection, I consider that many of Ms. Kelly's arguments against an award of costs of the interlocutory injunction application against her reflect, first, a failure to understand that she lost that application and the implications of that loss, and second, an anxiety to re-argue issues on which that judgment had taken a view and decided. For example, she sought to explain why she had not made an injunction application pursuant to Section 160 PDA 2000 - when the only relevant point at this stage and as to costs, and also, indeed, in the interlocutory injunction application and its determination, was that she had not in fact made such a section 160 application and so I could not award her a section 160 injunction.

INJUNCTION APPLICATION NOT MADE & CASE NOT PLEADED

22. I want to say a little about the injunction application which was not made and the case not pleaded. As I say, the Plaintiffs had not sought a section 160 injunction and in that judgment in October 2024 I said:

"It is, of course, necessary that a plenary summons set out, if only briefly, the legal basis of the claim.

Notably, in the factual context and as Ms. Kelly accepted, the plenary summons here does not invoke section 160 of the Planning and Development 2000 and so does not seek an injunction on the basis for which section 160 provides."19

That basis is that an injunction may be granted "Where an unauthorised development has been, is being or is likely to be carried out or continued...'."

23. I had observed in that judgment that whatever of the roof of the former Crown Paints factory was to be removed - the removal of which was put in issue as it would have consisted of part of the development of that factory for the purpose of fitting it for use as an IPAS accommodation centre – it had not yet been removed. I continued:

"No doubt if that work starts appropriate steps can be taken in the event of a fear that the work is being done unsafely as to asbestos removal. Here it suffices to say that the plenary summons does not mention asbestos or allege the breach or intended breach of any identified laws governing asbestos removal."20

24. In her written submissions and arguments as to costs, Ms. Kelly argued that asbestos removal was the central issue in the interlocutory injunction application. To this, there are three simple responses.

• First, she had not pleaded the asbestos issue in a highly detailed Plenary Summons. Whether she pleaded it after my judgment on the interlocutory injunction application is beside the point of the costs of her failed injunction application.

19 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §27.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §25.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

• Second, section 160 PDA 2000 provides for procedural exclusivity as to the manner in which a section

160 injunction is sought, which is to say, by originating notice of motion.

• Third, and more fundamentally, and whether or not she had pleaded the asbestos issue, and whether or not I was right or wrong in the view I took of it - an issue which could be decided only on appeal of my judgment - the fact remains that the Plaintiffs lost the injunction application and ordinarily costs follow that event.

UNSTATEABLE CASE FOR INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION

25. I turn then to the unstateable case on which the application for an interlocutory injunction was based. In my judgment on the interlocutory injunction application I said:

"When asked to state the legal bases on which she alleged a right of action capable of supporting the interlocutory injunctions which she seeks, Ms. Kelly nominated two:

o the precautionary principle as established in EU environmental law. She cites Article 191 TFEU.21 o the obligations as to public participation in environmental processes for which the Aarhus Convention22 provides.”23

26. I observed in that judgment that:

"... a case pleaded merely on the precautionary principle is unstateable. On this ground alone, the claim, made on an interlocutory basis, for “A mandatory injunction on the relevant public representatives to adhere to the precautionary principle and halt this project immediately' must be rejected."24

“… the case pleaded on the Aarhus Convention is unstateable.25

I needn't elaborate at this point on my reasons for having taken those views. I held that as both legal bases on which the interlocutory injunctions were sought are unstateable, all claims for such reliefs were rejected.26

27. Concluding that judgment, I refused all relief sought by way of interlocutory injunction:

21 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

22 Convention On Access To Information, Public Participation In Decision-Making And Access To Justice In Environmental Matters, Done At Aarhus,

Denmark, On 25 June 1998.

23 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §28.

24 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §31.

25 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §34.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §34.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

"... in particular as the causes of action and/or alleged illegalities on which the application was explicitly based and to which it was explicitly confined - breach of the precautionary principle and breach of Aarhus public participation rights - do not raise a fair issue to be tried."27

28. In my judgment on the interlocutory injunction application I also referred to averments made by the Plaintiffs’ absent any "evidence capable of supporting them".28 Amongst others, I found that baseless and vicious allegations had been made against the Garda Commissioner. I also recognised that there may be legitimate concerns as to State management of immigration. I was, nonetheless, highly critical of many aspects of the Plaintiffs' viciously destructive pleadings and evidence, both, as they each related to immigrants and to immigration. I will not repeat that criticism, but I wish to make clear that I resile from none of it. I should add that whether I resile from any of it is beside the point as for the purpose of the present application it is not open to me to resile from the content of that judgment.

29. I also observe that in that judgment I made no findings, and I make none now, that the Plaintiffs or any of them are racists. But in my judgment I described some of their pleadings and evidence as "disgraceful", "appalling" and "execrable" and "awash in meaningless conspiracy theories". I said that together they "comprise a vicious narrative" to be "fundamentally and unreservedly deprecated". 29 I should add that the cases of Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison30 and Shelly Morris v Bus Átha Cliath31 make it clear that what is pleaded will be imputed to the party making that plea. Whatever any argument might be that each is not responsible for the affidavits of the other, which in the circumstances of coplaintiffs together seeking relief I do not accept, there can be no doubt that each Plaintiff is responsible for the content of the Plenary Summons issued in their name and with their authority. At §37 of my judgment I listed verbatim the relevant pleas which I criticised.32 I see no need to repeat that recitation here.

30. In my interlocutory judgment I rejected the Plaintiffs' view that I should lend any weight to those pleas which I had listed at §37 of the judgment or to the averments which I had criticised in considering their application for an injunction. I identified the Plaintiff's irresponsibility in pleading and deposing to those dangerously provocative allegations. I also held:

"... that such minimal concern as is expressed in the Plaintiffs' papers for the conditions of accommodation of applicants for International Protection and for homeless migrants, when read in the context of those papers as a whole, in no substantial way diminishes the overall thrust of the content of the papers as described above" 33

I remain of those views.

27 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §60.

28 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §34.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §49.

30 Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2021] 2 IR 338.

31 Shelly Morris v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 1 IR 232.

32 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §37.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §53.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

31. I wish to be clear that I consider the event of the failure of an unstateable interlocutory injunction application to be, of itself and without more, sufficient reason in all the circumstances of this case to award costs of the interlocutory injunction application against all of the Plaintiffs. I consider that the conduct of the Plaintiffs and the manner and terms in which they pleaded and deposed to their case do not positively weigh in favour of awarding the costs of the interlocutory injunction application against them. But they do weigh heavily against any departure, as a matter of exception, from the general principle that costs should follow the event. That is the principle upon which I intend to award costs of the interlocutory injunction application.

32. All that said, and though it does not affect my decision, I think it proper to note that Mr. Croghan and Ms. Farrelly have expressed regret at the terms in which the proceedings were framed and the interlocutory injunction application was made. I have no reason to doubt that those expressions of regret are genuine.

33. Ms. Kelly, in contrast, has expressed no such regret, instead seeking to insist on her alleged rights of political speech and that I mischaracterised her views. I explained in the interlocutory judgment why I rejected that argument as to rights of political speech and that judgment binds both Ms. Kelly and me for the purposes of this costs application. Indeed, Ms. Kelly, in recent correspondence as to costs has, as counsel for Townbe asserts, doubled down on her allegation of a contemporary "Cromwellian plantation” of immigrants in Ireland. Whatever Ms. Kelly claims she means by that phrase, I have explained in my interlocutory judgment why, in terms of how others will inevitably understand it, that culturally freighted phrase has connotations of an extremely and irresponsibly inflammatory kind.

MR CROGHAN’S POSITION

34. I turn to the position of Mr. Croghan. He has been permitted to withdraw from the proceedings essentially for two reasons: the first being severe ill-health; the second being discord with his co-plaintiffs, who, he says, have turned against him despite his funding the action, in part due to his opposition to, as it is put, "taking the case to Europe". He remains in the proceedings as to the costs issues.

35. Mr Croghan’s letter of 8 December 2025 as to costs incorrectly suggests that on the occasion of his withdrawal from the proceedings I said I would not award costs against him. For the avoidance of doubt, I did not. I said he would remain in the proceedings for the particular purpose of determining whether an order for costs would be made. Had there been no prospect of awarding costs against him it would have been unnecessary to retain him in the proceedings for that purpose.

36. Mr. Croghan, in his letter of 8 December 2025, says that he lacks the means to pay any costs. He funded the case but has nothing left. He cites his recent serious illness and hospitalisation. It is also clear that he is now in virulent dispute with Ms. Kelly, Ms. Farrelly and the "Coolock Says No" group which, it

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

seems, was a group opposed to the proposal for an IPAS centre on the Site. Ms. Farrelly was a member and, for all I know, Mr. Croghan may have been a member.

37. Mr. Croghan, to his credit, expresses regret at terminology he used in the affidavit which he swore grounding the interlocutory injunction application. He apologises for at least some of the allegations which he made, including allegations against the Garda, some of which allegations, I understand, he is pursuing by other means. He blames Ms. Kelly for the objectionable terms in which the proceedings were pleaded and advanced, saying he was "green behind the ears" in this respect. He, I should record, disavows racism, citing his experience of having a mixed-race relative.

38. I note those expressions of regret and apology. However, blaming Ms. Kelly for the content of the proceedings is beside the point. The courts are open to all and the right of access to justice is vital. But litigation is a serious, formal and consequential business. It is not to be undertaken other than very carefully and responsibly and in the expectation that one will be held responsible for one’s actions in litigation. Affidavits are sworn evidence on oath - just as much as evidence given orally in the witness box. Deponents alone are responsible to the court for what they swear on affidavit. And as I have said, parties are personally responsible for pleadings issued in their name – as to which see Simpson and Shelly-Morris.

39. Also, it must be observed that Ms. Kelly was not entitled to be, and was not, Mr. Croghan's legal representative in these proceedings. That was repeatedly made clear at the many hearings in this case. Of the Plaintiffs, she certainly took the lead in argument. But her arguments were attributed to Mr. Croghan only insofar as he adopted them, which, until relatively recently, he generally did.

MS FARRELLY’S POSITION

40. Ms. Farrelly issued a letter of 16 December 2025 as to costs. She also submits that no order for costs should be made against her. She sets out her personal circumstances as a 55-year-old single mother of four, of whom two children are adults. She recites her poor financial circumstances, that she is in a minimum wage job and on social welfare. She states that she has no savings or assets, and she recites that one of her children has a history of serious and costly health problems, albeit, as I understand and happily note, that child is now much better. She says, and I accept, that she was already struggling to cope and that costs would cause her extreme financial hardship were they awarded against her. She says she acted in good faith and with good intentions and in the public interest, that her sole aim was to stop an IPAS centre in Coolock as local essential services were already stretched to bursting point.

41. I pause to observe that that was, in principle, a perfectly proper basis upon which to decide to oppose the IPAS centre – though, of course, I make no finding as to whether it was factually accurate. Ms Farrelly accepts that her concerns were not well-conveyed in her initial affidavit. She says that she was totally out of her depth in the entire process and "in my ignorance, it went all over my head". She says she

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

had little input to the proceedings since the injunction applications due to recent and serious back injury and head injury, for which she attends a chronic pain clinic, and she says that she left the conduct of the proceedings to Mr. Croghan and Ms. Kelly. She also, like Mr. Croghan, disavows racism and cites her experience of having a mixed-race family member.

42. That letter also, I record briefly, ventilates disappointment at the disagreement which has erupted with Mr. Croghan but I need not recite the details of the view she expresses as to that agreement.

43. Essentially, my observations as to Ms. Farrelly's letter and her application not to have costs awarded against her are similar to those I make as to Mr. Croghan. Ms. Farrelly is responsible for her actions and for expressing herself and formally associating herself in legal proceedings with content on sworn affidavit, which I deprecated, even if and to the extent that those affidavits were sworn by her co-plaintiffs. As I have said, she is in any event responsible for the content of pleadings which I have criticised. That said, I accept that Ms. Farrelly is not a racist and that she was largely out of her depth in these proceedings.

HARDSHIP – CROGHAN & FARRELLY

44. The essential argument made by Mr. Croghan and Ms. Farrelly against an award of costs against them is based upon their personal circumstances, their impecuniosity - that is to say their lack of money or other assets - and hardship. I accept the account given by Mr. Croghan and Ms. Farrelly as to their respective circumstances. I accept that neither could remotely afford to pay any award of costs against them. As the law puts it, they are impecunious. I also accept their accounts of their personal circumstances - severe personal ill-health in the case of Mr. Croghan and, in the case of Ms. Farrelly, significant ill-health and a recent history of severe ill-health of a close family member. I also accept that Mr. Croghan and Ms. Farrelly, especially Ms. Farrelly, in their pursuit of these proceedings got in beyond their depth and their comprehension of what they were about, and its implications were considerably limited.

45. The relevant law is set out in Smith v Cisco, citing the case of McFadden v Muckno Hotels:

"It is not generally open to the court without more to merely decide to make an order that there be no order as to costs exclusively on the grounds of impecuniosity of the unsuccessful party."34

The same view was taken in James v Watters as to "A plea of poverty or hardship":

"... the fact that a person is of limited means does not generally have any bearing on whether it is appropriate to make an order for costs against them in legal proceedings. The ability of the respondent to successfully execute an order for costs is a matter separate to the question of whether such an order should be made."35

34 Smith v Cisco Systems [2023] IECA 238 §28.

James v Watters [2023] IECA 144 §4.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

46. While I have considerable sympathy for Mr. Croghan and Ms. Farrelly, the fact remains that they mounted an unstateable application for interlocutory relief on a basis which was, frankly, deplorable, even though they now regret it. Again, while I award costs against them simply as they follow the event, I consider that the deplorable basis upon which they proceeded counterbalances any discretionary impulse which their personal circumstances might otherwise prompt in their favour as to costs.

MS KELLY’S POSITION

47. I turn to Ms. Kelly's position as to the interlocutory costs. Ms. Kelly did not plead hardship or impecuniosity. It is somewhat difficult to rationalise what exactly her argument was as to specifically the costs of the interlocutory injunction application, as her arguments for an award of costs in her favour related to the entire costs of the proceedings. Her position was set out primarily in e-mails of 5 December 2025. I do not intend to analyse them in forensic detail, but some comments are appropriate.

48. Ms. Kelly asserts that her interlocutory injunction application was not unmeritorious and that but for the injunction application Townbe would have removed a large asbestos roof without environmental impact assessment and relying on an inapplicable planning exemption 20F36 and thereby would have caused environmental damage and risk to human health. This submission, I consider, blithely ignores the fact that Ms. Kelly lost the injunction application as unstateable. The injunction application was refused. It was refused in part as the asbestos issue was not pleaded. That issue simply was not in the case at that point. Whatever caused Townbe to refrain from works, it was not the refusal of the interlocutory injunction application.

49. Ms. Kelly also asserts that my interlocutory judgment was wrong in various respects; amongst others, that I was wrong in my limitation of the scope of the interlocutory injunction application as to its legal basis, and that I had mischaracterised the Plaintiffs' legitimate political views, including her views of immigrants, and discriminated against her in so doing. Ms. Kelly, I must make clear, is entitled to criticise my judgment. If she does so on appeal, she may be vindicated in such criticism. But in this costs application my judgment on the interlocutory injunction is a given. As to these costs, criticising the judgment as wrong is pointless. Ms. Kelly is bound by my interlocutory injunction decision unless she successfully appeals it. I confess to the strong impression that Ms. Kelly never reconciled herself to this aspect of the law. In any event, and as the judgment records, she was clearly not entitled, on the papers before me, to move a section 160 injunction. And it was she who expressed herself content to confine herself to reliance on the precautionary principle and the Aarhus Convention - that expression of contentment is noted in my judgment on the interlocutory injunction application.

36 The Planning and Development (Exempted Development) (No. 4) Regulations 2023 S.I. 376/2023 provide that in specified circumstances a change of

use of premises to temporary use to accommodate or support displaced persons or persons seeking international protection is exempted development

and does not require planning permission.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

50. Next, Ms. Kelly asserts as to costs that Townbe should pay a cost for what she alleged was its perjury, attempted environmental and human health damage and SLAPP tactics. SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation and is a phenomenon of which the courts are aware. It can occur in a variety of contexts but particularly is noted as having occurred in certain cases in an attempt to frustrate the effectiveness of public participation in environmental processes and in environmental litigation. However, as the interlocutory injunction judgment records, the alleged perjury - and I make no finding of perjury - occurred in other proceedings and I explicitly held in my interlocutory judgment that I have no role in further pursuit of the matter. Though, as will be seen, that issue does have a remaining relevance. As to SLAPP tactics, Ms. Kelly forgets that it was she who initiated these proceedings, not Townbe.

DECISION - INTERLOCUTORY COSTS APPLICATION BY STATE & DUBLIN CITY COUNCIL

51. In light of the foregoing and in the end, the position as to the State's costs and the Council's costs of the interlocutory motion is pretty simple. They follow the event of refusal of an interlocutory injunction on the basis that the case made for it was unstateable. The jointly represented State Defendants will have a single set of costs of the interlocutory injunction application against all Plaintiffs jointly and severally. The Council will also have its costs of the interlocutory injunction application against all Plaintiffs jointly and severally for the same reason - that the injunction was refused on the basis that the case which had been made for it was unstateable.

TOWNBE’S INTERLOCUTORY COSTS

52. I have found the issue of Townbe’s interlocutory costs more difficult. Townbe won the injunction application and the starting point, as recognised in Pembroke, is that they, too, should have their costs of it.

53. However, on 24 October 2024, in the hearing of argument as to the interlocutory injunction application, an issue arose as to whether Townbe intended to remove the roof of the former Crown Paints factory in a context in which it was alleged that the roof contained asbestos and that its removal could or would pose a risk to human health.

54. Counsel for Townbe says, now, that that issue is irrelevant to the interlocutory injunction costs as the asbestos and roof removal issue had not been pleaded at the time the interlocutory injunction application was argued and decided and that issue had not affected the outcome of the interlocutory injunction application. He says that at the hearing of the interlocutory injunction application he had taken instructions in some haste as to the issue of roof removal and took them only as I had required to be informed of certain matters. Counsel’s assertions are not in the end determinative of my view as to Townbe's costs of the interlocutory injunction application.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

55. I note that, in her e-mail to Townbe of 5 December 2025, Ms. Kelly asserts that Townbe had lied to its Appropriate Assessment37 expert as to the nature of its intended works, as a result of which Townbe had relied on a falsified Appropriate Assessment Report which, consistent with what she considered their conduct throughout the proceedings, had “brazenly lied” about their intention to remove the asbestos roof, stating, as she said that AA report had, that Townbe intended internal works only. I do not associate myself with the strength of or the precise terms in which Ms. Kelly makes her allegation against Townbe in this respect. However, as will be seen, there is at least some substance to her allegation.

56. The transcript of the hearing of 24 October 2024 records that Ms. Kelly emphasised the prospect of removal of 50% of the roof. She cited an affidavit sworn for Townbe which, she said, "clearly means that they are taking off the roof". I observed at one point:

"Ms. Kelly ... your point that it is an "inside-outside concept" as following from the 50% of the roof structure removed does seem to me to make a degree of sense."

That "inside-outside concept" was a phrase generated by Townbe.

57. Before lunch at that hearing, the following content of the transcript seems to me to be relevant. Ms. Kelly said, referring to an affidavit, as I say, sworn on behalf of Townbe:

"It says on this affidavit that it..." – i.e. Townbe – “...does intend to remove the asbestos roof. It says on paragraph 14: ‘...it is all under cover but 50% of the roof structure is removed so it is an inside-outside concept'. So, in order to start assembling and putting in their modular homes the first step would be to remove this asbestos roof.”

She said Townbe were going to "plough ahead" in doing so "with no asbestos notification" - by which she meant notification to the appropriate authorities that removal of a roof containing asbestos was to be embarked upon. She further said that:

"The fact that the roof is made of asbestos is a fair issue to be tried and very serious."

58. As I say, I ultimately rejected that particular assertion of a fair issue to be tried. But, certainly, the issue whether the roof contained asbestos and whether it was to be removed was canvassed at the hearing. Immediately before lunch, I said the following:

"It's almost five past one, I'll sit again at five past two. On that occasion I would like a proper understanding of where Townbe sees itself in terms of its ability to carry out works, whether it in fact, as it averred, had intended to carry out works on the 15th, what permissions it had to do it and how it saw itself as being in compliance with planning law in doing that.

Within the meaning of the Habitats Directive.

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Now when I made that enquiry I expressed some concern at what I had read, I may as well say so, but I am alive to the fact that the pleadings and the affidavits may not be directed properly to that issue.

However, I do think I can't ignore it."

I was referring to the asbestos and roof removal issue.

59. Counsel for Townbe, replied:

"Yes, Judge. Well, I'll do my best to take instructions in relation to that over lunch, Judge."

60. I pause here. I must presume that Townbe was taking these proceedings very seriously. If Townbe were not readily to hand to give proper instructions over lunch, that is their own misjudgement. Taking instructions on a matter over lunchtime is a routine feature of the inherent unpredictability of litigation. Things might have been different had counsel failed to get instructions and come back after lunch and said so and that he could not answer the questions I had put. But that is not what occurred. He got instructions over lunchtime. I see no reason why those instructions should not have been accurate as to what was, in the end, a relatively simple question: whether the roof or some of it was to be removed.

61. Some background is useful at this point. In April 2024, an AA Screening Report was prepared for Townbe. It was exhibited in the proceedings, as it happens by Townbe in its later motion to dismiss the proceedings. I refer in this respect to Exhibit PC4 to the affidavit of Paul Collins filed on 26 February 2025. That report only briefly describes the intended development. But it explicitly states: "No external works are proposed". Stating the obvious, but for the avoidance of doubt, I consider that the removal of all or part of the external surface of a roof, to be external works.

62. After the lunch break Townbe, referring to the affidavit sworn for Townbe in defence of the application, said, by counsel:

"I'm not sure that I am necessarily taking off half the roof, Judge. I appreciate that's what it says there. But I'm not sure that in fact that will be proceeded with, or at least that something as dramatic as that will be proceeded with."

Counsel continued, referring to the Townbe affidavit:

"He's talking about the removal of 50% of the roof structure, not 50% of the roof. The entire roof can remain in place and 50% of the structure on the inside can be removed. The 4(1)(h) exemption allows

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2026] IEHC 22 Costs Ruling

me to carry out those works as long as everything is taking place internally and the external appearance of the building isn't changed. That's 4(1)(h).”38

The reference to “4(1)(h)” is to section 4(1) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 which provides for circumstances in which development will be considered exempted development and as not requiring planning permission.

63. I replied:

“I must say I would understand 50% of the roof structure is removed to mean you're removing 50% of the roof. Is it something different?"

Counsel replied in turn:

“I can't avail of 4(1)(h) and do works on the outside. I can only avail of it if I'm doing works on the inside. So the court asked me, in fairness, how did we think we were going to be able to proceed.

That is the answer. And I contacted Mr. Duffy in relation to that." 39

Mr. Duffy, I should say, was Townbe's planning consultant and had sworn an affidavit on Townbe's behalf in the interlocutory injunction application.

64. The transcript continues with me asking:

"….. And your instructions are, notwithstanding paragraph 14..." – that is to say, paragraph 14 of Townbe's affidavit – "...that it is not intended to remove 50% of the roof structure?"

Counsel replied:

“No, I didn't say that, Judge. I said it's not intended to do external works to the building." 40

I replied:

"Okay, we may be at cross purposes. I am understanding that when you remove the structure of the roof you necessarily remove the roof itself, because the structure is what holds the roof up. So maybe I am wrong."

Counsel replied:

“In fairness, Judge, you're now asking me an engineering question.”

38 Emphasis added.

39 Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

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I replied:

“No, you're telling me that, when it says 50% of the roof structure is removed, and maybe I'm misunderstanding you and I don't want to be unfair. …….. My understanding of what you said is that 50% of the roof structure is removed means that some form of structure would be removed but the roof will remain in place?”

Counsel replied:

“Correct. And all that will be removed are things that are internal to the building. 41

“So whether that means, for example, that, let's say there are three braces or three struts bracing the roof and perhaps they are replaced with one fantastic support structure, I don't know how these things work, but that there is - certainly that the structure is reduced but it is done internally."

I then replied:

"It would help ... if Townbe made precisely clear what works it intended ... this affidavit ... when it says 50% of the roof structure is removed, I can see no way that anybody can be blamed for believing, on the basis of that averment, that Townbe intends to remove 50% of the roof."

By that, I should add, I clearly meant 50% of the exterior surface of the roof.

65. In my interlocutory judgment, I addressed this issue as follows:

"Counsel for Townbe suggested, on instruction, that the words "50% of the roof structure is removed" do not mean "50% of the roof is removed". He says they mean that the roof will stay in place with only substructure being removed. I do not find that a readily apparent interpretation ... Townbe only has itself to blame if others believe on foot of that affidavit, perhaps wrongly, that their proposed development involves removing 50% of a roof which, another document exhibited before me strongly suggests, has a considerable asbestos content all as part of a development they have described as an "inside outside concept". Imprecision in an affidavit is at the risk of the deponent, not of the reader."42

66. My interlocutory judgment43 was also critical of an affidavit sworn by Mr. Collins for Townbe in other proceedings in July 2024 which had been brought to my attention and which, it transpired, had necessitated that Townbe have sworn a corrective affidavit in those proceedings. I saw no need to take a view at that point and as I have said, I do not find that there was any perjury on the part of the Townbe in that affidavit which required correction. I reject Ms. Kelly's characterisation of the position in that respect. But I do think it can be said that the experience of having had to make a corrective affidavit should have been salutary and should have amplified for Townbe what they ought to have known already - and which no doubt they were

41 Emphasis added.

42 Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §24.

Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607 §§57 and 58.

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advised by their competent legal advisors - that is to say, the vital importance of accuracy and straightforwardness in its dealings with the court. Put simply, if one is once bitten one should be twice shy.

67. It later became clear, by an affidavit of Mr. Duffy sworn on 21 February 2025, that Townbe in fact intended considerable removal of the exterior surface of the roof. That affidavit was sworn on foot of my direction to Townbe of the 10 February 2025 to swear an affidavit deposing to and exhibiting drawings as to the scope of the intended works on the roof. It is clear from that affidavit that the intention was, and always was, to remove approximately 50% of the roof, that is to say, of the external roof surface. The only

conclusion I can draw is that the position stated to the court on the 24th of October 2024, on Townbe's explicit instruction, was false in this respect. Bluntly, it was untrue.

68. I hasten to repeat, as I said on various occasions in court, my acceptance that counsel had been incorrectly instructed. No blame attaches to counsel in this respect. For the same reason, I take the same view that no blame attaches to the AA expert as to the content of the AA report.

69. But for the foregoing circumstances, I would have awarded Townbe its costs of the interlocutory injunction, just as I have awarded such costs to the State and to the Council. It seems to me that Simpson is authority for a nuanced and proportionate response in such cases to the conduct of a party otherwise entitled to costs. I do not consider this to have been a case of widespread lying on oath on a matter central to the issue before the court. Though Townbe's misconduct was serious, it was appreciably less serious than the issue thrown up by the case of Simpson. I bear in mind that Simpson holds that the need to protect the integrity of court process will in practice be rare and the jurisdiction is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly, fairly and proportionately, weighing and balancing all relevant circumstances. While all turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, even Mr. Simpson got one-third of his costs.

70. Nor should I forget, in this context, that the Plaintiffs lost the injunction application as unstateable. Nor should I forget my criticisms of the basis upon which the Plaintiffs had moved that application. And the untrue information tendered by Townbe was not causative of the result of the interlocutory injunction application.

71. Nonetheless, in my view it is proper to mark the court's disapproval of the conveyance to the court of information which was untrue and for the tendering of which Townbe was responsible and which, in the wider context, Townbe can only have appreciated significantly bore on its assertion that its proposed development of the IPAS centre at the Crown Paints Site required internal works only and so was exempted development which did not need planning permission.

72. I will, therefore, mark that disapproval by awarding Townbe only 60% of its costs of the interlocutory injunction application. Again, those costs will be awarded against the Plaintiffs jointly and severally. I should say that I considered exercising my discretion by awarding Townbe a lesser proportion of those costs. One

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could have taken a variety of views on that issue and on the proper balance as between the parties. But, on balance, I have concluded that Townbe's misbehaviour was, as it related to its dealings with the court, of a somewhat lesser gravity than the respects in which I criticised the basis upon which the Plaintiffs moved their application.

MS KELLY’S APPLICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY COSTS

73. For the avoidance of doubt, it follows also from the foregoing that Ms. Kelly's application for the costs of interlocutory injunction proceedings is refused.

COSTS OF MOOT PROCEEDINGS

74. I now turn to the costs of the moot proceedings generally. The only relevant application in that respect is Ms. Kelly's application for those costs. What follows relates to the costs of the proceedings other than the costs of the interlocutory injunction application, which I have already awarded against her.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO MOOT

75. The factual background to the moot is as follows. The State made much in the proceedings and at the costs hearing of the fact that no contract had ever been signed by the State for the use of the old Crown Paints factory as IPAS accommodation. That is true but is a materially incomplete account of the position.

76. The following facts are not in dispute.

• By letter dated 19 December 2023,44 the Department of Children told Townbe that, subject to certain contingencies it was "delighted to confirm that the Department intends to enter into an agreed contract with Townbe for the use of the old Crown Paints factory as IPAS accommodation."

• In April 2024, Townbe sought a declaration of exemption from planning permission from the Council on the basis that the change of use to an IPAS centre would start on the 1 May 2024. In support it provided the Department of Children letter dated 9 December 2023. I think it may have provided that letter in a separate communication, but nothing turns on that.

• The July 2024 riots in Coolock, in protest at the foreseen use of the old Crown Paints factory as an IPAS accommodation need not be described here.

44 inaccurately referred to at various points at hearing as the "Wendy Doyle letter". The letter of 19 December 2023 was exhibited by the State in an

affidavit sworn at a later point in the proceedings by Ms. McGee.

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• The Minister for Children was reported by RTÉ on 17 July 2024 as responding to the riots by confirming that the old Crown Paints factory would be used to house international protection applicants.45 That the Minister made that announcement was acknowledged by counsel for the State at the costs hearing.

• The Comptroller and Auditor General has reported that the construction of IPAS centres was in many cases commenced before leases had been signed - though it should be said that those cases related to publicly-owned sites. And counsel for the Minister accepted at the costs hearing that the Comptroller and Auditor General had found that, in many instances, no contracts were in place with many IPAS centre occupiers.

77. In those circumstances, I place some, but far from decisive, weight on the State's repeated arguments that they had never contracted for an IPAS centre in the Crown Paint site and that their ultimate

decision was merely one not to make a contract to which they had never legally committed. Those arguments are more formal than substantial.

78. I am also satisfied that Townbe intended to do, and was advancing its plans to do, the works necessary to use the site as an IPAS centre, though political and other controversies put their plans on hold. And in this respect I mention, again, that their application in April 2024 for an exemption declaration had envisaged that the change of use in question would start on the 1 May 2024. Perhaps that was never a realistic date, but it certainly indicates an intention to proximately commence that change of use.

79. The proceedings issued in August 2024. Whatever might be said against the Plaintiffs' proceedings, it cannot be said that they were premature or that their apprehension of the prospect of the use of the Site as an IPAS centre was insufficiently grounded in the facts. In truth, when these proceedings started the prospect of an IPAS centre on the Site was both real and immediate.

80. It must also be said, however, that the Plaintiffs' proceedings were merely one part of a doubtless complex mosaic of public and political controversy.

81. Ultimately, the Government announced, by email of 16 May 2025, to numerous TDs, Senators and local elected representatives, that it was "no longer considering the offer of a potential IPAS accommodation centre at the former Crown Paints site". Ms. McGee’s affidavit of 18 July 2025 for the State exhibited the email of 16 May 2025 and "...confirmed that the Minister is no longer pursuing the housing of IPAs ..." that is, international protection applicants, "... at the site and there is no reason to expect that the position would change in the foreseeable future." In consequence, Townbe stated, and has maintained the position, that it no longer intends to develop the Site as such a centre.

45 The Plaintiffs exhibited material from the RTÉ website as Exhibit MK1 to the affidavit of Ms. Kelly of 16 October 2024 recording the view expressed by

the Minister.

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82. Ms. McGee’s affidavit says nothing more, explicitly, about the Minister's reasons for deciding not to proceed with the project. It also emphasises, as I have said, that the State had made no contract with Townbe for the use of the Site. It confirms the accuracy of a discussion before the Court on 17 July 2025 of the Minister's decision. However, I'm satisfied from my perusal of the transcript in question, that discussion, canvassed whether the proceedings were moot and whether if moot, they should nonetheless be heard and decided. But it did not elaborate on why the Minister had decided not to proceed with the project.

LAW ON COSTS OF A MOOT – HUGHES & PT

83. Turning to the law as to the costs of the moot, I primarily refer to Hughes.46 It refers to the case of PT47 but what follows is drawn primarily from Hughes.

84. The first important point in Hughes, it seems to me, is that the approach to the costs of a moot is not focussed on the merits or demerits, or the prospects of success or failure, of the underlying action. Rather it focuses on the cause of the mootness. In that regard, three broad propositions can be discerned.

"First, where the mootness arises as a result of an event that is entirely independent of the actions of the parties to the proceedings, the fairest outcome will generally be that the parties should bear the costs themselves. Neither is responsible for the mootness, and neither should have to pay for costs rendered unnecessary by an event for which they bear no responsibility."48

It seems to me that this principle requires a particular application in cases involving multiple parties on both sides of the argument. As I will indicate in due course, it appears to me that Townbe and Dublin City Council fall into that category of parties in respect of whom it cannot be said that any action on their part produced the moot.

85. The second principle is that:

"Where the mootness arises because of the actions of one of the parties alone and where those actions

(a) follow from the fact of the proceedings so that but for the proceedings they would not have been undertaken, or (b) are properly characterised as 'unilateral' or perhaps (c) are such that they could reasonably have been taken before the proceedings, or before all of the costs ultimately incurred in the proceedings were suffered, the costs should often … be borne by the party whose actions have resulted in the case becoming moot.49

46 Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393.

47 PT v Wicklow County Council [2019] IECA 346.

48 Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 §31.

Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 §32. Emphasis added.

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"Where, however, the mootness results from the unilateral act of one of the parties the court will ordinarily lean in favour of an order for costs against that party."50

In the case of a unilateral action causing a moot,

"The default position is that costs should be awarded against the party whose action caused the moot. That party bears the onus of showing that their actions were not in response to the proceedings." 51

86. It seems to me that the second principle needs to be properly understood. It indicates not that costs of a moot are to be awarded as a matter of inevitability against the unilateral actor who brought about the moot. Rather, it indicates that, in the ordinary way at least, they will be so awarded and that ordinarily, to fend off that possibility it would be necessary for the unilateral actor to adduce evidence showing that their unilateral act was not in fact a response to the proceedings.

87. The third general proposition in Hughes relates to the particular position of statutory bodies. I don't think I need to dwell on it for present purposes.

88. However, it appears to me important to refer to the qualifying observation in Hughes, citing PT, that:

"Each of these three propositions, it must be stressed, present a general approach..." – a guide – "...

rather than a set of fixed, rigid rules. The starting point is that the Court has an overriding discretion in relation to the awarding of costs, and the decisions to which I have referred are intended to guide the exercise of that discretion. They are thus properly viewed as presenting a framework for the application of the Court's discretion in the allocation of costs in a particular context and should not be applied inflexibly or in an excessively prescriptive manner."52

CUNNINGHAM

89. Ms. Kelly cited Cunningham,53 and so I will briefly consider it - though it preceded and was considered in Hughes. Cunningham related to the costs of a moot judicial review in which the applicant had sought to prohibit a criminal trial in which the State had entered a nolle prosequi. That is to say, the State had decided not to go ahead with the criminal prosecution, and, therefore, the question whether such prosecution should be prohibited had become moot. A witness essential to the prosecution had died, but the State submitted that the court should not infer that his death was the only matter which caused the nolle prosequi. The court held that the case had become moot by the unilateral action of the State. It also held

50 Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 §24.

51 Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 §40.

52 Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 §34.

Cunningham v President of the Circuit Court [2012] IESC 39, [2012] 3 IR 222.

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that there was a virtual absence of evidence as to the true reasons why the State had come to the view that the prosecution was no longer sustainable.

57. This case seems to me to be of a piece with Hughes. It is an example of the principle that a party to proceedings who unilaterally acts with the effect of rendering them moot often bears the costs of those proceedings unless they can show that their act rendering them moot was not prompted by the proceedings but was prompted by factors external to the proceedings. The unilateral actor bears the onus of so demonstrating. That being the principle, and absent such evidence, the result was that Ms. Cunningham got her costs.

58. I comment that Cunningham, like all such cases, was decided on its particular facts. It must also be read in light of Hughes which, as has been said, stresses that the starting point is that the court has an overriding discretion as to the awarding of costs and that the propositions upheld in Cunningham, PT and Hughes are not fixed, rigid rules but are a framework, a general approach, intended to guide the exercise of that discretion.

59. The three principles laid down in Hughes are, one may say, easy enough to apply where the unilateral act rendering the case moot is taken for a single or a few readily discernible reasons or for none that are discernible. While remembering that the onus of proof of a reason for a unilateral act which has rendered a case moot lies on the unilateral actor, it seems to me that where it is reasonably apparent that the unilateral act was likely prompted by broad and/or multifactorial reasons and considerations, the stress explicitly laid in Hughes on the proposition that the principles laid down are not rigid rules becomes all the more pertinent.

JUDGMENT OF 18 JULY 2025 DECLINING TO HEAR ANY MOOT

60. I turn then to my judgment of 18 July 2025 declining to hear any moot. It is in one respect unusual. All parties wanted the case to proceed. The Plaintiffs wanted it to proceed to trial. The Defendants wanted it to proceed to the determination of their respective motions to dismiss the proceedings as bound to fail. Ultimately, in argument at the hearing on 17 July 2025, the State accepted, first, that I had an own-motion jurisdiction to find the case moot and decline to hear it on that account, and second, that the case was in fact moot, at least and specifically as to the Crown Paints Site project. The State also accepted that much or all of the rest of the case might be moot for want of the factual matrix supplied by the proposal to open an IPAS centre at the Crown Paints Site.

61. In that judgment, and of my own motion, I held the case moot as to the Crown Paints Site IPAS centre project. As I have said, the Government had announced, by e-mail of 15 May 2025 to TDs, senators and local elected representatives, that it was no longer considering the offer of such an accommodation centre and in consequence, Townbe had said that it would no longer develop the Site as such a centre. I therefore held that the factual matrix which underlay the proceedings, as they related to accommodation of

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immigrants at that Site, had dissipated and, so, that all factual and legal issues relating to that project were moot and, further, that I would not exercise my discretion to decide those issues. I adjourned to further argument the question of whether that left anything live in the case.

RULING OF 14 NOVEMBER 2025 ON FINAL ORDERS

62. Such argument ensued and on 14 November 2025 I made an ex tempore ruling as to final orders. I don't need to recount much of that ruling save that it resulted in an order that the entire case be struck out. I did observe that it was, perhaps, illustrative of Ms. Kelly's approach to the litigation that rather than, as she might have chosen, seeing the Government's decision not to advance the Crown Paints Site project as "savouring of victory". Ms. Kelly now puts this observation to a use as to costs the weight of which it will not bear. My observation was not an acknowledgment that she had won the case. Rather it was an observation that she might have taken the subjective view that, one way or another, an important objective of the case as she saw it had occurred (as opposed to having been achieved by the proceedings). In fact she had taken, as was her choice, the view that the Government's decision not to advance the Crown Paints Site project was merely yet more evidence of the Defendants' perfidy in attempting to avoid litigation of the bigger issues as she saw them.

DECISION - COSTS OF MOOT – TOWNBE & COUNCIL

63. I come then to the decision as to the costs of the moot proceedings as they relate to the applications by Ms. Kelly against Townbe and the Council. As has been seen in Hughes, orders as to costs of a moot turn not on the perceived strengths or weaknesses of the case on either side, but on the cause of its becoming moot. The Council was no part of that cause. Townbe, it is true, said that they would not proceed with the IPAS centre. But that was no more than their inevitable acceptance of the fact that their only possible customer, the State, had abandoned the project. In short, neither Townbe nor the Council caused the moot. It occurred independently of any action by either of them.

64. Applying the first principle in Hughes of the three I have outlined, no order will be made for or against Townbe or the Council as to the costs of the proceedings generally.

MS KELLY’S LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER 2025

65. What remains, therefore, is the question whether Ms. Kelly should receive any costs against the State for the proceedings generally.

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66. Ms. Kelly in her e-mails of 5 December 2025 made a number of observations relevant to this issue. I don't propose to go through all of them or to go through them in detail, but I will mention some.

• First, she made the point that no defences had been filed in the case. I'm not entirely sure what she considered the consequences of that observation should be. But the fact is that no defences were filed for a very simple reason; all the Defendants decided to first motion the court for the dismissal of the proceedings as bound to fail. That was a course they were entitled to take. Whether those motions would have proved successful, we will never know.

• Second, Ms. Kelly said that “I would have won this case at trial and so am entitled to my costs.” She said that she was confident that she would have proven at trial her views as to "globalist forces profiteering from mass people trafficking, immigration and immigrants" and that the State's care for asylum seekers was "worse than Cromwell's and amount to a plantation of foreigners". As has been seen, Hughes is clear: that is not the basis upon which costs are awarded or refused or any costs order is made of a moot.

• Third, Ms. Kelly said, "the works did not proceed because we alerted the powers that be to the asbestos issue". I observe that there is no evidence that the works did not proceed for that reason.

• Fourth, Ms. Kelly also said that her "principal objective was accomplished", there will be no migrant centre on the Crown Paints site, she was entirely successful, and she was entitled to the costs of the entire proceedings as following that event.

67. That Ms. Kelly would have won at trial cannot be reliably discerned at this point. The Plaintiffs might or might not have succeeded. The Defendants might or might not have succeeded. We will never know which of them, Ms. Kelly or the Defendants, was correct because the trial will never occur. The Defendants, at least, thought it worth their while to motion for the dismissal of the case as hopeless. But as I have said, Hughes is clear that the question who would have won at trial is not the determinant of the costs of a moot.

68. Nor do the costs turn on whether the moot represents a victory; that is to say the achievement of the outcome desired by Ms. Kelly. The question, rather, is whether the proceedings caused the action of a party which caused the moot.

REASONS FOR UNILATERAL STATE DECISION TO ABANDON THE PROJECT

69. I come, therefore, to the question of the reasons for the State's unilateral decision to abandon the IPAS project at the Crown Paints Site. I find that, within the meaning of Hughes, the case became moot because of the Minister’s unilateral act in abandoning the project. It falls, therefore, within the second of the three principles in Hughes.

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70. Applying Hughes, therefore, the next question is whether the proceedings caused the Minister to make that unilateral decision. The State now submits, in letters of 27 November 2025 and an earlier letter of

6 November 2024 that, as had been explained to the Plaintiffs very early in the proceedings, its decision not to contract for accommodation at the Site was always possible where no decision had been made to make such a contract. As I have said, there is some weight in it, but I don't lay a lot of weight on that assertion.

71. The State also submits in the letter of 27 November 2025, however, that the decision not to contract for accommodation at the Site was wholly unconnected with the proceedings or any claims made by the Plaintiffs in them. I must bear in mind that beyond the limited evidence of Ms. McGee the State has not adduced admissible evidence on oath, rather than assertions in correspondence, as to the reasons for its abandonment of the Crown Paints IPAS centre project. The assertion that its decision was wholly unconnected with the proceedings was a mere assertion in inter-partes correspondence. I do not consider that the State has discharged by admissible explicit evidence the onus of demonstrating that its abandonment of the contract was unconnected to the proceedings. There is here an absence of explicit evidence for the reason for that decision similar to that found in Simpson. On that basis, I should, as Hughes provides, tend to award Ms. Kelly her costs of the moot proceedings

72. However, as has been seen, the Hughes principles have been stressed by Murray J in Hughes as not being rigid rules for mechanistic application. They are, rather, a guide to assist the exercise of the overarching discretion of the court as to costs.54

73. As to the exercise of that discretion, I consider that some relevant inferences can be drawn from the circumstances of and surrounding the case.

• I consider that these proceedings sit, and the Minister's abandonment of the project occurred, in a much wider political horizon and scope of national controversy than merely the proceedings - that is, both as to the Coolock IPAS project and as to similar projects in many locations nationwide.

• It is not palatable to conclude, and I do not conclude, that the Minister's decision was in response to the disgraceful riotous behaviour, the occurrence of which I can take judicial notice, and, in any event, which has been described in various respects in the proceedings. Indeed, the Minister's response immediately after the riots was that the project would proceed.

• However, though the rioters were clearly and, it must be stated, entirely, wrong in what they did, such riotous behaviour was clearly underlain by significant local community opposition to the project. My interlocutory judgment recognised that there can be proper reasons for such opposition. I refused in that judgment to attribute to the people of Coolock the improper and inflammatory reasons which I deprecated in my judgment and which had been articulated by the Plaintiffs in these proceedings. Ms.

Farrelly has articulated one such proper reason; that local essential services are already stretched to bursting point. Of course, I make no determination as to whether in fact local essential services are

Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 §34.

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stretched in any respect which would properly inform or determine a decision whether or not to proceed with an IPAS centre at Coolock. I merely observe that the view that local essential services were inadequate would have been a proper basis upon which to oppose the project. Whether such a basis of opposition would have succeeded would have been a matter for the judgment of those responsible for making that decision - which is not the Court.

• That the Minister's announcement that the project would not proceed was made by e-mail to multiple public representatives is, at least, strongly suggestive of political motives for the abandonment of the project, rather than the coercion of the proceedings.

• Further, when the Minister's abandonment of the project was announced by e-mail of 16 May 2025, his motion to dismiss the proceedings as hopeless had already issued - presumably on legal advice that it was at least worth bringing that motion. The State, as late as written submissions of 6 June 2005, contended that there was no moot and pressed to continue the proceedings to a ruling on its motion to dismiss the proceedings. So, even after its announcement that the project would not proceed, the State continued to advocate for the continuation of the proceedings to a determination. That is not suggestive that the fear of the proceedings themselves had significantly informed the decision to abandon the project. And while my interlocutory judgment certainly did not preordain the result of the Defendants'

motions to dismiss, it seems reasonable to consider that the Minister may have derived at least some confidence in those motions from the fact that in my interlocutory judgment I had held significant aspects of the alleged legal basis for the entire proceedings to be unstateable.

• It bears observing also that the moot here was not sought by the Minister, it was declared by me, of my own motion, despite the initial opposition of the Minister, though that opposition faded in argument at the hearing in that regard.

74. Far from a fear of the proceedings and a motivation to, as it were, collapse the scrum of the proceedings by his announcement, these factors speak both of a confidence in the Minister as to the weakness of the case against him - whether a justified confidence we will never know - and a consequent anxiety that the proceedings would continue to their dismissal. I readily infer from all the circumstances I have canvassed above that the reasons for the Minister's decision to abandon the project were very probably multifactorial and political at very least in large part and that these proceedings may have paid a lesser, even a minor part in this motivation. In making his decision, the Minister's horizons and motivations were as a matter of probability, indeed very likely, far broader than this case.

THE CONDUCT ISSUE

75. I return now to the trenchant criticisms I made in my interlocutory judgment of the deplorable basis upon which this case was pleaded and argued. The question now is not whether those bases should inform an order for costs against Ms. Kelly. As to the proceedings generally, none is sought against Ms. Kelly. But in my view, those criticisms of her conduct of the proceedings on which, as Townbe points out, she has doubled-down in continuing to invoke the highly culturally charged and inflammatory trope of “Cromwellian

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plantation” imposed on "indigenous Irish" properly can and should weigh in at least some appreciable degree against the award of costs to Ms. Kelly.

76. It is well-recognised that costs orders can properly reflect the court's disapproval of the conduct of a case. There is some public interest that those who formally plead and mobilise as legal argument the types of opinion mobilised by the Plaintiffs and deprecated by me in my interlocutory judgment should not be seen to recover the costs of the proceedings in which they had done so.

77. I should add that counsel for the State directed me to certain elements of the Statement of Claim delivered in November 2024. To the extent that such content criticises my management of and decisions in the case, and whatever the sense in which such content of a Statement of Claim might be criticised, I think it wiser to ignore those criticisms for present purposes, save to observe that, in my interlocutory judgment, I clearly explained why the views I expressed did not represent the denial of Ms. Kelly's right to the expression of her political opinion: rather they were a proper response to the deployment of those opinions in legal proceedings as a basis upon which legal relief was sought.

DECISION ON MS KELLY’S APPLICATION FOR COSTS

78. In conclusion, therefore, and in all the foregoing circumstances, I consider that the discretion stressed by Mr. Justice Murray in Hughes as to the costs of a moot is exercisable in this case and I therefore decline to award any costs of the proceedings to Ms. Kelly.

ORDERS

90. Accordingly, there will be orders as follows

• As to the costs of interlocutory injunction application, orders for the State and the Council against each of the Defendants jointly and severally. While, at the request of counsel for the State, I will make costs orders in favour of each State Defendant, I make it clear that only one set of costs is recoverable and recovery by any State Defendant will, ipso facto, discharge to the extent of such recovery the costs orders in favour of all State Defendants.

• As to the costs of interlocutory injunction application, orders for 60% of a single set of Townbe’s costs against each of the Defendants jointly and severally. Again, I will make costs orders in favour of each Townbe Defendant, but make it clear that only one set of costs is recoverable and recovery by any Townbe Defendant will, ipso facto, discharge to the extent of such recovery the costs orders in favour of all Townbe Defendants.

• Ms Kelly’s application for costs is refused.

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• There will be no other order as to costs.

David Holland 15/1/26