High Court dismisses claim against Minister for Justice as bound to fail and an abuse of process.

FOR PUBLICATION

APPROVED

THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 113

Record No. 2023/4725 HP

BETWEEN

VAL HICKEY

Plaintiff

AND

JOSEPH HOWLEY, MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Defendants

Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 9th February 2026.

1. This matter comes before me by way of motion seeking the striking out or dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claim as against the First Named Defendant on a variety of bases namely:

a. Pursuant to Order 19 rule 28(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC) on the basis that they:

(i) Disclose no reasonable cause of action;

(ii) Amount to an abuse of process;

(iii) Are bound to fail; and/or

(iv) Have no reasonable chance of success.

b. Pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court;

c. On the basis that they are barred under section 12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act, 2003 (as amended);

d. Pursuant to the provisions of section 10 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act, 2004;

e. On the basis that they are barred by section 3(1) of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991 (as amended);

f. On the basis that they are barred by section 11 of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957 (as amended).

2. The relevant statutory provisions being engaged by the First Named Defendant are:

Order 19 Rule 28(1) of the RSC

28. The Court may, on an application by motion on notice, strike out any claim or part of a claim which:

(i) discloses no reasonable cause of action, or

(ii) amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, or

(iii) is bound to fail, or

(iv) has no reasonable chance of succeeding.

Section 12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act, 2003 (as amended)

Bar on bringing proceedings unless certain conditions are satisfied.

12.—(1) Unless and until an application is made to the Board under section 11 in relation to the relevant claim and then only when the bringing of those proceedings is authorised under section 14 , 17 , 32 or 36 , rules under section 46 (3) or section

49 and subject to those sections or rules, no proceedings may be brought in respect of that claim.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or any other provision of this Act is to be read as affecting the right of a claimant or a respondent to invoke, subject to and in accordance with this section, the jurisdiction of any court to make an order referred to in subsection (3) that could be made if proceedings, but for subsection (1), were to be brought or were about to be brought in respect of the relevant claim and the court shall, accordingly, have jurisdiction, subject to and in accordance with this section, to make such an order despite the enactment of subsection (1).

(3) The order mentioned in subsection (2) is any order of an interlocutory kind or power to make which is provided for by rules of court or otherwise inherent in the court's general jurisdiction in civil proceedings and, in particular, an order restraining the transfer of assets to a place outside the State for the purpose of defeating the rights of another arising out of the relevant claim or the dissipation of assets for that purpose and an order requiring evidence to be preserved.

(4) In relation to the invocation of the foregoing jurisdiction of the court the following provisions have effect—

(a) the application for the order concerned shall be made by motion on notice or, as appropriate, ex parte motion,

(b) without prejudice to the principles or rules that govern generally the exercise of that jurisdiction, the court shall not exercise that jurisdiction to make any order (not being an order relating to the transfer or dissipation of assets) unless it is satisfied that—

(i) the making of the application therefor is bona fide and for the sole purpose of ensuring the fair and just disposition of any proceedings that could be brought in the event of the issue of an authorisation referred to in subsection (1), and

(ii) the making of the order is required so as to enable the fair and just disposition of those proceedings,

(c) on the hearing of any such application the court shall have power to grant the relief sought or, subject to this section, make any other interlocutory order that is appropriate to the application or may adjourn, from time to time, the hearing of the application or dismiss the application and, in any of the foregoing cases, may make such order as to costs as it considers appropriate,

(d) the person making any such application shall be subject to the same duties as he or she would be subject to if the application were to be made in the course of proceedings brought in respect of the relevant claim and may (in addition to any undertaking he or she may be regarded as having given by operation of law) be required to give such undertakings as the court may specify in the circumstances,

(e) in the event of proceedings being brought in respect of the relevant claim pursuant to an authorisation referred to in subsection (1), any order made in exercise of the foregoing jurisdiction shall be deemed to be an order made in the course of those proceedings and the court may, accordingly, continue to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the order, and

(f) in the event of no proceedings being brought in respect of the relevant claim, the court may make such order as to the discharge of the order referred to in paragraph (e), to any other matters in consequence of the order so referred to and to the costs of the matter as in necessary or appropriate in the circumstances.

(5) The issuing of a notice of motion or the moving of a motion for the purposes of an application referred to in subsection (4) shall not be regarded as the commencement of proceedings in respect of the relevant claim for the purposes of the Statute of Limitations 1957 or the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 .

Section 10 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act, 2004

Bringing of proceedings.

10.— (1) Proceedings in the High Court, Circuit Court or District Court, in respect of a personal injuries action, shall be commenced by a summons to be known as and referred to in this Act as a “personal injuries summons”.

(2) A personal injuries summons shall specify—

(a) the plaintiff's name, the address at which he or she ordinarily resides and his or her occupation,

(b) the personal public service number allocated and issued to the plaintiff under section 223 (inserted by section 14 of the Act of 1998) of the Act of 1993,

(c) the defendant's name, the address at which he or she ordinarily resides (if known to the plaintiff) and his or her occupation (if known to the plaintiff),

(d) the injuries to the plaintiff alleged to have been occasioned by the wrong of the defendant,

(e) full particulars of all items of special damage in respect of which the plaintiff is making a claim,

(f) full particulars of the acts of the defendant constituting the said wrong and the circumstances relating to the commission of the said wrong,

(g) full particulars of each instance of negligence by the defendant.

(3) Where a plaintiff fails to comply with this section—

(a) the court may—

(i) direct that the action shall not proceed any further until the plaintiff complies with such conditions as the court may specify, or

(ii) where it considers that the interests of justice so require, dismiss the plaintiff's action,

And

(b) the court shall take such failure into account when deciding whether to make an order as to the payment of the costs of the personal injuries action concerned, or the amount of such costs.

(4) Where a plaintiff fails to comply with this section, the court hearing the personal injuries action concerned may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper.

Section 3(1) of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991 (as amended)

Special time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries.

3.—(1) An action, other than one to which section 6 of this Act applies, claiming damages in respect of personal injuries to a person caused by negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of a provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) shall not be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which the cause of action accrued or the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.

Section 11 of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957 (as amended).

Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions.

11.— (2) (a) Subject to paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection, an action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

FACTUAL HISTORY

3. The Plaintiff asserts that he was re-registered for VAT and income tax in error in or about 2011, having been de-registered in or about 2005. In consequence of such reregistration, he asserts that tax assessments and warrants were incorrectly issued, that appeals of such assessments were wrongly rejected and that there were, in consequence, wrongful enforcement steps taken against him. There are a number of allegations made against Revenue officials involved in actions pertaining to the tax affairs of the Plaintiff.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

4. The Plaintiff issued the within proceedings by way of plenary summons on the 28th September 2023 and they were served, and an Appearance was entered by the First Named Defendant shortly thereafter. A Statement of Claim was delivered on or about the 19th December 2023. It would appear that a different Statement of Claim was delivered to the Fourth Named Defendant on or about the 4th January 2024. The First Named Defendant delivered his Defence on or about the 26th June 2024. Thereafter, on or about the 23rd July 2024, another Statement of Claim was delivered by the Plaintiff upon the First Named Defendant. This Statement of Claim was directed to all of the Defendants. A draft Amended Statement of Claim was delivered by the Plaintiff to the First Named Defendant on or about the 28th February 2025 (this varies from the Statement of Claim of the 23rd July 2024 in that it contains two additional paragraphs at 15 and 16). It would appear that the necessary procedural steps have not been taken by the Plaintiff in respect of this last-mentioned pleading and in consequence it remains in draft only. There are files referenced in the Statements of Claim which have been requested by the First Named Defendant but have not been forthcoming from the Plaintiff. On the 5th June 2025, the Plaintiff served upon the First Named Defendant a notice of trial, a notice to produce and a notice setting down for trial. A motion for judgment in default of Defence has issued by the Plaintiff but it awaits determination of this motion.

EVIDENCE

5. The application is grounded on the Affidavit of Joseph Howley sworn on the 17th July 2025. He avers, at paragraph 8 of this Affidavit, that:

“The four statements of claim do not plead any claim which has any chance of success or which is not statute barred. Furthermore, the entire proceedings represent an abuse of process.”

6. The reasons averred to which support this contention are:

(a) All of the dated events pleaded occurred in excess of six years prior to the issuing of proceedings;

(b) Claims based on alleged tortious acts occurred in excess of six years prior to the issuing of proceedings;

(c) Claims based on alleged personal injuries occurred in excess of two years prior to the issuing of proceedings. In the context of such a claim, the deponent also avers that the Plaintiff commenced proceedings by way of plenary rather than personal injuries summons and that there is an absence of a verifying affidavit.

(d) No cause of action arises from the registration of a person who is trading for VAT and/or income tax and that, in any event, such registration occurred in 2011 and therefore any action arising from it was almost 12 years prior to the date of the institution of these proceedings;

(e) Assessments were made by the Revenue Commissioners in February 2012, in respect of the period 2006 to 2011, being a period in respect of which the Plaintiff did not make VAT or Income Tax returns. He had been de-registered in or about 2005 and re-registered in 2012. It is averred that the Plaintiff’s business traded throughout the period 2006 – 2011. The Affidavit of Mr. Howley avers that claims arising are statute barred and, in addition, such assessments (for VAT) as were raised were withdrawn by the First Named Defendant on or about the 6th February

2014 as a result of the Plaintiff filing Income Tax returns for the relevant periods which indicated no liability for VAT. A letter dated the 26th February 2014 from the Revenue Commissioners to the Plaintiff’s then solicitor is exhibited. It is clear from it that it is not intended to proceed further with the assessments pertaining to VAT. It is averred that no subsequent steps were taken.

(f) In respect of the issuance of a Revenue Warrant, the Plaintiff asserts that this was wrongfully issued. It is averred that a warrant issued from the Revenue Commissioners to the Dublin Sheriff and the latter then made a formal demand on or about the 24th May 2013. No further action was taken, according to the Affidavit and the Warrant was not enforced.

(g) There is reference in the Statement of Claim to an appeal and rejection thereof. The Affidavit states that while the Plaintiff expressed an intention to appeal the 2012 VAT assessments, no such appeal was brought. In addition, the First Named Defendant states that any decision relating to such appeal, had it been brought, would be appealable to the Appeals Commissioners and does not ground an application for damages such as is being pursued in the current case. Aside from this, it is averred that, again, the claim is in any event statute barred.

(h) There is a claim in the Statement of Claim based upon alleged “wrongful conviction and fines in the courts by DPP”. It would appear that the Plaintiff was prosecuted for late filing of income tax returns for the years 2005 to 2008. This prosecution was brought by the DPP and a fine was imposed by the District Court. The First Named Defendant avers that no cause of action such as is presently being brought is appropriate. The decision of the District Court could, potentially, be appealed and/or judicially reviewed but both are long since out of time and no extension of time was ever sought. It is averred that no cause of action arises in this regard as against the First Named Defendant and, in any event, would be long since statute barred;

(i) A claim is made that the then Chairman of the Revenue Commissioners failed to protect the rights (pursuant to the Constitution and human rights) of the Plaintiff.

The failure is alleged to have occurred in 2012. The named Chairman ceased to be such in 2015. It is averred that the claim is without particularisation, without foundation and discloses no bona fide cause of action. Abuse of process is asserted.

(j) It is claimed that pressure from the City Sheriff at the behest of the Revenue Commissioners (it is to be assumed from the issuance of the Warrant referenced above) caused the Plaintiff to lose his premises and livelihood. It is averred that such claim is statute barred, not particularised and without causal linkage between the alleged loss and the actions stated. It is averred that the claim is without foundation.

(k) There is a claim that the Plaintiff was maliciously targeted by two Revenue Officials. There is referenced to an incident at the Plaintiff’s then premises in Capel Street. The First Named Defendant avers that these allegations are false and baseless, without foundation and an abuse of process. The date of these alleged events, it is contended, makes any claim relating to them statute barred and, in addition, it is contended that the Plaintiff could not have suffered any damage as the VAT assessments relating to these events were withdrawn without enforcement, upon the filing of Income Tax returns by the Plaintiff for the relevant period;

(l) A claim relating to withholding of information in the period 2014 to 2019, it is averred, has not been particularised and is said to be without foundation. Reference is made to GDPR requests made by the Plaintiff in 2019 and 2022 both of which were responded to by the First Named Defendant;

(m) A number of claims relating to named individuals within the Revenue Commissioners are stated to be without foundation and/or disclosing no bona fide cause of action and/or an abuse of process and/or statute barred;

(n) The Plaintiff asserts that he was wrongly threatened with imprisonment by the Revenue Commissioners if he did not complete VAT and Income Tax returns from 2003 to 2010 and he asserts that this is so because he was de-registered during this time. It is common case that he was re-registered in or about 2011. The First Named Defendant contends that, in consequence, the Plaintiff was obliged to make the returns in question as he was trading and running a business throughout the period. It is averred that such threats were not made but that, upon his reregistration, the Plaintiff was obliged to make the returns referenced. He failed to do so and consequences ensued namely assessments and prosecution. When the returns were filed, it was evident that VAT liability did not arise due to insufficient trading and the assessments pertaining to VAT were withdrawn. In these circumstances, it is contended by the Deponent, Mr. Howley, that no wrong occurred and no cause of action arises;

(o) With reference to Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the last delivered Statement of Claim (received 25th February 2025), the Deponent avers that the reliefs sought in these paragraphs are against the Second Named Defendant (Minister for Justice) and the Fourth Named Defendant (Attorney General) and not the First Named Defendant.

I note that the proceedings were struck out as against these Defendants by Order of this Court (Twomey J.) of the 7th April 2025 as disclosing no reasonable cause of action as against the Second to Fourth Named Defendants or on the basis that the claim amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court and/or discloses no cause of action and/or is bound to fail, has no reasonable chance of succeeding and is unnecessary, misconceived in law and/or frivolous and/or vexatious;;

(p) The Affidavit of Mr. Howley proceeds to address the reliefs sought and avers to procedural defects and/or statute barring and/or lack of causal linkage between the asserted acts and the asserted damages;

(q) The Deponent concludes the grounding Affidavit averring that:

(i) The proceedings have no reasonable chance of success and are bound to fail;

(ii) The claims made are statute barred;

(iii) The claims made are procedurally defective;

(iv) The proceedings are an abuse of process;

(v) In consequence of the foregoing, significant court time and legal costs will be saved by a strike out at an early stage, as the Motion under consideration seeks.

7. There are a number of exhibits in the Affidavit of the First Named Defendant. The documents/files referenced in the Statement of Claim are requested in correspondence and there is a reply from the Plaintiff. There is a letter of the 17th August 2021 from the Plaintiff where he indicates that he is seeking repayment of the fines imposed by him in the District Court on the basis that he was re-registered for VAT and Income Tax in error. There is a response dated the 23rd August 2021 which states:

“I have reviewed the correspondence in this case and can confirm that the penalties you incurred related to the late filing in 2013 of your outstanding returns 2005-2010 inclusive.

Your subsequent de-registration for these tax heads was not retrospective and therefore it does not cover the years to which you refer.”

8. Correspondence (dating from 2019) relating to Data Subject Access Requests is also exhibited. There is a useful Note of Meeting of the 20th October 2022 detailing the background to the matters under consideration.

9. A replying Affidavit was sworn by the Plaintiff on the 1st October 2025. The Plaintiff correctly avers that he is entitled to the protection of Bunreacht nah Eireann. The Plaintiff correctly asserted his entitlement to have his human rights protected. He correctly avers that he is entitled to fair procedures. His Affidavit then sets out some very general averments, asserting failures on the part of the Revenue Commissioners in respect of these rights and entitlements. He avers that, in essence, his issues with the Revenue Commissioners commenced with an investigation by the then Chairman of the Revenue Commissioners in 2013 and concluded in April 2023 when the case was closed and that, in consequence, the matter is not statute barred. Letters are exhibited in this regard. As regards this correspondence, the 2013 letter does not reference the commencement of any investigation. It acknowledges receipt of correspondence from the Plaintiff and says that it is receiving attention and that the writer will “write to you again in due course.” The 2023 letter appears to relate to a complaint against officials of the Revenue Commissioners which was being considered under the Civil Service Disciplinary Code. The letter sets out that the complaint has been considered that a

decision not to commence an investigation has been made and that the matter (namely the complaint) is being closed. Clearly this is a matter entirely separate and distinct from the within proceedings. None of the reliefs being sought in the within proceedings could have been addressed in the context of a complaint under the Civil Service Disciplinary Code. This complaint and the consideration of it are not referenced in the Statement(s) of Claim herein save as regards a contention that persons were incorrectly stated to have retired. I do not know if this contention is correct or not.

10. The Affidavit sets out the background to the Plaintiff’s trading and taxation circumstances. He avers to having an active business which was tax compliant until 2003. He says that he was de-registered for Income Tax and VAT following a visit to his premises by two Revenue Officials in 2005. He says that this resulted from a blacklisting of his business by the Eastern Health Board (as it then was). He avers that a named Collector General tried to have the matter closed. He says that the Revenue Commissioners were aware of his de-registered status. He says that sequelae ensued thereafter which resulted in loss and damage to him, including erroneous criminal convictions and fines. He avers that his re-registration for VAT and Income Tax in

2011 was “in error”. He says that “multiple visits” to his business premises by the City Sheriff caused him to lose his premises and his livelihood. Importantly, the Plaintiff does not deny that he was trading in the period in respect of which the assessments were made and that he ultimately submitted returns in respect of this period.

11. A large number of documents are exhibited by Mr. Hickey. Correspondence indicates that in 1999, the Plaintiff’s business was under investigation by the Office of the Director of Consumer Affairs. It would appear that the Eastern Health Board, in consequence, directed some monitoring of purchases from the Plaintiff’s business under the Supplementary Welfare Allowance Scheme. The EHB, however, clearly indicated that it did not make directions as to the retail outlet from which recipients could make purchases. It appears (ref. letter from the Plaintiff’s then solicitor of the 27th November 2012) that thereafter (in or about 2005) the Plaintiff de-registered himself for VAT and Income Tax as a result of a loss of the HSE contract. On or about the 20th October 2011, the Plaintiff was re-registered for VAT and Income Tax, not at his instigation, but at the instigation of the Revenue Commissioners. Correspondence between the Revenue Commissioners and the Plaintiff dated that 21st October 2011 indicates that a Revenue investigation has commenced into the tax affairs of the Plaintiff. The correspondence references the “regularisation” of the Plaintiff’s tax affairs and seeks the submission of statutory returns. Importantly, this correspondence states: “Your continuing failure “to pay and file” all of the outstanding Statutory Returns will leave me with no alternative other than to raise Estimated Assessments for all relevant Duties and Tax …”.

12. This correspondence would appear to have occurred on the basis that the Plaintiff was trading (there would appear to have been a Revenue visit to the Plaintiff’s business premises). Returns were not filed for the period of de-registration and, in consequence, assessments were raised for this period upon re-registration. Assessments for VAT were acted upon in terms of enforcement but such enforcement steps were put on hold (in or about 2012) on the basis that returns were being filed and these indicated that the trading levels did not exceed the relevant threshold. These returns were considered and, in consequence thereof, the assessments were withdrawn. It would appear that there was a visit by officials to the Plaintiff’s business premises in or about 2012 in the context of enforcement (prior to its being put on hold). In the letter from the Plaintiff’s then solicitor it is stated, regarding communication with the Revenue Commissioners:

“We have to say we found this man very pleasant to deal with and very accommodating and we did speak with him about the “incident” in the shop also. We stressed to him that it appeared that the incident had been blown out of all proportion. Mr. O’Donnagain did not seem to have any axe to grind in relation to this.”

13. The District Court prosecution for failure to file returns would appear to have first been listed before that Court in or about July 2013. The Plaintiff has exhibited a number of Summonses for Witness which he issued at this time. These would appear to relate to a number of Revenue Officials. The Plaintiff was convicted on the 4th September 2013.

The VAT assessments were cancelled in or about February 2014. A printout in this regard has been furnished. It states: “T/p registered in error, cessation input and sect 22/23 assessments cancelled. Agreed with Maurice Priestley PO and Derek Lee AP.”

A handwritten note on this document as exhibited states that the Plaintiff only received this information in 2020. It is clear that a Warrant was lodged by the Revenue Commissioners with the Dublin City Sheriff in the first half of 2013 and a consequent letter was sent to the Plaintiff by the Sheriff on the 24th May 2013. This letter is in standard format. It makes reference to “seizure and sale without further notice” if sums claimed are not paid.

14. The Plaintiff exhibits a letter sent to the Revenue Commissioners dated the 15th February 2012 indicating that he wishes to appeal the assessment and that he has “forwarded same [the appeal] to the Appeal Commissioners”. This letter was responded to by the recipient of it on the 4th April 2012. It states that for an Appeal to be advanced, there are necessary steps to be taken and documents to be submitted.

Three such necessary steps are set out. The letter concludes: “I am not in a position to accept an Appeal until I received the details outlined above.” It would not appear that any further steps were taken to progress an Appeal.

15. By letter of the 13th March 2014, the Plaintiff’s then solicitor informed him that the Revenue Commissioners “have withdrawn the assessment which had been raised and this now end the Revenue claim against you in relation to VAT liability at this point in time.”.

16. The letter from the Revenue Commissioners confirming such withdrawal (dated the 26th February 2014) is exhibited by both parties.

SUBMISSIONS

17. The First Named Defendant references the jurisdiction to strike out contained in Order

19 rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC). Particular reference is made to Order 19 rule 23(3) and the entitlement of the Court to have regard to affidavit evidence in the context of such application and not only the pleadings.

“3) The Court may, in considering an application under sub-rule (1) or (2), have regard to the pleadings and, if appropriate, to evidence in any affidavit filed in support of, or in opposition to, the application.”

18. In relation to strike out for abuse of process, reference is made to the judgment of MacMenamin J. in Tracey v. Burton [2016] IESC 16. It is a jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly but is a sanction which cannot be ignored. Reference is also made to the judgment of McCracken J. in Fay v Tegral Pipes Ltd [2005] IESC 34 which sets out the rationale behind strike out for abuse of process. Access to the courts relates to “genuine disputes” and courts are not “a forum for lost causes”. Defendants must be protected from “the time consuming, expensive and worrying process of being asked to defend a claim which cannot succeed.” The test is whether there is a stateable case (Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd v. Purcell (Cregan J.) [2014] IEHC 525).

19. The First Named Defendant contends that the test is whether the Plaintiff has any reasonable chance of succeeding with his claim (Farley v. Ireland Supreme Court (Barron J.) 1 May 1997). In addition, the First Named Defendant contends that the Plaintiff is clearly statute barred as regards any personal injury claim (sections 2 and 3 of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991), any tortious claim (section 11(2)

of the Statute of Limitations 1957), any claim for repayment of income tax (section 865 Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997) and that, where there is no appeal against an assessment to tax, the assessment becomes final and conclusive (section 933 of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997). Such appeal must be to the Tax Appeal Commissioner. In Deighan v. Hearne [1990] 1 IR 499, Finlay CJ states:

“The court could not try an issue of fact arising from an assessment made in default of a return otherwise than through the appeal procedure provided in the income tax code.”

20. The Plaintiff in his submissions references the Revenue document of the 6th February 2014 and the fact that he did not receive this until September 2019 in the context of a data subject access request made by him to the Revenue Commissioners. This was the Revenue internal document confirming the withdrawal of the VAT assessment.

However, it is absolutely clear that the Plaintiff was aware of such withdrawal by virtue of the letter from the Revenue Commissioners to his then solicitors and the letter from his solicitors to him in February 2014 and March 2014 respectively. I cannot find that there was any detriment to the Plaintiff arising from his lack of knowledge of the internal Revenue Commissioners document mentioned above.

21. The Plaintiff referenced what he described as a “run in” with Revenue officials. This would appear to have occurred in or about 2011. He also referenced receipt of correspondence from the Sheriff concerning the Warrant. It is difficult to see the causal link between these events (which were undoubtedly difficult for Mr. Hickey) and the loss of his shop premises/business. The letter from Ms. Sweeney in 2023 would appear to relate to a process for the investigation of complaints against public servants in the exercise of their duties. This investigation was unrelated to the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiff in the within proceedings namely sequelae allegedly arising in consequence of assessed taxation liabilities in the context of a failure to file returns in accordance with law.

CONCLUSION

22. Striking out proceedings The authorities confirm that this is a jurisdiction to be exercised with caution, whether Order 19 rule 28 or the inherent jurisdiction is being invoked. As indicated by Clarke

J. in Moylist Construction Ltd v. Doheny [2016] IESC 9, this should only occur “when it is clear that there is no real risk of injustice in adopting that course of action.”

23. Pursuant to the amended Rule and in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, regard must be had to the facts as pleaded but there is also an entitlement to have regard to affidavit evidence adduced. However, in general, factual conflict cannot be resolved based on such affidavit evidence and where there is such conflict, it should be resolved in favour of the Plaintiff. In the present instance, there is little dispute between the parties as to the background factual circumstances to the Plaintiff’s allegations. The dispute is in relation to the alleged consequences as asserted by the Plaintiff and as to whether the factual circumstances together with the alleged consequences, taken at their height, cause Order 19 rule 28 to be engaged. In the present instance, the dictum of McCracken J. in Fay v Tegral Pipes Limited [2005] IESC 34 at paragraph 22 is most useful:

“In the present case, to a large extent, the facts themselves are not in issue;

what is in issue is the interpretation of those facts and the question of whether the facts can give rise to any cause of action. Indeed, if any facts are in issue, that is not a matter which can be determined on a motion of this nature, and the Court must assume that the facts as pleaded or deposed to on behalf of the Plaintiff are correct. However, the Court is entitled to examine the inferences which the Plaintiff seeks to draw from the facts in ascertaining whether those facts can give rise to any reasonable cause of action.”

24. Order 19 rule 28, as amended in 2023, was considered by Simons J. in Killeen v Higgins [2025] IEHC 582 where he stated:

“39. The amendment to Order 19, rule 28 has the practical effect of eroding the previous distinction between the jurisdiction to strike out and/or to dismiss proceedings pursuant to (i) Order 19 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and

(ii) the court’s inherent jurisdiction. In this way, the amendment effects a codification of prior case law where the limits of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to strike out were exposed. Nevertheless, the earlier case law continues to hold relevance. The Supreme Court had consistently stated—in its case law on inherent jurisdiction applications—that whatever might or might not be the merits of some form of summary disposal procedure, an application to dismiss proceedings as being bound to fail is not a means for inviting the court to resolve issues on a summary basis.

40. See, for example, Keohane v. Hynes [2014] IESC 66 (at paragraphs 6.5 and 6.6) as follows:

“[…] the underlying basis of the jurisdiction to dismiss as being bound to fail stems from the court’s inherent entitlement to prevent an abuse of process. Bringing a case which is bound to fail is an abuse of process.

If it is clear to a court that a case is bound to fail, then the court has jurisdiction to prevent that abuse of process by dismissing the proceedings. However, as again noted by Murray J. in Jodifern, whatever might or might not be the merits of some form of summary disposal procedure, an application to 16 dismiss as being bound to fail is not a means for inviting the court to resolve issues on a summary basis. It is for that reason that all of the jurisprudence emphasises that the jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised and only adopted when it is clear that the proceedings are bound to fail rather than where the plaintiff’s case is very weak or where it is sought to have an early determination on some point of fact or law. It is against that background that the extent of the court’s entitlement to look at the facts needs to be judged.”

41. The effect of the amendment introduced by the Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 19) 2023 (SI No. 456 of 2023) is to codify the existing jurisprudence. This is apparent from the language used under the amended rule: the phrases “bound to fail” and “no reasonable chance of succeeding” echo the language used in the previous case law to describe the limits of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

42. It seems to follow, by analogy with the pre-amendment case law, that the court hearing a strike out application may, to a limited extent, consider the underlying merits of the case. If it can be established that there is no credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as asserted, and that the proceedings are bound to fail on the merits, then the proceedings can be struck out pursuant to the amended rule.

43. An application to strike out proceedings will, almost by definition, have been brought at an early stage of the proceedings, at a time when the possibility of pursuing procedural mechanisms—such as the discovery of documents, interrogatories, and the power to subpoena witnesses—will not yet have been exhausted. The court hearing the strike out application must be confident that there is no credible basis for suggesting that it may, at trial, be possible for the plaintiff to establish the facts which are asserted in the pleadings, and which are 17 necessary for success in the proceedings. As emphasised in the earlier case law, experience has shown that cases which go to trial often take unusual turns on the facts which might not have been anticipated in advance. (See, by analogy, Lopes v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2014] IESC 21, [2014] 2 IR 301). It is not enough that the court might be satisfied that the case is a very weak one and is likely to be successfully defended. Rather, the court must be satisfied that the proceedings disclose no cause of action and/or are bound to fail.

44. A strike out application will not be appropriate where the issues of law raised are not straightforward. See Jeffrey v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence [2019] IESC 27, [2022] 2 IR 635 (at paragraph 40).

The Court continued to address the exercise of this jurisdiction in the context of statutory limitation periods:

“STRIKE OUT APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATION PERIODS

45. The question of whether proceedings are statute-barred is generally heard and determined as part of a unitary trial of the action. Occasionally, a defendant will seek to have the question of whether the proceedings are statutebarred determined in advance by way of the trial of a preliminary issue. The preliminary issue will be determined either by reference to an agreed statement of facts or by taking the plaintiff’s case at its height.

46. It is very unusual for a defendant to seek to have the question of whether proceedings are statute-barred determined by way of a strike out application.

This is because such an application requires a defendant to satisfy a much higher standard. As explained in the case law discussed above, the jurisdiction to strike out proceedings is one to be sparingly exercised and should only ever be adopted when it is clear that the proceedings are bound to fail rather than where the 18 plaintiff’s case is very weak or where it is sought to have an early determination on some point of fact or law. A strike out application is viewed through a very different lens than the trial of a preliminary issue: the court does not engage at a granular level with the question of whether the proceedings are statute-barred with a view to final determination on the merits one way or the other. Rather, the court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable chance of the plaintiff being able to answer the plea that the proceedings are statutebarred. The court must consider whether there is a reasonable possibility that evidence—whether oral or documentary—might be forthcoming which would support the plaintiff’s answer to the plea.”

25. There are four distinct bases for striking out proceedings provided for in Order 19 rule 28, which grounds significantly overlap with the inherent jurisdiction in this regard. In Meehan v. Ireland [2025] IECA 59, Allen J. states, at paragraph 60:

“60. Since the substitution of the new O. 19, r. 28 the jurisdiction to deal with a claim which is said to be an abuse of process is to be found in that rule. As Simons J. observed in O’Malley, the new rule reflects the pre-amendment jurisprudence. The new rule is expressed in terms of four alternatives. With the caveat – I suppose I should say – that the point was not argued, I see no difference between a claim which discloses no reasonable cause of action, or is bound to fail, or has no reasonable chance of succeeding. The foundation of the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss such claims in limine was the jurisdiction of the court to protect its process from abuse. That jurisdiction is now to be found in the new O. 19, rule 28. It is long and well established that it is an abuse of process to pursue a claim which is bound to fail; which a claim which discloses no reasonable cause of action is bound to do.”

26. The kernel of this application relates to striking out the proceedings on the basis of Order 19 rule 28 and/or the inherent jurisdiction, including having regard to the statutory limitation periods.

27. The causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff are set out in the Plenary Summons issued on the 28th September 2023. A range of tortious claims are listed, including a personal injuries claim. In this regard, the First Named Defendant references a failure to comply with section 12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act, 2003 as a ground for dismissal. I do not consider this to be fatal having regard to the provisions of section 4 of the 2003 Act as it defines “civil action” and also having regard to the decision of

O’Donnell J. (as he then was) in Clarke v O’Gorman [2014] IESC 721. The First Named Defendant also makes reference to the requirements of sections 10 and 14 and the Civil Liability and Courts Act, 2004 and alleges non-compliance. These statutory provisions, however, contain within them their own provisions in respect of noncompliance and a number of distinct approaches. I was not addressed in relation to these alternatives and therefore I will not determine this application on this basis.

28. The approach to be taken to applications such as the present are set out in the judgment of Clarke J. in Keohane v. Hynes [2014] IESC 66:

“6.7 I am in full agreement with the views expressed by Birmingham J. in Burke [v. Anglo Irish Bank Corporation plc & Anor [2011] IEHC 478]. Where there is evidence placed before the court on affidavit on behalf of a plaintiff which, if accepted at trial, might arguably lead to the plaintiff succeeding, then that is an end of the matter. But it does not necessarily follow that a plaintiff even has to put evidence of that type before the court. In Lopes, I observed at para 2.5:

‘In order to defeat a suggestion that a claim is bound to fail on the facts, all that a plaintiff needs to do is to put forward a credible basis for suggesting that it may, at trial, be possible to establish the facts which are asserted and which are necessary for success in the proceedings.

Any assessment of the credibility of such an assertion has to be made in the context of the undoubted fact, as pointed out by McCarthy J. in Sun Fat Chan (at p. 428), that experience has shown that cases which go to trial often take unusual turns on the facts which might not have been anticipated in advance.’ I commented to similar effect in Salthill Properties at para 3.15:

‘… it seems to me that I should assess the factual allegations …, not on the basis of whether those parties have shown that they have evidence which, if 19 accepted, would lead, arguably, to success in the proceedings but rather whether [the applicants] have established that it is impossible that any such evidence will be produced at trial.’

6.8 What the Court can analyse is whether a plaintiff's factual allegation amounts to no more than a mere assertion, for which no evidence or no credible basis for believing that there could be any evidence, is put forward. …

6.10 … [I]t is an abuse of process to maintain a claim based on a factual assertion in circumstances where there is no evidence available for that assertion and, importantly, where there is no reasonable basis for believing that evidence could become available at the trial to substantiate the relevant assertion. However, the bringing of a claim based on a factual assertion for which there is or may be evidence (even if the defendant can point to many reasons why it might be argued that a successful challenge could be mounted to the credibility of the evidence concerned) is not an abuse of process. It is for that reason that a court cannot properly engage with the credibility of evidence on a motion to dismiss as being bound to fail and it is for that reason that the very significant limitations which I have sought to identify exist in relation to the extent to which a court can properly engage with the facts on such an application.”

29. The first issue is whether – on the assumption that everything which the Plaintiff has alleged is true – his factual assertions disclose a cause of action against the First Named Defendant. The second issue is whether there is any reasonable basis for believing that evidence could become available to support those factual assertions.

30. The allegations of the Plaintiff, derived from the Statement of Claim and his Affidavit sworn in the context of this motion, are as follows:

The Plaintiff was deregistered for income tax and VAT some twenty years ago; his business having diminished due to external factors. However, he continued to trade.

In this context, the Revenue re-registered him for VAT and Income Tax and, returns not having been filed, an assessment was raised. Steps towards enforcement were advanced in respect of such assessment being the issuing of a Warrant which was sent by the Revenue to the Dublin City Sheriff for execution. Preliminary steps were taken in this regard by the Sheriff but execution did not occur in circumstances in which it would appear that the Plaintiff filed returns for the relevant period and, in consequence, it was established that he did not reach the threshold for VAT liability.

At this juncture, the assessment was not proceeded with and the Plaintiff, through his then solicitors, was so informed.

31. Additionally, the Plaintiff was prosecuted and convicted in relation to the failure to file returns. This prosecution occurred at the instigation of the DPP and was before the District Court. No appeal against conviction was pursued nor was any judicial review application brought concerning such criminal proceeding. It is important to state that this prosecution did not relate to the failure to pay the sums due and owing pursuant to the assessment. Rather it related to the failure to file returns which the District Court found to be proven and in respect of which fines were imposed.

32. The Plaintiff makes allegations of wrongdoing against a number of Revenue officials in the context of the foregoing circumstances.

33. The Plaintiff was trading in the period under consideration. Had he filed his Income Tax returns in accordance with law, no issue relating to VAT would have occurred as the threshold would have been known. He did not do so and steps occurred in consequence. Once he filed the returns as required, the liability was reviewed and the assessment was withdrawn. This occurred by letter of the 26th February 2014.

The Plaintiff was so informed by his then solicitors by letter of the 13th March 2014 and in consequence the entire matter was resolved by no later than mid-March 2014.

34. On these facts which are not in dispute between the parties, I conclude that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. Having regard to the vague, general and imprecise allegations of wrongdoing made by the Plaintiff against a variety of Revenue officials, if I am incorrect in the foregoing, having considered all of the documentation exhibited by the Plaintiff and his averments on Affidavit, I conclude that there is no reasonable basis for believing that evidence could become available to support those factual assertions.

35. In addition, while I accept that a strike out application is not usually an appropriate manner in which to deal with a claim that proceedings are statute barred (and in this regard I reference the dicta of Simons J. in Killeen, referenced above), it is clear from the authorities that strike out on this basis is sometimes justified (ref.:

Mulrooney v. Shee [2019] IEHC 822; LOC8 Code Limited v. Department of Environment, Climate Support and Communications and Ors. [2024] IECA 235).

36. The claims made herein are tortious claims, including a claim in respect of personal injuries. In respect of the tortious claims (excluding those in respect of personal injuries), the limitation period is six years. It is clear from the agreed facts that this period had long expired when the proceedings were issued in 2023. There are no particulars of personal injury therein. The only reference to personal injury is a list of alleged health ailments (high blood pressure, severe stress, panic attacks, distress, multiple visits to A + E with chest pain, anxiety attacks, hypertension, suicidal thoughts, hospitalised – heart stint fitted). There is a claim for €500,000 for injury to health. However, all of these issues relate to circumstances which had crystallised prior to March 2014 when the VAT assessments were withdrawn.

Having regard to the provisions of section 11 of the Statute of Limitations 1957 as amended and sections 2 and 3 of the 1991 Act, I conclude that it would be entirely unreasonable to determine that any tortious claim or any claim in respect of personal injuries had not long since become statute barred prior to the commencement of proceedings herein on the 28th September 2023.

37. Aside from issues of the Statute of Limitations as amended, I have concluded that these are proceedings which disclose no reasonable cause of action, have no reasonable chance of success and are bound to fail. The Plaintiff failed to submit income tax returns during a period when he was trading. He was prosecuted and convicted in respect of this default. Had he filed such returns, he would not only have avoided prosecution but, in addition, he would not have been subject to an assessment and his liabilities for income tax and/or VAT would have been evident.

Failing so to do, assessments were raised. These assessments were pursued by the Revenue Commissioners (as they are entitled to do) but were withdrawn when the returns were filed and these demonstrated that the relevant threshold had not been reached. The Plaintiff’s complaint seems to relate to interactions with Revenue personnel and with the Sheriff for the City of Dublin but these events occurred so many years in advance of the issuing of proceedings that it must be considered frivolous to bring the case and, in the words of Barron J. it would be:

“… a hardship on the defendant to have to take steps to defend something which cannot succeed and the law calls that vexatious.”

38. In these circumstances, I will grant the First Named Defendant the relief sought in Paragraph 1 of the Notice of Motion of the 21st July 2025.

39. The First Named Defendant having been successful in the relief being sought, he is presumptively entitled to an order for costs. If the Plaintiff would contend for any other costs order, I will allow him a period of fourteen days within which to file and serve a short-written submission – not exceeding 1,500 words – in which event the First Named Defendant will have fourteen days within which to file and serve his response with the same word limit.