High Court dismisses divorce property dispute, ordering third-party management due to party intransigence.

APPROVED

REDACTED

FOR PUBLICATION

THE HIGH COURT

FAMILY LAW

[2026] IEHC 21

Record No. M/2021/125

Between:

G.G.

Applicant

AND

H.I.

Respondent

Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 12th January 2026.

Introduction

1. The matter currently for determination must, at its most benign, be described as unfortunate. The parties have been blessed with a comfortable lifestyle, positive occupational circumstances and clearly talented and achieving children and yet they continue to engage in an acrimonious, prolonged and unseemly dialogue necessitating this application to court to resolve what must be described as insubstantial matters after reaching consent terms in the context of ruling a divorce settlement in 2022.

2. Most fortunately, I often find myself congratulating couples who have navigated the emotional rollercoaster of relationship breakdown and have been able to compromise their post-relationship arrangements. Such congratulation is entirely justified and deserved. The positive achievement represented by such compromise is never to be underestimated and ought always to be recognised and encouraged. In consequence, it is most regrettable when this achievement is set at nought through breach: nonperformance, deficient performance or other obfuscation. It would be naïve not to recognise that post-settlement difficulties can and do arise and there may be very legitimate reasons for such difficulties which make further court assistance necessary.

It is the job of the court to use its best endeavours to resolve these in accordance with law and always being mindful of restoring the spirit of resolution which the initial settlement represented.

3. The present case is far removed from such a situation. This application is one of intransigence over relatively trivial matters in circumstances where there is absolutely no difficulty or inability due to personal or financial circumstances to resolve the issues. The matter comes before me for determination, and I have done so. I must comment that court time and resources come at a cost – a cost to other court users and, in particular, to children in respect of whom court applications are required. The negative impact of disputes such as the present impact not only the parties and their families but other families who will have to wait longer for access to the court in consequence.

4. At the outset of this application, Counsel for the Applicant fairly and openly acknowledged that certain of the concerns arising in this application were very much at the lower end of the scale in terms of value. This is undoubtedly so. I do, however, wish to state that compliance with court orders is not selective and not partial. Court orders cannot and ought not to be ‘sliced and diced’, complied with as the performer deems fit. There may, of course, be instances of de minimus breach where a court would have to determine if enforcement applications were themselves unreasonable.

On the other hand, minor breaches may sometimes be more insidious. These are unnecessary and, in consequence, may demonstrate an attempt to weaponise performance of the Court orders. This would, in my view, be a most unfortunate and regrettable state of affairs.

5. The parties in this case settled their divorce proceedings in 2022. A Decree of Divorce and ancillary reliefs in the context of proper provision were ordered by this Court on the 16th December 2022. While there has been substantial compliance with these terms, the difficulties brought before me have been ongoing since shortly after the compromise and have generated a voluminous amount of correspondence, much of which was put before me. I have no doubt that had straight forward correspondence resulted in straight forward replies, the volume of such correspondence might have been reduced and the resolution of outstanding issues better advanced.

6. There are three issues arising: Maintenance, house contents, the joint rental property.

A. Maintenance.

7. The Applicant seeks maintenance arrears of €3689.83. These, she alleges, comprise non-payments and partial payments where deductions not in accordance with the Order were made by the Respondent for alleged expenses. These arrears, she alleges, have accrued over the period since the compromise agreement.

8. The maintenance provisions in the settlement terms ruled by the Court were extremely straight forward (paragraphs 5 and 8). There was to be an initial maintenance payment of €2,600 succeeded by a monthly payment of €500 for each of two dependent children. Additionally, there were certain stated children’s expenses which were to be equally borne by the parties. The stated expenses (paragraph 8) are medical, educational, orthodontic and dental expenses of the children. It would appear that the first payment due of €2,600 resulted in a payment of only €2,300. The last mentioned is not denied in the replying Affidavit of the Respondent.

9. The two dependent children were, at the time of settlement, attending university and in secondary school respectively. The Applicant alleges that there were four months when no payment was made for one or other of the children. The Respondent does not contest that he did not pay on these, asserting that he was not obliged to do so.

10. The first such non-payment was for the month of July at the end of the older child’s third year in college. The child in question had recently completed attending university abroad under the Erasmus programme. This child returned to college in September of that year, entering upon the fourth and final year of university. Two other periods of non-payment are in similar circumstances (university holiday period)

– July and August 2025 – but these relate to the younger child. The essence of the Respondent’s complaint, as set out in his replying Affidavit and in oral submissions, seems to be that the children (a) are not in full time education over the summer months; (b) have summer jobs from which they are earning money and (c) that the lapse of their student cards for the summer months supports his assertion of nondependency (I do not know if this is factually correct or not but I do not consider it material in any event). I do not accept his arguments, and I definitively reject any assertion that a dependent child ceases to be dependent during college vacation periods.

11. Section 2 of the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996 provides:

“dependent member of the family”, in relation to a spouse, or the spouses, concerned, means any child –

(a) of both spouses or adopted by both spouses under the Adoption Acts, 1952 to 1991, or in relation to whom both spouses are in loco parentis, or

(b) of either spouse or adopted by either spouse under those Acts, or in relation to whom either spouse is in loco parentis, where the other spouse, being aware that he or she is not the parent of the child, has treated the child as a member of the family who is under the age of 18 years or if the child has attained that age—

(i) is or will be or, if an order were made under this Act providing for periodical payments for the benefit of the child or for the provision of a lump sum for the child, would be receiving full-time education or instruction at any university, college, school or other educational establishment and is under the age of 23 years, or

(ii) has a mental or physical disability to such extent that it is not reasonably possible for the child to maintain himself or herself fully; …” (underlining added)

12. Summer employment has been the mainstay of third level students over many, many years. Third level education is undoubtedly a huge privilege for all those fortunate enough to be in a position to avail of it, but it does involve a situation where the normal indicia of adulthood are somewhat deferred – part of the emerging adulthood scenario. Resources for most are confined – sometimes very confined – as these dependent children (albeit that they are adults) are dependent upon family, State or extra-curricular earnings. Extra-curricular earnings allow for a semblance of adult independence to be enjoyed and, for those fortunate enough, some of the nonessentials of life to be experienced. Extra-curricular or summer employment does not serve to cease dependency for the benefit of a maintenance debtor. Educational enterprises operate according to a continuum which includes periods when the institution may be on holidays but the educational course being pursued is on-going.

A child remains in full time education for the duration of the third level experience, including during the vacation periods, until the course concerned is completed or ceased and is receiving full time education and instruction for that period.

Dependency, of course, ceases once the child reaches the age of 23 years.

13. Material changes in circumstances may result in maintenance review applications but there is no such application before me. While in no manner determining that this is such a case (I do not believe it to be so), circumstances can be envisaged where the financial circumstances of adult children might give rise to such a material change.

14. The last period of alleged non-payment is September 2024. It appears that the younger of the dependent children commenced third level education in September 2023. The choice of course was not successful. This would appear to have emerged relatively quickly into the course. The child did not sit the December 2023 college examinations and notified the university that they would not be continuing at the end of January 2024. The Respondent in his replying Affidavit states that this child “sadly dropped out at Christmas 2023”. Work in retail was commenced by this young person and this and other employments continued until the successful resumption of third level education in September 2024. While one would expect parents to be delighted at this resumption, this educational hiccup has been turned into a source of acrimony. While college term recommenced in mid-September 2024, notification of intention to re-enter was given previously and the Applicant notified the Respondent in August 2024 of the imminent return. The Respondent did not discharge maintenance for September 2024. The Respondent paid maintenance until February 2024 but claims entitlement to a refund for months prior. These exchanges can only be described as unbecoming, at their mildest. I have determined that full time education continued until the end of 2023 (although I accept that the likelihood of continuing with the first chosen course was diminished prior to this). Full time education recommenced in September. I conclude therefore that the month of September 2024 is due and owing but a credit is due for January and February 2024.

15. I therefore conclude that in relation to full non-payments, there were four unpaid months but a credit for two months leaving a sum due and owing of €1,000. Together with the deficiency from the first larger payment, the sum due and owing arising from direct payments amounts to €1,300.

16. The balance of €1,389.83 relates to deductions made from maintenance by the Respondent. He asserts that he paid expenses of the children for which the Applicant should have assumed (under the terms agreed or by agreement of the parties or otherwise) equal responsibility. Much of this sum relates to payments for air tickets.

Air travel expenses are not part of the expenses listed in the terms of settlement.

Therefore, if these are assumed by a parent, such assumption is a voluntary matter and a voluntary increase in support payments. It is always open to parents to pay expenses and maintenance for their children at rates in excess of those court ordered should they desire so to do. I note from paragraph 14 of the Respondent’s replying Affidavit that he makes such additional payments for which he is to be commended.

If a parent determines so to do, this does not entitle them to a credit or maintenance deduction. A small amount of the sums thus deducted are for expenses which are to be equally divided under the terms of settlement. The Respondent in paragraph 17 of his replying Affidavit described these as “not material”. The Applicant asserts a lack of vouching. The terms of settlement do not expressly provide for vouching of asserted expenses. It is beyond inexplicable that this matter comes before the Court and could not be resolved inter partes. The list of divisible expenses is clear. In consequence, those expenses not listed are also clear. It is also inexplicable why divisible expenses could not be vouched if vouching is requested. It is very difficult to comprehend the emotional trauma which this type of inter parental pettiness must have on children, even adult children. I was shocked by the suggestion that the, albeit adult, children (now child as there is only one remaining dependent) would be involved in the expenses division exercise (the parties suggested paying the one-half share directly to the children) – children should not be made debt collectors in the context of parental unreasonableness. In the context of these deductions, I have decided that additional arrears in the sum of €1,200 should be paid to the Applicant.

17. I therefore make the following orders in relation to maintenance:

1. Arrears of maintenance in the sum of €2,500 are to be paid to the Applicant within 14 days of this date.

2. Maintenance for the one dependent child is to be paid monthly by standing order on the 1st day of each month going forward, without any deduction.

3. In respect of listed expenditure for which each party is responsible as to one half, a list of such expenditure is to be provided by each parent to the other on a three-monthly basis in the form of a list of expenses and with a receipt vouching the expenditure attached. One half of the sums discharged are to be paid within 14 days of such vouching.

4. In respect of all other expenses (or any other additional support payments), these are a matter for agreement with the child or agreement between parents on a voluntary basis, outside the terms of the Orders of this Court.

B. House contents

18. A schedule (“Schedule C”) was appended to the settlement terms in relation to contents division. The Applicant was to receive, inter alia, a card table with brass inlay and two couches from the front room. She had not received the former and had only, she asserted, received one of the latter. The Respondent had definitively averred in his Affidavit (at paragraph 13) that he did not have the table. The averment relating to the latter was unclear. The Applicant indicated that if the Respondent gave evidence on oath that he did not have the second sofa, she would accept this. This was not a new sofa. This was not a valuable sofa and this issue comes very, very close to the de minimis principle which might sometimes arise to which I have previously referred. However, I have determined to deal with this due to the unsatisfactory nature of the Respondent’s response, describing the issue as “a red herring”. I do not consider it such. A “red herring” is something which misleads or distracts from the truth. I am unclear as to what truth the Respondent asserts was being corrupted in this instance. I heard evidence from the Respondent. A simple statement that he did not have the item in question was all the Applicant sought. I found his evidence to be evasive, lacking in clarity and obfuscatory. Photographs of the couches were produced which the Respondent said, “could be one couch”, as in the same couch. He reluctantly accepted that there were two couches in the room in question and appeared to be carefully framing his answer to say that he removed a couch from the back room while being entirely unprepared to simply state that he did not have either of the relevant couches. In response to me, he informed me of the place of purchase of the two couches (which he denied were a pair although bought together in the same place, upholstered to match and placed in the same room in the family home). He confirmed that the couch he had was bought from a particular supplier, being the supplier from which he accepted the front room couches were acquired, while acknowledging that the other (similar) couch was bought elsewhere.

He then resumed expressions of doubt about the photographs, and he denied that the two sofas bought together were a matching pair. His evidence in relation to all of this was unbecoming. I am ordering:

1. The gold-coloured sofa which the Respondent has is to be delivered to the Applicant in an unharmed condition within 14 days of this date. The Respondent is to arrange delivery of same by reputable furniture removal persons and he is to be responsible for the cost of such removal.

C. The joint rental property

19. Part of the terms of settlement included that a rental property, comprising a number of rental units, would be held by the parties as tenants in common as to 30% to the Applicant and 70% to the Respondent. The gross rental income, after deduction of expenses, was to be divided between the parties in the same percentages as their holdings. The Applicant made a number of complaints concerning exclusion and lack of transparency. The Respondent denied these. The terms of settlement provided for property partnership agreement to be entered into between the parties. The Applicant had had such agreement drafted which the Respondent rejected, viewing the terms as too complex and placing too many obligations upon him and none on the Applicant.

The Respondent did not provide any draft and seemed to be of the view that the Applicant should continue to furnish further amended drafts, having regard to his objections. The Respondent also asserted that he should receive a 12.5% management fee. When I suggested that an independent agency be retained to manage the property, the Respondent said that there would be no profit from the rental if this occurred.

20. When I heard this matter, I directed the Respondent to furnish his draft property partnership agreement within 14 days and the Applicant to respond within the same period. Absent agreement, I would determine the terms upon which the jointly held property was to be managed. This proposal and counterproposal have now been furnished to me.

21. There is no doubt that the term, in the settlement terms, is unfortunate. It states:

“The Applicant and the Respondent shall execute a property partnership agreement to regulate the ongoing operation of the property”.

It is an agreement to agree, and such agreements are, in general, unenforceable due to uncertainty.1 While an agreement to enter into meaningful negotiations may be enforceable, an agreement to agree terms as yet unknown and unspecified is not. The term in the settlement in this case is saved by application to court being envisaged in default. The terms state:

“Liberty to apply to this Honourable Court in relation to any serious dispute concerning the operation of the said partnership and further liberty to apply in respect of future sale of the said property.”

22. It is much to be preferred, where a subsequent agreement is required in order to operate settlement terms (e.g. shareholders’ agreement; property partnership agreement or such like) that the ruling or the finalising of the ruling would be adjourned so that this issue is resolved before the ruling is finalised. If this occurs, problems relating to such undoubtedly necessary additional agreement may be resolved substantially contemporaneously with the settlement terms being ruled and the Decree granted.

23. In accordance with my directions, the Respondent furnished a proposed Partnership Agreement to the Applicant by email of the 8th December 2025. The Applicant was not agreeable to this and, by letter of the 22nd December 2025 set out in detail the issues arising from her perspective. The Applicant seeks to have her proposed Partnership Agreement, originally furnished in January 2025, approved by me. It is my view that both of these documents envisage a degree of co-operation between the parties and an ability to co-work which on the evidence before me I do not consider to have any real prospect of success. I am of the view that external, third-party management of the commercial property concerned is the only realistic option.

Having considered the proposed property partnership agreements proffered by both parties, I order:

1. The jointly held property is to be placed with a property management agency who will manage it. Annual accounts prepared by this management agency are to be provided to both parties and the agency to pay the gross rent after expenses to the parties in accordance with their percentage share in it.

Bula v Tara Mines Unreported, 6 February 1997 (Lynch J.)

2. If such management company cannot be agreed, three names are to be submitted to the court within 14 days with the retainer terms and conditions of each annexed to the list.

3. Both parties are directed to fully co-operate with the provision of all information and keys/fobs/codes/copy tenancy agreements etc. as the agency may require and, in the event of default of agreement between the parties in relation to any decision concerning the rental of the property, the agency’s advice shall prevail.

4. In the event that an alternative Property Partnership arrangement (by way of a Property Partnership Agreement) is concluded as between the parties and such agreement is executed by them both within four weeks of the date of this judgment, I will vacate the Orders at 1 – 3 of this portion of my judgment.

24. I have little hope that these parties will succeed in managing this property together given their relationship and the history which is amply clear from this application. I very much hope that they will be able to do so as the property concerned seems to be a profitable commercial enterprise. It is for this reason that management by a third party seems appropriate although I do accept that this may reduce the profit levels from the enterprise. There is liberty to apply in respect of sale in the terms of settlement, but no such application was brought before me although the Respondent was suggesting this in correspondence and by way of submission. The Applicant’s Counsel was very clear that an Order for sale was not being sought by the Applicant.

In these circumstances, the issue of sale is not before me and therefore I make no determination in this regard.

25. I will hear from the parties in relation to costs and any other matters arising.