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2026_IEHC_126-1 AI generated

High Court dismisses proceedings as moot following resignation of defendants and new panel appointment.

Case Number 2026_IEHC_126-1
Court / Authority
Jurisdiction Ireland (IE)
Decision Date
Outcome Dismissed

Legislator summary

AI generated

The High Court struck out the plaintiff's proceedings, ruling they were no longer viable due to the resignation of two defendants and a new disciplinary panel appointment. The plaintiff sought injunctions and declarations against the original panel members regarding unfair procedures and refusal to recuse. The court determined that the fundamental reliefs were already achieved by the new panel's composition, rendering the remaining claims moot.

Legislator headnote

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Circular 49/2018; Natural Justice: Proceedings are dismissed as moot where the subject matter has been resolved by the resignation of original panel members and the appointment of a new, independent body.

Keywords

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Mootness Doctrine Disciplinary Appeal Panel Natural Justice Injunction Relief Resignation of Members Fresh Hearing Circular 49/2018

Cited Case Law

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Full text

THE HIGH COURT

RECORD NO. 2026 18 P

[2026] IEHC 126

BETWEEN

ENOCH BURKE

PLAINTIFF

AND

SEAN O’LONGAIN, GERALDINE O’BRIEN, JACK CLEARY

DEFENDANTS

Ex Tempore Judgment (No. 1) of Mr. Justice Cregan delivered on 20th February 2026

1. These proceedings are proceedings issued by Mr Burke against Mr O'Longain, Ms Geraldine O'Brien, and Mr Jack Cleary. The proceedings were instituted on 6th January 2026 by means of a plenary summons in which the plaintiff sought some 11 reliefs, including an injunction restraining each of the defendants from issuing their recommendation in the plaintiff's appeal under appendix 1(A) of Circular 49/2018 or from taking any further steps to continue to hear the plaintiff's appeal.

2. In the second paragraph of the plaintiff's plenary summons, he sought an order remitting the plaintiff's appeal back for a fresh hearing by a newly constituted Disciplinary Appeal Panel which does not include any of the named defendants. Thirdly, he sought a declaration that the second defendant's acceptance of the nomination to the DAP and her subsequent refusal to recuse herself therefrom is in breach of Circular 49/2018, unfair, unreasonable, unlawful, and contrary to natural justice and fair procedures.

3. The plaintiff also seeks various declarations about unfair procedures, about the unfair manner in which the defendants conducted the appeal, and that their refusal to permit the plaintiff to cross-examine witnesses was unfair, unreasonable, unlawful, and contrary to natural justice and fair procedures; he also sought declarations that the defendants' refusal to accept copies of affidavits was unfair, unreasonable, unlawful and contrary to natural justice, and various other related reliefs.

4. The plaintiff also brought an application for an interlocutory injunction which was made returnable before this Court on 14th of January and thereafter case managed by this Court from time to time.

5. In the notice of motion, the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining each of the defendants, their servants, or agents from issuing their recommendation in the plaintiff's appeal under appendix 1(A) of Circular 49/2018 or from taking any further steps to continue to hear the plaintiff's appeal.

6. That application was grounded upon Mr Burke's affidavit; there were replying affidavits received from Mr O'Longain and Mr Geraldine O'Brien; Mr Burke then filed a second affidavit as did Mr O'Longain and Ms O'Brien.

7. The matter was case managed by this Court from time to time and the matter came back before the Court on 4th February last, by which time the Court had given directions about the exchange of affidavits and also about the exchange of legal submissions. The Court intended on 4th February to shortly thereafter fix a hearing date for this motion.

8. However, what happened was that on the previous day, 3rd February, two members of the Disciplinary Appeal Panel – two of the defendants, Mr Sean O'Longain and Mr Jack Cleary – resigned from the panel. So, what then happened was that on 4th February, Mr Lyons, senior counsel for the defendants, indicated to the Court that, in his view, the proceedings were now moot.

9. Mr Burke indicated that he did not believe that they were moot. He sought time to consider the matter and I adjourned the matter on that basis. I also expressed my own concern in court as to whether or not the proceedings were moot, in circumstances where Ms Geraldine O'Brien was still apparently a member of the panel and where the plaintiff's claim in the plenary summons was, at paragraph 2, for an order remitting the appeal to a newly constituted Disciplinary Appeal Panel which does not include any of the named defendants. Also, the plaintiff sought a declaration that Ms Geraldine O'Brien's acceptance of the nomination and her subsequent refusal to recuse herself was in breach of the circular and was unfair, unreasonable, unlawful, and contrary to natural justice.

10. It seemed to me therefore that there were two issues that remained in the case: one was that if Ms Geraldine O'Brien remained on the panel, Mr Burke's case that she was guilty of objective bias, was still alive; and secondly, that he wanted an order remitting the appeal back for a fresh hearing by a new DAP which does not include any of the named defendants.

11. I adjourned the matter for two weeks and three days to allow all parties, but particularly Mr Burke, to consider the position as he indicated that he needed some time to do so. At the time, Mr Lyons for the defendants indicated that he thought a week would be sufficient. So, in ease of Mr Burke, I adjourned the matter for two weeks to allow him to prepare.

12. Now, during that time, the defendants' solicitors have engaged in correspondence which was exhibited before the Court in the affidavit of Feidhlim Mac Róibín of 18th February 2026. The most significant letter in that is a letter that has been sent by the defendants' solicitors to Mr Burke and it states as follows:

"Dear Mr Burke,

The above matter and our letters to you of 3rd and 4th February 2026 refer. As you are aware, the first and third defendants, (Mr O'Longain and Mr Cleary,) have tendered their resignations from the DAP. In consequence of their resignations and as stated in our letter of the 3rd February 2026, it is clear that the panel which was convened to hear and determine your appeal can no longer do so..."

13. And then, most importantly, the letter goes on to say as follows, – "Furthermore it is clear to Ms O'Brien, having regard to the provisions of Appendix 1(A) to DES Circular 49/2018 that she, the second named defendant, is precluded from having any further involvement in your appeal or participating in any future panel convened to hear your appeal. This is so in circumstances where she has had 'prior … dealings with’ your case and we confirm that Ms O'Brien will have no further involvement in your appeal."

14. This is a reference to the circular 49/2018 issued by the Department of Education which, at Appendix 1(A), sets out the provisions which govern the composition of the Disciplinary Appeal Panel and it says: "1. The board of management shall appoint a Teachers Disciplinary Appeal Panel which shall comprise:

• an independent chairperson from a panel nominated by the Minister for Education and Skills,

• a representative of the recognised management body,

• a nominee of the relevant teacher union..."

2. "No member shall be appointed to the Panel to consider a case referred to the Panel who has had any prior interest in or dealings with that particular case."

15. It is clear therefore that a new panel will have to be appointed, it is clear that the new panel will consist of three members: an independent chairperson, a representative from the recognised management body, and a nominee of the relevant teacher union.

16. It is clear also that Mr O'Longain and Mr Cleary will not form any part of that new disciplinary panel because they resigned from the existing panel, but what is quite clear from this letter is that Ms O'Brien also cannot play any part in the new panel when it is formed.

That being so, it is clear that the plaintiff has obtained the essential reliefs that he sought at paragraph one of his plenary summons. He effectively has obtained, not by order of this Court, but by, essentially, the facts on the ground, a result whereby none of the named existing defendants can issue their recommendations in the plaintiff's appeal, nor can they take any further steps to continue to hear the plaintiff's appeal; secondly he has succeeded in the second most important order he is seeking, which was an order remitting the plaintiff's appeal back for a fresh hearing by a newly constituted DAP which does not include any of the named defendants. It is clear that a new panel will have to be appointed and it is also clear that none of the existing members will form part of that new panel.

17. The letter from McInnes Dunne Murphy of 18th February 2026 could not have been clearer. It states: "We confirm that Ms O'Brien will have no further involvement in your appeal."

18. So it is crystal clear that the fundamental reliefs that the plaintiff seeks, not only in his injunction, but also in his plenary summons, are moot and this Court does not intend to take up precious judicial time – let alone impose significant costs on other parties – to hear a case which has now effectively been rendered moot by the resignations of two members and the undertaking by the third member that she will not serve on the new panel.

19. Likewise, all of the declarations that the plaintiff has sought in the rest of the plenary summons relate to what he says was the unlawful conduct of the second Disciplinary Appeal Panel, namely the refusal to allow him cross-examine witnesses, the refusal to accept certain evidence, the refusal to allow him make submissions et cetera. Those now fall away because a new panel will be appointed and the new members of the new panel will hear the appeal in the way that they decide they should do so. So, I am satisfied that these proceedings are moot and in those circumstances I intend to strike out the proceedings.