High Court quashes Tribunal decision for failing to weigh psychiatric evidence supporting applicant's credibility.

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2026] IEHC 121 Record No. 2024/1110 JR BETWEEN

N.

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

FIRST RESPONDENT AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION

SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 2nd day of March, 2026

INTRODUCTION

1. The central issue in these judicial review proceedings is whether the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter “the Tribunal”) adequately considered medical evidence in the form of a psychiatric report which concluded that the Applicant suffered from Complex PTSD, that her symptoms were highly consistent with the events she described and offered the opinion that the Applicant’s memory difficulties were clinically explained and should not be treated as adverse to credibility. The Applicant requires an extension of time within which to bring the within proceedings.

BAGKGROUND

2. The Applicant claims to be a South African national who fled South Africa after the murder of her brother by a drug gang who allegedly threatened to kidnap and force her into prostitution.

3. She arrived in Ireland on the 13th of February, 2023 and applied for international protection on the 13th of April, 2023 in accordance with s.15 of the International Protection Act, 2015 (hereinafter “the 2015 Act”) undergoing a preliminary interview under s.13(2) of the 2015 Act and completing an International Protection Office Questionnaire.

4. The Applicant attended an interview pursuant to the provisions of s.35 of the 2015 Act with an International Protection Officer (hereinafter “IPO”) on the 26th of April, 2023.

5. At first instance, the IPO accepted the credibility of the Applicant’s claimed nationality and family circumstances but found her account of threats from a gang not credible.

This account was viewed as vague, uncorroborated and speculative. The IPO also found no evidence that the Applicant had sought State protection and some documentation submitted was deemed unverifiable. Reliance was placed on the fact that South Africa is a designated safe country of origin. It was found that there was no evidence the Applicant would face persecution or serious harm if returned. For these

reasons, the IPO recommended refusal of refugee and subsidiary protection in a s. 39 Report which was adopted on behalf of the Minister.

6. The Applicant appealed to the Tribunal from the decision of the IPO by Notice of Appeal dated the 13th of July, 2023. She was afforded an oral hearing on the 23rd of February, 2024, as it was considered necessary for reasons set out at para. 5 of Tribunal

Decision as follows:

“owing to the fact that her claim failed because of the lack of credibility of its material elements owing to the alleged vagueness and lack of specificity in her section 35 interview and in her Questionnaire. However, the Tribunal considered that the Section 35 report interview disclosed some missed opportunities to allow the Appellant to elaborate on her answers or to probe her further on the material aspect of her claim, and that the conclusion that her claim was vague and lacking in detail, therefore, was a questionable one.

Indeed, the Section 35 interview appeared to be little more than an hour and half long, including the ‘read back’ elements and a break of 20 minutes. The Tribunal considered it one of the poorest quality Section 35 interviews it had encountered. This had the practical effect that the Tribunal had to pose a range of queries to the Appellant in the course of the hearing.”

7. It appears that during the hearing, the Applicant became distressed. In consequence, the Tribunal suggested that a medico-legal report might be useful and permitted her legal representatives three weeks from the date of the hearing to decide whether to obtain one. An email indicating that an appointment had been made for just such a report was subsequently received by the Tribunal and time was allowed for same.

8. As a result of other issues that arose in the course of the hearing, the Tribunal also allowed the Applicant three weeks to furnish any material relating to the alleged misuse of her brother’s Facebook account, and any material relating to his post mortem in South Africa, as well as any phone messages that might pertain to her brother and that

might be relevant to the material aspect of her claim. Material relating to these aspects was received by the Tribunal by email dated the 14th of March, 2024.

MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT

9. The Medico-Legal Report, prepared by a Consultant Psychiatrist with previous experience in preparing Spirasi reports, was furnished by email dated the 12th of April, 2024, wherein clinical findings were made.

10. The Report concluded that the Applicant met the diagnostic criteria for Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (ICD-11 code 6B41). In the Report, the Consultant Psychiatrist stated:

“In my opinion, her post traumatic symptoms (e.g. nightmares, intrusive thoughts and memories, avoidance symptoms, heightened reactivity, increased startle reaction) relate to the horrific murder of her brother last year. She continues to be deeply affected by this event and the threats that she, and her sister, received in the aftermath. She was unable to attend her brother's burial and had to flee her home and her family immediately. She was obviously overwhelmed when speaking about these events to me. As well as typical post traumatic symptoms (intrusive images, avoidance symptoms and heightened reactivity) she also reports that she feels “worthless” and emotionally “numb”.

Her symptoms conform with a diagnosis of complex PTSD as defined in the ICD

11. In my opinion her post traumatic symptoms are highly consistent with her account of what happened to her and her family in February 2023"

11. The Report further explained that difficulty recalling specific details is normal in trauma survivors, citing and quoting from the UNHCR Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (New York and Geneva, 2022) (hereinafter “the Istanbul Protocol”). It was pointed out that extreme emotional arousal disrupts memory storage, traumatic memories are often fragmented and even core details may be poorly recalled and memory recall varies over time. The Report stated:

“The events of February 2023 were very traumatic for Ms. N and her family. In my opinion Ms. N was severely traumatized by what happened and is now suffering with CPTSD, as outlined above. Many people who experience such highly traumatizing events do not afterwards easily recall specific details of these events. In fact, there is evidence that the more traumatising the event, the more likely this is to happen. Any difficulty that Ms. N experienced with regard to recall at her IPAT interview should be understood in this context.”

12. Summarising his findings in the Report the Consultant Psychiatrist stated:

“I found that Ms. N is currently suffering several intense and ongoing psychiatric symptoms. In my opinion these are best understood in terms of a diagnosis of complex PTSD as described above. Overall, these symptoms are highly consistent with her account of her traumatic bereavement in February 2023 and subsequent terrorization by her brother's killers. They also go some way to explain the difficulties she has experienced in recounting a full narrative of these events.”

TRIBUNAL DECISION

13. In the written Tribunal Decision dated the 4th of July, 2023, the Tribunal listed the following documents as having been submitted in support of the Applicant’s appeal:

i. Republic of South Africa National Identity Card in the name of the Applicant (Original);

ii. Death certificate in the name of her brother;

iii. SAPS report dated 25th of April, 2023;

iv. Copy news article from Jozi FM News re death of two young boys, aged 5 and 6 years old;

v. Copy of a Facebook entry dated the 23rd of June 2023, which read ‘Stop using [Name] Face book’ [Sic];

vi. Copy of Notice of Death from South African Department of Home Affairs;

vii. Medico-Legal Report, dated the 12th of April 2024;

viii. Legal Submission dated the 3rd of May 2023 and the 14th of February 2024, both of which referred to relevant extracts from COI;

ix. ‘Permission to Remain’ material (not relevant to the Tribunal’s determination);

x. Legal Submissions compiled by her legal representatives undated but received on the 1st of February 2024 referencing COI.

14. In the Decision, the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant is a national of South Africa.

It was further accepted, having regard to the documentary evidence (death certificate and post-mortem report) that the Applicant’s brother had died violently in February, 2023.

15. The Tribunal quoted at some length from the Medico-Legal Report (para. 21 of the Tribunal Decision) as follows:

“‘Based on her self-reported symptoms, her scores on psychiatric questionnaires, and my own clinical assessment, I believe that she meets the criteria for a diagnosis of complex posttraumatic stress disorder (CPTSD), ICD-

11 code 6B41 (see definition in Section D, above). She also reports a number of severe anxiety and depressive symptoms but, in my opinion, these are best understood to be part of her posttraumatic reaction….

In my opinion, her posttraumatic symptoms (e.g. nightmares, intrusive thoughts and memories, avoidance symptoms, heightened reactivity, increased startle reaction) relate to the horrific murder of her brother last year. She continues to be deeply affected by this event and the threats that she, and her sister, received in the aftermath. She was unable to attend her brother's burial and had to flee

her home and her family immediately. She was obviously overwhelmed when speaking about these events to me.

As well as typical posttraumatic symptoms (intrusive images, avoidance symptoms and heightened reactivity) she also reports that she feels 'worthless'

and emotionally 'numb'. Her symptoms conform with a diagnosis of complex PTSD, as defined in the ICD 11. In my opinion, her posttraumatic symptoms are highly consistent with her account of what happened to her and her family in February 2023.’”

16. The Tribunal then went on to quote further from the Medico-Legal Report (at para. 22 of the Tribunal Decision) as follows:

“‘During her interview with IPAT Ms N struggled to recall specific details of what happened to her in February 2023. Her solicitor wrote that: ‘During [Applicant’s name] evidence, she disclosed that she is suffering from trauma which is affecting her memory and ability to recall details about her experiences in South Africa. The TM directed that medical evidence would be useful’.

The revised Istanbul Protocol points out that:

‘In extreme emotional arousal, when the body is under threat, memory storage is impaired. Memories of traumatic experiences may as a result be fragmented and poorly located in the overall context of chronology or location. Details central to the experience are recalled better than peripheral details (date and number detail is particularly poorly recalled), but even some details core to the experience may not be reliably recalled. The ability to recall and recount details of traumatic events may vary over time, particularly when an individual has PTSD. Differences in the history (particularly, variable ability to recall details about torture and ill-treatment experiences) obtained from interviews conducted at different times are to be expected’ (paragraph 345 p.82).

The events of February 2023 were very traumatic for Ms N and her family. In my opinion, Ms N was severely traumatised by what happened and is now suffering with CPTSD, as outlined above. Many people who experience such highly traumatising events do not afterwards easily recall specific details of these events. In fact, there is evidence that the more traumatising the event, the more likely this is to happen. Any difficulty that Ms N experienced with regard to recall at her IPAT interview should be understood in this context.

In summary, I found that Ms N is currently suffering several intense and ongoing psychiatric symptoms. In my opinion, these are best understood in terms of a diagnosis of Complex PTSD, as described above. Overall, these symptoms are highly consistent with her account of a traumatic bereavement in February 2023 and subsequent terrorization by her brother's killers. They also go some way to explain the difficulties she has experienced in recounting a full narrative of these events.’”

17. The Tribunal proceeded to also summarise the Applicant’s evidence as to what happened prior to leaving South Africa and her arrival in Ireland. At that part of the

Decision dealing with questioning of the Applicant by the Tribunal in relation to the lady she claims to have stayed with when she arrived in Ireland, the Applicant was noted to have been “incoherent and rambling” leading the Tribunal to suggest a medical assessment.

18. Notwithstanding the terms of the Medico-Legal Report subsequently submitted to the Tribunal, which as seen above was quoted extensively in the Decision, the Tribunal found (at para. 27):

“The Tribunal does not consider that the medical report provides an explanation for the Appellant’s failure to provide any meaningful information on her time in Ireland, as the explanation therein suggests lapses in memory might a feature in relation to the event that causes the trauma but the events after her arrival in Ireland do not relate to that event. At that point, she was safe, and the unknown lady was putting herself out to accommodate the Appellant in her family home for two months before the Appellant attended at the IPO to make her claim. Even allowing for the fact that trauma will clearly impact on memory recall, and the

Appellant is severely traumatised, this does not explain why she had virtually no recall of the details relating to a two-month period when she lived in Ireland before making her claim.”

19. The Tribunal also remarked on the fact that the Applicant had lost her passport just before making her application for protection and on the fact that the Applicant’s family (including mother, sister and children) were still living in South Africa before proceeding to record its conclusions on the core elements of the claim, namely, that the Applicant’s brother was killed by criminal drug dealers because he refused to work for them and the Applicant was threatened with physical and /or sexual abuse or exploitation as a result of his refusal causing her to flee South Africa.

20. At paras. 30-31, the Tribunal found:

“There is no doubt in the Tribunal’s view that the Appellant’s brother was violently killed on the 5 February 2023, and that she and her family were alerted by the people she described as eyewitnesses in the course of her evidence.

However, the further issue is whether the Appellant was also subject to threats of gender-based or gender-related violence and threats to her life generally. The Tribunal is unable to decide this matter and considers that element of the claim to be uncertain.”

21. The Tribunal then proceeded to consider whether, based on the Applicant’s general credibility, she should be accorded the benefit of the doubt. In assessing this issue, the Tribunal outlined “the matters that suggest that the Appellant’s claim is credible and those that undermine the credibility of this aspect.”

22. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant’s account of her brother’s murder was consistent and detailed, and the documents supplied in relation to his death were also consistent with her account. The Tribunal treated this as going “to her credit”. In contrast, the Tribunal found her account and explanation of her two months spent in Ireland lacking in credibility saying (at para. 33):

“even considering that trauma can affect memory at times, as the medicolegal report explains. Her lack of detail about that period is not credible. Further, the claim that she mislaid her passport when going to, or making her way to, the IPO to make her claim is highly questionable, especially as it contained all her travel documents or evidence thereof. The Tribunal allowed the Appellant to provide the messages indicating the misuse of her brother’s Facebook account but the only one produced was that of the Appellant demanding that some unidentified person stop using her brother’s Facebook account in May 2023, when one might have expected the messages showing misuse to have been produced. Further, the Tribunal considers that the Appellant’s claim that the ‘Holy In Power’ organisation bought the Appellant a ticket to Ireland, but provided no information to her about applying for international protection or how to seek help in Ireland, and yet allowed her to travel on her own, is odd. It undermines the claim that the organisation acted at very short notice to help her flee South Africa and insisted that she flee the country. To these concerns, the Tribunal adds that the Appellant’s sister was and is, on her account, also subject to the threats to which the Appellant was subject. However, despite the Appellants claims that [name of brother]’s murderers say they know where the Appellant’s sister lives, there have been no attempts to interfere with her sister’s life in all the time that the Appellant has been in Ireland since her brother’s death in 2023.”

23. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal stated that it could not conclude that the benefit of the doubt applied to uncertain aspects of the Applicant’s claim, namely that she had received threats of a gender-based nature or threats to her person more generally.

24. While reference is made to the Medico-Legal Report in terms of memory frailty in the Tribunal Decision, it bears note that the finding that her presenting symptoms were considered “highly consistent” not only with her account of her traumatic bereavement in February, 2023, but also with subsequent terrorization by her brother's killers, while quoted earlier in the Tribunal Decision, is not referred to as evidence in respect of the alleged persecutory acts nor in deciding on general credibility for the purpose of assessing the evidence in relation to uncertain elements of the Applicant’s claim in accordance with s. 28(7) of the 2015 Act in respect of that element of her claim.

PROCEEDINGS

25. By application dated the 9th of December, 2024, on foot of papers filed in the Central Office on the 3rd of September, 2024, the Applicant applied, inter alia, for leave to seek an order of certiorari quashing the Tribunal Decision (and consequential Ministerial decisions). Leave to seek an extension of time was also sought, citing legal representatives’ delay during the vacation periods and oversight). By Order (Simons J.) ex parte made on the 9th of December, 2024, leave was granted. Opposition Papers were filed on the 1st of July, 2025. Although the Applicant filed written submissions in support of this application on the 31st of July, 2025, the Respondent’s submissions were only filed on the 9th of January, 2026. By way of preliminary objection, it is pleaded that the proceedings were not taken in accordance with time limits under s. 5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 (as amended) (hereinafter “the 2000 Act”)

and that adequate grounds for an extension of time had not been advanced.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

Extension of Time

26. The impugned decision dated the 4th of July, 2024 was received under cover of letter dated the 5th of July, 2024, but proceedings were not filed until 3rd of September, 2024, well outside the 28-day time limit specified under s. 5(2) of the 2000 Act.

27. The application for an extension of time was grounded on the Affidavit of the Applicant’s solicitor. She explains (at para. 4 of her Supplemental Affidavit sworn on the 3rd of September, 2024) the reason for the delay in bringing the judicial review proceedings stating that:

i. The Applicant instructed that the decision be challenged on or about the 9th of July 2024.

ii. Junior Counsel’s opinion was sought on the 11th of July 2024, received on the 15th of July 2024, and Senior Counsel's further input was requested that same day.

iii. An error occurred, causing the matter to “slip off the radar” of both Senior Counsel and the solicitor’s office.

iv. Senior Counsel was on vacation for approximately three weeks in August, and staff in the solicitor’s office were also on leave for two weeks in August.

v. The issue re-emerged after the letter from the Ministerial Decisions Unit dated the 23rd of August 2024, prompting re-engagement with counsel on the 27th–28th August 2024.

vi. The papers were then urgently prepared and finalised late on the evening of the 28th of August, 2024 and steps were then taken to swear affidavits and issue the proceedings. Papers were filed in the Central Office on the 3rd of September, 2024.

28. The Applicant’s solicitor emphasised on affidavit that the delay was not the Applicant’s fault but resulted from counsel being away and administrative error in her office.

29. The parties agree that the most relevant authority on the question of an extension of time, given the similarity in the facts, is the decision in P (Zimbabwe) v. IPAT [2025] IEHC 403 (Simons J.). In P (Zimbabwe), the applicant was a Zimbabwean national who sought judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal, refusing him refugee status and subsidiary protection on the basis that his claim lacked “general credibility.”

30. In deciding on whether to extend time, Simons J. applied the “good and sufficient reason” test under s.5(2) of the 2000 Act, interpreted in light of G.K. v. Minister for Justice [2002] 2 I.R. 418 and later Supreme Court authority such as Thomson v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31. His judgment makes clear that the test is not confined to examining why the applicant failed to act within 28 days, but instead involves a broader, discretionary, multi-factor assessment. Simons J emphasised this distinction between a requirement to show a good reason for the failure to bring the case in time and a requirement to show a good reason for the court to extend the time period quoting G.K.

and Thomson.

31. Simons J expressly referenced jurisprudence under both s.5 and Order 84, r.21 (although noting the latter has a stricter threshold) identifying that relevant factors include: the nature of the order being challenged; the conduct of the applicant; the conduct of the respondent; the effect of the decision being challenged; whether refusal would cause significant prejudice; public policy favouring prompt resolution and whether the delay caused any actual impact on the progress of the case.

32. He found that the applicant need not prove that every day of delay was justified, finding a failure to fully explain all delay may create difficulty but is not automatically fatal.

The key factor was whether the delay caused any actual delay to the proceedings since the legislative intention underlying the imposition of a short time-limit is to ensure that any legal challenge to the implementation of an immigration decision, which meets the leave threshold, be heard and determined promptly. He noted tht this legislative intention is underscored in s.5(7) which requires the High Court to prioritise proceedings under s.5 of the 2000 Act. In P (Zimbabwe) he found that the late filing made no difference to how quickly the case moved through the High Court.

33. Ultimately, although the applicant in P (Zimbabwe) filed proceedings well outside the 28-day statutory time limit, the court granted an extension of time. It did so in the light of the facts that the delay caused no real impact on the case’s progression, the time limit expired during the long vacation, the applicant was blameless as the delay arose from counsel’s availability and office staffing issues, the delay in the case coming on for hearing was caused by the delay in the Respondent delivering opposition papers and a failure to comply with the requirements of Order 84 Rule 22(4) in this regard. Simons

J. also found that refusing the extension would unjustly prevent the applicant from challenging a decision which the court has determined to be well founded on the merits in circumstances where the application for an extension of time was heard in tandem with the substantive judicial review. In considering the actual delay in the case, the

Court noted that proceedings in respect of a decision in July, 2023, were only resolved in July, 2025, the implication being that a delay in the commencement of the proceedings was not a major contributory factor in the delayed resolution of the proceedings.

34. Applying the same broad, discretionary, multi-factorial test as Simons J. in P (Zimbabwe), although this case has come on for hearing in a slightly shorter time-frame, I am satisfied that there is good and sufficient reason, in all the circumstances of this case, to extend time taking into account the absence of prejudice, the Applicant’s limited blameworthiness, the lack of actual impact on the prompt disposal of proceedings (having regard to the time taken for Opposition papers in the order of 7 months combined with a further 5 month delay in delivering written submissions) challenging an asylum or immigration decision and the importance of determining an arguably well-founded challenge which comes on for hearing at the same time as the extension of time application.

Treatment of Medical Evidence

35. The core ground of challenge advanced on behalf of the Applicant is that the Tribunal unlawfully failed to engage with, weigh, or reason upon the medico-legal evidence (CPTSD symptoms supporting credibility), contrary to authority with reliance being placed on AS v IPAT [2023] IEHC 53. In the course of argument, I have also been referred by the parties to RMK (DRC) v. RAT [2010] IEHC 367; MM v. RAT [2015] IEHC 158; R v. RAT [2017] IECA 297; JUO (Nigeria) v. IPAT [2018] IEHC 710 and to the terms of the Istanbul Protocol. Guideline No. 2017/6 on Medico-Legal Reports introduced by the Chairperson of the Tribunal in 2017, informed by the Istanbul Protocol, was included with the authorities provided to me by the parties.

36. The principles applying to the proper approach to the assessment of medical evidence in protection claims are now well-established and helpfully summarised by the decision of Faherty J. in MM v. RAT at para. 28 of her judgment. The obligation to consider the medical evidence in total when assessing credibility and to put the medical evidence into the totality of the evidence is clear. While the probative value to be attributed to this evidence is a matter for the Tribunal upon a fair adjudication, it is for the Tribunal to explain its approach to the evidence (corroborative or not and why) in the light of the conclusions reached. As set out in AS v. IPAT (at para. 64), the authorities establish that there is a requirement to consider the medico-legal evidence in arriving at findings of credibility whether the evidence is of low or high probative value. The extent of the duty to explain why the evidence is not accepted will, however, vary depending on its evidential value.

37. The Tribunal in this case took several steps in the conduct of the appeal which demonstrated a commitment to ensuring fairness of process. A decision was made to conduct an oral hearing because the s.35 interview report disclosed missed opportunities to allow the Applicant to elaborate on her answers or probe her further regarding material aspects of her claim such that the Tribunal considered the conclusion reached by the IPO that her claim was vague and lacking in detail to be questionable.

Indeed, it was the Tribunal who identified the potential relevance of medical evidence, again evidence of attention to fairness in the process by the Tribunal.

38. This case is notably different to many of those cited above. Not alone was the procurement of the Medico-Legal Report prompted by the Tribunal but the Report was quoted at some length in the Decision. After acknowledging the conclusions recorded in the said Report, the Tribunal proceeded to weigh the evidence in respect of the core elements of the claim advanced. In doing so, the Tribunal accepted several of the findings contained in the Report. It was accepted, for example, that trauma will impact on memory recall and that the Applicant was “severely traumatised” (para. 27) when assessing the Applicant’s account of the two-month period when she lived in Ireland before making her claim.

39. The Tribunal properly engaged with the evidence insofar as memory is concerned noting that it supported a conclusion that memory might “feature in relation to the event that causes the trauma but the events after her arrival in Ireland do not relate to that event. At that point, she was safe, and the unknown lady was putting herself out”. This was a logical finding in the light of the contents of the Medico-Legal Report which clearly linked difficulties in recall to the events of February, 2023. In this way, the Tribunal adequately explained why the contents of the Medico-Legal Report did not explain vagueness or lack of detail in the Applicant’s account in relation to occurrences after February 2023.

40. Noting as “bizarre” the claim that the Applicant had lost her passport together with all of her travel related documents suggesting, when questioned about this, that they may have fallen out of the side pocket of her bag just before attending the IPO to make her claim and the fact that the Applicant’s mother, sister and daughter continue to live in South Africa, it was concluded that there was no doubt in the Tribunal’s view that the Applicant’s brother was violently killed on the 5th of February, 2023. It was also accepted that the Applicant and her family were alerted by eyewitnesses as to the murder (at para. 30).

41. Despite accepting these elements of the claim (supported by documentation and the Applicant’s consistent evidence), the Tribunal was “uncertain” in relation to the claim that the Applicant was also subject to threats of gender-based or gender related violence and threats to her life generally (para. 31) and proceeded to consider the evidence in this regard to determine whether, on the balance of probabilities and applying, if necessary, the benefit of the doubt, it accepted that this part of the claim relating to the threats against the Applicant in connection with the events around her brother’s death.

As clear from the extract from the Tribunal Decision quoted at para. 22 above, the Tribunal considered pro-credibility factors as including that the Appellant's account of her brother's murder was consistent and detailed, and the documents supplied in relation to his death were also consistent with her account. On the negative side, however, the Tribunal identified some five different factors as undermining her credibility. These were her vague account and explanation of her two months spent in Ireland (not explained by medical evidence), the “highly questionable” claim that she mislaid her passport on her way to the IPO, the fact that only one Facebook message was produced and the messages showing misuse as alleged were not produced, the “odd” claim to have been provided with a plane ticket by an organisation but no information in relation to applying for international protection or seeking help in Irelan and, finally, the fact that the Applicant's sister continues to live openly in South Africa and there have been no attempts to interfere with her life since her brother's death in 2023.

42. Having thus recited a series of negative credibility findings, while acknowledging the medico-legal explanation for memory difficulties, the Tribunal concluded that the Applicant’s general credibility was not established and for this reason it could not be concluded that the benefit of the doubt applied to the uncertain aspect of the Applicant’s claim. No reference was made to the medical findings made that the Applicant’s post-traumatic symptoms were “highly consistent” with her account of what happened to her, namely, her brother’s murder in February, 2023 and subsequent threats and terrorisation by his killers. According to the Istanbul Protocol (at para. 543), however, “highly consistent with” is used to denote that the psychological findings “could have been caused by the alleged torture or ill-treatment and there are few other possible causes”. This means that a finding of “highly consistent” was relevant to an assessment of the overall credibility of the claims made and has some evidential value.

43. The difficulty as I see it, therefore, with an otherwise exemplary Tribunal Decision in this case is that when assessing credibility for the purpose of determining whether the Applicant had been subjected to threats, the Tribunal did not refer at all to the positive credibility factors contained in the Medico-Legal Report when the Report explicitly stated that the Applicant’s post-traumatic symptoms were “highly consistent” with her account of what happened to her, namely, her brother’s murder in February, 2023 and subsequent threats and terrorisation by his killers.

44. In view of the terms in which the medical opinion is offered, it seems to me that it is not possible to isolate the probative value of that evidence as corroborative of the death of her brother only (accepted by the Tribunal albeit without explicit reference to the medical evidence or assessment of its potential probative value), without also considering its probative value in respect of the claimed threats against the Applicant (rejected by the Tribunal but again without explicit reference to the medical evidence except with regard to memory and without assessment of its potential probative value), in the manner in which the Respondent’s counsel endeavoured to do in argument before me

45. I accept that “highly consistent” psychological findings differ from “highly consistent”

physical findings. The Respondent’s point in reliance on the decision in RMK (DRC)

v. RAT is well made. There is a difference between the injuries of a psychological nature described in the Medico Legal Report in this case and physical findings such as a broken finger, prolapsed rectum, scarring and marks described as “highly consistent with or typical of the abuse he experienced in prison” and referred to by Clark J. in RMK (DRC)

v. RAT (at para. 26) as requiring “very strong countervailing evidence to negate their evidential impact”. Clearly, the findings in issue here in relation to psychological injuries are not of this moment in terms of their evidential value. This does not excuse a requirement to weigh highly consistent psychological findings at all in the mix of the evidence as a whole.

46. As pointed out in the Istanbul Protocol (at para. 544):

“Specifying the degree of consistency is common in evaluating physical evidence of torture Are in treatment and can be useful for psychological evidence as well. However, the underlying logic differs as consistency between psychological findings and alleged torture or ill treatment does not refer to the connection between a specific symptom and a specific torture or ill treatment method. Instead it refers to the connections between a set of traumatic experiences and the overall psychological, psychosocial and psychiatric presentation of the person. The primary question is whether these connections make sense and the extent to which they are explained by the abuse the person alleges to have suffered.”

47. Connections between a set of traumatic experiences and overall psychological, psychosocial and psychiatric presentation of a person have some evidential value. What their value is requires to be assessed in the context of the evidence as a whole and in the light of what it is alleged occurred. It is this assessment which is lacking in this case insofar as the occurrence of the persecutory events and the Applicant’s overall credibility is concerned.

48. I also accept that insofar as the Applicant’s presentation on psychological evaluation could have been caused by the alleged torture or ill-treatment and that there are few other possible causes in the Consultant Psychiatrist’s opinion, that a question may arise as to whether those symptoms could nonetheless be attributable to the violent death of the Applicant’s brother alone and irrespective of whether threats were then made against the Applicant personally as counsel on behalf of the Respondent has urged. This is an entirely legitimate question in considering what probative value should properly attach to the medical evidence insofar as the threats and the Applicant’s general credibility is concerned, although not straightforward for the Tribunal in circumstances where the Psychiatrist does not differentiate in the Medico-Legal Report.

49. Counsel for the Respondents makes a cogent argument contending that probative value of the “highly consistent” findings made in this case in relation to the psychological symptoms displayed by the Applicant is low. She supports her argument well by reference to the terms of the Istanbul Protocol. The problem for the case the Respondents advance in submissions in this regard is that this is not an assessment which the Tribunal carried out. It is no function of mine to enter the domain of the Tribunal by assessing evidence and deciding what weight should attach to it in a form of decision on the merits of the case in a challenge by way of judicial review.

50. It seems to me that the Tribunal did not reject the findings contained in the Medico- Legal Report but nor did it assess the corroborative value of the medical evidence in respect of the Applicant’s accounts of being subjected to persecutory treatment and no findings in this regard are contained in the Decision. Accordingly, it may be distinguished from JUO (Nigeria) where the Tribunal viewed the evidence as a whole and expressly said so. It was accepted by the Tribunal in JUO (Nigeria) that the medical evidence was to “some extent supportive” but (per Humphreys J. at para. 10) that support was “insufficient to take the applicant over the line in the context of all of the evidence.” It is clear from JUO (Nigeria) (at paras. 11 and 12) that the Tribunal in that case explained its approach to the assessment of the evidence and its reasons for not accepting it as decisive in all the circumstances of that case.

51. While in this case the Tribunal had regard to the medical evidence in relation to memory issues, it ignored it insofar as it corroborated the Applicant’s accounts of persecutory treatment. The medical evidence was not weighed in the mix of the evidence as a whole by the Tribunal in concluding that the Applicant had not established that she had been subjected to threats. This omission is not cured by the extensive reference made to the

Medico-Legal Report in quoting from it and referring to it with regard to memory issues where it is nonetheless clear that the Medico-Legal Report’s “highly consistent”

findings did not weigh with the Tribunal either to counter the negative credibility findings set out in the Tribunal Decision or in its assessment of the evidence in support of whether persecutory treatment in the form of threats occurred.

52. The “highly consistent” findings made were capable of providing potential objective confirmation of the Applicant’s account and ought to have been weighed as part of the evidence as a whole by the Tribunal. It failed to do so in any substantive way. As this is not a case where the balance of evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of a finding of a lack of credibility, noting that it has been accepted by the Tribunal that the Applicant’s brother suffered a violent death and that Tribunal was “uncertain” of the claimed threats, I cannot conclude that the findings of lack of credibility in this case are of such a magnitude that due consideration of the medical evidence in this case could make no difference to the outcome.

53. Accordingly, I am driven to conclude that notwithstanding the otherwise careful and patently fair approach of the Tribunal in this case generally, the Tribunal Decision cannot be allowed to stand.

CONCLUSION

54. For the reasons given, I have concluded that the Applicant is entitled to an extension of time pursuant to s.5(2) of the 2000 Act and an order of certiorari in terms of para. D

(1) of her Statement of Grounds quashing the decision of the First Named Respondent affirming the first instance decision that the Applicant should be refused a grant of refugee and or subsidiary protection status and notified to the Applicant on or about Monday the 8th of July, 2024. I will hear the parties in respect of the terms of final and consequential orders if necessary and this matter will be listed for mention before me following the expiry of fourteen days from the electronic delivery of this judgment for finalisation.