High Court dismisses student's claim for no-costs order, ruling weak arguments warrant default rule application.

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 131

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

2024 1221 JR

BETWEEN

STUDENT A

APPLICANT

AND

PROVOST, FELLOWS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN,

TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY OF IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 5 March 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. The principal judgment in these proceedings was delivered on 6 February 2026, Student A v. Trinity College Dublin [2026] IEHC 54. The principal judgment held that the applicant, Student A, was not entitled to an anonymisation order in respect of these judicial review proceedings. This supplemental judgment determines the incidence of the legal costs of the motion seeking to set aside the reporting restrictions.

NO FURTHER REDACTION REQUIRED

2. The applicant, the unsuccessful party on the motion, contends that the costs of the motion should not follow the event. It is submitted that the motion raised issues of public importance in relation to the interaction between the constitutional imperative of open justice and the personal rights of students seeking to qualify for entry to a regulated profession. The first named respondent, Trinity College Dublin, contends that costs should follow the event in the ordinary way.

3. For ease of exposition, I will refer to Student A as “the applicant” or “the student”, and Trinity College Dublin as “the university”.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

4. The within judicial review proceedings were commenced on 30 September 2024. As part of the ex parte order granting leave to apply for judicial review, made on 9 December 2024, reporting restrictions were imposed prohibiting publication of any matter which would or could identify the student or the university.

5. The university filed a motion on 29 April 2025 seeking to set aside the reporting restrictions. The motion was part-heard on 30 June 2025 and adjourned to allow the parties time to prepare written legal submissions. The hearing resumed on

20 October 2025 and judgment was reserved. The principal judgment was delivered on 6 February 2026. The reporting restrictions were set aside, subject only to a temporary anonymisation order to preserve the efficacy of the applicant’s right of appeal.

6. The substantive application for judicial review was heard over three days in late January 2026 and judgment in that matter has been reserved separately. The present judgment is concerned solely with the costs of the reporting restrictions motion. I heard oral argument on the incidence of costs on 19 February 2026. Judgment was reserved to today’s date.

7. No relief is being pursued as against the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland, and the society has not participated in the proceedings.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

8. Counsel on behalf of the applicant invited the court to exercise its discretion to make no order as to costs, citing Little v. Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53. Counsel submitted that the principal judgment is the first extensive judgment which examines the anonymisation of proceedings in the context of what might be described as “fitness to practise” issues in relation to students seeking to qualify for entry to a regulated profession. It was further submitted that the principal judgment is of public significance and addresses the administration of justice in public in a context which had not previously been the subject of a substantive determination.

9. As to the specific criteria identified in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer, counsel for the applicant submitted as follows. First, Trinity College Dublin, as a university in receipt of substantial public funding, falls within the concept of a State actor or public body for the purposes of the public interest litigation case law. Second, the reporting restrictions motion raised a point of law of general public importance, being the first case to address anonymisation orders in the context of students seeking to qualify for entry to a regulated profession. Third, the costs criteria were to be applied to the motion itself, rather than to the substantive judicial review proceedings.

10. Counsel accepted that the applicant has a direct personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings, but submitted that it is not a prerequisite to the exercise of the court’s discretion that the litigation be brought for the purpose of vindicating rights or interests of the public generally, rather than the personal interests of the party.

11. Counsel on behalf of the university, while acknowledging that the principal judgment is extensive and reviews a substantial body of law, submitted that the judgment does not decide a point of law of general public importance in the sense described in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer. The judgment merely applied the well-established principles in Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] IESC 18, [2017] 2 IR 284 to a particular factual matrix.

12. It was further submitted that the issues arising on the motion have no systemic importance and did not arise from any ambiguity or weakness in legislation. The applicant would have obtained a purely personal advantage had the motion succeeded. For those reasons, it was submitted that the normal costs rule should apply and that the university, having been entirely successful in its motion, should be entitled to recover its costs against the applicant.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COSTS

13. The legal principles governing the allocation of costs of public interest proceedings against the State, or against bodies exercising public functions, have been authoritatively restated by the Supreme Court in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53. Insofar as relevant to proceedings pending before the High Court or the Court of Appeal, the factors guiding the exercise of the power to absolve an unsuccessful applicant from the cost consequences that usually follow the failure of their challenge are stated as follows (at paragraphs 68 to 71):

“First, those Courts enjoy a discretion not to award costs

against an unsuccessful plaintiff or applicant in a public

interest proceeding. These are civil proceedings against the

State, or an organ or agency of the State (including a

statutory body) in which the plaintiff or applicant seeks relief

in public law, whether in the form of a challenge to the

validity, legality or compatibility having regard to the

Constitution, European Law, the European Convention on

Human Rights or the general principles of administrative

law, in respect of an enactment, measure, act, omission or

decision of a body of the defendant or respondent whether

by way of plenary action, proceedings by way of judicial

review, or statutory appeal, and which present the various

other features I have outlined at paragraph [34] of this

judgment.

Second, in determining whether to exercise that discretion in

favour of such a litigant, the Court must have regard to all

the facts and circumstances. I have identified some relevant

considerations at paragraph [35] of this judgment: these are

as pertinent to the exercise by the High Court and Court of

Appeal of its jurisdiction, as they are in the exercise by this

Court of its jurisdiction to award costs.

Third, because this is essentially a balancing exercise, there

are case specific factors which may cause the Court to

exercise its discretion to order costs, even in proceedings in

which many of these criteria are met. These include that the

case was an obviously weak one, that the point was

ultimately found to be covered by well-established authority,

that the nature of the private advantage at stake for the

unsuccessful party in the action is such that it would be

unjust not to award costs (for example if the proceedings

were brought for a commercial purpose), that the conduct of

the unsuccessful party is such that costs should be awarded

against it, or that the point of law in issue is so discrete and

particular to the case of the unsuccessful party that it is not

appropriate to exempt the claimant from the order that

usually follows complete defeat.

Fourth, while the courts retain a power to order costs in

public interest litigation in favour of an unsuccessful party,

the cases in which that power should be exercised are very

rare. It would be only in the most exceptional of

circumstances that they would not comprise cases where the

constitutional issues litigated were ‘fundamental’ and

‘touched on sensitive aspects of the human condition,’ cases

of ‘conspicuous novelty’, cases in which the issue was one of ‘far reaching importance in an area of the law with general application’, in which the courts have clarified an otherwise ‘obscure or unexplored area’, or cases in which the claimant, although ultimately unsuccessful, prevailed on a discrete issue in the case which was itself significant. Even where a case falls within one or more of these categories, the Court must have regard to the factors I have identified in the preceding paragraph in determining whether to award costs in such circumstances.”

14. It is of assistance in applying these principles to any particular case to recall the underlying rationale for special costs treatment in public interest proceedings.

The judgment in Child and Family Agency v. Guardian ad Litem

[2026] IEHC 88 analyses that rationale in terms of two competing effects. The default costs rule serves what may be described as a disciplining effect: it acts as a curative against unmeritorious litigation and recognises that it will often be unjust to force a successful party to bear the costs of their litigious victory. However, the risk of an adverse costs order may in some instances go beyond this healthy disciplining effect and produce a deterrent effect, namely, an outcome whereby worthwhile proceedings are unlikely to be brought forward for hearing for want of a litigant with the financial resources to justify the risk of costs exposure. The criteria in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer seek to mediate between these two effects, by ensuring that the deterrent effect of costs does not stifle proceedings which genuinely serve the public interest, while avoiding the inadvertent encouragement of unmeritorious litigation.

15. These, then, are the principles to be applied by this court in deciding on the proper allocation of the legal costs of the proceedings.

DISCUSSION

16. For ease of exposition, I will use the shorthand “exemption from costs” to describe an outcome whereby the court exercises its discretion to depart from the default position on costs and thereby relieve an unsuccessful party from having to pay the successful party’s costs.

17. Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is, strictly speaking, addressed to the ultimate outcome of the proceedings rather than the outcome of an interlocutory motion within the proceedings. However, Order 99, rule 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides that the High Court, in considering the awarding of the costs of any action or step in any proceedings, shall have regard to the matters set out in section 169(1), where applicable. It follows, therefore, that the principles in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer can be applied, with minor modifications, to the determination of the costs of an interlocutory motion.

18. The principal modification is that—in determining the incidence of costs—it is the significance of the points of law arising on the reporting restrictions motion which falls to be considered. The question of whether the points of law which arise in the substantive application for judicial review are of general public importance is a matter for another day.

19. The fact that the reporting restrictions motion was brought by the university rather than by the student does not materially affect the application of the costs principles. There is no reason, in principle, as to why the entitlement to an exemption from costs should be confined to the moving party in proceedings. The purpose of departing from the default costs position is to ensure that public interest litigation be heard and determined. It is an essential element of this that the proceedings be properly argued in our adversarial system. In practice, this will normally necessitate the participation of a legitimus contradictor. A party who is in a position to put forward counterarguments of real substance on the merits fulfils this role and may have grounds for seeking an exemption from costs if the proceedings clarify an area of the law in the public interest.

20. Certainly, it would be inappropriate in the present proceedings to attach any weight to the identity of the party bringing the motion. The fact that it is the university, rather than the student, who brought a motion is simply a quirk of the procedural history. Had reporting restrictions not been imposed as part of the ex parte order granting leave, then the student would have been the moving party in a motion seeking reporting restrictions.

21. The judgment in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer emphasises that the point of law raised by the party seeking an exemption from costs must be stateable, and that it is only in unusual circumstances that costs would not be ordered against an unsuccessful party where the case is other than one of real substance on the merits. The judgment indicates that the strength of the case for an exemption from costs is in proportion to the strength of the underlying claim.

22. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the arguments actually advanced on behalf of the applicant in the present proceedings. As set out in more detail at paragraphs 26 to 28 of the principal judgment, the argument for an anonymisation order had been advanced by reference to three related propositions as follows. The first proposition is that the identification of the student as the applicant for judicial review will adversely affect his constitutional rights to a good name and to earn a livelihood. The second proposition is that a student of pharmacy is entitled to be treated, as regards fitness to practise and disciplinary matters, in a manner analogous to a qualified pharmacist under the Pharmacy Act 2007. The third proposition is that an anonymisation order will be appropriate where the identification of an individual as a party to legal proceedings might adversely affect their mental health.

23. These three arguments were rejected for the reasons explained in the principal judgment (the third on evidential grounds). Of course, the fact that an argument has been rejected on the merits is always the starting point for the analysis of an application for a costs exemption. The court must assess the strength of the unsuccessful argument, and consider whether it justifies a departure from the default position on costs. The exercise is unavoidably self‑referential, in that the same court—having previously rejected the arguments on the merits—must still consider whether they were reasonably stateable and of sufficient weight to warrant a nil order as to costs. For the reasons which follow, none of the three arguments reaches this threshold.

24. The application of the Gilchrist principles to disciplinary proceedings or fitness to practise proceedings involving members of a regulated profession is well established. The position is addressed in a number of judgments. These are all discussed in detail at paragraphs 43 to 52 of the principal judgment. The fact that many of the cases concerned qualified professionals, rather than students, does not transform the application of the same principles in the present case into a point of law of general public importance. Novelty of factual application is not the same as novelty of legal principle. The principal judgment may have clarified the application of the Gilchrist principles in a very particular context, but did not render the law more certain in any area where it had previously been obscure or contested.

25. This is because there is no genuine uncertainty in the law. The threshold for departing from the constitutional imperative of open justice, in circumstances where the court exercises its common law power in the absence of legislation, has been stated with clarity by the Supreme Court: the interests involved must be very clear and the circumstances pressing. The applicant’s arguments failed because they were inconsistent with established principle. The argument that the right to a good name justifies anonymisation was found to invert the proper analysis.

26. One of the main planks of the applicant’s case had been predicated upon the mistaken premise that disciplinary proceedings applicable to a qualified pharmacist are heard in private by default. In fact, as explained at paragraphs 80 to 86 of the principal judgment, the position is the obverse. The default position under the Pharmacy Act 2007 is that hearings before the professional conduct committee “shall be held in public”. This is subject to a discretion to hold all or part of the hearing in private. The contended-for analogy with a qualified pharmacist actually undermines the applicant’s argument for reporting restrictions.

27. The case for an exemption from costs might have had some cogency had the wording of the governing legislation, i.e. the Pharmacy Act 2007, been unclear and had the principal judgment provided clarification in relation to its interpretation. In the event, the initial confusion on the applicant’s side as to the precise operation of the legislation had been resolved by the date of the resumed hearing. The applicant’s side accepted that the default position was that a hearing was in public. Notwithstanding this, the analogy with a qualified pharmacist was pressed. For present purposes, the point is that the judgment did not necessitate any clarification of the meaning and effect of the legislation such as might justify an exemption from costs.

28. The principal judgment identified, in respect of each of the arguments advanced, that each was misconceived as a matter of established law. The reasonable expectation of privacy argument was rejected on two independent grounds. The analogy with the Pharmacy Act 2007 was rejected as self-defeating. The social media argument was characterised as speculative and unsupported. The mental health argument under section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 failed for want of any independent medical evidence. The fact that certain arguments failed for want of an adequate evidential base made it unnecessary to address any novel legal issues which might otherwise have arisen for determination.

29. As explained earlier, the rationale for departing from the default costs position is to prevent the deterrent effect of costs from stifling proceedings which serve a genuine public interest. Where, however, a party advances a case that is not merely unsuccessful but is obviously weak, the disciplining effect of the default rule is properly engaged. To allow an exemption from costs in such circumstances would risk inadvertently encouraging unmeritorious litigation: the precise concern identified in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer.

30. Finally, it should be explained that it has not been necessary, for the purpose of resolving the reporting restrictions motion, to reach a definitive view on whether Trinity College Dublin falls within the concept of a State actor in the sense that the concept is understood in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer. This is because the application for an exemption from costs fails on other grounds. I am conscious that one of the issues for determination in the substantive judgment is whether the impugned decisions are amenable to judicial review. It seems sensible, therefore, to say nothing further on the State actor point in circumstances where it is not necessary to do so in determining the incidence of costs.

CONCLUSION AND FORM OF ORDER

31. The university has been “entirely successful” in having the reporting restrictions set aside. The default position under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (as applied by analogy under Order 99, rule 3) would be that the university would be entitled to recover its costs of the motion as against the applicant/student.

32. For the reasons explained earlier, none of the criteria identified by the Supreme Court in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53 are satisfied. The motion did not involve a point of law of general public importance; the legal principles applied were well settled; and the opposing arguments were obviously weak.

33. Accordingly, an order will be made directing that the applicant is to pay the university’s costs in respect of the reporting restrictions motion. These costs include all reserved costs, and the costs of the written legal submissions filed in connection with the motion. The university is also entitled to recover the costs incurred in relation to the short hearing on 19 February 2026. The costs are to be adjudicated under Part 10 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 in default of agreement between the parties.

34. The costs order will be stayed pending the final determination of the proceedings at the level of the High Court or further order. In the event there is an appeal or an application for leave to appeal in relation to the costs order, same will be stayed pending the final determination of the appeal proceedings or further order.

Appearances

Rosario Boyle SC and Conor Duff for the applicant instructed by Sonia McEntee Solicitors Patrick Leonard SC and Liam O’Connell for the first respondent instructed by Byrne Wallace Shields LLP