High Court finds solicitors in contempt and orders remote attendance to ensure public justice.

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 132

[ Record No 2026/18P ]

BETWEEN

ENOCH BURKE

PLAINTIFF

AND

SEAN O’LONGAIN, GERALDINE O’BRIEN AND JACK CLEARY

DEFENDANTS

Judgment (No. 2) of Mr. Justice Cregan delivered on 4th day of March, 2026

Introduction

1. This is my second judgment in this case. My first judgment in this matter was an extempore judgment delivered on Friday, 20th February 2026 ([2026] IEHC 126.) In that judgment, I struck out the plaintiff's proceedings as being moot, in circumstances where the first and third defendants had resigned from the Disciplinary Appeal Panel (“DAP”) and the second defendant had effectively given an undertaking that she would no longer serve on any new DAP.

2. This judgment deals with two further issues in these proceedings:

(1) first, Mr. Burke's application that I should address a specific argument which he made at the hearing on 20th February and which he complains I did not address in my first judgment (i.e. his argument that I should send Mr. O'Longain's affidavits to the Director of Public Prosecutions, on the grounds that he, Mr.

Burke, alleges that Mr. O’Longain has lied on affidavit and committed perjury);

and

(2) secondly, whether a contempt of court was committed by Mrs. Martina Burke and Ms. Ammi Burke at the hearing on Friday, 20th February 2026.

Background

3. Before I deal with these issues, I should set out the background to these matters. Mr. Burke was dismissed by Wilsons Hospital for gross misconduct in or about January 2023. He then exercised his right of appeal to the Disciplinary Appeal Panel. The Disciplinary Appeal Panel was formed. Mr. Burke challenged one of the members of the DAP on the grounds of objective bias. He was unsuccessful in the High Court but he was successful in the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal ruled that Mr. Christie could no longer serve on the Disciplinary Appeal Panel on the grounds of objective bias.

4. As a result, a second DAP was formed and it had a hearing on 13th December 2025. On the day before the hearing, Mr. Burke applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay on the DAP hearing the case, on the grounds of alleged inconsistent statements made by (i) a member of the Court of Appeal hearing his appeal in 2023 and (ii) statements made by a member of the Court of Appeal in its decision in Burke v. O'Longain in July 2025. The Court of Appeal refused his application for a stay. The Disciplinary Appeal Panel proceeded with its hearing on 13th December 2025.

5. On 6th January 2026, Mr. Burke instituted the present proceedings. The primary relief he sought was an injunction to restrain all three members of the DAP from continuing with hearing his appeal and an order that all three members of the DAP should stand down. His case was based on a number of grounds. In particular, he sought a declaration that Ms.

Geraldine O’Brien, the second named defendant, should be disqualified on the grounds of objective bias. He also complained that the hearing deprived him of some of his key constitutional rights including the right to cross-examine. Mr. Burke sought short service of the notice of motion in early January 2026 and the matter came before the court again on 14th January 2026.

6. On that date, I indicated to Mr. Burke that, in my view, from reading the papers, he had raised substantive and credible issues and I proposed to release him from prison (where he is currently imprisoned for his ongoing contempt of court for trespassing on the grounds of Wilsons Hospital School) so that he could properly prepare for his case. I indicated to Mr. Burke in clear terms that he would continue to be bound by the permanent injunction granted by Mr. Justice Owens. (I dealt with these matters in my fourth judgment in Wilson's Hospital School v Burke (No. 4) [2026] IEHC 31.)

7. Mr. Burke was released from prison that day, and instead of spending his time wisely preparing for this case, he decided that he would commit another contempt of court and trespass again upon the school property. As a result, he was again arrested and imprisoned within a few days.

8. Also, on 14th January 2026 (the DAP having given an undertaking not to continue with its hearing until the resolution of the proceedings), I gave directions for the exchange of affidavits and legal submissions and adjourned the matter until 4th February. On 4th February, I expected to set an urgent hearing date for the hearing of Mr. Burke’s injunction application because Mr. Burke is in prison.

9. However, on 3rd February, the day before the case was due to be mentioned in court, correspondence from the defendant’s solicitors indicated that Mr. O'Longain and Mr. Jack Cleary, the first and third defendants, had resigned from the DAP.

The hearing on 4th February, 2026

10. At the hearing on 4th February, Mr. Lyons SC for the defendants submitted that in those circumstances, the case was moot. Mr. Burke objected to this and requested a period of two weeks in which to consider the matter. I agreed to this application and adjourned the matter to 20th February 2026.

11. I also indicated that it seemed to me that there were at least two issues which were still live. These were: (i) that Mr. Burke was seeking, in his plenary summons, a declaration that all three members of the DAP should stand down and that only two had; and (ii) that he was seeking a declaration that Ms. O’Brien should step down from the panel because she was objectively biased. These were matters that I suggested needed to be considered by both parties.

12. On the day before the next hearing (i.e. on 19th February 2026) the defendants swore an affidavit, exhibiting various correspondence. In this correspondence, it was clear that Ms. Geraldine O'Brien was, in effect, giving an undertaking that, as a new DAP would have to be formed, and as one of the rules of the Disciplinary Appeal Process was that a person who had previously served, could not serve again, she would not serve in any new DAP.

13. At the hearing on 4th February 2026, Ms. Mallon BL on behalf of Wilson's Hospital sought to make submissions to the court. Mr. Burke objected on the grounds that she had no right of audience before the court. I indicated that I agreed with this and I indicated to Ms. Mallon BL that if the school wished to bring a motion to be joined as a notice party, it could consider doing so.

14. On 18th February 2026, the school brought an application for short service of a notice of motion to be joined as a notice party. I granted short service for this motion to be made returnable before the court on 20th February 2026.

The hearing on 20th February 2026

15. There were therefore two matters before the court at the hearing on 20th February 2026. The first was the school's application to be joined as a notice party; the second was the plaintiff’s application for an interlocutory injunction and the defendant's submission that Mr. Burke’s proceedings should be struck out on the grounds that they were now moot.

(i) The court's warning to Mr Burke and members of his family

16. At the very start of the hearing, at approximately 10:30am on Friday, 20th February 2026, I gave a clear warning to Mr. Burke (which I had regularly given) that if any of his submissions or conduct strayed beyond what I regarded as acceptable behaviour, I would direct that he would be immediately returned to Mountjoy prison and that the hearing would continue with him online.

17. I also gave a warning that if any member of Mr. Burke's family present in court interfered with, or interrupted, the court hearing in any way, I would immediately direct that Mr. Burke be returned to Mountjoy Prison and that the hearing would continue online.

18. I then indicated that I intended to consider:

(1) the school's application to be joined as a notice party first; and

(2) to then hear the defendant's application to strike out the proceedings as being moot.

19. Mr. Burke immediately objected to this sequence, arguing that the issue on mootness should go first and that the application to be joined as a notice party should be heard second.

20. I indicated to him that I disagreed with this submission and that the logic of the position was that I first needed to decide who was entitled to address the court on the issue of mootness and therefore I had to first consider the issue of whether the school could be joined as a notice party.

21. Rather than have Ms. Mallon BL open her application, in order to save time, I asked Mr. Burke whether he was consenting to that application, Mr. Burke indicated in strong terms that he was opposed to the application to join the school as a notice party. When he had finished, I then invited Ms. Mallon BL to formally open her application. She then opened her affidavit and opened an exhibit (which was a letter to Mr. Burke) in the usual way. Ms. Mallon BL acted entirely within the bounds of a proper opening of an application before court.

(ii) Interruption of court proceedings – contempt of court

22. What then happened was that whilst Ms. Mallon BL was opening an exhibit (i.e. the letter to Mr. Burke), Mr. Burke stood up and loudly protested that Ms. Mallon BL should not be allowed to open this letter and that it was completely unacceptable and disgraceful. I indicated to Mr. Burke that she was perfectly entitled to read out this letter in the usual way and asked him to resume his seat. However, Mr. Burke refused to do so and continued to protest loudly and vociferously to me in respect of this matter. I asked Mr. Burke on at least three occasions to resume his seat but he refused to do so.

23. At this point, Mrs. Martina Burke, his mother, and Ms. Ammi Burke, his sister, stood up and began shouting and roaring at the court and at Ms. Mallon BL at the top of their voices. They protested loudly that the panel “is still in existence” that “Geraldine O’Brien is still on the panel”, that she had not resigned etc.

24. The sight of all three members of the Burke family (i.e. Mr. Enoch Burke, Mrs. Martina Burke and Ms. Ammi Burke) all shouting and roaring at the court, whilst I was hearing a motion to join a notice party was astonishing, even though they have done it numerous times before. The recording on the DAR does not, and cannot, capture the atmosphere caused in the courtroom by their intense and venomous interruptions. Likewise, the transcript of the DAR, at an even further remove, would fail to capture the incident as it really was.

25. Such was the level of shouting and roaring directed at the court, that I simply could not be heard above their shouting. I tried repeatedly to ask them to sit down and to be quiet. I could not be heard over the din and they refused to abide by the directions of the court.

26. At this time, a large number of gardai (perhaps as many as ten or twelve) who were present in court – as they always are when Mr. Burke's cases are before the court – came into the well of the court, in order to protect the court from any further misbehaviour and to carry out such directions of the court as might be given. It has been my custom in the past, when the Burkes create such disturbances, to ask members of An Garda Siochana to remove members of the Burke family from the court so that the hearing can resume, and to rise whilst this happens.

27. However, on this occasion, the interruptions were so loud and so vociferous that I simply could not be heard over the shouting of Mr. Burke, Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke. Indeed, I decided that, rather than just having them removed, I would issue an order for the attachment of Mrs. Martina Burke and Ms. Ammi Burke there and then, and direct that they should be brought back before the court at 2pm for a hearing on contempt of court, but such was the commotion that I was unable to be heard above their uproar.

28. I would pause here to remark how extraordinary it is that a Judge of the High Court cannot be heard to issue an order for attachment against two parties to be brought before the court later in the day, to answer a charge of contempt of court, because of the level of shouting and roaring which those same persons were engaged in. It is unprecedented, in my experience.

29. There is no case in the Chancery List – apart from that of Mr. Burke – where I have had to rise on each and every occasion when the Burke cases are before the court and ask the gardai to remove members of the Burke family from the court for their continuous shouting and roaring at the court during hearings. The behaviour of the Burkes therefore is truly exceptional and has to be seen to be believed.

30. As the disturbance continued, and as there was no sign of Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke or Mr. Enoch Burke sitting down, or stopping their shouting, despite repeated requests to do so, I rose to allow the gardai to remove Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke from the court. I also directed that Mr. Burke be returned to Mountjoy Prison and that I would resume the hearing at 12 midday on-line.

31. Even when I was outside the court, I could hear the continuous shouting and roaring as they were removed from the court. These outbursts were certainly not warranted by whether the school was joined as a notice party to the proceedings.

32. It is clear that the proceedings descended into chaos and had to be abandoned until later in the morning. It was a gross disruption of court proceedings and an affront to the administration of justice.

(iii) Resumption of the proceedings

33. After Mr. Burke had been returned to Mountjoy prison, I resumed the hearing at about 12.15pm. I made the order that the school be joined and I heard the application by counsel on behalf of the defendants to have the proceeding struck out on grounds of mootness. Mr. Burke then made his objections. Ms Mallon BL also made submissions.

34. I then proceeded to give an ex-tempore judgment in this matter as the issues were crystal clear. Mr. Burke had sought a declaration that all three members of the DAP should resign and that there should be a new DAP. He had achieved this objective because two members of the panel had resigned and the third member, Ms. Geraldine O'Brien, had agreed not to take any part in the work of the new DAP because of the DAP rules. In his central objective, therefore, Mr. Burke had been successful. This however did not satisfy him. He wanted the proceedings to continue, to seek a declaration that Ms. O'Brien was objectively biased and therefore should resign from the panel. There was, however, no point in continuing with these proceedings, wasting valuable court time and imposing costs on the defendants in circumstances where a new DAP had to be formed and she had agreed that she could not serve on the new DAP. This court does not engage in proceedings which are wasteful of precious court time and wasteful of legal costs to satisfy the whims of Mr. Burke.

35. It was not clear to me at all why Mr. Burke was objecting to the striking out of the proceedings. He had achieved all of his objectives which were, in substance, an order that the existing members of the Disciplinary Appeal Panel should step aside and that a new Disciplinary Appeal Panel should be formed.

The ex parte application on Monday, 23rd February 2026

36. I had intended to request the registrar to write to Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke to indicate to them that I wished to invoke the contempt of court jurisdiction because of their conduct on 20th February 2026, and to direct them to appear before the court on Wednesday, 25th February 2026. However, as it happened, Dr. Isaac Burke, Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke appeared in my court towards the end of the list on Monday, 23rd February 2026 at approximately 12:30pm to make an ex parte application on behalf of Mr. Burke.

37. Dr. Burke indicated that Mr. Enoch Burke wished to apply to me to request that I deal with an argument of his which, he said, I had not addressed in the course of my ex-tempore judgment on 20th February 2026. This issue was that he had argued that I should refer Mr. O'Longain's affidavits to the DPP for perjury. I indicated to Dr. Burke that I would hear this application on Wednesday, 25th February 2026.

38. I also addressed Mrs. Martina Burke and Ms. Ammi Burke directly as they were in court, and I indicated to them that I intended to invoke the contempt of court jurisdiction because of their behaviour on Friday, 20th February 2026. I indicated to them that I would hear this contempt of court matter on Wednesday, 25th February 2026 at 10:30am and that they should appear before me on that date. I also informed them that they had a right to obtain legal representation, and/or that they would be allowed to represent themselves and address the court directly on the matter. I also indicated to them that if they were found guilty of contempt of court, it could result in imprisonment and/or a fine.

The hearing on Wednesday, 25th February 2026

39. There were, therefore, two issues before the court on this day. These were:

(i) Mr. Burke’s application that papers be sent to the DPP; and

(ii) the contempt of court hearing in respect of Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke.

Mr Burke's application to send Mr O'Longain's affidavits to the DPP

40. In the course of his submissions before the court on Friday, 20th February 2026 as to why his proceedings were not moot, Mr. Burke submitted that Mr. O'Longain had sworn false affidavits, that they amounted to perjury and that the court should refer this matter to the DPP.

41. Having heard Mr. Burke's submissions and the submissions of other parties, I held in my ex-tempore judgment that the proceedings were moot. I did not specifically address this issue about the referral to the DPP because it was not relevant to the issue of mootness and because I thought it was a submission of no merit, for reasons which I will set out below.

42. Mr. Burke then made his submissions as to why Mr. O’Longain’s affidavits should be submitted to the DPP for perjury. These submissions were made by Mr. Burke on-line from Mountjoy Prison. Mr. McDowell BL then replied on behalf of Mr. O’Longain.

43. Mr. Burke, in his second affidavit, set out why he believes certain averments of Mr. O’Longain are false. The heart of his objection is that he said that the averment of Mr. O’Longain, that the DAP intended to continue the hearing at a later date, is false. His argument is based on the fact that Mr. O'Longain stated at the end of the hearing that "this hearing is over", the fact that Mr. O'Longain never stated that the hearing would continue at a later date, that it was his clear understanding that the hearing had concluded, and the fact that the DAP wrote to Mr. Burke stating that “following the hearing on 13th December 2025 and having considered the matter inclusive of your letters of the 19th and 29th of December 2025, the DAP has decided to reconvene the hearing”.

44. Mr. O’Longain swore a second affidavit on 27th January 2026. He states as follows:

“4. By way of overarching point, Mr Burke's affidavit repeatedly accuses me of dishonesty and of lying on affidavit. I take grave exception to this accusation. I have qualified as a barrister and take my oath and my duties to the High Court seriously. I reject in the strongest of terms Mr Burke's accusation against me"

45. At paragraph 8, he states:

“At paragraph 63, Mr Burke takes issue with my averment that the DAP had always intended to reconvene for a second day of hearing”.

46. At paragraph 9, he states

“In order to understand why Mr Burke got the wrong end of the stick as regards the DAP's intentions, it is important to emphasise that, owing to the conduct of Mr Burke and his family, the day of hearing concluded in chaotic scenes, with people shouting across the room and at the DAP. It simply was not possible for the DAP to rationally explain to Mr Burke that the hearing would continue on another day. My focus as chair was on restoring some semblance of order to the room. Had the day of hearing concluded in a normal and calm atmosphere, as it ought to have, then it would have been possible for the DAP to explain the next steps to the parties”. (emphasis added)

47. This then is the state of the affidavit evidence in these proceedings. Mr. Burke accuses Mr. O’Longain of lying on affidavit and Mr. O’Longain takes grave exception to this accusation and denies entirely that he has done so.

48. Having considered the submissions of all the parties, I am of the view that Mr. Burke’s application must fail and that there is no question of this court referring Mr. O’Longain’s affidavits to the DPP for a number of reasons.

49. First, Mr. Burke has made allegations that Mr. O’Longain has lied on affidavit and Mr. O’Longain has denied those allegations. This court would never make findings of fact (or findings of truth or untruth) in contested interlocutory injunctions where both parties give a different version of events on affidavit. It is only after a fully contested hearing at the plenary trial, and only after both parties had been cross-examined about their affidavits, that a court would make findings as to whether one party had lied on affidavit or not, and perhaps consider sending the papers to the DPP. These proceedings have now been struck out as being moot, and so neither party will be cross-examined on their affidavits. Therefore, this court will not make any such findings.

50. Secondly, I have no doubt that if Mr. Burke had proper independent legal representation, he would have been advised that, as the proceedings were now moot, all subsidiary issues fell away, and this was clearly a subsidiary issue. In my view, this is so obvious that it is unlikely that an independent counsel would have even asked me to revisit this issue.

51. Thirdly, Mr. Burke accuses everyone of lying. Mr. Burke has accused Ms. Justice Roberts of lying; he has accused Mr. Justice Nolan of lying; he has accused every judge who has heard his case of lying; he has accused Ms. Mallon BL (counsel for the school), of lying; he has accused Mason Hayes and Curran (solicitors for the school) of lying; he has accused Senior Counsel and Junior Counsel for the DAP of lying. He has now accused Mr. O'Longain of lying. Every single person who says something with which Mr. Burke disagrees with is accused of lying. This undermines the credibility of his case against Mr. O’Longain.

52. Fourthly, this court has been dealing with Mr. Burke for the last five months and is of the view that he himself is entirely mendacious about the reasons why he is in prison. He is not in prison because of his beliefs in transgenderism or because he will not “bow the knee to transgenderism"; he is in prison because he has breached a court order not to trespass on the school's grounds. He is not entitled to his own truth. The objective truth is that he is in prison for trespassing.

53. In the circumstances, I am of the view that Mr. Burke is not a credible witness. I would never take Mr. Burke's characterisation of an opponent’s version of events as even remotely resembling the truth of the situation. Indeed, this very dispute reinforces me in my view that the DAP must have a stenographer present at the hearings – whether Mr. Burke agrees to it or not – in order to combat the amount of lies and misrepresentations which Mr. Burke and/other members of his family persist in. A transcript of the hearing will provide proof of who said what, and when.

54. Fifthly, Mr. O’Longain’s averment (that Mr. Burke got the “wrong end of the stick” and that the DAP hearing concluded in chaotic scenes with people shouting across the room and it was not possible for the DAP to explain that the hearing would continue on another day) has the ring of truth to it. In my experience, Mr. Burke gets “the wrong end of the stick” on a regular basis and constantly misinterprets statements made. Moreover, the chaos Mr. Burke and his family cause at every hearing is extraordinary and so he, and they, are mainly responsible for this misunderstanding.

55. Sixthly, every day of the week this court deals with cases in which one party accuses another party of lying on affidavit or giving false accounts on affidavit. It is part and parcel of the litigation process. Unfortunately, it is more common for litigants in person, such as Mr. Burke, to accuse the other side of lying than it is for persons with legal representation. Counsel and solicitors recognise from experience that different parties may have different recollections of events without either party deliberately lying on affidavit.

56. Finally, Mr. Burke can, if he so wishes, refer the matter himself to the Gardaí and/or the DPP. That is a matter for him. The fact that he can do so however gives the lie to the ridiculous allegation that the court is “covering up” for Mr. O’Longain.

57. (Mr Burke referred to the case of the Court of Appeal in Hand v McGregor referring papers to the DPP. However, no written judgment or any other document was put before me in relation to this case, and so I do not know what were the facts which prompted the court to do so. In those circumstances, I cannot assess its relevance. In any event, I will deal with the case before me).

58. Therefore, for these reasons, Mr. Burke's application is refused.

The contempt of court hearing on 25th February 2026

59. The second issue before the court was the contempt of court hearing in respect of Mrs. Martina Burke (“Mrs. Burke”) and Ms. Ammi Burke (“Ms. Burke”).

60. At the outset of the hearing, I re-stated to Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke that I had decided to invoke the contempt of court jurisdiction in respect of both of them in respect of their conduct at the hearing on Friday, 20th February 2026.

61. I indicated to them that the issue before the court was whether their conduct amounted to contempt of court (i.e. contempt in the face of the court.) I outlined to them that the offence of contempt in the face of the court occurs when words are spoken that interfere with the administration of justice. I also indicated that the court has an inherent power to summarily and immediately try an offence of contempt where this is necessary in the interests of the proper administration of justice. I stated that this serves an important purpose of ensuring that the courts maintain order in the courts to ensure that all parties can be properly heard, to ensure that the court can ensure that all applications are properly and fairly dealt with, and to ensure that there is no interference with the administration of justice.

62. I also outlined to them that the specific conduct in respect of which I was invoking the contempt of court jurisdiction was their repeated shouting and roaring at the court on Friday, 20th February 2026, their repeated refusals to sit down, despite my request to them to do so, and despite the warning which I had given to them some five or ten minutes earlier. I also indicated that the specific conduct was their interruption of Ms. Mallon BL's application to have the school joined as a notice party by repeatedly shouting and roaring that the panel (i.e. the Disciplinary Panel) was still in existence and that Ms. O'Brien (i.e. Ms. Geraldine O'Brien, the second named defendant) was still on the panel and other remarks designed to disrupt the proceedings.

63. I indicated that the conduct in respect of which I was invoking the contempt of court jurisdiction was for their repeated shouting at the court which constituted contempt in the face of the court, interrupting court proceedings, refusing to comply with directions of the court, and causing the court to abandon the application until order was restored in court and until they were removed from the court by 10 to 12 gardai.

64. I also outlined to them that if I found them to be in contempt of court, the court could impose a term of imprisonment and/or a fine or both.

65. Finally, having already warned them that they could obtain legal representation, and as they clearly wished to represent themselves, I indicated to them that I would allow each of them to address the court separately, that they had a full right to represent themselves, and a full right of audience, and that I wanted them to address two issues:

(i) whether they wanted to contest whether their behaviour and/or conduct on Friday, 20th February amounted to a contempt of court; and

(ii) whether they wished to offer a defence or explanation.

The submissions of Mrs Burke

66. I listened carefully to Mrs. Burke's submissions and she spoke for approximately 20 minutes. I will try and disentangle the various arguments she made.

67. Fundamentally, Mrs. Burke's submission was that her son was unjustly imprisoned and that he had been denied his lawful constitutional rights. That however is simply not true. Mr. Burke was suspended for gross misconduct and the school assumed he would no longer attend the school. However he insisted on doing so. The school then brought an application to the High Court for an injunction to restrain his trespass. Mr. Burke had a full right to argue that case, which he did, and he lost. The court granted an injunction restraining Mr. Burke from trespassing. Mr. Burke then defied the court order. As a result, the school, as would be normal, brought an application for attachment and committal. Mr. Burke again had an opportunity to be heard. He was heard and the court rejected his submissions and jailed him for contempt of court. Mr. Burke had a right of appeal. He exercised that right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court. Thereafter, the school brought forward the full action seeking declarations that its suspension was lawful and also a permanent injunction to restrain Mr. Burke from trespassing. Mr. Burke had a full opportunity to contest this case. He filed a defence and counterclaim. In his counterclaim, he sought declarations about his constitutional rights to freedom of religion. However, at the hearing over four days, before Mr. Justice Alex Owens, Mr Burke so misconducted himself and so abused the processes of the court, that he was excluded from the court by Mr. Justice Owens. He was told that if he agreed to abide by the rulings of the court, he could appear in court and argue his constitutional case. He refused to do so. He refused to turn up and, as a result, his case in respect of his constitutional rights was struck out for nonattendance. I will pause there for a moment to remark that it is simply extraordinary that Mr. Burke cannot even behave well enough in court to argue his own case about his own constitutional rights. This is not normal behaviour.

68. Mr. Burke had a right to appeal this decision of Mr. Justice Owens but he failed to do so, for over two and a half years, until very recently. Instead, Mr. Burke applied to ask another judge of the High Court to set aside Mr. Justice Owen's order. This matter came on before Mr. Justice Sanfey. Mr. Burke was fully heard on the matter and his application was refused as it was an unstateable application, because one High Court Judge is not an appeal court from another High Court Judge. Mr. Burke made a similar application to me to set aside Mr. Justice Owens’ order and I refused it for the same reasons. So, to say that Mr. Burke has been denied his constitutional rights is simply ridiculous. It would be truer to say that Mr. Burke has so abused the processes of the court that his case was struck out and he finds himself in prison for contempt of court. Even when I released him on 14th January 2026, in order to prepare for this case, he decided, that rather than spending time wisely and preparing for this case, he would trespass again at the school. So, Mr. Burke has no one to blame for being in prison other than himself.

69. Mrs. Burke complained bitterly that her son has been imprisoned for over 600 days. That should be a badge of shame for him. That is 600 days when he has refused to obey a court order, 600 days when he has refused to accept the rule of law. It is, more importantly,

600 days where the school has been protected from his trespasses, 600 days where the school has been free to teach its pupils without his malign presence disrupting the school programme.

70. One can hear Mrs. Burke repeatedly shouting "Free Enoch Burke". However, Mr. Enoch Burke can free himself. As this Court has said repeatedly, he has the keys to his own prison. All he has to do is to indicate to the court that if he is going to turn up to the school to report for work, as he says he is entitled to do, that he remain outside the school gates, and that he obeys the court order not to trespass on the school grounds. Mr. Burke keeps loudly asserting his constitutional rights but he also has a legal duty to obey court orders. He has a duty like every other citizen to obey the law. If he does not obey the law then he will be imprisoned for contempt of court, like every other citizen who disobeys the law. That is equality before the law and obedience to the rule of law.

71. If Mrs. Burke really wants to free Enoch Burke she could do so herself. I have no doubt that she could persuade her son to change the disastrous course of action that he has embarked upon. I tried to argue this point with Mrs. Burke. But there is simply no reasoning with her or with any of the members of the Burke family whom I have encountered in court. They are impervious to reason. Theirs is a faith-driven ideology which refuses to accept the rule of law. So be it. The rule of law applies to them whether they accept it or not.

72. In any event, Mrs. Burke's complaints about her son being in prison are no defence to a contempt of court charge. Her submissions in this regard, whilst understandable, are completely irrelevant. Insofar as they are put forward as a justification or defence for her actions, I do not accept them.

73. The second argument she made was that I had not addressed Mr. Burke's application on Friday, 20th February 2026, to refer Mr. O'Longain's affidavits to the DPP. I have set out my reasons above why I did not do so. But in any event, this clearly cannot provide any justification for her outburst of shouting on Friday, 20th February 2026. The incident of her contempt of court occurred at 10:44am during Ms. Mallon's application to have the school joined as a notice party. The hearing in relation to Mr. Burke's submission about reporting Mr. O'Longain to the DPP was only dealt with after 12:15pm – after the hearing resumed, and after Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke had been removed from the court. This clearly therefore is not a justification.

74. The third argument she put forward was that the school had no right to be joined as a notice party. That however is not a decision for Mrs. Burke to make. That is a matter for the court to decide, based on the facts of the case.

75. Mrs. Burke's next argument was that my decision on Friday, 20th February to strike out the proceedings was manifestly unfair. However, yet again that argument misses the point. The disruption by Mrs. Burke was done at approximately 10.40am onwards. As a result, the court had to abandon the hearing. The application which was being considered at that time was the application by the school to be joined as a notice party. It was only after the hearing resumed at 12.15pm that the court heard further submissions about whether the proceedings should be struck out. I made an ex-tempore decision striking out the proceedings on the grounds of mootness (i.e. on the grounds that continuing with the proceedings was absolutely pointless). So, her argument that she was shouting at the court because I struck out the proceedings is nonsense.

76. Fundamentally, however, it is clear that Mrs. Burke believes that she has a right to shout at any judge at any time on whatever issue she wants, irrespective of whether it disrupts court proceedings or not. She has shown this on numerous occasions in the past. She, like other members of the Burke family have been treated with great forbearance so far by the courts, and the courts have simply directed that they be removed from the court repeatedly because of their ongoing behaviour. However, this cannot continue. Courts cannot continue in the absolute certainty that Mrs. Burke and/or other members of the Burke family will continue to interrupt the proceedings on every occasion when the matter is before the court. This is a gross interference with the administration of justice. On each and every occasion, at least ten guards have to be present in court to ensure order and to remove members of the Burke family. This is completely abnormal. Indeed, I cannot think of any other case in the last 30 years where this has happened.

77. Having considered all her submissions, I am of the view that they provide no defence or justification for her actions and I would conclude that her repeated shouting on 20th February 2026, and her disruption of the court hearing, amounted to a contempt of court.

Ms Ammi Burke’s submissions

78. I also afforded Ms. Ammi Burke a full opportunity to be heard and she was heard. Her submissions were completely inappropriate in tone and content to be addressed to a Judge of the High Court from a person who is a solicitor. Again, she was asked to address whether she considered her conduct amounted to contempt of court and also to address what justification or defence or explanation she wanted to put forward for her conduct.

79. Her first submission was that my striking out of the proceedings as being moot or pointless was "an appalling abuse of power" and that I was "desperate to strike out the proceedings". These submissions are manifestly absurd and, quite frankly, show that Ms. Burke has simply lost all sense of professional propriety. I have set out in my ex-tempore judgment the reasons why I struck out the proceedings as being moot. However, I would like to address this point in some further detail, because the argument of Mr. Burke, Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke, on this mootness issue is so wrong-headed that it beggars belief.

The second Disciplinary Appeals Panel commenced its work and had its hearing on 13th December 2025. It had a hearing which lasted the whole day. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the DAP intended to sit for a second day. What is relevant is that the DAP sat and heard evidence for one full day. Subsequently, on 3rd February 2026, in the course of these proceedings, Mr. O'Longain and Mr. Cleary resigned. It would have been simply impossible to appoint two new members to the existing DAP because the existing DAP had part-heard Mr.

Burke's appeal. It would have been in breach of all fair procedures for two new members of the DAP to sit on the existing DAP when a full day's evidence had already been heard. It is simply unimaginable that they could have done so. In those circumstances a new Disciplinary Appeal Panel had to be created. And it had to consist of three members. There would be two new members to replace Mr. O'Longain and Mr. Cleary. That raises the question of who would be the third member. If it were the case that Ms. O'Brien was to be nominated as the third member, then of course Mr.

Burke would be right to say the proceedings were not moot because he had brought his challenge to Ms. O'Brien as being objectively biased. That is the very point that I made to the parties on 4th February 2026. However, that point was answered by the rule in the Circular which says that no member who has already participated in a previous DAP hearing can participate in a new hearing. In those circumstances, Ms. O'Brien was absolutely barred from sitting on the new DAP. She simply could not do it. Moreover, the solicitors for the DAP wrote to Mr.

Burke to tell him precisely this – that Ms. O’Brien accepted that she could not sit on the new DAP. Therefore, Mr. Burke achieved everything he wanted (i.e. a new DAP with three entirely new members.)

80. It is clear therefore, that the only sensible course of action was to strike out the proceedings as being pointless. It was a matter of common sense. So, to argue that my striking out of proceedings on the grounds that they were pointless or moot was an "appalling abuse of power" is both an astonishing and indefensible submission.

81. However, even apart from this, the point is that Ms. Burke's contempt of court occurred from 10.44am onwards when the court was hearing an application by the school to be joined as a notice party. Ms. Burke's outbursts caused the court to have to interrupt the proceedings and rise whilst she and her mother were removed from the court and her brother was removed to Mountjoy prison. The submission to strike out the proceedings did not take place until the hearing resumed at 12.15pm and my decision was only given at approximately 12:50pm. That decision certainly could not justify in any way her interruption and contempt of court at 10.44am onwards, when I had not even made my decision on mootness at that time.

82. Ms. Burke further submitted that I struck out the proceedings on the grounds of mootness even though there was no motion before the court to strike out. There was no need for a motion to strike out the proceedings for mootness on those grounds. That could be done by a simple submission; it did not require a separate notice of motion and affidavit.

83. Ms. Burke’s third submission was that Ms. Mallon BL should not have been entertained in her application to be joined as a notice party to the proceedings, because the school was opposed to her brother. She said "I won't sit silently by while his constitutional rights have been denied”. Clearly, Ms. Burke is unapologetic and defiant about her behaviour. Again, however, Ms Mallon properly brought an application to be joined as a notice party; she was opening her affidavit and exhibits in the course of that application and she had every right to bring that application to the court. It is clear that what Ms. Burke sought to do was to interrupt the court proceedings so that that application could not even properly be heard and determined by the court. It is the very essence of an interference with the administration of justice.

84. I am satisfied that there was nothing in her remarks which seriously sought to controvert the allegation that her behaviour on Friday, 20th February 2026 constituted a contempt of court.

85. I am also satisfied that nothing she said could amount to a justification or defence or explanation for her behaviour.

86. Having considered all Ms. Burke's submissions, I am satisfied that she also is guilty of contempt of court (i.e. contempt in the face of the court.)

Legal principles on contempt of court

87. The justification for the law on contempt of court is as old as the common law itself. As has been said many times, the first place in which order must be maintained is in the court room itself. This allows all parties to argue their case in an atmosphere of calm and respect, no matter how highly charged the case might be.

88. As O’Donnell J. (as he then was) stated in Walsh v Minister for Justice [2019] IESC 15:

“6. This is not a complete catalogue of all the difficulties encountered in a given day by anyone attending court, but it leads to a recognition that it is central to a court's capacity to administer justice that it should be capable of maintaining order. This in turn allows competing claims – sometimes highly charged, and always of importance to the participants - to be ventilated, fairly and dispassionately considered, and adjudicated upon. As was said long ago, of all the places where law and order must be maintained, the first place is in the courtrooms themselves.”

“7. The refusal to accept rulings and decisions, the constant interruption of court proceedings, and the making of offensive interjections and comments is at best rude and inconsiderate to all other court users who are obliged to accept the necessity for calm in court proceedings, but more often amounts to simple bullying. When carried out in a concerted manner, it is, and is often intended to be, menacing and intimidatory. These are serious concerns which should not be ignored or lightly dismissed. Disruption of proceedings attacks the very essence of a fair hearing which it is the court's obligation to provide, and every litigant's right to obtain.” (emphasis added)

89. And at paragraph 16 he states:

“16. The justification for law of contempt is as old as the law itself. Some of the history of the procedure is traced in the judgment delivered by McKechnie J. A courtroom cannot be a forum where the rule of law is applied unless those rules of law which promote a calm atmosphere and the orderly resolution of issues are maintained. That atmosphere of order may be taken for granted in most courts on most days, but it cannot be achieved without the possibility, even if rare, that persistent and deliberate breach will attract a serious sanction. The enforcement of order must be immediate. The commencement of separate proceedings to be heard by a different court at some later date cannot be an effective way to deal with the immediate issue. Furthermore, in serious cases of deliberate breach, there would be a risk of endless replication of proceedings if a contemnor proceeded to disrupt each of the proceedings in turn. While this may be only a possibility, it is by no means unrealistic, as the experience of any modern Irish courtroom will show. If the justice system could not immediately protect the courtroom proceedings from disruption, it would become correspondingly difficult not just to transact the business of the court, but also to persuade litigants, witnesses, and all others who have to have recourse to the courts system to trust it and to continue to abide by its decisions, even when they disagree with them. Yet that acceptance of outcomes is central to any civilised society based on the rule of law.” (emphasis added)

Assessment

90. Mrs. Burke’s, and Ms. Burke’s, behaviour, in shouting at the court and/or at Ms. Mallon BL, and/or in repeatedly interrupting the court hearing, and repeatedly ignoring court directions to stop interrupting, were a paradigmatic case of contempt of court.

91. They both knew full well that they had no right of audience and no right to speak, yet they persisted in standing up in court and shouting and roaring at the top of their voices. They did so simultaneously and in a concerted manner. They did not stop when requested to do so by the court.

92. Indeed, anything I said, or wanted to say, was drowned out by the roaring and shouting from Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke. The hearing descended into chaos. The gardaí appeared in the well of the court to remove them from the court. They continued to shout and roar until they were removed from the court – indeed, long after that. They have a perfect right to shout and roar outside the Four Courts – but not inside the court room.

93. It is clear that Mr. Enoch Burke and other members of the Burke family, including Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke, believe that they are above the law and that the law does not apply to them. The question is whether they should be exempt from the rule of law because they are, apparently, Christian evangelicals. The question only has to be stated in these terms to realise the answer is definitely no. There is no exemption for Christian evangelicals, or climate change activists, or animal right activists, or anti-abortion protesters. The law applies equally to all persons who seek to deliberately interrupt court proceedings and seek to disrupt them.

94. Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke – just like their brother Enoch – are not exceptional. They are just exceptionally unable to accept what every other citizen in this republic accepts every day (i.e. that the law applies to them and that they are subject to the rule of law.) We live in a democracy governed by the rule of law and not a theocracy governed by the Burke family.

Sanctions

95. In Walsh v Minister for Justice and Equality and another [2019] IESC 15, the Supreme Court indicated, on the facts of that case, that the sentence of two weeks for contempt in the face of the court imposed by the Circuit Court on Mr. Walsh was “not so disproportionate as to render the detention unlawful” (per O’Donnell J. at paragraph 37) (whilst also noting at paragraph 36 that it was not an appeal against the severity of the sanction). In my view, that case is a useful comparator for considering the sentence in this case, although there are of course aggravating factors in the present case.

96. This court has repeatedly warned Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke to cease and desist from their interruptions. This has not worked. This court has also repeatedly directed the gardaí to remove Mrs. Burke and Ms. Burke from the court. This has not worked either. They continue to shout and disrupt court hearings on almost every occasion. There comes a time when the court must then move to consider contempt of court proceedings against them. That time is long overdue.

97. Having considered all the circumstances, I am of the view that Mrs. Martina Burke should be sentenced to two weeks imprisonment.

98. I am also of the view that Ms. Ammi Burke should also be sentenced to two weeks imprisonment.

99. Ms. Ammi Burke is a solicitor and an officer of the court. As such, she has been trained about her professional and ethical duties to the court. She has however, completely lost sight of this some time ago. She was part of the Burke family disturbance which actually prevented the Court of Appeal from delivering its judgment in open court and she had to be removed from the Court of Appeal by gardaí. Her own case Burke v W.R.C. and Arthur Cox was dismissed as an abuse of process by Bolger J. because of her disgraceful behaviour in court. Her appeal against the decision to the Court of Appeal also could not continue because of her behaviour.

100. Whilst I appreciate that she was not acting as a solicitor in this case, she knows perfectly well the rules of conduct in court and the rules governing representation of persons in court. Those rules are clear and they are simple. All persons must conduct their cases with respect for the court and accept the rulings of the court. A person, such as her brother Enoch Burke, may represent himself in court or he may be represented by a solicitor and/or counsel. He cannot represent himself in court and also be represented by any other person including his brother, sister, mother or any other member of the family. She knows these rules perfectly well, yet she chose to breach them repeatedly.

101. Her conduct on 20th February 2026 was a deliberate and brazen contempt of court. She has been repeatedly removed from the courts by the gardaí. I have never encountered a solicitor who has behaved in this way. In my view, Ms. Burke’s behaviour is disgraceful and indefensible, particularly given that she is a trained solicitor. I am therefore, going to send certain papers to the Law Society’s relevant disciplinary committee to consider if – and at what appropriate time – it should open a disciplinary investigation into Ms. Burke. That is a matter for them. The relevant papers will include:

(i) My judgment of 18th November 2025;

(ii) This judgment;

(iii) The judgment of Ms. Justice Bolger in Burke v W.R.C. and Arthur Cox; and

(iv) The judgment of Mr. Justice Noonan for the Court of Appeal in the same case.

Future hearings – Mrs Burke, Ms Burke and Dr Burke to attend remotely

102. Court is a stressful environment for all litigants at the best of times. There are issues at stake which can be of enormous importance to the parties; the loss of a job, the loss of a family home, etc. However, the constant interruptions and shouting by Mr. Burke and certain members of the Burke family make a stressful environment into a toxic environment. Counsel for the school, and for the DAP, and, indeed, the court, are constantly shouted down and constantly interrupted. Hearings are constantly disrupted by their insatiable desire for attention.

103. It is long past time for the court to call a halt to this family circus. I am therefore considering making a direction under section 11 of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020, and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, that Mrs. Burke, Ms. Burke and Dr. Isaac Burke should not be permitted to attend any further hearings involving Mr. Enoch Burke, in person, but should only be allowed to attend those hearings remotely. All three persons have repeatedly interrupted court proceedings. This will mean that they can see and hear the proceedings in court, but they will no longer be able to interrupt court proceedings. The constitutional principle that justice must be administered in public is a sacred principle. It prevents secret trials and other abuses. That principle is not undermined by such an order. Mrs. Burke, Ms. Burke and Dr. Burke are free to attend remotely, but their disgraceful behaviour in court means that they would no longer be automatically entitled to attend in person as of right.

104. If Mrs. Burke, or Ms. Burke, or Dr. Isaac Burke, object to such an intended order, they can file written legal submissions to the Registrar within three weeks setting out the reasons for their objections. I will then consider these submissions and decide whether I will, in fact, make such an order.