High Court dismisses judicial review of International Protection Tribunal's rejection of asylum claim based on blood feud allegations.

Record No. 2024/815JR [2026] IEHC 13 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW

Between

K. S.

Applicant

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE Respondents

Judgment of Mr Justice Cian Ferriter delivered 15 January 2026

Introduction

1. In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant seeks an order quashing a decision of the respondent Tribunal of 23 May 2024 in which the Tribunal rejected his claim for international protection on the basis that it did not accept as credible his case that he was at risk of persecution if returned to Albania as a result of being targeted in a blood feud between his family and another family.

Background

2. The background to the applicant's claim for international protection is as follows. His case is that, in January 1997, a man called F. H. killed the applicant's paternal uncle who had the same name as the applicant. It appears that the original killing arose out of a dispute relating to land. After the killing, the applicant's grandfather tried to prevent any further killings and there were no incidents for a period between the applicant's family and the H. family. In 2001, another uncle of the applicant took revenge on F. H. by murdering that man's brother. It seems that the blood feud lay dormant for a long number of years until in 2021/2022, the applicant's father got into a fresh dispute with F. H. and, subsequently, in 2022, the applicant's family received a message from the H. family through a mutual connection saying that the applicant was being targeted by them for a revenge killing. In October 2022, the applicant's father asked the applicant to return to his family home because of this threat, telling the applicant that he would not be safe in Albania. At this time, the applicant was living and working in Tirana.

3. In mid-October 2022, an incident occurred when the applicant returned home from work in Tirana. The applicant says that he was returning home from work one evening when he saw a car parked close to his house. Three masked men got out of the car and began to chase the applicant. One of the men was armed and the others had baseball bats. The applicant says that he ran into an alley and managed to escape the men. He says that he left Albania shortly afterwards in November 2022 and travelled by boat to Italy. He spent five months in Italy and worked in construction until he made enough money to travel further. He ultimately came to Ireland by truck having travelled through France.

International Protection Process

4. The applicant applied for international protection in Ireland on 18 May 2023. His international protection case is that he fears that, if returned to Albania, he would be the subject of a further attempted attack or murder by the H. family or people acting on their behalf in the context of the blood feud between his family and the H. family.

5. When lodging his application for international protection on 18 May 2023, the applicant filled out an IPO questionnaire in which he set out an account of the blood feud and the reason why he feared for his life if returned to Albania.

6. On 28 June 2023, the applicant was interviewed (in an interview he dealt with in Albanian with the help of an interpreter) pursuant to s. 35(12) of the International Protection Act 2015 ("the 2015 Act") (“the s.35 interview”).

7. On 31 August 2023, an officer of the IPO delivered a detailed report pursuant to s. 39 of the 2015 Act in which the IPO officer assessed the applicant's claim for international protection and recommended refusal of refugee status or subsidiary protection on the essential basis that he did not accept the credibility of the applicant’s claim to be the target of a blood feud. The applicant appealed to the Tribunal against that decision and filed a detailed notice of appeal (which had input from his legal advisers) on 14 September 2023. In the notice of appeal, he sought an oral hearing of his appeal.

8. The Tribunal, in its decision of 23 May 2024 (“the decision”), held that the applicant should be refused a declaration as a refugee and refused subsidiary protection status.

The applicant’s case in these judicial review proceedings

9. The applicant's case in summary terms is that the Tribunal erred in refusing to grant the applicant an oral hearing; that the Tribunal breached fair procedures and the duty to cooperate by making findings which had not been previously made or put to the applicant in the process, thereby rendering the process fundamentally unfair; and that the Tribunal acted in breach of principles 4 and 5 of Cooke J's 10 principles in IR v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144 (“IR”), in particular by failing to rationally analyse and fairly weigh the evidence before it and by making findings on the evidence that were not cogent and which did not bear a legitimate connection to the adverse findings.

10. In order to set the legal issues arising in this judicial review in their proper context, it is necessary to look in some detail at the grounds of the IPO recommendation and the grounds of the appeal against that recommendation as contained in the notice of appeal, before addressing the terms of the Tribunal decision.

The IPO Recommendation

11. In section 5 of the IPO recommendation (headed "credibility"), the IPO officer assessed the applicant's claim that he and his family were involved in a blood feud with the H. family. The IPO officer quoted the applicant's evidence from his questionnaire and s.35 interview and stated that the applicant's responses to questions regarding his knowledge of the blood feud were inconsistent with earlier statements where he had stated he did not know anything about the feud and that his family had tried to spare him from that and that they did not speak about it as a family. This inconsistency was put to the applicant in his s. 35 interview (the relevant context here being that the applicant was not even born at the time of the original killing of his paternal uncle in 1997 and was in fact only born in 2001, the year of the revenge killing of the murderer's brother). The applicant's essential evidence was that his family had not told him about the conflict until he started being targeted in 2022. Once he was targeted, his evidence had been that his family had "of course" told him what was going on. The IPO officer took the view that this response did not address the inconsistency raised as the applicant had stated that he knew about the past conflict between the families but that it was not spoken about by the family. He took the view that this inconsistency undermined the credibility of the applicant's claim.

12. The IPO officer took the view by reference to available country of origin information ("COI") that the long period between the revenge killing committed by the applicant's uncle in 2001 until 2022 suggested that the 2001 killing was a revenge killing and not a blood feud. The IPO officer took the view that the applicant did not adequately address this query in his responses at interview. The IPO officer also took the view by reference to COI that blood feuds were largely a feature of Northern Albania and not in the district from which the applicant came.

13. The IPO officer concluded:-

"Overall, while the applicant's account of this material fact [i.e. the existence of the blood feud] was sufficiently detailed, an internal inconsistency arose in relation to his level of knowledge of his family's involvement in a blood feud. The applicant's account was also inconsistent with COI relating to blood feuds, which indicated that his family were involved in a revenge killing and not a blood feud, and that blood feuds are only prevalent in the northern regions of Albania. In light of the above, the applicant's claim that he and his family are involved in a blood feud with the H. family is not accepted on the balance of probabilities as a material fact." (p. 10 of decision).

14. The IPO officer then considered the applicant's claim that his life was threatened in Albania as a result of the blood feud. He set out the applicant's evidence at the s. 35 interview in relation to the incident, including questions in relation to the detail of the incident and how he managed to get away from the three men chasing him. The IPO officer formed the view that:-

"The applicant's response to questions regarding this incident and how he managed to escape from a group of armed men was insufficiently detailed, although he was provided with an opportunity to provide such detail at interview. As a result, this lack of detail undermines the credibility of the applicant's claim."

15. The IPO officer went on to hold that an inconsistency arose in relation to the applicant's timeline of events in relation to the incident, there being discrepancies in relation to the timeline as between answers in his s.35 interview and the content of his legal submissions. The IPO officer also determined that there was a further inconsistency in respect of the applicant’s case as to whether the applicant or his family reported the incident to the police.

16. The IPO officer concluded in relation to the alleged incident in October 2022 that:-

"Overall, the applicant's claim in respect of this material fact is insufficiently detailed, particularly in relation to the incident which took place in Tirana and the applicant's escape. A number of inconsistencies arose in relation to the claim namely when the said incident occurred and whether attempts were made by the applicant and his family to report the incident to the police. In light of the above, the applicant's claim that his life was threatened in Albania as result of a blood feud is not accepted on the balance of probabilities as a material fact."

17. As the essential basis of his claim was disbelieved, the IPO officer went on to conclude that the applicant was not entitled to a declaration as a refugee in that he had not established a well-founded fear of persecution required by s. 2 of the 2015 Act and was not eligible for subsidiary protection as substantial grounds had not been shown for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to Albania.

18. The IPO officer concluded, pursuant to s. 39(4) of the 2015 Act, that Albania, as the applicant's country of origin, was a safe country of origin.

19. This latter finding meant that the applicant's appeal would proceed as an accelerated appeal pursuant to s. 43 of the 2015 Act, with the default position being that the appeal would be processed on a papers-only basis unless the applicant could persuade the Tribunal that it was in the interests of justice to hold an oral hearing.

Notice of Appeal

20. The applicant lodged an appeal against the IPO recommendation. In his notice of appeal, he did not advance any new factual material in relation to his core claim. Rather, he advanced lines of argument as to why the IPO had erred in rejecting the credibility of his claim.

21. In summary, the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:-

(i) That the IPO erred in concluding that there was a material inconsistency in the account given by the applicant concerning the extent of his knowledge of the blood feud. He submitted that "It can be both true that the applicant received a certain amount of information from his father about it because they are regularly in contact and also that his father kept certain other details from him in order to protect the applicant and reduce his worry concerning the situation. It is also plausible that the applicant's father would have advised the applicant to leave and protect himself when he became aware that the applicant had become a target."

(ii) That the IPO erred in seeking to categorise the present risk to the applicant as a revenge killing rather than a blood feud.

(iii) That the IPO erred in concluding that the applicant was not the target of a blood feud on the basis that such feuds are more prevalent in the north of the country

– the fact that the applicant was not from the north of Albania was not determinative of whether or not he was the subject of a blood feud.

(iv) The applicant submitted that he provided all relevant details of the attack in October 2022 and that the IPO erred in holding that it was insufficiently detailed; that there was no material inconsistency in his account of the timing of the attack and that it would be possible for the H. family to locate the applicant in Tirana owing to the small size of the country with a 2019 legal article being advanced to support this latter contention.

(v) That there was no inconsistency by reason of the applicant or his family not reporting the matter to the police in light of their previous experience that police protection was not forthcoming when it was sought in the past.

22. The applicant included with his notice of appeal two earlier Tribunal decisions as relevant precedent in each of which the relevant Tribunal accepted as credible the fact that the applicant had limited information as to events when the applicant was only a child on the basis that it was accepted that children would be shielded from the full facts of a difficult scenario by adults wishing to protect them.

23. The notice of appeal also sought an oral hearing pursuant to s. 43 of the 2015 Act on the basis that it was in the interests of justice to have such a hearing. In support of his application for an oral hearing, the applicant submitted that insofar as any of the elements of his story may be in doubt, they went to his personal credibility and the future risk posed to him. He submitted that:-

"The applicant should be provided a chance to give evidence on those details before any adverse findings are made against him. This will provide an opportunity by which an appeal hearing could base its decision on hearing further details or clarifications from the appellant and in which his credibility could be assessed in a face-to-face setting and which could make a significant difference to the outcome of his appeal."

24. It was noted that his loss of an automatic right to an oral hearing was on the grounds in s. 39(4)(e) of the 2015 Act that his country of origin had been designated as a safe country of origin (and not, for example, under s. 39(4)(b) that the applicant had made inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insufficient representations making his claim for international protection clearly unconvincing).

25. He noted that the facts concerning his substantive claim were not supported by direct documentary evidence and therefore the plausibility of his oral statements was a particularly important matter in the assessment of credibility. The notice of appeal then cited, in support of his application for an oral hearing, the decision of Cooke J in SUN v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2013] 2 IR 555 and the decision of Barr J in UP v Minister for Justice [2014] IEHC 567. He also referred to the decision of Phelan J in TB v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 275 where she held, at para. 69, that an oral hearing may be mandated "where the proper determination of the appeal turns on the personal credibility of the applicant in respect of matters of a kind that could have taken place but had been rejected purely because the applicant has been disbelieved when recounting them".

The Tribunal’s decision

26. The Tribunal in the first part of its decision addresses the applicant's claim for an oral hearing on the appeal. The Tribunal member noted that the authorities do not suggest that all issues of credibility require an oral hearing, citing VZ v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR

135. He noted that an appellant may expand on their evidence in the notice of appeal and can challenge factual findings in the papers. He referenced O'Donnell J (as he then was) in VJ v Minister for Justice [2019] IESC 75 when it was made clear that what is required is an opportunity to make a case and that depends on the nature of the case made. The Tribunal also noted my decision in SK v IPAT [2021] IEHC 781. The Tribunal said that it was not the case that the Tribunal was bound either to adopt the precise credibility findings of the IPO or else grant an oral hearing, citing MA v RAT [2015] IEHC 528. The member then states that:-

"It is clear from the legislation and the many decisions of the Supreme Court, the High Court and more recently the Court of Appeal that it is not the case that credibility findings are such that they can only be resolved by way of an oral hearing. There must be engagement with an actual assessment of the specific credibility grounds in an individual case and there must be an actual need to hear and test that evidence."

27. The core part of the Tribunal's reasoning on the request for an oral hearing (at para 11 of the decision) was that:-

"The credibility findings in this case are capable of objective assessment on the papers and are not based on subjective factors arising from interview. The Tribunal considers that the appellant had the opportunity to address any issues that he wants to address, or by way of further evidence/information in support of his claim since his notice of appeal issued. The appellant has not specified what, if anything, he wishes to say that is different, more expansive or clearer than what was said at interview stage. The Tribunal considers that in the absence of any issue or new element of the claim or specific detail that must be probed in order to be assessed that the appellant is seeking to repeat evidence in an oral hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not consider that a restatement of a claim before the Tribunal justifies an oral hearing in this case, given that no personal or demeanour type findings have been made against the appellant."

28. The Tribunal reiterated that the credibility findings in the case were capable of objective assessment on the papers, were not based on subjective factors arising from the oral hearing and that the applicant had been given adequate opportunity to set out his claim in his original application, and interview, his questionnaire, the s. 35 interview and in the notice of appeal.

29. The Tribunal concluded on the question of whether an oral hearing was required (at para. 13) that there were not any areas of the applicant's claim that he had not been given the opportunity to adequately address.

30. Over the course of four pages of its decision, the Tribunal went on to address the applicant's core claim that he was attacked because of a blood feud with the H. family.

31. The decision in this part recounts the applicant's evidence from his s. 35 interview as to the origin of the blood feud. The Tribunal held that the applicant provided:-

"…a vague account which lacks specific detail about this blood feud. The Tribunal does not consider the appellant’s claim he was not told much about the feud to be plausible, or consistent. The appellant had conversations with his family and claimed to have had a conversation with his father the day before who told him to come home because of the feud."

32. The Tribunal next addressed the applicant's explanation for lack of evidence of his uncle's murder, which was that the police would not give them that information because the

H. family were powerful and politically connected. The Tribunal considered that the explanation given by the applicant was vague and lacked specific detail and was inconsistent with the fact that the applicant had stated that F. H. had served a prison sentence in Albania (at para. 26).

33. The Tribunal considered that the applicant's explanation for the blood feud was a generalised account of dispute which lacked specific and meaningful detail about its cause and how it resumed (para 27).

34. The Tribunal then held that the applicant's lack of knowledge about the blood feud and his claim he was told limited information was inconsistent with his account that he was having daily conversations with his family, he knew there were murders, that people had served prison sentences and what sentences were served (para. 28).

35. The Tribunal concluded on the blood feud question (at para 29) by holding that they considered that:-

"There is a general vagueness and lack of specific detail about the blood feud, how a truce was maintained for 20 years, what was the cause of this truce being broken, and what conversations the appellant had with his father and family about the conflict and blood feud. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was a blood feud between the appellant's family and the H. family."

36. Notwithstanding that the Tribunal determined that there was no current blood feud, it went on to nonetheless examine the applicant's claim in relation to the October 2022 incident. The Tribunal considered that the applicant's account of being attacked and chased by a group of armed men was a "limited description of an attack in which he claims his life was at risk". The Tribunal quoted from his evidence in the s. 35 interview as to how he allegedly got away from the attackers and stated that it considered that there was "a vagueness and a lack of specific detail to explain how far he was chased, how long this lasted, and how he escaped when they were armed and had a car" (para 31).

37. The Tribunal then noted (at para 32) the fact that the applicant had not sought international protection while living in Italy for five months after his departure from Albania and quoted the applicant's evidence at s. 35 interview stage that it would not have been safe for him to seek protection in Italy because of its proximity to Albania but noted notwithstanding this explanation that he had stayed in Italy for five months and does not claim to have been attacked or threatened in Italy.

38. The Tribunal concluded (at para 33) that "looking at the case in the round, and weighing up the credibility indicators in respect of material facts, the Tribunal does not accept that the appellant was attacked because his family were involved in a blood feud with a powerful family”.

Relevant legal principles

39. Apart perhaps from the question of the circumstances in which there is a right to an oral hearing in a papers-only appeal, there is no real dispute as to the legal principles applicable to the grounds on which the applicant advances his case. Those principles are as follows.

40. The starting point of course is that the relevant procedures in the international protection process have their origin in EU law, in particular the Qualification Directive (Directive 2004/83/EC) and the Procedures Directive (Directive 2005/85/EC). The principles in these Directives are enacted in the 2015 Act. Accordingly, article 4 of the Qualification Directive sets out the principles governing the assessment of facts and circumstances of an application for international protection and imposes a duty on the State (here, through the Tribunal and the IPO) to assess the relevant elements of the application in co-operation with the applicant. This is reflected in the terms of s. 28(2) of the 2015 Act which requires the Tribunal in co-operation with the applicant to assess the relevant elements of the application for the purposes of an appeal. Section 27 of the 2015 Act imposes a similar duty of cooperation on an applicant for international protection. The importance of the duty of cooperation is confirmed in the CJEU decision in Case C-726/21 X v IPAT (see in particular at paras 54 to 57, and 60) and may require the Tribunal to seek further information depending on the circumstances. Thus, section 44 of the 2015 Act empowers the Tribunal to request the Minister (in practice via the IPO) to make such further enquiries and to furnish the Tribunal with such further information as the Tribunal considers necessary within such period as may be specified by the Tribunal.

41. The entitlement to fair procedures in the international protection process also finds expression in domestic legal provisions such as article 40 of the Constitution (see e.g. BW v RAT [2017] IECA 296 (“BW”) at para 39).

42. Section 46(1) of the 2015 Act requires the Tribunal, before reaching a decision on an appeal before it, to consider, inter alia, the notice of appeal and the IPO recommendation under appeal.

43. The applicant also relies for his case on a number of the principles set out by Cooke J in IR in relation to how to treat evidence going to credibility in an assessment of an international protection application. Those principles were approved of by Hogan J in RA v RAT [2017] IECA 297 at para 48. The principles are as follows:

“(1) The determination as to whether a claim to a well-founded fear of persecution is credible falls to be made under the Refugee Act 1996 by the administrative decisionmaker and not by the Court. The High Court on judicial review must not succumb to the temptation or fall into the trap of substituting its own view for that of the primary

decision-makers.

(2) On judicial review the function and jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to ensuring that the process by which the determination is made is legally sound and is not vitiated by any material error of law, infringement of any applicable statutory provision or of any principle of natural or constitutional justice.

(3) There are two facets to the issue of credibility, one subjective and the other objective. An applicant must first show that he or she has a genuine fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The second element involves assessing whether that subjective fear is objectively justified or reasonable and thus well founded.

(4) The assessment of credibility must be made by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed. It must not be based on a perceived, correct instinct or gut feeling as to whether the truth is or is not being told.

(5) A finding of lack of credibility must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation and the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding.

(6) The reasons must relate to the substantive basis of the claim made and not to minor matters or to facts which are merely incidental in the account given.

(7) A mistake as to one or even more facts will not necessarily vitiate a conclusion as to lack of credibility provided the conclusion is tenably sustained by other correct facts. Nevertheless, an adverse finding based on a single fact will not necessarily justify a denial of credibility generally to the claim.

(8) When subjected to judicial review, a decision on credibility must be read as a whole and the Court should be wary of attempts to deconstruct an overall conclusion by subjecting its individual parts to isolated examination in disregard of the cumulative impression made upon the decision-maker especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person.

(9) Where an adverse finding involves discounting or rejecting documentary evidence or information relied upon in support of a claim and which is prima facie relevant to a fact or event pertinent to a material aspect of the credibility issue, the reasons for that rejection should be stated.

(10) Nevertheless, there is no general obligation in all cases to refer in a decision on credibility to every item of evidence and to every argument advanced, provided the reasons stated enable the applicant as addressee, and the Court in exercise of its judicial review function, to understand the substantive basis for the conclusion on credibility and the process of analysis or evaluation by which it has been reached”.

44. The applicant also laid emphasis on aspects of the EUAA Handbook Practical Guide to Evidence and Risk Assessment, 2nd Ed., 2024 in relation to how the duty the co-operate should operate in practice. This is not a legally binding document but does seek to offer expert guidance as to how officers assessing international protection applications under the

Directives should approach their work. This guide contains detailed advice on credibility assessment in the international protection assessment process including advice on the application of internal credibility indicators such as sufficiency of details and specificity (section 2.2.1).

45. Section 43 of the 2015 Act provides as follows:

“43. Where the report under section 39 [i.e. the IPO recommendation report] includes any of the findings referred to in section 39 (4), the following modifications shall apply in relation to an appeal under section 41 by the applicant concerned—

(a) the appeal shall be brought by notice in writing within such period, which may be a shorter period than that prescribed for the purposes of section 41 (2)(a), from the date of the sending to the applicant of the notification under section 40, as may be prescribed under section 77,

(b) notwithstanding the provisions of section 42, the Tribunal, unless it considers it is not in the interests of justice to do so, shall make its decision in relation to the appeal without holding an oral hearing, and

(c) the notification referred to in section 40 (1) shall include a statement informing the applicant concerned of the effect of the modifications referred to in paragraph (a) and (b).”

46. Section 39(4) provides that “Where a report under this section includes a recommendation of the international protection officer referred to in subsection (3)(c), [i.e. whether a declaration of refugee status or subsidiary protection should or should not be granted] the report may also include one or more of the following findings:

(a) that the applicant, in submitting his or her application and in presenting the grounds of his or her application in his or her preliminary interview or personal interview or at any time before the conclusion of the examination, has raised only issues that are not relevant or are of minimal relevance to his or her eligibility for international protection;

(b) that the applicant has made inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insufficient representations which make his or her claim to be eligible for international protection clearly unconvincing;

(c) that the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application as soon as reasonably practicable having had opportunity to do so;

(d) that the applicant, for a reason referred to in section 32, is not in need of international protection;

(e) that the applicant’s country of origin is a safe country of origin.”

47. As can be seen, in any of the scenarios covered by s.39(4), including a finding by the IPO under s.39(4)(e) that the applicant’s country of origin is a safe country of origin, s. 43(b) provides that the Tribunal shall make its decision in relation to an accelerated appeal without holding an oral hearing “unless it considers it is not in the interests of justice to do so”.

48. Section 43(b) represented a change in the legal position which had obtained under the Refugee Act, 1996, where, if an applicant for refugee status came from a designated safe country of origin, there was no facility in the Act for an oral hearing at all and any appeal proceeded on an accelerated, “papers-only” basis.

49. The question of an entitlement as a matter of fair procedures to an oral hearing in a safe country of origin, papers-only appeal under the 1996 Act was considered in some detail by Cooke J. in the case of SUN v. The Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors [2013] 2 IR 555 (“SUN”).

50. The issue in that case was summarised by Cooke J. (at para 28) as being the effectiveness of the remedy by way of appeal to the Tribunal where an applicant has been automatically deprived of an oral re-hearing before the Tribunal by reason only of the fact that a finding has been made (at equivalent of IPO stage) to the effect that the applicant is a national of a designated ‘safe country’: “In particular, where…the primary ground upon which the negative recommendation has been based is a finding of a lack of personal credibility on the part of the applicant in the claim which has been advanced, can an appeal to the Tribunal conducted exclusively on paper be considered an ‘effective remedy’ in the sense of art. 39 [of the

Procedures Directive] when the applicant does not have the opportunity of persuading the court or tribunal dealing with the appeal of his credibility by personal observation and persuasion?”

51. Cooke J went on to reason as follows (at para 40):

“[40] Where, as in the present case, a claim for asylum has been rejected in a s. 13 report upon the basis that the applicant has been found not to be telling the truth, the issue of personal credibility is clearly fundamental to the appeal and, accordingly, to the character of the appeal procedure as providing a remedy which is effective to rectify the basis upon which the claim has been rejected. Where, as here, the events and facts described by an applicant are of a kind that could have taken place (as opposed to matters which are demonstrated to be impossible or contradicted by independent evidence), but have been rejected purely because the applicant has been disbelieved when recounting them, it is, in the judgment of the court, clear that the effectiveness of the appeal remedy as a matter of law is dependent upon the availability to the applicant of an opportunity of persuading the deciding authority on appeal that he or she is personally credible in the matter.”

52. In my judgment in SK v IPAT [2021] IEHC 781 (“SK”), I quoted and applied the above passage in the context of s.43 of the 2015 Act. I also quoted from and applied the analysis of O’Donnell

J. (as he then was) in M.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] 1 ILRM 361 (“MM”)

where he addressed the likely need for an oral hearing where credibility was in issue in the “classic sense” of whether an account of disputed facts is to be believed or not. I expressed the view that O’Donnell J.’s analysis in MM chimed with the approach taken by Cooke J. in SUN.

I concluded (at para 27) that “the approach outlined by Cooke J. in SUN and the analysis of O’Donnell J. in MM provide considerable assistance in assessing the principles which should guide the exercise by IPAT of its discretion under s. 43(b) in assessing whether in any given case it is not in the interests of justice to make a decision on an appeal without holding an oral hearing. Accordingly, where the issue of personal credibility is fundamental to the appeal and where the credibility of the applicant’s account of the events and facts subtending his or her case is in issue in the classic sense i.e. where the events and facts are of a kind “that could have taken place (as opposed to matters which are demonstrated to be impossible or contradicted by independent evidence), but have been rejected purely because the applicant has been disbelieved when recounting them” (Cooke J. in SUN at paragraph 40), the interests of justice are likely to merit an oral appeal.”

53. Phelan J. also adopted this approach to the question of whether an oral hearing could be required under s.43(b) in her judgment in TB v IPAT [2022] IEHC 275 (“TB”) (at para 67).

54. It is important to note that Cooke J. addressed earlier in his judgment in SUN the type of personal credibility issues involved in a situation where an applicant has been “disbelieved when recounting” his story. At para 38 he posed the question in the following terms:

“Where…the facts or events of a claim could have happened but the story is rejected because of the applicant's hesitations, apparent evasions, failures of recollection or discrepancies, is a second opportunity to convince the decision-maker of personal credibility then a necessary ingredient of an appeal remedy which is "effective" in the particular scheme of the Act of 1996..?” (emphasis added).

55. In AW v ORAC [2013] IEHC 71 (“AW”), a case decided not long after SUN, Mac Eochaidh J quoted from the key passages of the judgment of Cooke J. in SUN and said (at para 21) that he had no difficulty in accepting the analysis set out in that judgment. He then said (at para 22), applying the SUN principles to the facts of the case before him, that “the applicant was not disbelieved because of prevarication, evasiveness, shiftiness or any other aspect of demeanour or what Cooke J refers to as “personal credibility”.”

56. Mac Eochaidh J put it in the following way (again in the context of the prior regime under the Refugee Act 1996 but in terms that are applicable in principle to the processes under the 2015 Act) in AW at para 26; “the principle I discern from the authorities is that…where demeanour type or personal credibility findings underpin the first instance decision, then the applicant may require the opportunity to give oral evidence again on appeal. For example, if ORAC refused protection because it disbelieved an applicant and did so exclusively on grounds of evasiveness, or memory failure or the manner in which evidence was uttered, then fairness would seem to require that such applicant can be permitted to speak again.”

57. While I think this dictum may go a little far in confining itself to an entitlement to oral hearing only where credibility rejection has been exclusively grounded on demeanour type findings at first instance, it seems to me that where issues material to an overall lack of credibility finding are determined on demeanour-type grounds such as those identified by Cooke J. and Mac Eochaidh J, the interests of justice are likely to require an oral hearing to ensure a fair appeal on those types of issues.

58. It is important to emphasise that an applicant can also be disbelieved (and therefore be held to lack credibility) on non-demeanour type grounds such as when the content of his or her story on its own terms lacks coherence or plausibility or contains material inconsistencies such that a view can be safely arrived at, without the need for any further oral hearing, that the account should not be accepted.

59. Again, there is no hard and fast rule and each case will fall to be assessed on its own facts.

There may be a spectrum of cases between “pure” demeanour-type rejection of personal credibility to cases where an objective assessment of the case advanced by an applicant on its own terms demonstrates that the case cannot stand up. There may be cases where there are contested facts in the sense explained by O’Donnell J. in MM which require an oral hearing to resolve. It is possible to envisage a variety of scenarios (such as where new issues or evidence going to credibility arises on an appeal) that can only be fairly tested orally on the appeal or that may depending on the circumstances be fairly determined on the basis of the papers and written representations alone. The overriding requirement is that the appellant gets an opportunity to fairly make his case.

60. In this regard, an important appellate authority in the context of paper-only appeals is the judgment of Peart J in BW v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 296 (“BW”).

61. It is worth quoting at some length what Peart J has to say about oral hearings and fair procedures in the context of paper-only appeals under the 1996 Act. At para 39 he held as follows:

“39. While the ORAC included in its report a finding that the applicant had delayed in making her application for a declaration of refugee status for the purposes of s. 13(6)(c)

of the Refugee Act, 1996, as amended, resulting in the applicant having no entitlement to an appeal by way of an oral hearing – indeed a conclusion which the applicant has not contested - she nevertheless remains entitled to an effective appeal remedy in accordance with the purpose and objective of Directive 2005/85/EC (“the Procedures

Directive”). She was also entitled to be afforded fair procedures under Article 40.3 of the Constitution. Her rights in these respects are not diluted or reduced by the fact that she could not require an oral hearing. This is of particular importance where adverse credibility findings have been made against an applicant which have been found to undermine the credibility of her account of events upon which her alleged fear of persecution are based, and which have led to her application being refused.

62. Peart J’s comments at para 40 of his judgment are of particular relevance to the case before me:

“40. In some cases on a papers-only appeal, the matters which have led to an adverse credibility finding have been made by ORAC, and will already have been put to the applicant at interview by ORAC, and are included in the s. 13 report, and she will therefore have had an opportunity of addressing these concerns during the ORAC process, and perhaps afterwards in correspondence and/or by providing further information. In such cases, where there is a papers-only appeal, the Tribunal will have before it all the material provided to ORAC, including the application form, the notes of interview, any documents and material provided by the applicant in support of her account, including relevant country of origin information. Even in such cases, the Tribunal must still take particular care to ensure that fair procedures have been applied to the consideration of the appeal. As was stated by Clark J. in V.M. (Kenya) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & ors [2013] IEHC 24, the Court, on an application for judicial review in relation to a papers-only appeal “… therefore looks with heightened vigilance at the process of the documentary appeal in circumstances where an appellant has no opportunity to appear and explain or expand on any perceived inconsistencies or deficits in his/her claim” “.

63. Peart J then emphasises that where a concern emerges for the first time on a papers-only appeal that is material to the applicant’s case and which the appellant has not already had a fair opportunity to address, the appellant as a matter of fair procedures will be entitled to an opportunity to address it. He stated (at paras 41 and 42):

41. A particular difficulty arises for the tribunal dealing with a papers-only appeal where the tribunal member considers that the appellant’s credibility may be called into question by certain matters appearing from the papers before the Tribunal, but which have not formed the basis for any adverse credibility comment or finding by the ORAC in its s. 13 report and are matters which were not put to the appellant during the procedures before the Commissioner. Do the requirements of an effective appeal remedy and/or fair procedures to which the appellant is entitled require that the appellant be provided with some opportunity to address such new concerns which she has not previously had an opportunity to address since they were not previously raised at the ORAC stage of the process? If so, what form does that opportunity take? Should she be asked to address the concerns by correspondence? Should the matters of concern be put to her at some form of oral hearing? Does every new matter of concern need to be put to her in some manner, no matter how trivial or tangential, or should such an opportunity be confined to concerns which are important to the overall conclusion as to credibility and therefore the success or failure of the appeal?

42. These are questions the answers to which are to some extent fact-dependent, and each case will need to be considered on its own facts. But where an issue of concern emerges for the first time on a papers-only appeal in relation to a matter which the appellant has not already had a fair opportunity to address, either because it was not put to her at interview, or because perhaps it may have arisen for whatever reason only after the ORAC process had ended, and that concern is in relation to something which is material to the basis on which asylum is being sought, and therefore to the decision whether or not she be granted a declaration of refugee status, she is as a matter of fair procedures entitled to an opportunity to address it. Whether that opportunity requires some form of oral hearing in relation to the concern, or whether it can be dealt with fairly and adequately in writing will depend on the particular facts. It will be a matter to be considered by the Tribunal member in any individual case. But the principle is the same. If the concern is a material concern – one that has the capacity to affect the outcome of the appeal – then the appellant is entitled to a fair opportunity to address the concern where that opportunity has not already been provided.”

64. This latter statement was approved in the context of s.43 of the 2015 Act by Phelan J in TB (at para 75).

65. BW (at para 44, following Cooke J in SUN at para 37) also makes clear that depending on context an opportunity to address credibility issues at appeal stage need not necessarily be addressed by way of further oral hearing; the opportunity to adduce additional evidence e.g. by a further written statement of an applicant, may well suffice. (As already noted, s. 44 of the 2015 Act empowers the Tribunal to make such further enquiries and to request such further information as the Tribunal considers necessary. An appellant is also free to tender further information or evidence in his Notice of Appeal against an IPO recommendation should such material be germane to his appeal.)

66. Having referred further to the judgment of Cooke J in SUN and the judgment of Clarke J (as he then was) in Moyasola v RAC [2005] IEHC 218 (“Moyasola”), Peart J concluded in BW (at para 50) that “where for the first time on the papers-only appeal the tribunal considers that some matter of significance, not previously raised or addressed during the ORAC process, speaks to the question of the applicant’s personal credibility [such that] the Tribunal is considering a significant matter for the first time in the entire process, [f]air procedures demand, in my view, that some opportunity be provided to the applicant to address such a concern before it is relied upon for an adverse credibility finding. Where this does not occur the finding in question may have to be set aside, particularly where that finding is objectively material to the basis for a conclusion that the applicant lacks credibility, and the decision on appeal is to uphold the recommendation of the RAC to refuse a declaration.”

67. Counsel for the applicant said that there may be some tension between the approach of Mac Eochaidh J in MA v RAT [2015] IEHC 528 (“MA”) and the approach seen in some other authorities including Moyasola and BW.

68. In MA, Mac Eochaidh J stated (at para 20) that:

“The essential case made by the applicant is that the Tribunal Member should not have made new credibility findings against the applicant on a papers only appeal without reverting to him and putting these issues to him. I reject this argument. Where the Tribunal intends to make negative credibility findings based on the statements made by the applicant during the asylum process, whether on a papers only appeal or on an oral appeal, there is no obligation to revert to the applicant to give him or her an opportunity of explaining a perceived inconsistency, a contradiction, an implausible suggestion or any other circumstance arising from what the applicant has personally said, during the application process, which causes the Tribunal Member to conclude that credibility should be rejected. The Tribunal is no more required to do this than would a judge be required on hearing implausible testimony or on noticing an inconsistency in evidence to warn a witness that a negative credibility finding is imminent. The fact that the negative credibility finding is made on a papers only appeal is irrelevant.”

69. In fairness, Mac Eochaidh J did then say at para 22:

“No reliance could be placed on material unknown to an applicant to defeat a claim for asylum. Thus, country of origin information which contradicts an applicant’s narrative must be disclosed and an opportunity afforded to address it. Contrarily, it must be assumed that an applicant is aware of what he or she has said during the asylum process. It is noted that an applicant has full opportunity in an appeal, even a “papers only” appeal to address any inconsistency, contradiction, implausibility or any other problem arising from what has been said during the asylum application process.”

70. In a similar vein Humphreys J in JH v IPAT [2018] IEHC 752 (“JH”) stated (at para 10) that

“it is an inherent feature of the de novo appeal system involved in an appeal to IPAT that if one gets a negative decision which includes some positive features, and if one then appeals by way of rehearing, everything is up for discussion on the appeal, including the possibility of reversal of the positive elements. That is so whether one is appealing from the District Court to the Circuit Court or any other mechanism by way of rehearing, such as from the IPO to the IPAT. It is even possible to lose favourable findings where an appeal is less than de novo, such as from the High Court to an appellate court. It then becomes a tactical decision as to whether to appeal a partly favourable and partly unfavourable decision. If one chooses to appeal, one cannot complain if favourable elements are displaced.”

71. In so far as there is any conflict between MA or JH and BW, I am bound by BW as a Court of Appeal authority. The key point as emphasised in BW is that the Tribunal in a papers-only appeal (particularly one turning on the applicant’s credibility) should not be relying on material or grounds to reject an appeal which have not been previously notified to the applicant within the overall process such that an applicant has not fairly had a chance to deal with such issues.

72. The question as to whether an issue has been raised for the first time at tribunal stage on appeal and therefore requires in fairness to be notified to an appellant so that the appellant has an opportunity to address it (whether by oral hearing or further written representation) will be a fact-sensitive one. But a common sense approach has to be taken: is it in substance a new matter which goes to a material part of the determination of the appellant’s claim or is it a matter that in truth has been in issue in the proceedings prior to the Tribunal appeal stage and which does not require any further invitation for submissions to be determined fairly? If it is a new issue, is it of a type that requires an oral hearing to resolve or can it be fairly disposed of on paper?

73. If the Tribunal on a de novo hearing is assessing precisely the same material which the IPO assessed but places a different emphasis or characterisation on the material than the IPO, it cannot in general terms be faulted for that and will not ordinarily in such circumstances be required to revert to an appellant to invite further representations. Common sense must apply.

The appeal process should not become bogged down before the Tribunal in an iterative process of requests for further information or submissions and responses to those requests just because the Tribunal may take a somewhat different view to the IPO on the same underlying material.

Different considerations will apply if there is new material before the Tribunal which was not considered at IPO stage. The overriding question is one of fairness: has the applicant been given a fair opportunity in the overall process to make his or her case and address any material points of concern in relation to that case raised during the process, including in the appeal?

Did the Tribunal err in law in not granting an oral hearing on the appeal?

74. The applicant says that as the IPO rejected the truthfulness of his account of the blood feud he was entitled to an oral hearing in the interests of justice to fairly resolve his appeal.

75. In my view, the Tribunal in its decision fairly summarised (at least in broad terms) the legal principles applicable to the question of whether the necessity for an oral hearing arises in a papers-only appeal. The reference by the Tribunal in its decision to there being no “personal or demeanour type findings” against the applicant is a reference to the absence of those types of findings considered by Cooke J in SUN and Mac Eochaidh J in AW as set out above.

76. In my view, there was no obligation on the Tribunal to order an oral hearing on appeal in this case as it was not an appeal from a demeanour-based rejection of credibility and no other issues of truly contested fact arose. Rather, the IPO had rejected the applicant's account as effectively not stacking up on its own terms due to a combination of internal inconsistencies in the applicant's story, insufficient detail in aspects of the applicant’s story, and inconsistencies between the applicant’s story and external COI material. It seems to me that the Tribunal was entitled to take the view that this was not a demeanour-type rejection of credibility case and that nothing had been raised in the notice of appeal which necessitated an oral hearing in the interests of justice to fairly dispose of the appeal. The Tribunal was entitled to take the view that the credibility finding were capable of objective assessment on the papers particularly where the applicant chose not to expand on his evidence at the appeal stage despite the IPO report findings.

77. I therefore conclude that the Tribunal did not err in refusing an oral hearing in this case. It was within the legitimate band of decisions open to the Tribunal to refuse an oral hearing on the particular facts of the case.

Did the Tribunal err in deciding appeal on matters not notified to applicant or otherwise unlawfully fail to engage with the applicant’s case or breach the duty to co-operate?

78. The applicant has sought to engage in a detailed parsing of the Tribunal's decision with a view to demonstrating that the Tribunal arrived at conclusions which the applicant did not get an advance opportunity to address in his notice of appeal. However, stepping back from the appeal here, the IPO in broad terms rejected the applicant's case as being implausible on the basis that it was insufficiently detailed, internally inconsistent and therefore not coherent, and externally inconsistent with COI material. The Tribunal, for its part, in analysing the same material, reached broadly the same adverse conclusions but laid emphasis instead, in addition to certain internal inconsistencies, on an overall lack of detail and a lack of coherence. I do not think there was any obligation on the Tribunal to revert to the applicant prior to arriving at its

decision in the circumstances, whether as a matter of fair procedures or pursuant to the duty to co-operate.

79. I think this is clear when the applicant’s specific grounds of complaint in relation to the Tribunal’s decision are considered in turn.

80. In his statement of grounds, the applicant complains that the Tribunal departed from the IPO’s finding that his account of the blood feud was “sufficiently detailed” and found instead that “the applicant provided a vague account which lacked specific detail about this blood feud”

(decision, para 25); that this finding was one made for the first time on appeal without giving him an oral hearing to address and failed to engage with the submissions in the notice of appeal as to why a lot of detail could not have been expected given the applicant’s age when material events occurred.

81. However, this case overlooks the full relevant finding of the Tribunal which was that the applicant provided "A vague account which lacks specific detail about this blood feud. The Tribunal does not consider the appellant’s claim he was not told much about the feud to be plausible, or consistent. The appellant had conversations with his family and claimed to have had a conversation with his father the day before who told him to come home because of the feud." (Decision para 25)

82. This finding addresses the substance of applicant’s case on the notice of appeal and effectively rejects it. This is not a new or fresh finding in substance as the IPO officer, while noting that the applicant's account of this aspect of matters was sufficiently detailed, had held that there was an internal inconsistency in relation to the applicant's level of knowledge of his family's involvement in a blood feud as between not having much detail about knowledge of the blood feud on the one hand but giving evidence that he did speak to his family about the revival of the feud once he became a target, on the other (IPO recommendation page 8 – see para 11 of this judgment).

83. It cannot be the case that the Tribunal was required in advance of its decision to go back and invite the applicant to further comment on that indicative finding. The applicant had made his case by reference to the evidence which he had given at various stages in the IPO process and his submissions on that evidence. Importantly, notwithstanding the IPO finding, the applicant did not seek to tender any further evidence or explanation or detail on this issue. It is clear that the Tribunal did not accept his submissions on appeal. The Tribunal provided a reasoned basis for its findings. This court cannot gainsay those findings.

84. The applicant contends in his statement of grounds that the Tribunal made a new finding not made by the IPO and without notice to the applicant that the applicant’s account of how the feud resumed was lacking in detail (decision, para 27). The applicant complains that this was effectively a reversal of an IPO finding that sufficient detail had been provided. Again, this overlooks the core finding of the Tribunal in the next paragraph of its decision “that the applicant knew that his father was trying to have meetings to resolve the conflict that had broken out” [i.e. the resumption of the feud]. The appellant was asked when he became aware of the recent conflict and stated “I talked to my family every day so I would know what was happening they would tell me…The Tribunal considers the appellant’s lack of knowledge about the blood feud and his claim he was told limited information to be inconsistent with his account he was having daily conversations with his family, he knew there were murders, people served prison sentences and what sentences were served”. As already noted, this is effectively the same basis upon which the IPO determined there was an unacceptable inconsistency in his overall account of the feud.

85. While the applicant seeks to characterise the findings as one of vagueness and lack of specific detail, it is clear from the detailed terms of the Tribunal's decision that the Tribunal was relying not only on a lack of plausible detail but also on inconsistencies in the applicant's account. The applicant was, in general terms, aware that inconsistencies in his account (in addition to absence of detail on certain key areas) were central to the IPO's rejection of his claim and had every opportunity through his notice of appeal, including by way of submission of any additional information or statement on his behalf, to address those concerns. He chose rather to rely on the same evidence but to make submissions as to the different conclusions which the Tribunal ought draw from that evidence. I do not see that the Tribunal can be said to have acted unlawfully because it arrived at somewhat more nuanced conclusions on the same evidence or a somewhat different characterisation of the evidence to those of the IPO officer or did not accept the conclusions urged upon it by the applicant.

86. The applicant next complains in his statement of grounds that the Tribunal made a new finding in relation to his account of the October 2022 incident in Tirana which he never received an adequate opportunity to address. The Tribunal considered that the applicant's account of being attacked and chased by a group of armed men was a "limited description of an attack in which he claims his life was at risk". The Tribunal quoted from his evidence in the s. 35 interview as to how he allegedly got away from the attackers and stated that it considered that there was "a vagueness and a lack of specific detail to explain how far he was chased, how long this lasted, and how he escaped when they were armed and had a car".

87. The applicant complains that these questions in relation to the attack were never put to him and he never got an opportunity to address these points, in breach of his right to fair procedures and the Tribunal's duty of co-operation with him. He complains in his statement of grounds that the Tribunal failed to weigh the actual facts recited by him and his interview and questionnaire evidence before the IPO which he says in substance addressed the questions which the Tribunal identified as not being sufficiently explained. He says that the matters identified by the Tribunal in its decision could have been asked of him in an oral hearing.

88. However, I do not believe that these complaints are well-founded. The IPO too found that there was a lack of detail in his account of the alleged attack. While the applicant in his notice of appeal contended that the account was not insufficiently detailed and did not fail to provide any material information, the Tribunal took a different view, as it was entitled to. There is no unlawfulness in that approach. No new issue or material was being considered by the Tribunal which necessitated an invitation for further representations from the applicant.

89. The Tribunal concluded that "looking at the case in the round, and weighing up the credibility indicators in respect of material facts, the Tribunal does not accept that the appellant was attacked because his family were involved in a blood feud with a powerful family". In my view, that was a conclusion reasonably open to the Tribunal on the evidence and submissions before it and was safely arrived it as a matter of law.

90. An important point on the facts of this case is that no new substantive matter was raised or relied upon by the Tribunal which was not in broad terms already in issue in the process. The IPO recommendation had rejected the applicant's case in its entirety on the basis of a combination of inconsistency and lack of detail leading to a conclusion in essence that the applicant’s story on its own terms was not plausible. The Tribunal subjected the same evidence and materials to a de novo exercise of assessing its plausibility, including its coherence, consistency and sufficiency of detail. It arrived at the same ultimate conclusion, albeit with some differences of emphasis in how it arrived at those conclusions. There was nothing improper in such an approach or nothing in the case on appeal which required the Tribunal to revert to the applicant to invite further information, material or submissions prior to giving its

decision, whether as a matter of fair procedures or pursuant to its duty of co-operation or otherwise. It seems to me that the applicant's case essentially invites the court to analyse the evidence before the Tribunal in a different way to that analysed by the Tribunal and to arrive at different conclusions. That of course is not something which this court can do in judicial review proceedings.

Alleged failure to engage with Notice of Appeal

91. The applicant contends that in truth there was no engagement at all with the grounds of appeal which he advanced. However, I do not accept that this is the case. The Tribunal said in its

decision that it considered all the papers in the matter, including the IPO decision and the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal is referenced a number of times in that part of the decision dealing with the application contained in the notice of appeal for an oral hearing. It is not the case that the Tribunal is obliged to recite each and every ground advanced by the applicant in his notice of appeal in the course of its decision and to give its view on each ground of appeal. What is clear is that the Tribunal took a view on each of the core issues arising in relation to the plausibility, consistency and detail of the various aspects of the applicant's account. It clearly did not agree with the applicant's submissions on those matters. It provided a reasoned decision by reference to the relevant evidence in relation to its findings and its ultimate decision.

92. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in Rana and Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC

46 (at para. 93), it is not in general necessary to support a statement that all material has been considered with further evidence to prove the veracity of the statement. Decision-makers in this type of process are not required to list out everything that has been put before them to address each aspect individually. This was a reiteration of the principles set out by the Supreme Court in GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418. The rule is that a person claiming that a

decision-making authority “has contrary to its express statement ignored representations which it has received must produce some evidence, direct or inferential, of that proposition before he can be said to have an arguable case".

93. While it may have been more helpful for the Tribunal to have engaged more directly with the grounds advanced in the notice of appeal, it seems to me that a reading of the Tribunal's

decision as a whole shows that the notice of appeal was considered and makes clear that the Tribunal was not persuaded by the various points advanced in the notice of appeal as to why the IPO decision should not be upheld. I do not see that any unlawfulness is made out in the circumstances.

Alleged breach of IR principles

94. In my view, there has been no breach of the relevant principles in IR. The Tribunal in its

decision identified the reasons why it believed the applicant's account was either insufficiently detailed or inconsistent or was not otherwise plausible and it did so by reference to the evidence which the applicant had given in the IPO process. The applicant’s evidence as a whole was rationally analysed and the Tribunal’s findings were cogently reasoned. It is not for this Court on a judicial review to engage in a merits-based review of the decision which might arrive at a different conclusion on the evidence and submissions before the Tribunal.

Conclusion

95. For the reasons outlined in this judgment, I conclude that the applicant is not entitled to any of the relief he seeks in these proceedings.