High Court dismisses appeal on grounds that decision-maker provided sufficient reasons despite not explicitly resolving conflicting country of origin information.

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 120

[Record No. 2024/1508JR]

BETWEEN

E.S. (ALBANIA)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barr delivered electronically on the 3rd day of March 2026.

Introduction.

1. The applicant is a young woman from Albania. She claimed international protection in the State on 4 August 2022. She sought international protection on the grounds that she was fleeing from domestic violence at the hands of her fiancé. She also asserted that state protection was not available to her in her country of origin.

2. By decision dated 30 October 2024, the first applicant affirmed the decision of the International Protection Officer (IPO) to neither grant the applicant a declaration of refugee status, nor a subsidiary protection declaration.

3. The applicant challenges the legality of that decision on the grounds that the

decision-maker failed to give adequate reasons for the decision. In particular, it is submitted that as there was conflicting country of origin information (hereinafter “COI”), it was incumbent on the decision-maker to state why she had preferred the COI in the form of a 2023 report from the United States Department of State, over two reports which were favourable to the applicant’s position concerning the lack of state protection for her in Albania, as stated in an Amnesty International report and in a Freedom House report, both from 2023.

4. It was submitted that where the decision-maker had failed to set out reasons why she preferred one piece of COI over another piece of conflicting COI, she had failed to give adequate reasons in the legal sense for the decision that she had made.

5. On behalf of the first respondent it was submitted that the decision which had been handed down had carefully analysed all the relevant COI. It was submitted that the COI to which the applicant referred, was not actually in conflict with the US report which had been relied upon in reaching the conclusion that state protection was available. Accordingly, it was submitted that the applicant’s submission was without substance in this regard. In the alternative, it was submitted that adequate reasons were patent within the context of the entire decision.

6. There is also an issue on time in relation to the bringing of this application, which will be dealt with later in the judgment.

The Applicant's Story.

7. At her interview, the applicant stated that she had completed nine years in primary school, followed by three years in high school. Thereafter, she did not go on to university or take up employment. She resided with her family, who were supporting her.

8. In the Spring of 2021, her family arranged for her to become engaged to a young man from another family, which was known to her uncle. She stated that they stayed together for approximately one year. She did not reside with her fiancé permanently, but stayed with him on occasion, as her family did not allow her to stay with him until they were married.

9. The applicant stated that in the time that they were together, her fiancé was not generally physically abusive of her, but did engage in psychological abuse. He would not allow her to go out too much. He threatened her that if she went out, he would hit her. He also told her what clothes she was not to wear.

10. The applicant stated that in about January 2022, they were getting on reasonably well. However, when she checked his mobile phone, she saw messages that showed that her fiancé was cheating on her. As a result of this, she sought to end the relationship. She stated that when she told her fiancé that she wanted to end the engagement, he grabbed her tightly around the arms and squeezed them. When she told him to stop doing that, he hit her on the face. She stated that she was forcibly kept in his house that might. The next day, she saw an opportunity to escape and she ran away. She went back to live with her family.

11. The applicant stated that after she had left her fiancé, he came to her house on two or three occasions. On one of these occasions, he got into a fight with the applicant's brother. When he was leaving the house on that occasion, he produced a gun and showed it to the applicant. He said that he was going to kill her.

12. The applicant stated that her fiancé returned to the house once or twice more, until her uncle and cousins told him not to come to the house again. The applicant stated that on two occasions after that, she encountered her ex-fiancé in the town where she lived. On one occasion, he grabbed her by the arm. She stated that she was left with marks on her arm.

13. The applicant stated that in March 2022, after the applicant had been assaulted by her ex-fiancé in his home and after he had called on two occasions to her house, she went to the police to make a report in the matter. She stated that she went to the police on one occasion. She reported both incidents to them. She stated that the police took a record of her complaint. They said that they would investigate the case and come back to her. She stated that they never returned to her with any update on their investigation. She stated that she did not return to the police station to get any update in the matter.

14. In or about May 2022, after the applicant had had the two encounters with her ex-fiancé in the town, she decided that she would have to leave the country. She went by ferry to Italy, where she resided with her cousin in Milan for 2.5 months. She then went by truck to Ireland, where she claimed international protection on 4 August 2022.

Chronology of the Proceedings.

15. Having sought international protection on 4 August 2022, the applicant completed her questionnaire for the IPO and was subsequently interviewed pursuant to s.35 of the 2015 Act by an authorised officer of the IPO on 11 December 2023.

16. By way of decision dated 10 January 2024, the IPO recommended that the applicant be neither granted refugee status, nor a subsidiary protection declaration.

17. The applicant appealed the decision of the IPO by notice of appeal dated 1 February 2024. The applicant's legal representatives furnished written submissions to the first respondent dated 21 October 2024. An oral hearing of the appeal was held on

22 October 2024. The decision of the first respondent issued on 30 October 2024.

18. The applicant's statement of grounds seeking to challenge the legality of the

decision of the first respondent was filed on 3 December 2025. That was six days outside the 28 day statutory period permitted under s.5 (2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. Leave to apply for relief by way of judicial review was granted by the High Court (Phelan J.) by order dated 13 January 2025.

Submissions on Behalf of the Applicant.

19. In relation to the preliminary point that had been raised by the respondent to the effect that the applicant's application was brought outside the time permitted to challenge a decision of the first respondent, it was submitted that the facts deposed to by the applicant at para.3 of her affidavit sworn on 28 November 2024, together with the matters deposed to in the affidavit sworn by the applicant’s solicitor, Anna Milword, on 3 December 2024, made it appropriate that the court should grant a short extension of time to enable the applicant's application to proceed.

20. In that regard, the applicant’s solicitor had stated that upon receipt of the

decision from the first respondent she had obtained the advices of junior counsel. Junior Counsel had prepared initial advices, but had indicated that the advices of senior counsel should be obtained. That was done. The senior counsel opined that there were substantial grounds justifying the institution of proceedings seeking to set aside the decision of the first respondent.

21. The applicant’s solicitor stated that upon receiving those advices, she requested her client to come to Dublin for the purpose of swearing the grounding affidavit. The applicant was then residing in Cork.

22. In her affidavit sworn on 28 November 2024, the applicant stated that when the junior counsel had initially advised within the 28 day period that there were substantial grounds for bringing judicial review proceedings, she had formed the intention to seek the leave of the court to institute such proceedings. However, she stated that as she resided in Cork it was not possible for her to travel to Dublin in time to swear the affidavit, until she did so on 20 November 2024, which was one day outside the 28 day time limit provided for under the statute.

23. At the hearing, counsel submitted that good grounds had been put forward as to why it had not been possible for the applicant to bring her proceedings within the tight time limit provided for under the statute. It was submitted that the small extension that was required would not cause any prejudice to the respondent. It was submitted that in these circumstances the court should extend the time and permit the application to proceed.

24. The applicant's main ground of challenge to the decision of the first respondent, was on the basis that the decision-maker had failed to consider two core pieces of COI that had been before the Tribunal which were favourable to the case made by the applicant that state protection was not available to her in Albania. In the alternative, it was submitted that in reaching her decision, the decision-maker had preferred COI in the form of a USDOS report of 2023, over the two reports that were favourable to the applicant, being an Amnesty International report of 2023 and a Freedom House report of 2023, without stating why she had preferred that report over the other reports.

25. It was submitted that it was clearly set down in D.V.T.S. v Minister for Justice 2007 [IEHC] 305, that the Tribunal was not permitted to arbitrarily prefer one piece of country of origin information over another. In that case it was held that where there was conflicting COI, it was incumbent on the Tribunal to engage in a rational analysis of the conflict and to justify its preferment of one view over another on the basis of that analysis. It was submitted that that decision had been applied in many cases subsequently: see I.S. v RAT [2015] IEHC 859; A.D. v RAT [2015] IEHC 268; F.T. v RAT [2013] IEHC 167; N.U. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 87 and O.S.O. v IPAT [2024] IEHC 16.

26. It was submitted that in the present case, while the Tribunal had referred to the conflicting pieces of COI, it had failed to give any reasons as to why it was preferring the USDOS report of 2023, to the Amnesty International and Freedom House reports, also of 2023. It was submitted that having regard to this failure on the part of the

decision-maker, the decision was clearly lacking in reasons in the legal sense and therefore should be set aside.

Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent.

27. On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted by Mr. Henry BL, that in relation to the time point, it had been accepted by the applicant that her application had been lodged out of time. It was submitted that the Oireachtas had provided a tight time limit for the bringing of applications seeking to set aside decisions of the first respondent. It was a matter for the court as to whether it regarded the reasons that had been set out in the affidavits sworn by the applicant and by her solicitor, as justifying the extension of time sought in the present case.

28. In relation to the submission that the decision-maker had failed to consider all relevant COI, it was submitted that this was simply untenable. It was submitted that when one read the decision of the first respondent as a whole, it was abundantly clear that the decision-maker had considered all relevant COI, because she had actually referred to it.

29. In this regard, counsel pointed out that while the Amnesty International report had been referred to by the applicant in her submissions to the first respondent, it had been the first respondent itself which had raised the Freedom House report. It was submitted that the main thrust of the two reports on which the applicant sought to rely, was to the effect that domestic violence was rife in Albania. The Tribunal had accepted two matters in this regard: first, that the applicant had suffered domestic violence at the hands of her ex-fiancé, and secondly, that domestic violence was commonplace in that country.

30. Turning to the issue of the existence of state protection, it was submitted that the test for the existence of state protection in a particular country, was set down in s.31 of the International Protection Act 2015. It was submitted that this test had been correctly applied by the decision-maker in reaching her decision in this case.

31. Furthermore, it was submitted that there was a general presumption at law that a state would provide protection for its citizens and those resident in the country, until the contrary was proven: see D.K. v RAT [2006] 3 IR 368; G.O.B. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 229.

32. It was submitted that in the present case, the decision-maker had considered all relevant COI and the facts as specifically related to the applicant herself and had reached the decision that state protection was available to her in Albania. It was submitted that in reaching that decision the Tribunal had considered all relevant matters and had acted entirely reasonably within its jurisdiction.

33. In relation to the lack of reasons point, it was submitted that when one looked at the material that had been submitted by the applicant, it was apparent that the Amnesty International report dealt with the prevalence of domestic violence in Albania. It did not state that police protection was not available to those who reported issues of domestic violence. It was submitted that in this regard, it was noteworthy that the applicant had only submitted that report for consideration by the Tribunal under the heading of “Persecution”, and not as part of any submission made in relation to the lack of state protection.

34. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the Amnesty International report was not in conflict with the provisions of the USDOS report, which had furnished extensive data and opined that state protection was available to citizens and residents in Albania.

35. It was submitted that in these circumstances there was no obligation on the

decision-maker to state why she had preferred the USDOS report to that of the Amnesty International report, because they were not in conflict with each other on the issue of state protection.

36. It was accepted that there was half a sentence in the Freedom House report which suggested that police resources were lacking in the area of domestic violence. It was submitted that it was abundantly clear why the decision-maker had reached her

decision as to the existence of state protection in the applicant's case, based on the data and material in the USDOS report. It was submitted that once the reason for a decision was clear, it was not necessary to deal with every single document and argument put forward on behalf of an applicant: see O.M.A.(SIERRA LEONE) v RAT [2018] IEHC 370; E.S. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613.

37. It was submitted that all that was required in relation to the giving of reasons for a decision, was that a clear pathway should be demonstrated as to why the decisionmaker has reached the decision that he or she had made. It was submitted that when one read the decision in this case, it was abundantly clear why the decision maker had reached her decision on the existence of state protection. Accordingly, it was submitted that there was no lack of reasoning in this case. It was submitted that the court should refuse the applicant's application for relief.

Discussion and Conclusions.

38. The court has carefully considered the papers in this case, including the written and oral submissions of counsel and the case law cited therein.

39. The first point which falls for determination is as to whether it is appropriate to extend the time for the bringing of this application. It is accepted that an extension of approximately six days is required. In this regard, the court notes that there is a very tight time period laid down in the statute for those who wish to challenge a decision of the first respondent.

40. While the Oireachtas is entitled to set down tight time limits for the bringing of challenges to various types of decisions, those time limit should not be applied in a rigid way, so as to deprive an applicant of access to the courts, where there are good reasons for extending the time, particularly given the short time period that was open to them. In the present case, the court is satisfied having regard to the matters averred to by the applicant and by the applicant’s solicitor in their affidavits, that there are good reasons for extending the time within which this application should be brought.

41. The court accepts the evidence given by the applicant’s solicitor that she had to obtain the advices of junior counsel and consequent thereon had to obtain the advices of senior counsel. The court is satisfied that these advices were in favour of proceeding with the application for judicial review and that consequent thereon, the applicant formed the intention to challenge the decision within the relevant 28 day time limit. That she was not able to lodge her papers within the time prescribed in the statute, was due to the fact that she had to travel from Cork to Dublin to swear the necessary grounding affidavit. The court is satisfied that no prejudice will be suffered by the respondents by an extension of time. The court holds that it is appropriate to extend the time for bringing the within application.

42. The first substantive ground of challenge put forward by the applicant in her written submissions was to the effect that the first respondent had failed to consider the COI that had been submitted in this case. The court is satisfied that when one reads the

decision of the first respondent as a whole, it is clear that a full and fair consideration was given to all items of COI. In particular, it is to be noted that the Freedom House report of 2023, upon which the applicant relies in these proceedings, was a report that was introduced into the appeal by the Tribunal of its own motion.

43. The first respondent referred to various pieces of COI under several headings, including in the following paragraphs of the decision: 5.4; 5.5; 5.6; 5.7; 5.8; 5.9. Of particular relevance, the Tribunal under the heading of “Domestic Violence” referred to the Amnesty International report at paragraph 5.10. It went on to refer to other reports on the issue at paragraphs 5.11, 5.12. and 5.13. It referred to the Freedom House report at para. 5.14 and to the USDOS report at paragraph 5.15.

44. On the issue of state protection, the decision of the first respondent came to the

conclusion at 5.17 that it was quite clear from even a cursory look at the objective COI on file that there was a significant problem with domestic violence against women in Albania, as well as there being a significant level of corruption in the police force. The Tribunal went on at para. 5.20 to look at the applicant's account of having suffered domestic violence at the hands of her ex-fiancé. It also looked at her account in relation to reporting the matter to the police. The Tribunal held that it was prepared to accept that the applicant went to the police on two occasions. That was a very fair finding to make, as in her interview she had clearly stated that she only went to the police on one occasion, but had reported two sets of incidents to them on that occasion. Be that as it may, the Tribunal reached findings that were in favour of the applicant. These were to the effect that domestic violence was rife in Albania. The second was that it accepted that the applicant had suffered the assaults, intimidation and abuse that she had complained of at the hands of her ex-fiancé.

45. Having made extensive reference to the various pieces of COI, as outlined above, the Tribunal reached its decision on this aspect at paragraph 5.21. The Tribunal accepted that there had been reports before it from 2019 and 2021, which stated that the courts had dismissed an alarming number of protection order cases. The courts in Albania had accepted, or partially accepted only 24% of petitions. However, the Tribunal went on to note that the country of information concerned was somewhat dated. It noted that there was more up-to-date country information which stated that the situation pertaining to the police, the judiciary, corruption and domestic violence had improved significantly.

46. The court is satisfied that when one reads the Tribunal decision in its entirety, and in particular the portions where various aspects of COI is considered, it is clear that the COI that was before the Tribunal both of recent and less recent origin, was fully considered by the Tribunal in reaching its decision.

47. I turn now to the central issue in this case, which is whether the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its decision. In this regard, it is submitted by the applicant that the Tribunal in preferring the USDOS report of 2023, failed to indicate adequately or at all why it was preferring that report over the Amnesty International report and the Freedom House report which were also from 2023.

48. The particular portion of the Amnesty International report relied upon by the applicant is in the following terms:

“Domestic violence against women was rife. According to police data, during the first three months of the year there were more than 1000 reported cases of violence against women, resulting in 510 protection orders. Of the 5210 cases of domestic violence recorded by the police in 2022, in March the public prosecutor's office reported only 1880 cases; men were responsible for 92.8% of the attacks. Between January and September, 12 women had been killed by their partners or other family members.”

49. The portion of the Freedom House report, which is relied upon by the applicant, was brief in the extreme. It was in the following terms:

“Domestic violence is widespread. Police are poorly equipped to handle cases of domestic violence or spousal rape, which is often not understood to be a crime.”

50. By way of comparison, the portion of the USDOS report of 2023, that is quoted at para. 5.15 of the decision was in the following terms:

“Domestic or intimate partner violence was a crime, with penalties up to three years imprisonment. The law on domestic violence extended protection to survivors and provided for issuance of protective orders that automatically covered children as well. The government enforce the law effectively. Police operated an automated application process that allowed for rapid issuance of protective orders. NGOs reported high levels of gender-based violence, including domestic violence. As of August, 11 women had been reported killed during the year by their partners or family members. The Ministry of Health and Social Protection reported survivors in 60 cases of domestic violence had received services at the National Reception Centre for Domestic Violence as of August.”

51. While it is always important to read the entire decision as a whole, the court accepts that the kernel of the Tribunal's decision on state protection was set out at para.

5.21. Having noted that there were a number of reports from 2019 and 2021, which referred to an alarming number of cases being dismissed from the courts where protection orders had been sought, the Tribunal went on to note that more up-to-date country of origin information painted a different picture. It went concluded as follows in that paragraph:

“… However, the Tribunal notes that this country information is from 2019 and 2021 and that there is more up-to-date country information which states that the situation pertaining to the police, judiciary, corruption and domestic violence has improved significantly. For example, the more recent objective country information from the USDOS 2023, cited above, states that ‘domestic or intimate partner violence was a crime, with penalties up to three years imprisonment. The law on domestic violence extended protection to survivors and provided for issuance of protected orders that automatically cover children as well. The government enforce the law effectively. Police operated an automated application process that allowed for rapid issuance of protective orders. This suggests that there are laws in place for domestic violence which are enforced. Victims can get protective orders and the objective information states that the law is enforced effectively. Furthermore, the 2023 USDOS report states that ‘the Ministry of Health and Social Protection reported survivors in

60 cases of domestic violence had received services at the National Reception Centre for Domestic Violence as of August’. It is accepted that the law is lagging behind in relation to issues such as spousal rape for example, but this is not the issue before the Tribunal.”

52. The Tribunal went on in para. 5.22 to note that there was a police oversight agency which investigates corrupt police officers. They also noted that there was a government human rights body, which operated without influences. The Tribunal also noted that objective COI indicated that the government had made greater efforts to address police impunity. The Tribunal referred to data which showed greater activity on the part of the government and its agencies in this regard in relation to the investigation of complaints brought against police officers. The Tribunal further noted that there was an ombudsman who is authorised by law to monitor and report on prisons and detention centres and conduct administrative investigations of complaints from citizens. There was also clear COI which indicated that a new vetting tool had been introduced to ensure that judges who are selected, were independent.

53. Having reviewed the aspects of the applicant's case that dealt with state protection, it came to the conclusion that the applicant did have access to effective and non-temporary protection in Albania. It held that those responsible for state protection took reasonable steps to prevent people suffering from persecution or serious harm.

54. In determining this issue, the court accepts the general statement of principle as laid down in the D.V.T.S. case that where there is conflicting COI, and where the

decision-maker relies on one piece of COI, it is incumbent on the decision-maker to set out his or her reasons as to why they are preferring that piece of COI to another piece of conflicting COI. That general proposition of law has been followed in many subsequent cases.

55. However, the court accepts the submission made by counsel on behalf of the respondent that this only applies where there is genuinely conflicting COI. In the present case the court accepts the submission made by counsel on behalf of the respondent that the Amnesty International report, as quoted above, does not say anything of significance in relation to the existence or absence or efficacy of state protection. The portion relied upon by the applicant deals with the existence of domestic violence in Albania. That such crimes are commonplace throughout the country, was accepted by the Tribunal.

56. The court holds that in preferring the content of the USDOS report in relation to the existence of state protection in Albania, the decision-maker was not required to state why she was discounting, or not accepting the Amnesty International report because that report was not in conflict with the USDOS report on the issue of state protection. The Amnesty International report dealt with a different matter, being the existence of domestic violence, which had been accepted by the Tribunal as being rife in Albania.

57. It was accepted by counsel on behalf of the respondent that the decision-maker had not explicitly stated why she was preferring the USDOS report over the sentence, or possibly half sentence, in the Freedom House report which related to the adequacy of police resources. When one looks at the entirety of the portions of the USDOS report that were considered and cited by the decision-maker in her report, I do not think that it can credibly be argued that because the decision-maker did not explicitly refer to why she was preferring that detailed report over a single sentence in a report from Freedom House, which the Tribunal itself had introduced in evidence, should lead to the Tribunal

decision being struck down for lack of reasoning.

58. The duty to give reasons does not mean that every single point and every single sentence in a piece of COI has to be recited or referred to in the course of a decision.

59. In O.M.A. v RAT, Humphreys J. held that the obligation to resolve conflicts in COI in a reasonable manner should not be “generalised into an obligation to narratively discuss country information… It is not necessary to tediously list every element of an applicant's case and rejected it point by point”. That decision was cited with approval by Phelan J. in E.S. v IPAT.

60. In Y.Y. v Minister for Justice & Equality [2017] IESC 61, O'Donnell J. stated that all that was necessary was that one could “genuinely understand the reasoning process” and that the decision set out a “clear reasoned path”.

61. The court is satisfied that when read as a whole, it is abundantly clear why the Tribunal came to the conclusion that state protection was available to the applicant. This was based on the USDOS report, which contained data and statistics which were a more than adequate basis for the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that it did. The fact that the Tribunal did not explicitly discount the weight applied by it to one sentence in the Freedom House report, cannot be seen as a reasonable or rational basis to strike down the decision for lack of reasons.

62. At the end of the day, this Court is satisfied that the first respondent gave the applicant’s appeal a very thorough and fair hearing, in which the Tribunal considered both the COI that was before it and the individual circumstances of the applicant. It reached a decision that was fair and reasonable. It was one that was open to it on the evidence that was before it. One cannot realistically expect any more of an administrative decision.

63. For the reasons set out herein, the court refuses the reliefs sought by the applicant in her notice of motion and in her statement of grounds.

64. As this judgment has been delivered electronically the parties shall have two weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions of not more than 1000 words on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise.

65. The matter will be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 24 March 2026 for the purpose of making final orders.